{ "id": 4362288, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CHARLES FITZGERALD HARRIS", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Harris", "decision_date": "2012-04-03", "docket_number": "No. COA11-1031", "first_page": "590", "last_page": "598", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "219 N.C. App. 590" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "652 S.E.2d 71", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639755, 12639756, 12639757, 12639758, 12639759, 12639760, 12639761, 12639762, 12639763, 12639764, 12639765, 12639766, 12639767, 12639768, 12639769, 12639770, 12639771, 12639772 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "unpublished" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/652/0071-10", "/se2d/652/0071-01", "/se2d/652/0071-02", "/se2d/652/0071-03", "/se2d/652/0071-04", "/se2d/652/0071-05", "/se2d/652/0071-06", "/se2d/652/0071-07", "/se2d/652/0071-08", "/se2d/652/0071-09", "/se2d/652/0071-11", "/se2d/652/0071-01", "/se2d/652/0071-02", "/se2d/652/0071-03", "/se2d/652/0071-04", "/se2d/652/0071-05", "/se2d/652/0071-01", "/se2d/652/0071-02" ] }, { "cite": "661 S.E.2d 890", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12641224, 12641222, 12641223 ], "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/661/0890-03", "/se2d/661/0890-01", "/se2d/661/0890-02" ] }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 368", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12641530 ], "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/663/0433-02" ] }, { "cite": "656 S.E.2d 709", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640373 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "715" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/656/0709-01" ] }, { "cite": "663 S.E.2d 432", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12641528, 12641526, 12641527 ], "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/663/0432-03", "/se2d/663/0432-01", "/se2d/663/0432-02" ] }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 367", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12641220, 12641526, 12641527, 12641528, 12641594 ], "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/661/0889-01", "/se2d/663/0432-01", "/se2d/663/0432-02", "/se2d/663/0432-03", "/se2d/664/0315-03" ] }, { "cite": "654 S.E.2d 28", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640031 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "31", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Gregory, 223 N.C. 415, 418, 27 S.E.2d 140, 142 (1943)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/654/0028-01" ] }, { "cite": "531 U.S. 1018", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9679042, 9678662, 9678761, 9678795, 9678864, 9678834, 9678739, 9678962, 9678903, 9678645, 9678999, 9678940, 9678686, 9678719 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/531/1018-14", "/us/531/1018-02", "/us/531/1018-06", "/us/531/1018-07", "/us/531/1018-09", "/us/531/1018-08", "/us/531/1018-05", "/us/531/1018-12", "/us/531/1018-10", "/us/531/1018-01", "/us/531/1018-13", "/us/531/1018-11", "/us/531/1018-03", "/us/531/1018-04" ] }, { "cite": "636 S.E.2d 277", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636994 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "280" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/636/0277-01" ] }, { "cite": "492 S.E.2d 37", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 N.C. 141", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 551140, 551241, 551058, 551257, 551261 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/347/0141-04", "/nc/347/0141-03", "/nc/347/0141-05", "/nc/347/0141-02", "/nc/347/0141-01" ] }, { "cite": "485 S.E.2d 337", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "339" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "126 N.C. App. 393", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11710933 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "396" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/126/0393-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 S.E.2d 677", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "680", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "280 N.C. 273", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571097 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "276", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/280/0273-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-7.5", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "721 S.E.2d 673", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "678", "parenthetical": "citing N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-7.5" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 14-202", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(d)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 14-27.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(4)" }, { "page": "(5)", "parenthetical": "defining sexually violent offenses so as to include offenses set forth in Article 7A of Chapter 14 of the North Carolina General Statutes and certain other offenses, such as incest and taking indecent liberties with a student" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.7", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "108 S.E. 756", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "weight": 2, "year": 1921, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "758" }, { "page": "758" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "182 N.C. 793", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8658869 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1921, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "798" }, { "page": "798" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/182/0793-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 N.C. App. 681", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "unpublished" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 S.E.2d 15", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 557", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4693913, 4704150, 4701941, 4693702 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0557-04", "/nc/316/0557-02", "/nc/316/0557-03", "/nc/316/0557-01" ] }, { "cite": "336 S.E.2d 861", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "862", "parenthetical": "holding that the fact that a statutory term was misspelled in an indictment did not render that charging instrument fatally defective" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 N.C. App. 199", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520316 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "201-02", "parenthetical": "holding that the fact that a statutory term was misspelled in an indictment did not render that charging instrument fatally defective" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/78/0199-01" ] }, { "cite": "71 S.E. 326", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1911, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "327", "parenthetical": "quoting Howard C. Joyce, Treatise on the Law Governing Indictments \u00a7\u00a7 201 & 202, at 215-19 (1st ed. 1908)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "155 N.C. 466", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8652682 ], "year": 1911, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "470", "parenthetical": "quoting Howard C. Joyce, Treatise on the Law Governing Indictments \u00a7\u00a7 201 & 202, at 215-19 (1st ed. 1908)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/155/0466-01" ] }, { "cite": "146 S.E.2d 418", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "420" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "266 N.C. 528", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561409 ], "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "531" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/266/0528-01" ] }, { "cite": "188 N.C. App. 744", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4155277 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "752" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/188/0744-01" ] }, { "cite": "27 S.E.2d 140", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1943, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "142" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "223 N.C. 415", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8610537 ], "year": 1943, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "418" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/223/0415-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 N.C. App. 718", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8375867 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "722", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Gregory, 223 N.C. 415, 418, 27 S.E.2d 140, 142 (1943)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/187/0718-01" ] }, { "cite": "683 S.E.2d 215", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 586", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "675 S.E.2d 406", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "409" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "196 N.C. App. 650", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4166258 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "652" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/196/0650-01" ] }, { "cite": "148 L. Ed. 2d 498", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "121 S. Ct. 581", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "528 S.E.2d 326", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "341" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 481", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155877 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "503" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0481-01" ] }, { "cite": "148 S.E.2d 15", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "17-18" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "267 N.C. 212", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558861 ], "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "215" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/267/0212-01" ] }, { "cite": "423 S.E.2d 496", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "497", "parenthetical": "quoting McClure v. State, 267 N.C. 212, 215, 148 S.E.2d 15, 17-18 (1966)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "108 N.C. App. 330", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524137 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "332", "parenthetical": "quoting McClure v. State, 267 N.C. 212, 215, 148 S.E.2d 15, 17-18 (1966)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/108/0330-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 S.E.2d 917", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1953, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "920" }, { "page": "920" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "238 N.C. 325", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8607564 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1953, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "328" }, { "page": "328" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/238/0325-01" ] }, { "cite": "180 N.C. App. 151", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8239959 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "153" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/180/0151-01" ] }, { "cite": "459 S.E.2d 510", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "512", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "341 N.C. 173", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 793125 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/341/0173-01" ] }, { "cite": "103 S.E.2d 861", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1958, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "864" }, { "page": "864" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "248 N.C. 447", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8624346 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1958, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "451" }, { "page": "451" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/248/0447-01" ] }, { "cite": "714 S.E.2d 201", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "206", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Courtney, 248 N.C. 447, 451, 103 S.E.2d 861, 864 (1958)" }, { "page": "206" }, { "page": "206" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.18", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 18, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 878, "char_count": 21543, "ocr_confidence": 0.749, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.5149616656468377e-07, "percentile": 0.6682320088931826 }, "sha256": "cb85674ac998f8f940078818fa94ba5c757566cd64b7acbefe26fc16801f66f5", "simhash": "1:fb4b66e5523f0ef7", "word_count": 3507 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:16:59.313771+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "JUDGES BRYANT AND ELMORE concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CHARLES FITZGERALD HARRIS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ERVIN, Judge.\nDefendant Charles Fitzgerald Harris appeals from a judgment sentencing him to 88 to 115 months imprisonment based upon his convictions for having been a sex offender unlawfully on the premises of a place intended primarily for the use, care, or supervision of minors in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.18 and having attained the status of an habitual felon. On appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this case because the indictment lodged against him failed to allege all the essential elements of the offense defined in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.18. After careful consideration of Defendant\u2019s challenge to the trial court\u2019s judgment in light of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that the trial court\u2019s judgment should be vacated.\nI. Factual Background\nA. Substantive Facts\nOn the morning of 14 January 2010, Officers Darryl Norton and Brett Hock of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department responded to a suspicious vehicle call at an elementary school located in Charlotte. According to the caller, a black male was asleep in a vehicle parked in the school parking lot.\nAfter their arrival at the school, the officers observed a vehicle matching that described by the caller in the location which the caller had specified. Upon approaching the vehicle, the officers found Defendant asleep in the driver\u2019s seat. At that point, Officer Norton knocked on the vehicle\u2019s window, woke Defendant, and asked for identification, which Defendant provided.\nWhile Officer Hock ran a records check on Defendant, Officer Norton talked to him. Defendant told Officer Norton that he was at the school for the purpose of picking up his girlfriend, who worked there. After the records check revealed that Defendant was a registered sex offender, Defendant was handcuffed and placed in the back of a patrol car while the officers attempted to obtain more information about the parameters associated with Defendant\u2019s sex offender registration status.\nAfter making appropriate inquiries, Officer Norton learned that Defendant was required to have obtained written permission from the principal or the principal\u2019s agent before coming onto school grounds. Although Officer Norton was able to verily that Defendant\u2019s girlfriend worked at the school, the school\u2019s principal stated that he did not know Defendant and that Defendant did not have permission to be on school grounds. As a result, the officers placed Defendant under arrest.\nB. Procedural History\nOn 6 July 2010 and 23 August 2010, the Mecklenburg County grand jury returned bills of indictment charging Defendant with being a sex offender unlawfully on premises primarily intended for the use, care, or supervision of minors in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.18 and having attained the status of an habitual felon. The charges against Defendant came on for trial before the trial court and a jury at the 16 May 2011 criminal session of Mecklenburg County Superior Court. At trial, the State and Defendant stipulated that Defendant was required to register as a sex offender as the result of prior convictions for attempted second degree rape and sexual battery. On 17 May 2011, the jury returned a verdict convicting Defendant of having violated N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.18. After the return of the jury\u2019s verdict, Defendant pled guilty to having attained habitual felon status. Based upon the jury\u2019s verdict and Defendant\u2019s guilty plea, the trial court entered a judgment sentencing Defendant to 88 to 115 months imprisonment. Defendant noted an appeal to this Court from the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nII. Legal Analysis\nIn his sole challenge to the trial court\u2019s judgment, Defendant contends that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this case because the indictment purporting to charge him with violating N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.18 failed to allege all the essential elements of the offense defined in that statutory provision. More specifically, Defendant contends that the indictment failed to (1) \u201cclearly and lucidly set forth that [Defendant] was on the premises of the school[;]\u201d (2) \u201callege [that Defendant] was \u2018knowingly\u2019 on the premises of the school[;]\u201d or (3) \u201callege [that Defendant] had been convicted of an offense under Article 7A of Chapter 14 of the North Carolina General Statutes or an offense involving a minor child.\u201d We conclude that at least a portion of Defendant\u2019s argument has merit.\nAccording to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-924(a)(5) an indictment must contain:\nA plain and concise factual statement in each count which, without allegations of an evidentiary nature, asserts facts supporting every element of a criminal offense and the defendant\u2019s commission thereof with sufficient precision clearly to apprise the defendant or defendants of the conduct which is the subject of the accusation.\n\u201cAs a \u2018[prerequisite to its validity, an indictment must allege every essential element of the criminal offense it purports to charge,\u2019 \u201d State v. Billinger, _ N.C. App. _, _, 714 S.E.2d 201, 206 (2011) (quoting State v. Courtney, 248 N.C. 447, 451, 103 S.E.2d 861, 864 (1958)), although it \u201cneed only allege the ultimate facts constituting each element of the criminal offense.\u201d State v. Rambert, 341 N.C. 173, 176 459 S.E.2d 510, 512 (1995) (citation omitted). \u201cOur courts have recognized that[,] while an indictment should give a defendant sufficient notice of the charges against him, it should not be subjected to hyper technical scrutiny with respect to form.\u201d In re S.R.S., 180 N.C. App. 151, 153, 636 S.E.2d 277, 280 (2006). \u201cThe general rule in this State and elsewhere is that an indictment for a statutory offense is sufficient, if the offense is charged in the words of the statute, either literally or substantially, or in equivalent words.\u201d State v. Greer, 238 N.C. 325, 328, 77 S.E.2d 917, 920 (1953).\n\u201cNorth Carolina law has long provided that \u2018[t]here can be no trial, conviction, or punishment for a crime without a formal and sufficient accusation. In the absence of an accusation the court acquires no jurisdiction whatever, and if it assumes jurisdiction a trial and conviction are a nullity.\u2019 \u201d State v. Neville, 108 N.C. App. 330, 332, 423 S.E.2d 496, 497 (1992) (quoting McClure v. State, 267 N.C. 212, 215, 148 S.E.2d 15, 17-18 (1966)). \u201c[Wjhere an indictment is alleged to be invalid on its face, thereby depriving the trial court of [subject matter] jurisdiction, a challenge to that indictment may be made at any time, even if it was not contested in the trial court.\u201d State v. Wallace, 351 N.C. 481, 503, 528 S.E.2d 326, 341, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1018, 121 S. Ct. 581, 148 L. Ed. 2d 498 (2000). This Court \u201creview[s] the sufficiency of an indictment de novo.\u201d State v. McKoy, 196 N.C. App. 650, 652, 675 S.E.2d 406, 409, appeal dismissed and disc. review denied, 363 N.C. 586, 683 S.E.2d 215 (2009). \u201cAn arrest of judgment is proper when the indictment \u2018wholly fails to charge some offense cognizable at law or fails to state some essential and necessary element of the offense of which the defendant is found guilty.\u2019 \u201d State v. Kelso, 187 N.C. App. 718, 722, 654 S.E.2d 28, 31 (2007) (quoting State v. Gregory, 223 N.C. 415, 418, 27 S.E.2d 140, 142 (1943)), disc. review denied, 362 N.C. 367, 663 S.E.2d 432 (2008). \u201c \u2018The legal effect of arresting the judgment is to vacate the verdict and sentence of imprisonment below, and the State, if it is so advised, may proceed against the defendant upon a sufficient bill of indictment.\u2019 \u201d State v. Marshall, 188 N.C. App. 744, 752, 656 S.E.2d 709, 715 (quoting State v. Fowler, 266 N.C. 528, 531, 146 S.E.2d 418, 420 (1966)), disc. review denied, 362 N.C. 368, 661 S.E.2d 890 (2008).\nThe indictment by means of which the grand jury attempted to charge Defendant with violating N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.18 alleged, in pertinent part, that:\nTHE JURORS FOR THE STATE UPON THEIR OATH PRESENT that on or about the 14th day of January, 2010, in Mecklenburg County, Charles Fitzgerald Harris did unlawfully, willfully and feloniously on the premises of Winget Park Elementary School, located at . . . Charlotte, North Carolina. A place intended primarily for the use, care, or supervision of minors and defendant is a registered sex offender.\n(emphasis added). According to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.18:\n(a) It shall be unlawful for any person required to register under this Article, if the offense requiring registration is described in subsection (c) of this section, to knowingly be at any of the following locations:\n(1) On the premises of any place intended primarily for the use, care, or supervision of minors, including, but not limited to, schools, children\u2019s museums, child care centers, nurseries, and playgrounds.\n(c) Subsection (a) of this section is applicable only to persons required to register under this Article who have committed any of the following offenses:\n(1) Any offense in Article 7A of this Chapter.\n(2) Any offense where the victim of the offense was under the age of 16 years at the time of the offense.\nAs a result, the essential elements of the offense defined in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.18(a) are that the defendant was (1) knowingly on the premises of any place intended primarily for the use, care, or supervision of minors and (2) at a time when he or she was required by North Carolina law to register as a sex offender based upon a conviction for committing an offense enumerated in Article 7A of Chapter 14 of the North Carolina General Statutes or an offense involving a victim who was under the age of 16 at the time of the offense. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.18.\nA. Omission of \u201cGo\u201d or \u201cWent\u201d\nFirst, Defendant contends that the indictment failed to \u201cclearly and lucidly\u201d allege that Defendant went onto the premises of the school. Defendant\u2019s argument hinges on the fact that the language contained in the indictment to the effect that Defendant \u201cdid unlawfully, willfully and feloniously on the premises of Winget Park Elementary School\u201d omitted any affirmative assertion that Defendant actually went on the school\u2019s premises. We do not find this argument persuasive.\nAlthough \u201c \u2018an indictment may be couched in ungrammatical language, this will not, of itself, render the indictment insufficient, provided the intention and meaning of the pleader is clearly apparent,\u2019 \u201d since \u201c \u2018[i]t is the general rule that an indictment is not vitiated by mistakes which are merely clerical, where they do not destroy the sense of the indictment, and the meaning is apparent.\u2019 \u201d State v. Hawkins, 155 N.C. 466, 470, 71 S.E. 326, 327 (1911) (quoting Howard C. Joyce, Treatise on the Law Governing Indictments \u00a7\u00a7 201 & 202, at 215-19 (1st ed. 1908)) (holding that an indictment alleging that the defendant \u201cunlawfully, willfully and feloniously break and enter\u201d with the intent to commit larceny was not fatally defective based upon the omission of the word \u201cdid\u201d). A cursory analysis of the language in which the challenged indictment is couched clearly indicates that Defendant was being charged with having been \u201con the premises\u201d of the school. The absence of words such as \u201cgo\u201d or \u201cwent,\u201d while less than optimal, does not render the indictment unclear. As a result, given that the challenged language, taken in context, sufficiently apprised Defendant that he was alleged to have entered the grounds of a school, see State v. Thrift, 78 N.C. App. 199, 201-02, 336 S.E.2d 861, 862 (1985) (holding that the fact that a statutory term was misspelled in an indictment did not render that charging instrument fatally defective), appeal dismissed and disc. review denied, 316 N.C. 557, 344 S.E.2d 15 (1986), this component of Defendant\u2019s challenge to the indictment lacks merit.\nB. Omission of \u201cKnowingly\u201d\nSecondly, Defendant argues that the fact that the indictment failed to allege that he \u201cknowingly\u201d entered the school grounds rendered the indictment fatally defective. We do not find this contention persuasive either.\n\u201cOur Supreme Court has held that \u2018[t]he term willfully implies that the act is done knowingly ....\u2019\u201d State v. Memminger, 186 N.C. App. 681, 652 S.E.2d 71, 2007 N.C. App. LEXIS 2234, *6 (2007) (unpublished) (quoting State v. Falkner, 182 N.C. 793, 798, 108 S.E. 756, 758 (1921)) (holding that the absence of the term \u201cknowingly\u201d from an indictment which stated that the defendant \u201c \u2018did ... willfully.. . possess [cocaine] with intent to sell or deliver . . .\u2019 \u201d did not render the indictment invalid given that the allegations in the indictment sufficiently tracked the applicable statutory language and given that the allegation that the defendant acted \u201cwillfully\u201d implied that knowing conduct had occurred). As we have already noted, the indictment returned against Defendant alleged that he was \u201cunlawfully, willfully and feloniously on the premises\u201d of the school. Although the indictment did not explicitly track the relevant statutory language by alleging that Defendant was \u201cknowingly\u201d on the school\u2019s premises, the fact that the indictment stated that Defendant acted \u201cwillfully,\u201d sufficed to allege the requisite \u201cknowing\u201d conduct. Falkner, 182 N.C. at 798, 108 S.E. at 758. As a result, we conclude that this aspect of Defendant\u2019s challenge to the indictment attempting to charge him with violating N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.18 lacks merit.\nC. Omission of Allegations Concerning Prior Convictions\nFinally, Defendant contends that the indictment failed to allege that he had been convicted of an offense enumerated in Article 7A of Chapter 14 of the North Carolina General Statutes or an offense involving a victim who was under 16 years of age at the time of the offense as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.18(a). This aspect of Defendant\u2019s argument has merit.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.7 provides that \u201c[a] person who is a State resident and who has a reportable conviction shall be required to maintain registration with the sheriff of the county where the person resides.\u201d A \u201creportable conviction\u201d is defined as:\na. A final conviction for an offense against a minor, a sexually violent offense, or an attempt to commit any of those offenses unless the conviction is for aiding and abetting. A final conviction for aiding and abetting is a reportable conviction only if the court sentencing the individual finds that the registration of that individual under this Article furthers the purposes of this Article as stated in [N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7] 14-208.5.\nb. A final conviction in another state of an offense, which if committed in this State, is substantially similar to an offense against a minor or a sexually violent offense as defined by this section, or a final conviction in another state of an offense that requires registration under the sex offender registration statutes of that state.\nc. A final conviction in a federal jurisdiction (including a court martial) of an offense, which is substantially similar to an offense against a minor or a sexually violent offense as defined by this section.\nd. A final conviction for a violation of [N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7] 14-202(d), (e), (f), (g), or (h), or a second or subsequent conviction for a violation of [N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7] 14-202(a), (al), or (c), only if the court sentencing the individual issues an order pursuant to [N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7] 14-202(1) requiring the individual to register.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(4). The offenses punishable by virtue of Article 7A of Chapter 14 of the North Carolina General Statutes include first degree rape, rape of a child, second degree rape, first degree sexual offense, sexual offense with a child, second degree sexual offense, sexual battery, intercourse and sexual offenses with certain victims, and statutory rape. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 14-27.1-.10. As a result, a number of convictions that result in the imposition of a registration requirement pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-208.7, including certain forms of secret peeping, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 14-202(d)-(h), and sexually violent offenses, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(5) (defining sexually violent offenses so as to include offenses set forth in Article 7A of Chapter 14 of the North Carolina General Statutes and certain other offenses, such as incest and taking indecent liberties with a student), do not constitute offenses which are listed in Article 7A of Chapter 14 of the North Carolina General Statutes or involve a victim under the age of 16. For that reason, the simple fact that an individual required to register as a sex offender enters the premises of any place intended primarily for the use, care, or supervision of minors does not inevitably mean that a violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.18 has occurred.\nThe indictment in which the grand jury attempted to charge Defendant with violating N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.18 simply alleged that Defendant was a \u201cregistered sex offender.\u201d In view of the fact that certain individuals are required to register as sex offenders despite the fact that they did not commit an offense that is listed in Article 7A of Chapter 14 or involved a victim under the age of 16, an allegation that Defendant was a \u201cregistered sex offender\u201d does not suffice to allege all of the elements of the criminal offense enumerated in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.18. Greer, 238 N.C. at 328, 77 S.E.2d at 920. Thus, we are compelled to conclude that the indictment returned against Defendant fails to \u201c \u2018allege every essential element of the criminal offense it purports to charge,\u2019 \u201d Billinger, _ N.C. App. at _, 714 S.E.2d at 206 (quoting Courtney, 248 N.C. at 451, 103 S.E.2d at 864), thereby depriving the trial court of jurisdiction to enter judgment against Defendant for his alleged violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.18(a). In view of the fact that we are required to \u201cvacate [Defendant\u2019s underlying felony conviction, we [must] also vacate [Defendant's judgment sentencing [D]efendant as a[n] habitual felon.\u201d State v. Fox, _ N.C. App. _, _, 721 S.E.2d 673, 678 (2011) (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-7.5).\nIn seeking to persuade us to reach a contrary result, the State contends that the \u201cspecific offense committed would be mere sur-plusage\u201d and that the allegation that Defendant\u2019s conduct was \u201cunlawful\u201d gave him ample notice that his status as a registered sex offender precluded him from entering the premises of the school in question. However, according to well-established North Carolina law, only those allegations which are \u201cbeyond the essential elements of the crime sought to be charged are irrelevant and may be treated as sur-plusage.\u201d State v. Taylor, 280 N.C. 273, 276, 185 S.E.2d 677, 680 (1972) (emphasis added). An allegation that the underlying offense requiring sex offender registration was an offense listed in Article 7A of Chapter 14 of the North Carolina General Statutes or involved a victim under the age of 16 is an essential element for purposes of the offense set out in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.18(a) and cannot, for that reason, be treated as mere surplusage. In addition, we do not believe an allegation that Defendant\u2019s conduct was \u201cunlawful\u201d satisfies the requirement that the indictment allege every essential element of an offense under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.18(a). Billinger, _ N.C. App. at _, 714 S.E.2d at 206. Alleging that Defendant was a \u201cregistered sex offender\u201d and that his conduct was \u201cunlawful\u201d does not, standing alone, provide any notice of the nature of Defendant\u2019s allegedly unlawful conduct or the reason that his alleged conduct was unlawful. As a result, we conclude that neither of the State\u2019s justifications for upholding the challenged \u201cprior offense\u201d allegation have merit.\nIII. Conclusion\nThus, for the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the indictment returned against Defendant for the purpose of charging him with violating N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.18 was insufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction upon the trial court. As a result, the trial court\u2019s judgment should be, and hereby is, arrested and Defendant\u2019s convictions are vacated without prejudice to the State\u2019s right to attempt to prosecute Defendant based upon a valid indictment.\nVACATED.\nJUDGES BRYANT AND ELMORE concur.\n. Although we recognize that our decision in Memminger has no precedential effect, United Services Automobile Ass\u2019n v. Simpson, 126 N.C. App. 393, 396, 485 S.E.2d 337, 339, disc, review denied, 347 N.C. 141,492 S.E.2d 37 (1997), we find its reasoning persuasive.", "type": "majority", "author": "ERVIN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Catherine F. Jordan, for the State.", "Thomas, Ferguson & Mullins LLP, by James H. Monroe, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CHARLES FITZGERALD HARRIS\nNo. COA11-1031\n(Filed 3 April 2012)\nSexual Offenders\u2014unlawfully on premises of place intended primarily the use, care, or supervision of minors\u2014indictment fatally defective\u2014no subject matter jurisdiction\nThe trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over a case in which defendant was charged with having been a sex offender unlawfully on the premises of a place intended primarily for the use, care, or supervision of minors. The indictment failed to allege that defendant had been convicted of an offense enumerated in Article 7A of Chapter 14 of the North Carolina General Statutes or an offense involving a victim who was under 16 years of age at the time of the offense as required by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-208.18(a).\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 17 May 2011 by Judge H. William Constangy in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 8 February 2012.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Catherine F. Jordan, for the State.\nThomas, Ferguson & Mullins LLP, by James H. Monroe, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0590-01", "first_page_order": 600, "last_page_order": 608 }