{
  "id": 4356168,
  "name": "COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS, INC., Plaintiff v. JUDY C. REED, TROY D. REED, JUDY C. REED, EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF MARGARET D. SMITH, AND COUNTRYWIDE TITLE CORPORATION, TRUSTEE, Defendants",
  "name_abbreviation": "Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. Reed",
  "decision_date": "2012-05-15",
  "docket_number": "No. COA11-769",
  "first_page": "504",
  "last_page": "511",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "220 N.C. App. 504"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
    "id": 14983,
    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "637 S.E.2d 528",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "case_ids": [
        12637287
      ],
      "year": 2006,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "530",
          "parenthetical": "citation omitted"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/se2d/637/0528-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "Wis. Stat. \u00a7 700.24",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "Wis. Stat.",
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 2011,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "S.C. Code Ann. \u00a7 27-7-40",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "S.C. Code Ann.",
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 2011,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "(a)(iii)"
        },
        {
          "page": "(a)(iii)",
          "parenthetical": "providing, \"[t]he fee interest in real estate held in joint tenancy may not be encumbered by a joint tenant acting alone without the joinder of the other joint tenant or tenants in the encumbrance\""
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 53-244.010",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "2009 N.C. Sess. Laws 374",
      "category": "laws:leg_session",
      "reporter": "N.C. Sess. Laws",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 53-243.11",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "431 S.E.2d 225",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1993,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "226-27",
          "parenthetical": "citations omitted"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "110 N.C. App. 776",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        8526459
      ],
      "year": 1993,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "778",
          "parenthetical": "citations omitted"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/110/0776-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "105 S.E.2d 62",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1958,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "64",
          "parenthetical": "quotation omitted"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "248 N.C. 691",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8625697
      ],
      "year": 1958,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "693",
          "parenthetical": "quotation omitted"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/248/0691-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 41-2",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.",
      "weight": 7,
      "year": 2011,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "(a)"
        },
        {
          "parenthetical": "emphasis added"
        },
        {
          "page": "(b)"
        },
        {
          "page": "(b)"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "500 S.E.2d 82",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1998,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "347 N.C. 577",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        551084,
        551341,
        551219,
        551285,
        551099
      ],
      "year": 1998,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/347/0577-02",
        "/nc/347/0577-05",
        "/nc/347/0577-01",
        "/nc/347/0577-04",
        "/nc/347/0577-03"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "491 S.E.2d 656",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1997,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "657"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "127 N.C. App. 442",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        11797328
      ],
      "year": 1997,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "444"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/127/0442-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "530 S.E.2d 829",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 2000,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "835",
          "parenthetical": "citations omitted"
        },
        {
          "parenthetical": "citation omitted"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "352 N.C. 77",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        684915
      ],
      "year": 2000,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "83",
          "parenthetical": "citations omitted"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/352/0077-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "361 N.C. 85",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        3744780
      ],
      "year": 2006,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "88",
          "parenthetical": "citation omitted"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/361/0085-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "407 S.E.2d 819",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1991,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "826"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "329 N.C. 727",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        2553418
      ],
      "year": 1991,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/329/0727-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 53-243",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.",
      "weight": 2,
      "opinion_index": 0
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 721,
    "char_count": 17723,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.748,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 5.3228843983221193e-08,
      "percentile": 0.33548635460986337
    },
    "sha256": "b3e13bf4751a5a11f2720cb1805cfa22b8859b70214fc6fa4f9d820667f093a3",
    "simhash": "1:4f39e5b86434ecd9",
    "word_count": 3000
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:35:53.925153+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges ERVIN and BEASLEY concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS, INC., Plaintiff v. JUDY C. REED, TROY D. REED, JUDY C. REED, EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF MARGARET D. SMITH, AND COUNTRYWIDE TITLE CORPORATION, TRUSTEE, Defendants"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "THIGPEN, Judge.\nTroy and Judy Reed (\u201cDefendants\u201d) and Co\u00fantrywide Home Loans, Inc., (\u201cPlaintiff\u201d) appeal the trial court\u2019s order granting Plaintiff\u2019s motion for summary judgment, in part, and denying Defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment. After careful review, we conclude that Plaintiff\u2019s appeal is not properly before this Court; therefore, we dismiss Plaintiff\u2019s appeal. As to the remaining issues, we affirm the trial court\u2019s order, in part, and reverse, in part.\nThe record tends to show the following: On 25 March 2001, Margaret D. Smith (\u201cMrs. Smith\u201d) and Mrs. Smith\u2019s daughter and son-in-law, Judy and Troy Reed (\u201cDefendants\u201d), executed an offer to purchase and contract to buy a home in Mooresville, North Carolina. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., (\u201cPlaintiff\u2019) agreed to finance the purchase of the home and provided a loan to Mrs. Smith in the amount of $117,900.00. The general warranty deed named the grantees as \u201cMargaret D. Smith and Troy D. Reed and wife, Judy C. Reed Joint Tenants with rights of survivorship[.]\u201d The deed of trust to secure Plaintiff\u2019s loan and promissory note was prepared in Mrs. Smith\u2019s name only and was executed by Mrs. Reed, as attorney in fact for Mrs. Smith, on 1 May 2001. Neither Mr. Reed nor Mrs. Reed signed the deed of trust or promissory note in his or her individual capacity.\nDefendants lived together in the home with Mrs. Smith and cared for Mrs. Smith, such that Mrs. Smith was not required to go to a nursing home.\nOn 19 October 2001, the loan went into default and foreclosure proceedings were commenced.\nOn 7 February 2004, Mrs. Smith passed away. After Mrs. Smith\u2019s death, Defendants began corresponding with Plaintiff regarding a modification of the loan, such that the loan would be in Defendants\u2019 name. Plaintiff drafted a loan modification agreement on 25 June 2004 and sent the agreement to Defendants. The agreement purportedly \u201camend[ed] and supplemented] (1) the Mortgage, Deed of Trust, or Deed to Secure Debt (the \u2018Security Instrument\u2019).\u201d Defendants signed the agreement on 6 July 2004.\nDefendants made payments on the loan to Plaintiff for a short period of time, until approximately August or September 2004. Defendants did not make any additional payments after 2004, and Plaintiff made demand for the payments. On 16 November 2004, Plaintiff notified Defendants that the loan was in default for nonpayment, and Plaintiff gave Defendants the opportunity to cure the default by paying or seeking a loan modification.\nIn 2006, Defendants requested that they be considered for a further loan modification. However, this modification was denied because Mr. Reed failed to provide proof of income as required.\nOn 22 January 2009, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants praying that the court order reformation of the deed of trust to reflect the intent of the parties by making Defendants obligors.\nOn 16 April 2009, Defendants filed an answer and counterclaims alleging negligent misrepresentation and a violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 53-243.il. Defendants claimed they were entitled to injunctive relief.\nOn 24 January 2011, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, stating that there was no genuine issue of material fact and that Plaintiff was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on both Plaintiff\u2019s claim and Defendants\u2019 counterclaims.\nLikewise, on 17 February 2011, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment alleging there was no genuine issue of material fact and that they were entitled to judgment in their favor as a matter of law for the following reasons: (1) The reformation of instruments is governed by a three year statute of limitations, and because the date of closing on the loan in this case was 1 May 2001, the statute of limitations was tolled before Plaintiff sought reformation of the Deed of Trust; and (2) Defendants were not a party to the contract in this case, as neither Defendant signed the Note.\nThe trial court entered an order on 25 March 2011, decreeing that there was no genuine issue of fact in this case and granting summary judgment in Plaintiff\u2019s favor. The trial court also \u201cdeclar[ed] judgment ... as follows\u201d:\n1. Margaret D. Smith, prior to her death, owned a one-half undivided interest in the real property more particularly described at Deed Book 1259, page 1119-1120, Iredell County Registry. Margaret D. Smith\u2019s one-half undivided interest is encumbered by a deed of trust to the benefit of Plaintiff which is recorded at Book 1259, pages 1122-1134 of the ICR.\n2. Troy D. Reed and Judy C. Reed, as Tenants by Entireties, own a one-half undivided interest in the subject real property which is not encumbered by the deed of trust to the benefit of Plaintiff.\n3. Upon the death of Margaret Smith her interest, subject to the deed of trust to the benefit of Plaintiff, vested in Troy D. Reed and wife Judy C. Reed pursuant to the Right of Survivorship as set forth in the deed.\n4. The Loan Modification Agreement executed by Troy D. Reed and Judy C. Reed on July 6, 2004 does not create an encumbrance on the Reed\u2019s original one-half undivided interest in the real property.\n5. Troy D. Reed and wife Judy Reed own the real property in fee simple absolute; subject to Plaintiff\u2019s deed of trust encumbering a one-half undivided interest in said real property.\nFrom this order, Defendants appeal.\nI: Plaintiff\u2019s Appeal\nWe first address Defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss Plaintiff\u2019s cross-appeal for Plaintiff\u2019s failure to file an appellant\u2019s brief. An appellant\u2019s brief is due thirty days after the Clerk of the Court of Appeals mails the printed record to the parties. N.C. R. App. P. 13(a) (2012). N.C. R. App. P. 14(d)(2) (2012) provides that \u201c[i]f an appellant fails to file and serve its brief within the time allowed, the appeal may be dismissed on motion of an appellee or on the court\u2019s own initiative[.]\u201d Id. In this case, the briefs were to be filed no later than 10 August 2011. Plaintiff failed to file a cross-appellant\u2019s brief.\nWe find the case of Alberti v. Manufactured Homes, Inc., 329 N.C. 727, 407 S.E.2d 819 (1991) to be instructive. In Alberti, the Court ruled:\nPlaintiffs gave proper notice of appeal on these issues [of attorneys\u2019 fees, treble damages, and interest] but did not file an appellant\u2019s brief within the time allowed under Rule 13 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rather, they attempted to argue the issues in their appellee\u2019s brief. The Court of Appeals, therefore, correctly held that plaintiffs had failed to preserve any of these questions for its review, and we affirm this decision.\nBecause on these issues plaintiffs are seeking affirmative relief in the appellate division rather than simply arguing an alternative basis in law for supporting the judgment, they are not entitied to cross-assign error in their appellee\u2019s brief. N.C. R. App. P. 10(d). To have properly raised these issues plaintiffs should have filed, but did not file, an appellant\u2019s brief.\nId. at 739, 407 S.E.2d at 826.\nBecause Plaintiff did not file a cross-appellant\u2019s brief in this case, we grant Defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss Plaintiff\u2019s cross-appeal and will not address the question of whether the trial court erred by concluding that \u201c[t]he Loan Modification Agreement executed by Troy D. Reed and Judy C. Reed on July 6, 2004 does not create an encumbrance on the Reed\u2019s original one-half undivided interest in the real property.\u201d\nII: Defendants\u2019 Appeal\nA: Standard of Review\nWe review a trial court\u2019s order granting or denying summary judgment de novo. Builders Mut. Ins. Co. v. N. Main Constr., Ltd., 361 N.C. 85, 88, 637 S.E.2d 528, 530 (2006) (citation omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate \u201cif the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 56(c) (2011). \u201cAll facts asserted by the adverse party are taken as true, and their inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to that party.\u201d Dobson v. Harris, 352 N.C. 77, 83, 530 S.E.2d 829, 835 (2000) (citations omitted). \u201cThe showing required for summary judgment may be accomplished by proving an essential element of the opposing party\u2019s claim does not exist, cannot be proven at trial, or would be barred by an affirmative defense[.]\u201d Id. (citation omitted).\nSummary judgment may be granted in a declaratory judgment proceeding, \u201cand the scope of appellate review from allowance of a summary judgment motion therein is the same as for other actions.\u201d N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Briley, 127 N.C. App. 442, 444, 491 S.E.2d 656, 657 (1997), disc. rev. denied, 347 N.C. 577, 500 S.E.2d 82 (1998).\nB: Summary Judgment\nIn Defendants\u2019 argument on appeal, they contend the trial court erred by granting, in part, Plaintiff\u2019s motion for summary judgment and denying Defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment because the deed of trust did not survive Mrs. Smith\u2019s death. We find this argument without merit.\nThe question presented in this appeal is a novel one. The general warranty deed filed on 2 May 2001 created a joint tenancy between Mrs. Smith and Defendants, with right of survivorship. However, the deed of trust, which was filed one minute after the general warranty deed, encumbered the property. Mrs. Smith was the sole obligor on the deed of trust. This Court must determine whether the deed of trust severed the joint tenancy, such that only the portion of the property owned by Mrs. Smith was encumbered, or whether the deed of trust did not sever the joint tenancy, but instead obligated Mrs. Smith and Defendants, thus encumbering the entire property.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 41-2(a) (2011) permits the creation of a joint tenancy with right of survivorship \u201cif the instrument creating the joint tenancy expressly provides for a right of survivorship.\u201d Id. \u201cUpon conveyance to a third party by one of two joint tenants holding property in joint tenancy with right of survivorship, a tenancy in common is created between the third party and the remaining joint tenant.\u201d Id. (emphasis added).\n\u201cA mortgage is a conveyance by a debtor to his creditor, or to some one in trust for him, as a security for the debt.\u201d Walston v. Twiford, 248 N.C. 691, 693, 105 S.E.2d 62, 64 (1958) (quotation omitted).\nNorth Carolina is considered a title theory state with respect to mortgages, where a mortgagee does not receive a mere lien on mortgaged real property, but receives legal title to the land for security purposes. In North Carolina, deeds of trust are used in most mortgage transactions, whereby a borrower conveys land to a third-party trustee to hold for the mortgagee-lender, subject to the condition that the conveyance shall be void on payment of debt at maturity. Thus, in North Carolina, the trustee holds legal title to the land.\nNeil Realty Co. v. Medical Care, Inc., 110 N.C. App. 776, 778, 431 S.E.2d 225, 226-27 (1993) (citations omitted).\nThe doctrine of survivorship does not apply to tenancies in common, and upon the death of a person holding property as a tenant in common, the person\u2019s share descends to her heirs or is devised as her will provides. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 41-2; see also See 1 James A. Webster, Jr., Patrick K. Hetrick & James B. McLaughlin, Jr., Webster\u2019s Real Estate Law in North Carolina \u00a7 7.05 (6th ed. 2011). \u201cAny joint tenancy interest held by a husband and wife, unless otherwise specified, shall be deemed to be held as a single tenancy by the entirety, which shall be treated as a single party when determining interests in the joint tenancy with right of survivorship.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 41-2(b).\nIn this case, because North Carolina is a title theory State, and thus a mortgage is a conveyance, Mrs. Smith severed the joint tenancy when she, as the sole obligor on the deed of trust, filed the deed of trust encumbering the property. After the joint tenancy was severed, Mrs. Smith\u2019s interest as a tenant in common was one-half of the property; Defendants\u2019 interest, as tenants by the entirety, was also one-half. This is because Defendants are husband and wife; as such, they held the property \u201cas a single tenancy by the entirety\u201d and were \u201ctreated as a single party when determining interests in the joint tenancy with right of survivorship\u201d upon severance of the joint tenancy. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 41-2(b).\nBased on the foregoing, we hold the trial court was correct in concluding that \u201cTroy D. Reed and Judy C. Reed, as Tenants by Entireties, own a one-half undivided interest in the subject real property which is not encumbered by the deed of trust to the benefit of Plaintifff.]\u201d In other words, the deed of trust executed by Mrs. Smith only encumbered Mrs. Smith\u2019s interest in the property \u2014 the portion of the property owned by Mrs. Smith as a tenant in common after the severance of the joint tenancy by the filing of the deed of trust. However, we further hold the trial court was incorrect in concluding that \u201c[u]pon the death of Margaret Smith her interest, subject to the deed of trust to the benefit of Plaintiff, vested in Troy D. Reed and wife Judy C. Reed pursuant to the Right of Survivorship as set forth in the deed.\u201d The joint tenancy was severed upon the filing of the deed of trust, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 41-2, and Mrs. Smith\u2019s interest in the property converted to a tenancy in common, which has no right of survivorship. Lastly, because Mrs. Smith\u2019s interest in the property did not vest pursuant to the right of survivorship, we hold the trial court was also incorrect in concluding that \u201cTroy D. Reed and wife Judy Reed own the real property in fee simple absolute[.]\u201d\nIn summary, we hold that the trial court was correct in concluding that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact in this case and that Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on the issue of whether the deed of trust in this case encumbered Mrs. Smith\u2019s one-half interest in the property as a tenant in common. We further conclude that the trial court erred by concluding that Mrs. Smith\u2019s interest in the property \u201cvested in Troy D. Reed and wife Judy C. Reed pursuant to the Right of Survivorship\u201d and Defendants \u201cown the real property in fee simple absolute[,] subject to Plaintiff\u2019s deed of trust.\u201d The joint tenancy was severed upon the filing of the deed of trust, and Mrs. Smith\u2019s interest in the property converted to a tenancy in common, which has no right of survivorship.\nAFFIRMED, in part, REVERSED, in part, and DISMISSED, in part.\nJudges ERVIN and BEASLEY concur.\n. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 53-243.11, the Mortgage Lending Act, was repealed after the filing of Plaintiffs counterclaim in this case by 2009 N.C. Sess. Laws 374 \u00a7 1, effective 31 July 2009. The Secure and Fair Enforcement Mortgage Licensing Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 53-244.010, et seq., was codified.\n. Other States have codified statutes addressing the particular question raised in this appeal, and our General Assembly may also consider and address this issue, should it be so inclined. South Carolina, S.C. Code Ann. \u00a7 27-7-40(a)(iii) (2011) prohibits any encumbrance of a joint tenancy unless all joint tenants join in the encumbrance. See S.C. Code Ann. \u00a7 27-7-40(a)(iii) (providing, \u201c[t]he fee interest in real estate held in joint tenancy may not be encumbered by a joint tenant acting alone without the joinder of the other joint tenant or tenants in the encumbrance\u201d). In Wisconsin, Wis. Stat. \u00a7 700.24 (2011) provides that on the death of a mortgaging joint tenant the survivor takes subject to the mortgage. See Wis. Stat. \u00a7 700.24 (stating that a real estate mortgage, a security interest, or a lien \u201con or against the interest of a joint tenant does not defeat the right of survivorship in the event of the death of such joint tenant, but the surviving joint tenant or tenants take the interest such deceased joint tenant could have transferred prior to death subject to such mortgage, security interest or statutory lien\u201d).",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "THIGPEN, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Travis E. Collum, Attorney at Law, P.A., by Travis E. Collum and Stacy L. Williams, for defendants.",
      "Eisele, Ashbum, Greene & Chapman, P.A., by John D. Greene, for plaintiff."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS, INC., Plaintiff v. JUDY C. REED, TROY D. REED, JUDY C. REED, EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF MARGARET D. SMITH, AND COUNTRYWIDE TITLE CORPORATION, TRUSTEE, Defendants\nNo. COA11-769\n(Filed 15 May 2012)\n1. Appeal and Error \u2014 cross-appeal\u2014failure to file cross-appellant\u2019s brief \u2014 appeal dismissed\nPlaintiff\u2019s cross-appeal in a case arising out of a dispute over real property was dismissed where plaintiff failed to file a cross-appellant\u2019s brief.\n2. Real Property \u2014 deed of trust \u2014 encumbered decedent\u2019s property interest \u2014 joint tenancy \u2014 severed upon filing of deed of trust\nThe trial court did not err in a dispute over real property by concluding that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and that plaintiff was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on the issue of whether a deed of trust in this case encumbered decedent\u2019s one-half interest in the property as a tenant in common. The trial court did err by concluding that decedent\u2019s interest in the property vested in Troy D. Reed and wife Judy C. Reed pursuant to the right of survivorship and that defendants owned the real property in fee simple absolute, subject to plaintiff\u2019s deed of trust. The joint tenancy was severed upon the filing of the deed of trust and decedent\u2019s interest in the property converted to a tenancy in common, which has no right of survivorship.\nAppeal by defendants from order entered 25 March 2011 by Judge Dale Graham in Iredell County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 1 December 2011.\nTravis E. Collum, Attorney at Law, P.A., by Travis E. Collum and Stacy L. Williams, for defendants.\nEisele, Ashbum, Greene & Chapman, P.A., by John D. Greene, for plaintiff."
  },
  "file_name": "0504-01",
  "first_page_order": 514,
  "last_page_order": 521
}
