{ "id": 4356454, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MONTREZ BENJAMIN WILLIAMS, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Williams", "decision_date": "2012-04-17", "docket_number": "No. COA11-1496", "first_page": "130", "last_page": "135", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "220 N.C. App. 130" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "148 L.Ed. 2d 498", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "531 U.S. 1019", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9679395, 9679139, 9679434, 9679470, 9679118, 9679312, 9679215, 9679186, 9679251, 9679283, 9679351, 9679101, 9679165, 9679069 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/531/1019-12", "/us/531/1019-04", "/us/531/1019-13", "/us/531/1019-14", "/us/531/1019-03", "/us/531/1019-10", "/us/531/1019-07", "/us/531/1019-06", "/us/531/1019-08", "/us/531/1019-09", "/us/531/1019-11", "/us/531/1019-02", "/us/531/1019-05", "/us/531/1019-01" ] }, { "cite": "528 S.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "12" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 536", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155711 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "553" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0536-01" ] }, { "cite": "300 S.E.2d 375", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378", "parenthetical": "citation, quotation marks, ellipses, and brackets omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 655", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565416 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "660", "parenthetical": "citation, quotation marks, ellipses, and brackets omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0655-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 532, "char_count": 11424, "ocr_confidence": 0.752, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.8591662004228935e-08, "percentile": 0.3660667089085117 }, "sha256": "a75716fb0410977d5712e6354b52ef9af2a89b2ccb87424c5cece6f606b0c7a6", "simhash": "1:1ff99aa3e16b44ea", "word_count": 1868 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:35:53.925153+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges ELMORE and STEELMAN concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MONTREZ BENJAMIN WILLIAMS, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "STROUD, Judge.\nDefendant appeals his two convictions for first degree murder. For the following reasons, we find no error.\nI. Background\nThe State\u2019s evidence tended to show that on 1 July 2008, defendant confessed to shooting two people in self-defense; an eyewitness told detectives that defendant had committed the shootings. No weapons were found on or around either of the victims and both were shot more than once. On or about 14 July 2008, defendant was indicted for two counts of murder. On 25 May 2011, defendant filed notice that he \u201cintendfed] to offer the defense of self-defense[.]\u201d After a trial by jury, defendant was found guilty of two counts of first degree murder. Defendant was twice sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. Defendant appeals.\nII. Standard of Review\nDefendant argues only plain error before this Court.\nThe plain error rule is always to be applied cautiously and only in the exceptional case where, after reviewing the entire record, it can be said the claimed error is a fundamental error, something so basic, so prejudicial, so lacking in its elements that justice cannot have been done, or where the error is grave error which amounts to a denial of a fundamental right of the accused, or the error has resulted in a miscarriage of justice or in the denial to appellant of a fair trial or where the error is such as to seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings or where it can be fairly said the instructional mistake had a probable impact on the jury\u2019s finding that the defendant was guilty.\nState v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 660, 300 S.E.2d 375, 378 (1983) (citation, quotation marks, ellipses, and brackets omitted).\nIII. Other Crimes\nDefendant called his mother to testify as to his character, and she specifically described defendant as a \u201cpeacemaker\u201d and stated that she had not seen any \u201ckind of violent part in\u201d defendant. On cross examination, the State questioned defendant\u2019s mother as to her knowledge that defendant had previously been \u201cconvicted of crimes\u201d including armed robberies and that he had \u201cpistol whipped\u201d a person; defendant\u2019s mother acknowledged most of these actions by defendant but held to her testimony as to defendant\u2019s peaceful nature. Defendant first contends that \u201cthe trial court committed plain error when it allowed the State to introduce evidence . . . [defendant] had been charged with and convicted of crimes involving armed robberies even though . . . [defendant] never testified.\u201d (Original in all caps.)\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404 provides in pertinent part as follows:\n(a) Character evidence generally. \u2014 Evidence of a person\u2019s character or a trait of his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except:\n(1) Character of accused. \u2014 Evidence of a pertinent trait of his character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same[.]\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404(a)(1) (2007). N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 405(a) provides that \u201c[i]n all cases in which evidence of character or a trait of character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion. On cross-examination, inquiry is allowable into relevant specific instances of conduct.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 405(a) (2007).\nDefendant argues that his mother\u2019s testimony as to his peaceful nature did not \u201copen the door\u201d to the State\u2019s cross examination as to his prior crimes; we disagree. In State v. Roseboro, 351 N.C. 536, 528 S.E.2d 1, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1019, 148 L.Ed. 2d 498 (2000), our Supreme Court determined that evidence of defendant\u2019s prior violent acts against his wife was admissible, as defendant had called witnesses to testify to his peaceful nature:\nA criminal defendant is entitled to introduce evidence of his good character, thereby placing his character at issue. The State in rebuttal can then introduce evidence of defendant\u2019s bad character. Such evidence offered by the defendant or the prosecution in rebuttal must be a pertinent trait of his character.. . . Defendant placed his character at issue by having members of his family testify about his reputation for nonviolence or peacefulness, a pertinent trait of his character. In accordance with Rule 405(a), the prosecutor then cross-examined these witnesses about whether they knew of or had heard any accusations that defendant had hit or been violent toward his wife.\nDefendant argues that the prosecutor failed to limit his inquiry only to specific instances of misconduct by defendant by asking very general questions about whether the witnesses knew about any violence in the marriage or allegations of violence. Given that defendant\u2019s character witnesses testified that defendant was not a violent person, the prosecution was entitled to probe their knowledge of defendant\u2019s violence in his marriage. Such an inquiry was directed at specific instances of defendant\u2019s misconduct in the context of his marriage, not just general charges of violent behavior. On this basis, defendant\u2019s argument that the prosecutor elicited irrelevant information concerning problems in defendant\u2019s marriage is without merit.\n351 N.C. 536, 553, 528 S.E.2d 1, 12 (citations and quotation marks omitted). Just as in Roseboro, here defendant\u2019s mother also testified that defendant was not a violent person, placing \u201ca pertinent trait of his character\u201d at issue. Id. The State\u2019s questions regarding defendant\u2019s prior crimes fall squarely under Rule 404(a)(1), as they were in rebuttal to the defendant\u2019s character evidence as to his peaceful nature.\nDefendant further argues that even if his mother\u2019s testimony \u201copened the door\u201d to the State\u2019s cross examination, his prior crimes were juvenile adjudications, and the use of evidence of a juvenile adjudication is limited by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-3000(f), which provides:\nThe juvenile\u2019s record of an adjudication of delinquency for an offense that would be a Class A, Bl, B2, C, D, or E felony if committed by an adult may be used in a subsequent criminal proceeding against the juvenile either under G.S. 8C-1, Rule 404(b), or to prove an aggravating factor at sentencing under G.S. 15A-1340.4(a), 15A-1340.16(d), or 15A-2000(e). The record may be so used only by order of the court in the subsequent criminal proceeding, upon motion of the prosecutor, after an in camera hearing to determine whether the record in question is admissible.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-3000(f) (2007). Defendant argues that even if his prior adjudications were admissible, the trial court failed to hold an in camera hearing to determine the admissibility of his juvenile record.\nDefendant\u2019s reliance upon N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-3000(f) is misplaced for two reasons. First, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-3000(f) specifically addresses the use of juvenile court records. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-3000(a) defines the juvenile \u201crecord\u201d as this term is used by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-3000(f):\nThe clerk shall maintain a complete record of all juvenile cases filed in the clerk\u2019s office to be known as the juvenile record. The record shall include the summons and petition, any secure or nonsecure custody order, any electronic or mechanical recording of hearings, and any written motions, orders, or papers filed in the proceeding.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-3000(a) (2007).\nThe State did not seek to introduce any portion of defendant\u2019s juvenile record, so no in camera hearing was needed. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-3000(f). Juvenile records include far more information than the simple fact of an adjudication. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-3000(a). The State\u2019s questions on cross examination only inquired as to defendant\u2019s mother\u2019s knowledge of defendant\u2019s prior crimes. Secondly, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-3000(f) mentions use of juvenile records under Rule 404(b), not Rule 404(a)(1), and this evidence falls squarely under Rule 404(a), not Rule 404(b). Accordingly, this argument is overruled.\nIV. Co-Defendant in Prison\nDuring defendant\u2019s trial, on direct examination by the State, Ms. Shay Hammond testified that on the day of the murders she had seen defendant with \u201cBlack.\u201d The State questioned Ms. Hammond about Black\u2019s current whereabouts and she testified that he was in prison for \u201c[s]everal things\u201d including murder. Defendant also contends \u201cthe trial court committed plain error when it allowed the State to introduce evidence . . . [defendant\u2019s] co-defendant was already in prison for murder.\u201d (Original in all caps.) We note that there is no evidence in the record before us that defendant had a co-defendant; our record indicates defendant was tried alone. It is also not clear from the testimony that the \u201cmurder\u201d Black was imprisoned for was the same incident which led to defendant\u2019s charges. However, assuming that the person characterized as a \u201cco-defendant\u201d was involved in the same events for which defendant was charged, and that the trial court erred in allowing in evidence of this co-defendant\u2019s prior conviction for murder, in light of the evidence we have already noted, including defendant\u2019s confession, the fact that no weapons were found on or around either of the victims, and the evidence presented showing both of the victims were shot more than once, we cannot say any alleged error by the trial court amounted to plain error. See id.\nV. Conclusion\nFor .the foregoing reasons, we find no plain error.\nNO ERROR.\nJudges ELMORE and STEELMAN concur.\n. We note that although Rule 404(b) is not applicable in this case, some juvenile records are admissible under Rule 404(b), including evidence of \u201can offense that would be a Class A, Bl, B2, C, D, or E felony if committed by an adult[.]\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-3000(f).", "type": "majority", "author": "STROUD, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Special Deputy Attorney General Lars F. Nance, for the State.", "Glenn Gerding, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MONTREZ BENJAMIN WILLIAMS, Defendant\nNo. COA11-1496\n(Filed 17 April 2012)\n1. Evidence \u2014 witness testimony \u2014 prior crimes or bad acts\u2014 opened the door\nThe trial court did not commit plain error in a first-degree murder case when it allowed the State to introduce evidence that defendant had been charged with and convicted of crimes involving armed robberies. Defendant\u2019s mother\u2019s testimony as to his peaceful nature opened the door to the State\u2019s cross examination as to his prior crimes. Further, the State did not seek to introduce any portion of defendant\u2019s juvenile record, so no in camera hearing was needed under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-3000(f) and the evidence fell squarely under Rule 404(a).\n2. Evidence \u2014 witness testimony \u2014 co-defendant in prison for murder \u2014 no plain error\nDefendant\u2019s argument in a first-degree murder case that the trial court committed plain error when it allowed the State to introduce evidence that defendant\u2019s \u201cco-defendant\u201d was already in prison for murder was overruled. Even assuming that the person characterized as a \u201cco-defendant\u201d was involved in the same events for which defendant was charged, and that the trial court erred in allowing evidence of this co-defendant\u2019s prior conviction for murder, in light of the remaining evidence, any alleged error by the trial court did not amount to plain error.\nAppeal by defendant from judgments entered 15 June 2011 by Judge Hugh B. Lewis in Superior Court, Mecklenburg County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 22 March 2012.\nAttorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Special Deputy Attorney General Lars F. Nance, for the State.\nGlenn Gerding, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0130-01", "first_page_order": 140, "last_page_order": 145 }