{ "id": 4356893, "name": "BILLY G. PATTERSON, PEARNELL PATTERSON, and KEITH PATTERSON, Plaintiffs v. THE CITY OF GASTONIA, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Patterson v. City of Gastonia", "decision_date": "2012-05-01", "docket_number": "No. COA11-520", "first_page": "233", "last_page": "249", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "220 N.C. App. 233" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "670 S.E.2d 629", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12642407 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "632", "parenthetical": "quoting Redevelopment Comm'n of Greensboro v. Sec. Nat'l Bank of Greensboro, 252 N.C. 595, 610, 114 S.E.2d 688, 698 (1960)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/670/0629-01" ] }, { "cite": "68 S.E.2d 783", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1952, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "787" }, { "page": "787" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "235 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8620036 ], "year": 1952, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "6" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/235/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "293 S.E.2d 101", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "109" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 187", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567947 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "199" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0187-01" ] }, { "cite": "434 S.E.2d 666", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "667", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "112 N.C. App. 120", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520396 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "122", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/112/0120-01" ] }, { "cite": "497 S.E.2d 457", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "462", "parenthetical": "\"This definition clearly indicates that for purposes of condemnation, 'property' is limited to interests in real property, and does not include personal property.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "129 N.C. App. 183", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11648937 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "191", "parenthetical": "\"This definition clearly indicates that for purposes of condemnation, 'property' is limited to interests in real property, and does not include personal property.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/129/0183-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 25-2-105", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(1)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "580 S.E.2d 721", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "723", "parenthetical": "observing that \"[traditionally, the law treats a mobile home not as an improvement to real \u2022property but as a good, defined and controlled by the UCC as something 'movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale ....'\" (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 25-2-105(1) (2001))" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 N.C. App. 261", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9186998 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "264" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/158/0261-01" ] }, { "cite": "547 S.E.2d 124", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "127", "parenthetical": "\"[B]ecause the insurance policy does not indemnify defendant against the negligent acts alleged in plaintiff's complaint, defendant has not waived its sovereign immunity . . . .\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "144 N.C. App. 131", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11433222 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "135", "parenthetical": "\"[B]ecause the insurance policy does not indemnify defendant against the negligent acts alleged in plaintiff's complaint, defendant has not waived its sovereign immunity . . . .\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/144/0131-01" ] }, { "cite": "545 S.E.2d 243", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "246" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "143 N.C. App. 97", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11433311 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "100" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/143/0097-01" ] }, { "cite": "374 S.E.2d 488", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "492" }, { "page": "492" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "92 N.C. App. 446", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527146 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "451" }, { "page": "451" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/92/0446-01" ] }, { "cite": "62 S.E.2d 525", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "528" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "233 N.C. 54", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8597493 ], "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "57" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/233/0054-01" ] }, { "cite": "326 S.E.2d 39", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 8, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "46" }, { "page": "41" }, { "page": "48" }, { "page": "42" }, { "page": "43" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "73 N.C. App. 44", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521674 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/73/0044-01" ] }, { "cite": "688 S.E.2d 426", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "429" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 784", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4151199 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "789" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/363/0784-01" ] }, { "cite": "282 S.E.2d 580", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "581" }, { "page": "583" }, { "page": "584" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "54 N.C. App. 110", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520383 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/54/0110-01" ] }, { "cite": "681 S.E.2d 415", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "418" }, { "page": "418" }, { "page": "416" }, { "page": "418" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "199 N.C. App. 304", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4170709 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "308" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/199/0304-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 S.E.2d 688", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "698" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "252 N.C. 595", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8624853 ], "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "610" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/252/0595-01" ] }, { "cite": "194 N.C. App. 716", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4162961 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "719", "parenthetical": "quoting Redevelopment Comm'n of Greensboro v. Sec. Nat'l Bank of Greensboro, 252 N.C. 595, 610, 114 S.E.2d 688, 698 (1960)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/194/0716-01" ] }, { "cite": "413 S.E.2d 276", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "291" }, { "page": "289" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "330 N.C. 761", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2511641 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "785-86" }, { "page": "782" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/330/0761-01" ] }, { "cite": "678 S.E.2d 351", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "355" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 334", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4151090 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "340" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/363/0334-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1218, "char_count": 41070, "ocr_confidence": 0.753, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.989406066647367e-08, "percentile": 0.37228502511150263 }, "sha256": "dca65cc155a88e0a56d9970dcfff50d37c4967a84a183983113f0bf040ea5f0b", "simhash": "1:1b7ff762172f455a", "word_count": 6710 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:35:53.925153+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge STROUD concur." ], "parties": [ "BILLY G. PATTERSON, PEARNELL PATTERSON, and KEITH PATTERSON, Plaintiffs v. THE CITY OF GASTONIA, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "GEER, Judge.\nPlaintiffs Billy G. Patterson, his wife Peamell Patterson, and their son Keith Patterson (\u201cthe Pattersons\u201d) appeal from the trial court\u2019s orders granting the City of Gastonia\u2019s motions to dismiss and for summary judgment. The Pattersons primarily contend on appeal that the City\u2019s actions relating to demolition of the Pattersons\u2019 mobile homes violated their due process rights under the North Carolina Constitution. As we find that the Pattersons had an adequate alternative remedy at law for redress of their claim, their direct state constitutional claim was barred, and the trial court properly granted summary judgment.\nFacts\nMr. and Mrs. Patterson were the record owners of 21 mobile homes located at Patterson Circle in Gastonia, North Carolina. Their son, Keith Patterson, also claims an ownership interest in the mobile homes. The Pattersons leased the property on which the homes were located.\nThe City opened code enforcement cases on those 21 mobile homes in January 2006. In its code enforcement action, the City relied upon the procedures adopted in the City\u2019s Minimum Housing Code pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-443 (2011). Section 160A-443 authorizes municipalities to adopt \u201cordinances relating to dwellings within [a] city\u2019s territorial jurisdiction that are unfit for human habitation.\u201d The statute requires that the City designate a public officer to exercise the powers described. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-443(1). The statute further provides in pertinent part that \u201cwhenever it appears to the public officer (on his own motion) that any dwelling is unfit for human habitation, the public officer shall, if his preliminary investigation discloses a basis for such charges, issue and cause to be served upon the owner of and parties in interest in such dwellings a complaint stating the charges in that respect and containing a notice that a hearing will be held before the public officer (or his designated agent) . . . .\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-443(2). That notice must contain notice of the time and place of the hearing to be held before the public officer. Id.\nFollowing the hearing, if \u201cthe public officer determines that the dwelling under consideration is unfit for human habitation, he shall state in writing his findings of fact in support of that determination and shall issue and cause to be served upon the owner thereof an order[.]\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-443(3). That order may provide either for (1) demolition of the property or (2) repair of the property. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-443(3)(a), (b). In order to decide if an order for repair should issue, the public officer must determine whether \u201cthe repair, alteration or improvement of the dwelling can be made at a reasonable cost in relation to the value of the dwelling\u201d \u2014 the City is authorized to fix in advance \u201ca certain percentage of [the property\u2019s] value as being reasonable[.]\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-443(3)(a).\nThe City of Gastonia\u2019s Minimum Housing Code mirrors these provisions and sets the reasonable value for purposes of an order of demolition at 50% of the value of the dwelling. Gastonia, N.C., Code of Ordinances ch. 16, art. V, \u00a7\u00a7 16-127(13), 16-132(a), (b) (1982). However, the City\u2019s Code also provides an additional opportunity for the owner to repair the dwelling apart from that set out in the enabling legislation. Under the Code, if the chief code enforcement officer determines that the building is \u201cdilapidated,\u201d then he or she must make written findings of fact and \u201cshall issue\u201d an order requiring the owner to \u201cvacate, close and remove or demolish\u201d the building within a specified time. Id. at \u00a7 16-132(b)(2). Within 10 days from the date of that \u201corder determining that the building is dilapidated, the owner may notify the chief code enforcement officer in writing of his intent to make such repairs or alterations to said dwelling.\u201d Id. at \u00a7 16-132(b)(3). After receipt of such a notice, the chief code enforcement officer is required to issue \u201ca supplemental order\u201d directing the owner to bring the dwelling into a minimum standard of fitness. Id. The order must provide a reasonable time for the repairs to be completed, which may be no less than 30 days and no more than 90 days. Id.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-446(c) (2011) provides for an appeal to a housing appeals board from \u201cany decision or order of the public officer ... by any person aggrieved thereby\u201d within 10 days of the rendering or service of the order. Consistent with the statute, the City of Gastonia\u2019s ordinance provides for an appeal to the Board of Adjustment from \u201cany decision or order of the chief code enforcement officer.\u201d Gastonia, N.C., Code of Ordinances ch. 16, art. V, \u00a7 16-132(d). An appeal from an order requiring the aggrieved person to do any act suspends the effect of the chief code enforcement officer\u2019s order. Id.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-446(f) further provides that \u201c[a]ny person aggrieved by an order issued by the public officer or a decision rendered by the board may petition the superior court for an injunction restraining the public officer from carrying out the order or decision and the court may, upon such petition, issue a temporary injunction restraining the public officer pending a final disposition of the cause.\u201d The City of Gastonia\u2019s code likewise allows \u201c[a]ny person aggrieved by an order issued by the chief code enforcement officer or a decision rendered by the board ... to petition the superior court for a temporary injunction, restraining the chief code enforcement officer pending a final disposition of the cause, as provided by G.S. 160A-446(f).\u201d Gastonia, N.C., Code of Ordinances ch. 16, art. V, \u00a7 16432(e).\nIn this case, following an investigation, the chief code enforcement officer issued an emergency notice of violations for the Pattersons\u2019 mobile homes and ordered the Pattersons'to bring the mobile homes into compliance with the City Code within 48 hours of receipt of the notices. On 27 January 2006, the Pattersons received Reports and Requests for Corrective Action which advised them that the code violations with which they were charged had to be corrected within 30 days. In January and February 2006, Mr. and Mrs. Patterson obtained building permits for the mobile homes listing themselves as the owners of the homes.\nOn 6 March 2006, the City served complaints and notices of hearing by the United States mail, return receipt requested, alleging that the Pattersons\u2019 dwellings were not in compliance with the City\u2019s building code and setting a hearing before the chief code enforcement officer for 29 March 2006. Billy Patterson attended the 29 March 2006 hearing before the chief code enforcement officer. Following the 29 March 2006 hearing, the chief code enforcement officer issued an order to demolish for each of the mobile homes owned by the Pattersons. Those orders, however, granted the Pattersons the option to elect, within 10 days from the date of the order to demolish, to bring the dwellings into compliance with the building code by submitting a written notice of intent to repair the property.\nOn 7 April 2006, Billy Patterson signed notices of intent to repair all 21 mobile homes. The chief code enforcement officer then issued supplemental orders to repair, giving the Pattersons until 7 May 2006 to complete the ordered repairs. Those supplemental orders were served on Mr. and Mrs. Patterson by the United States mail, return receipt requested. The return receipt was signed by plaintiff Keith Patterson. When none of the mobile homes were completely repaired by 6 June 2006, the City Council, via its consent agenda, issued orders to demolish all of the mobile homes that were not in compliance with the City\u2019s Minimum Housing Code.\nOn 26 July 2006, Dee Dee Gillis, chief code enforcement officer for the City of Gastonia, sent a letter to Mr. and Mrs. Patterson outlining what actions and documentation would be necessary for the Pattersons to prove that the mobile homes had been brought into compliance with the Housing Code. On 10 November 2006, the City of Gastonia tore down six of the 21 mobile homes at issue. Following the City\u2019s demolition of those six mobile homes, the Pattersons sold one of the mobile homes. Dr. Anthony, the owner of the land on which the mobile homes sat, had the remaining mobile homes tom down because he did not want to have further difficulties with the City.\nOn 26 June 2008, the Pattersons filed suit against the City of Gastonia alleging wrongful demolition on the basis of the City\u2019s having violated their common law and constitutional due process rights, inverse condemnation, trespass, and conversion/trespass to chattels. The City filed two motions to dismiss the complaint. The first motion contended that the complaint should be dismissed under North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (2) based on sovereign immunity, while the second motion, based on Rule 12(b)(6), asserted that the Pattersons had failed to state a claim for relief.\nOn 16 January 2009, the trial court entered an order granting the first motion to dismiss after finding that the City had not waived its sovereign immunity. The court dismissed \u201cthe causes of action in the Complaint sounding in tort, entitled \u2018Wrongful Demolition\u2019, \u2018Conversion/ Trespass to Chattels\u2019 [sic], and \u2018Trespass\u2019, constituting the First, Third and Fourth Causes of Action, respectively.\u201d The court denied the motion to dismiss the second cause of action for \u201cInverse Condemnation.\u201d\nOn 16 October 2009, the City filed a motion for summary judgment on the Pattersons\u2019 inverse condemnation claim on the grounds that (1) plaintiffs\u2019 had not exhausted their administrative remedies, (2) plaintiffs could not prove facts constituting an inverse condemnation, and (3) the claim was barred by the statute of limitations. On 22 October 2009, the Pattersons filed a motion to amend their complaint to reallege their due process claims based on the intervening decision of Craig v. New Hanover Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 363 N.C. 334, 678 S.E.2d 351 (2009).\nBoth the City\u2019s motion for summary judgment and the Pattersons\u2019 motion to amend were heard on 26 October 2009. The trial court granted defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment as to the inverse condemnation claim, but allowed the Pattersons\u2019 motion to amend their complaint to reassert their due process claims under the North Carolina Constitution.\nOn 10 December 2009, the Pattersons filed their amended complaint, alleging that the Pattersons had not been given any notice of the 6 June 2006 hearing at which the City determined that their property was to be demolished and were not, therefore, given an opportunity to present evidence that they \u201chad not been given an adequate opportunity to repair the subject dwellings.\u201d The amended complaint further alleged that \u201c[e]ven though Plaintiff Keith Patterson was a co-owner of the subject property, he was never given notice by the Defendant or offered an opportunity to be heard prior to the demolition.\u201d\nOn 18 November 2010, the City filed a second motion for summary judgment asserting that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to the remaining due process claims. On 9 December 2010, the trial court entered an order granting the City\u2019s summary judgment motion. The trial court concluded that the Pattersons had an adequate remedy at law that barred their constitutional claim and that plaintiffs Billy G. Patterson and Pearnell Patterson were, in any event, afforded due process. As for Keith Patterson, the trial court concluded that he was not entitled to notice as he had no ownership interest in the property that had been recorded.\nThe Pattersons timely appealed to this Court from the trial court\u2019s orders granting the City\u2019s motions to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1), (2), and (6) and from the orders granting the City\u2019s motions for summary judgment.\nI\nThe Pattersons first contend that the trial court erred in ruling in the 16 January 2009 order that their due process claims \u2014 labeled \u201cWrongful Demolition\u201d \u2014 were barred by governmental immunity. The trial court dismissed this cause of action as \u201csounding in tort.\u201d The complaint, however, alleged that \u201c[defendant demolished Plaintiffs\u2019 property without affording Plaintiffs adequate due process under the common law and Constitution of the State of North Carolina.\u2019\u2019(Emphasis added.)\nIn Corum v. Univ. of N.C., 330 N.C. 761, 785-86, 413 S.E.2d 276, 291 (1992), our Supreme Court held that sovereign immunity does not bar state constitutional claims: \u201cThe doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot stand as a barrier to North Carolina citizens who seek to remedy violations of their rights guaranteed by the Declaration of Rights.\u201d The trial court, therefore, erred in dismissing the first cause of action to the extent it asserted a claim for violation of due process under the North Carolina Constitution. However, because the court subsequently allowed the Pattersons to amend their complaint to reassert their due process claims, they were not prejudiced by the error.\nII\nThe Pattersons next contend that the trial court erred in granting the City\u2019s motion for summary judgment as to their due process claims. Plaintiff Keith Patterson argues individually that he was given no notice at all of any of the proceedings relating to the demolition of the mobile homes. All of the Pattersons contend that they were denied notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to the City\u2019s passing, on 6 June 2006, an ordinance directing that the Pattersons\u2019 mobile homes be demolished. The Pattersons argue that the demolition under these circumstances constituted both a procedural due process and a substantive due process violation.\nA. Failure to Serve Keith Patterson with Notice\nKeith Patterson was not served with the notices, complaints, and orders sent to Billy G. and Peamell Patterson. Plaintiffs argue that the failure to notify him violated the enabling statutes \u2014 N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-442 (2011) and N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-443(2) \u2014 and denied him due process. The City responds that because Keith Patterson was not a record owner of the mobile homes, they had no duty to serve him.\nSection 160A-443 sets forth the provisions that a city must include in any ordinances adopted pursuant to its power to regulate minimum housing standards. Under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-443(2), the initial complaint must be served on \u201cthe owner of and parties in interest\u201d of the dwellings at issue. Subsequent provisions in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-443 refer simply to \u201cthe owner.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-442(4) (emphasis added) defines \u201cowner\u201d: \u201c \u2018Owner\u2019 means the holder of the title in fee simple and every mortgagee of record,.'\u201d On the other hand, \u201c \u2018[p]arties in interest\u2019 means all individuals, associations and corporations who have interests of record in a dwelling and any who are in possession thereof.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-442(5) (emphasis added).\nThe Pattersons do not contend that Keith Patterson was a record owner of the property. Instead, the Pattersons assert that \u201c[a]t no time did Plaintiffs ever inform the City that Keith Patterson was not a co-owner of the dwellings. . . . The City knew or should have known that Keith Patterson was a co-owner of the dwellings and would have been privy to that fact through numerous conversations with the lessor of the real property and seller of the dwellings.\u201d\nThe Pattersons argue that \u201cof record\u201d in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-442(4) modifies only \u201cmortgagee\u201d and not \u201cthe holder of the title in fee simple.\u201d This construction of the definition of \u201cowner\u201d is not consistent with the definition of \u201cparties in interest,\u201d which also is limited only to those who have an interest \u201cof record.\u201d It is a \u201c \u2018fundamental rule of statutory construction that statutes in pari materia, and all parts thereof, should be construed together and compared with each other.\u2019 \u201d Martin v. N.C. Dep\u2019t of Health & Human Servs., 194 N.C. App. 716, 719, 670 S.E.2d 629, 632 (2009) (quoting Redevelopment Comm\u2019n of Greensboro v. Sec. Nat\u2019l Bank of Greensboro, 252 N.C. 595, 610, 114 S.E.2d 688, 698 (1960)). We see no reasonable basis for concluding that the General Assembly would limit \u201cparties in interest\u201d and \u201cmortgagee [s]\u201d to those \u201cof record\u201d but would not have the same limitation for holders of title in fee simple. Indeed, Lawyer v. City of Elizabeth City N.C., 199 N.C. App. 304, 308, 681 S.E.2d 415, 418 (2009), relied upon by plaintiffs, appears to construe the statutes as referring to owners of record.\nIn Lawyer, this Court reversed a grant of summary judgment because \u201creasonable minds could differ as to whether the steps taken by defendants [to ascertain to whom notice should be sent] were sufficient.\u201d Id. at 309, 681 S.E.2d at 418. The plaintiffs in Lawyer had purchased the house and property at a sheriffs sale, but the sheriffs deed was not filed until after the house was demolished. Id. at 305, 681 S.E.2d at 416. The prior owners remained listed by the tax office as the \u201cowners of the property\u201d and, therefore, received the City\u2019s notices of condemnation. Id. The prior owners then sent a letter indicating that they no longer owned the property because it had been sold at auction. When the City inquired of the tax office and the register of deeds, it was assured that the prior owners were the owners of the property. Id.\nIn concluding that issues of fact existed, this Court noted that while \u201c[n]o party presented evidence as to what the appropriate standard of care under the circumstances would be[,] [h]ad the City engaged an attorney to conduct a title search, including all \u2018out\u2019 conveyances, the attorney should have discovered the unrecorded sheriff\u2019s deed.\u201d Id. at 308, 681 S.E.2d at 418. The Court could not, however, determine whether the City had a duty to do so. Id. We read Lawyer as holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiffs were, in fact, an owner of record under the circumstances of that case.\nIn support of their contention that the City was required to conduct an investigation to identify even those owners not of record, the Pattersons also cite Farmers Bank of Sunbury v. City of Elizabeth City, 54 N.C. App. 110, 282 S.E.2d 580 (1981). In Farmers Bank, the plaintiff bank had entered into a promissory note with the record owners of the property that was secured with a deed of trust on that property. Id. at 111, 282 S.E.2d at 581. That deed of trust was in fact recorded and included the name of the trustee although there was no reference to the bank. Id. at 115, 282 S.E.2d at 583. The deed of trust did not, however, include the trustee\u2019s address. Id. This Court reversed entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendant City and enforcement officer because the defendants had not specifically identified what steps, if any, they had taken to ascertain the identity and whereabouts of the trustee or other interested parties apart from the record homeowners. Id. at 115-16, 282 S.E.2d at 584.\nIn short, in Lawyer, there was evidence that the plaintiffs\u2019 ownership could have been uncovered through a title search, giving rise to issues of fact regarding whether they were owners of record. In contrast, in Farmers Bank, the existence of the deed of trust was a matter of public record, but there was a question whether the defendants could have with reasonable diligence located the trustee and the bank based on the recorded deed of trust. Neither case suggests that a city has a duty to investigate interests not identifiable through a search of the public record.\nHere, the Pattersons have presented no evidence that Keith Patterson\u2019s interest in the mobile homes appeared anywhere in the public record. Instead, they contend that the City should have gone beyond a public record search and conducted an investigation to uncover whether there might have been owners other than those appearing of record. Neither the statute nor the case law imposes this duty on a city. Under the circumstances of this case, the trial court properly granted summary judgment on Keith Patterson\u2019s individual due process claim.\nB. Failure to Give Notice as to June 2006 Ordinance\nWe next turn to plaintiffs\u2019 argument that they were denied due process under the North Carolina Constitution when the City failed to give them notice of the June 2006 City Council meeting and an opportunity to be heard before the passing of the ordinance of demolition. In Corum, 330 N.C. at 782, 413 S.E.2d at 289, our Supreme Court held that \u201cin the .absence of an adequate state remedy, one whose state constitutional rights have been abridged has a direct claim against the State under our Constitution.\u201d Therefore, in order for plaintiffs to proceed under the state constitution, they must establish that they lacked an adequate alternative state remedy.\nAn alternative remedy is adequate when \u201ca plaintiff [has] at least the opportunity to enter the courthouse doors and present his claim.\u201d Craig, 363 N.C. at 340, 678 S.E.2d at 355. Phrased differently, \u201can adequate remedy must provide the possibility of relief under the circumstances.\u201d Id.\nIn Copper v. Denlinger, 363 N.C. 784, 789, 688 S.E.2d 426, 429 (2010), our Supreme Court held that \u201can adequate remedy exist[ed] at state law to redress the alleged\u201d due process injury when a statute granted a student the right to appeal first to the School Board and then to superior court from disciplinary decisions. The Supreme Court affirmed an order granting a motion to dismiss the state constitutional due process claim when \u201cthe complaint contained] no allegations suggesting that the student was somehow barred from the doors of either the courthouse or the Board. Nor [did] the complaint allege that he exhausted his administrative remedies, or even that it would have been futile to attempt to appeal his suspension to the Board.\u201d Id. The Court concluded: \u201cThus, under our holdings in both Corum and Craig, an adequate remedy exists at state law to redress the alleged injury, and this direct constitutional claim is barred.\u201d Id.\nCopper controls our decision in this case. The Pattersons\u2019 amended complaint alleged that the City violated their due process rights by failing to give them notice of the 6 June 2006 City Council hearing and failing to give them an opportunity to present evidence that they \u201chad not been given an adequate opportunity to repair the subject dwellings.\u201d The Pattersons, however, had available to them the right to appeal to the City\u2019s Board of Adjustment and the right to seek injunctive relief in superior court \u2014 both remedies that would have redressed any inadequacy in the time allowed to repair their mobile homes.\nIn response to the chief code enforcement officer\u2019s order that the mobile homes be demolished, the Pattersons chose, on 7 April 2006, to sign a notice of intent to repair as allowed by the City\u2019s Code. The chief code enforcement officer then issued a supplemental order requiring that the premises be repaired by 7 May 2006. The order specifically warned that a failure to complete the repairs by that date would render the supplemental order void, and the City would pursue further remedies including demolition of the premises.\nInstead of signing an intent to repair, the Pattersons could have chosen to appeal the initial order of the chief code enforcement officer requiring demolition. Although they chose the alternative route of repair, upon receipt of the supplemental order with its 7 May 2006 deadline, the Pattersons could have appealed to the Gastonia Board of Adjustment on the grounds that they needed additional repair time. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-446(c) (providing for appeal to housing appeals board from \u201cany decision or order of the public officer ... by any person aggrieved thereby\u201d); Gastonia, N.C., Code of Ordinances ch. 16, art. V, \u00a7 16-132(d) (allowing appeal to Board of Adjustment from \u201cany decision or order of the chief code enforcement officer\u201d within 10 days of issuance or service of order). That appeal would also have had the effect of suspending the chief code enforcement officer\u2019s order. The Pattersons would have had the right to seek review of the Board\u2019s decision by way of a petition for writ of certiorari filed with the superior court. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-446(e).\nIn addition, or alternatively, under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-446(f), if the Pattersons believed that the time allowed for repair was inadequate, they could have \u201cpetition[ed] the superior court for an injunction restraining the public officer from carrying out the order or decision and the court [could], upon such petition, issue a temporary injunction restraining the public officer pending a final disposition of the cause.\u201d See also Gastonia, N.C., Code of Ordinances ch. 16, art. V, \u00a7 16-132(e) (providing that \u201c[a]ny person aggrieved by an order issued by the chief code enforcement officer or a decision rendered by the board\u201d may petition superior court for temporary injunction restraining chief code enforcement officer).\nThus, the Pattersons had administrative appeals and the right to seek relief in superior court to bar the demolition of their mobile homes \u2014 remedies that would have allowed them to present evidence that they had not been given enough time to repair their property, precisely the process they claim they were denied. Further, the Pattersons claim that given more time, they would have performed their acknowledged duty to bring their property into compliance with the City\u2019s Minimum Housing Code. The administrative remedies and petition for injunctive relief could have provided the necessary additional time. Plaintiffs provide no explanation why they did not pursue these remedies and make no argument that pursuit of the remedies would have been futile. Consequently, under Copper, an adequate remedy existed for the Pattersons at state law to redress their alleged injury, and their direct constitutional claims are, therefore, barred.\nThe Pattersons, however, point to Wiggins v. City of Monroe, 73 N.C. App. 44, 326 S.E.2d 39 (1985), in which this Court reversed summary judgment entered in favor of the City even though the plaintiffs had not attempted to avoid demolition of their house by pursuing their administrative remedies. Wiggins predates Corum and does not specifically address state constitutional claims.\nNevertheless, in Wiggins, the chief building inspector had \u2014 as authorized by the City \u2014 directed the plaintiffs that the City would allow them to avoid demolition if they began repairs on the house within 10 days and completed the repairs within 60 days. Id. at 46, 326 S.E.2d at 41. Although the plaintiffs began their repairs within the 10-day time period, the City demolished the house 13 days into the 60-day repair period. Id. This Court held that although the chief building inspector had the \u201clegal right initially to pursue either remedy \u2014 repair or demolition \u2014 he could not abandon the chosen remedy \u2014 the reparations \u2014 in midstream.\u201d Id. at 48, 326 S.E.2d at 42. \u201cOnce the alternate remedy [of repair was] elected, it [could not] be arbitrarily withdrawn.\u201d Id., 326 S.E.2d at 43.\nWiggins stands in stark contrast with this case. Here, the full 60-day period allowed for repair had elapsed without the Pattersons having completed the repairs. The supplemental order provided that if the Pattersons did not comply with the deadline, then their mobile homes would be demolished. The Chief Code Enforcement Officer\u2019s July letter did not change the deadline. As a result, unlike the City in Wiggins, the City of Gastonia did not withdraw the repair remedy in mid-stream. It simply enforced its deadline. While the Pattersons had remedies they could have pursued to obtain an extension of that deadline, they chose not to do so. Wiggins does not provide a basis for reversing summary judgment on the Pattersons\u2019 constitutional claims.\nThe Pattersons further argue that the administrative remedies were immaterial because the City Council was required to conduct an evidentiary hearing prior to passing the ordinance ordering demolition and that the failure to do so violated due process. The sole authority cited by the Pattersons is N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-443(5), which provides:\nThat, if the owner fails to comply with an order to remove or demolish the dwelling, the public officer may cause such dwelling to be removed or demolished. The duties of the public officer set forth in this subdivision shall not be exercised until the governing body shall have by ordinance ordered the public officer to proceed to effectuate the purpose of this Article with respect to the particular property or properties which the public officer shall have found to be unfit for human habitation and which property or properties shall be described in the ordinance. No such ordinance shall be adopted to require demolition of a dwelling until the owner has first been given a reasonable opportunity to bring it into conformity with the housing code. This ordinance shall be recorded in the office of the register of deeds in the county wherein the property or properties are located and shall be indexed in the name of the property owner in the grantor index.\n(Emphasis added.) Plaintiffs argue that the italicized language requires that the City Council \u201cmake a finding that a property owner has been given a reasonable opportunity to repair the dwelling before the ordinance to demolish can be issued.\u201d\nNothing in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-443(5) requires that the City Council make any findings or conduct an evidentiary hearing. Plaintiffs\u2019 argument would require that we rewrite the statute to read: \u201cNo such ordinance shall be adopted to require demolition of a dwelling until [the governing body has made a finding that] the owner has first been given a reasonable opportunity to bring it into conformity with the housing code.\u201d It is well established, however, that \u201c[w]e have no power to add to or subtract from the language of the statute.\u201d Ferguson v. Riddle, 233 N.C. 54, 57, 62 S.E.2d 525, 528 (1950). The statute requires that the property owner be given a reasonable opportunity to repair the property; it does not require that the City Council conduct an evidentiary hearing and make a finding that the owner received the reasonable opportunity.\nAs the statute states and this Court noted in Newton v. City of Winston-Salem, 92 N.C. App. 446, 451, 374 S.E.2d 488, 492 (1988), the factual determinations are made in a hearing before the public officer. In Newton, the Court found that the plaintiff had no opportunity to be heard on the determination that a dwelling should be demolished because the hearing for which the plaintiff received notice involved an order to repair and not an order to demolish. Id. The demolition order was based only on the building inspector\u2019s determination without benefit of a hearing, that the condition of the property had changed due to vandalism. Id.\nHere, the Chief Code Enforcement Officer issued an order for demolition after a hearing at which Billy Patterson appeared. The officer made the finding that repair of the \u201cdwelling [could not] be made at a reasonable cost in relation to the value of the dwelling\u201d under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-443(3)(b). Thus, in contrast to Newton, the Pattersons in this case were given an opportunity to be heard on the fundamental question regarding whether \u201cthe repairs cannot be made at a reasonable cost in relation to the value of the dwelling.\u201d Newton, 92 N.C. App. at 451, 374 S.E.2d at 492.\nIf plaintiffs disagreed with that determination or, upon electing to attempt to repair the properties, believed they had not been given a long enough repair period, then plaintiffs had adequate alternative state remedies they could, but did not, pursue. The trial court, therefore, properly entered summary judgment in favor of the City on the Pattersons\u2019 state constitutional claims.\nIll\nWith respect to their tort claims for conversion, trespass to chattels, and trespass, the Pattersons contend that the trial court should not have found them barred by sovereign immunity. It is, however, \u201ca fundamental rule that sovereign immunity renders this state, including counties and municipal corporations herein, immune from suit absent express consent to be sued or waiver of the right of sovereign immunity.\u201d Data Gen. Corp. v. Cnty. of Durham, 143 N.C. App. 97, 100, 545 S.E.2d 243, 246 (2001).\nA city may waive sovereign immunity by purchase of insurance:\n(a) Any city is authorized to waive its immunity from civil liability in tort by the act of purchasing liability insurance. Participation in a local government risk pool pursuant to Article 23 of General Statute Chapter 58 shall be deemed to be the purchase of insurance for the purposes of this section. Immunity shall be waived only to the extent that the city is indemnified by the insurance contract from tort liability. No formal action other than the purchase of liability insurance shall be required to waive tort immunity, and no city shall be deemed to have waived its tort immunity by any action other than the purchase of liability insurance.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-485(a) (2011). Sovereign immunity is not waived if the municipality\u2019s insurance excludes the claim from coverage. See Doe v. Jenkins, 144 N.C. App. 131, 135, 547 S.E.2d 124, 127 (2001) (\u201c[B]ecause the insurance policy does not indemnify defendant against the negligent acts alleged in plaintiff\u2019s complaint, defendant has not waived its sovereign immunity . . . .\u201d).\nThe Pattersons do not address whether their claims are covered or excluded by the City\u2019s insurance coverage. Instead, the Pattersons seem to argue that, regardless of any absence of insurance, the City waived sovereign immunity by failing to follow the procedures in its Code. Although the Pattersons have not demonstrated that the City failed to follow proper procedures, the Pattersons, in any event, have not cited cases addressing sovereign immunity, but rather have relied on cases addressing constitutional claims or public official immunity even though the Pattersons sued only the City and not any public officials. The Pattersons have not, therefore, identified any error in the trial court\u2019s decision that sovereign immunity barred their claims for conversion, trespass to chattels, and trespass to real property.\nIV\nFinally, the Pattersons contend that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment as to their claim for inverse condemnation. The Pattersons have acknowledged in their brief, however, that they cannot bring an inverse condemnation claim for the loss of mobile homes because mobile homes are considered personal property. See Hensley v. Ray\u2019s Motor Co. of Forest City, Inc., 158 N.C. App. 261, 264, 580 S.E.2d 721, 723 (2003) (observing that \u201c[traditionally, the law treats a mobile home not as an improvement to real \u2022property but as a good, defined and controlled by the UCC as something \u2018movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale ....\u2019\u201d (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 25-2-105(1) (2001))); City of Durham v. Woo, 129 N.C. App. 183, 191, 497 S.E.2d 457, 462 (1998) (\u201cThis definition clearly indicates that for purposes of condemnation, \u2018property\u2019 is limited to interests in real property, and does not include personal property.\u201d).\nThe Pattersons nonetheless argue that the City\u2019s unauthorized entry onto the property they leased supported a claim for inverse condemnation. In an inverse condemnation action, a plaintiff must show:\n(1) a taking (2) of private property (3) for a public use or purpose. Although an actual occupation of the land, dispossession of the landowner, or physical touching of the land is not necessary, a taking of private property requires \u2018a substantial interference with elemental rights growing out of the ownership of the property.\u2019 A plaintiff must show an actual interference with or disturbance of property rights resulting in injuries which are not merely consequential or incidental.\nAdams Outdoor Adver. of Charlotte v. N.C. Dep\u2019t of Transp., 112 N.C. App. 120, 122, 434 S.E.2d 666, 667 (1993) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Long v. City of Charlotte, 306 N.C. 187, 199, 293 S.E.2d 101, 109 (1982)).\nThe Pattersons cite no authority and we have found none suggesting that the City\u2019s entry onto a leasehold in accordance with its authority under the City\u2019s Minimum Housing Code and the enabling legislation constitutes a taking within the meaning of inverse condemnation. The trial court, therefore, properly granted summary judgment on plaintiffs\u2019 inverse condemnation claim.\nAffirmed.\nChief Judge MARTIN and Judge STROUD concur.\n. We note that while the affidavit of the chief code enforcement officer for the City of Gastonia states that the only mobile homes demolished by the City were six mobile homes torn down in November 2006, plaintiffs assert in their brief on appeal that the City demolished certain of the mobile homes in June 2006 and others were demolished in August and September 2006. Plaintiffs\u2019 claim does not appear to be supported by the record, although the specific date of demolition is not germane to our consideration of the issues in the case.\n. In their reply brief, plaintiffs also contend that the City was required to issue subsequent orders to demolish following the supplemental orders to repair, citing N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-443(5a). This contention was not the basis of the due process claims as alleged in the amended complaint and, therefore, is not properly before this Court.\n. Sovereign immunity means that \u201ca subordinate division of the state, or agency exercising statutory governmental functions like a city administrative school unit, may be sued only when and as authorized by statute.\u201d Smith v. Hefner, 235 N.C. 1, 6, 68 S.E.2d 783, 787 (1952). Whereas public official immunity provides that: \u201c[A] public official, engaged in the performance of governmental duties involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, may not be held personally liable for mere negligence in respect thereto.\u201d Id. at 7, 68 S.E.2d at 787.", "type": "majority", "author": "GEER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Gray Layton Kersh Solomon Furr & Smith, P.A., by Michael L. Carpenter and William E. Moore, Jr., for plaintiffs-appellants.", "Stott, Hollowell, Palmer & Windham, L.L.P., by Martha Raymond Thompson and Lindsay E. Willis, for defendantappellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "BILLY G. PATTERSON, PEARNELL PATTERSON, and KEITH PATTERSON, Plaintiffs v. THE CITY OF GASTONIA, Defendant\nNo. COA11-520\n(Filed 1 May 2012)\n1. Constitutional Law \u2014 due process claim \u2014 not barred by governmental immunity \u2014 amended complaint \u2014 no prejudice\nThe trial court erred by dismissing plaintiffs\u2019 cause of action to the extent it asserted a claim for violation of due process under the North Carolina Constitution as the claims were not barred by governmental immunity. However, because the court subsequently allowed plaintiffs to amend their complaint to reassert their due process claims, plaintiffs were not prejudiced by the error.\n2. Constitutional Law \u2014 due process claims \u2014 no service on plaintiff required \u2014 adequate state remedy existed\nThe trial court did not err by granting defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment as to plaintiffs\u2019 due process claims. Defendant was not required to serve notices, complaints, and orders regarding the demolition of plaintiffs\u2019 mobile homes on plaintiff Keith Patterson as his interest in the mobile homes did not appear anywhere in the public record. Furthermore, plaintiffs\u2019 claim that they were denied due process under the North Carolina Constitution when defendant failed to give them notice of a City Council meeting and an opportunity to be heard before the passing of the ordinance of demolition was barred as an adequate remedy existed at state law to redress their alleged injury.\n3. Appeal and Error \u2014 preservation of issues \u2014 sovereign immunity \u2014 bar to tort claims \u2014 failure to cite authority\nThe trial court did not err in a case involving the demolition of plaintiffs\u2019 mobile homes by concluding that plaintiffs\u2019 tort claims for conversion, trespass to chattels, and trespass were barred by sovereign immunity. Plaintiffs failed to cite cases addressing sovereign immunity, instead relying on cases addressing constitutional claims or public official immunity, even though plaintiffs sued only the City of Gastonia and not any public officials.\n4. Eminent Domain \u2014 inverse condemnation \u2014 no authority that actions constituted a taking\nThe trial court did not err in granting summary judgment as to plaintiffs\u2019 claim for inverse condemnation. Plaintiffs cited no authority, and the Court of Appeals found none, suggesting that defendant City\u2019s entry into a leasehold in accordance with its authority under the City\u2019s Minimum Housing Code and the enabling legislation constituted a taking within the meaning of inverse condemnation.\nAppeal by plaintiffs from orders entered 16 January 2009, 23 November 2009, and 9 December 2010 by Judges David S. Cayer, Timothy L. Patti, and W. Robert Bell respectively in Gaston County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 10 October 2011.\nGray Layton Kersh Solomon Furr & Smith, P.A., by Michael L. Carpenter and William E. Moore, Jr., for plaintiffs-appellants.\nStott, Hollowell, Palmer & Windham, L.L.P., by Martha Raymond Thompson and Lindsay E. Willis, for defendantappellee." }, "file_name": "0233-01", "first_page_order": 243, "last_page_order": 259 }