{ "id": 4356293, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DEMARIO JAQUINTA ROLLINS", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Rollins", "decision_date": "2012-05-15", "docket_number": "No. COA11-969", "first_page": "443", "last_page": "457", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "220 N.C. App. 443" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "354 N.C. 372", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 138413 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/354/0372-01" ] }, { "cite": "651 S.E.2d 279", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639564 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "287" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/651/0279-01" ] }, { "cite": "631 S.E.2d 868", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636215 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "873" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/631/0868-01" ] }, { "cite": "650 S.E.2d 29", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639310 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "33" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/650/0029-01" ] }, { "cite": "652 S.E.2d 299", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639685 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "300, 301" }, { "page": "301", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" }, { "page": "301" }, { "page": "300" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/652/0299-01" ] }, { "cite": "661 S.E.2d 732", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 342", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4150926 ], "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0342-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 N.C. App. 308", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8156410 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "320" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/186/0308-01" ] }, { "cite": "548 S.E.2d 501", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "505", "parenthetical": "quoting Rich, 351 N.C. at 393-94, 527 S.E.2d at 303" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 629", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135983 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "634", "parenthetical": "quoting Rich, 351 N.C. at 393-94, 527 S.E.2d at 303" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0629-01" ] }, { "cite": "111 S. Ct. 29", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "90" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "112 L. Ed. 2d 7", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "498 U.S. 802", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6235240, 6238188, 6237841, 6237108, 6236790, 6236441, 6236154, 6237501, 6235838, 6235551 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/498/0802-01", "/us/498/0802-10", "/us/498/0802-09", "/us/498/0802-07", "/us/498/0802-06", "/us/498/0802-05", "/us/498/0802-04", "/us/498/0802-08", "/us/498/0802-03", "/us/498/0802-02" ] }, { "cite": "388 S.E.2d 84", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "104" }, { "page": "92" }, { "page": "105" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 56", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5305472 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0056-01" ] }, { "cite": "220 S.E.2d 572", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "289 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566333 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/289/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "216 S.E.2d 160", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "162" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "26 N.C. App. 440", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8553180 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "443" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/26/0440-01" ] }, { "cite": "721 S.E.2d 395", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "402", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Miller, 26 N.C. App. 440, 443, 216 S.E.2d 160, 162, aff'd, 289 N.C. 1, 220 S.E.2d 572 (1975)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "218 N.C. App. 329", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4364115 ], "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "340", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Miller, 26 N.C. App. 440, 443, 216 S.E.2d 160, 162, aff'd, 289 N.C. 1, 220 S.E.2d 572 (1975)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/218/0329-01" ] }, { "cite": "220 S.E.2d 545", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "552" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "288 N.C. 660", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570518 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "669" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/288/0660-01" ] }, { "cite": "178 N.C. App. 460", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8378360 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "466" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/178/0460-01" ] }, { "cite": "560 S.E.2d 776", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "781" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "355 N.C. 294", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 220055 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "301" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/355/0294-01" ] }, { "cite": "261 S.E.2d 114", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "117" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 95", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573434 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "98" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0095-01" ] }, { "cite": "679 S.E.2d 865", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "870", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 98, 261 S.E.2d 114, 117 (1980)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "198 N.C. App. 457", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4168856 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "465", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 98, 261 S.E.2d 114, 117 (1980)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/198/0457-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 N.C. App. 57", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8154614 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "62" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/186/0057-01" ] }, { "cite": "555 S.E.2d 557", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "581" }, { "page": "581-82" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "426 S.E.2d 692", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "697" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 N.C. 431", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2546948 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "440" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/333/0431-01" ] }, { "cite": "247 S.E.2d 905", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "917" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "295 N.C. 559", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566309 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "581" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/295/0559-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 S.E.2d 859", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "864" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 N.C. App. 252", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11079314 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "259" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/138/0252-01" ] }, { "cite": "527 S.E.2d 299", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "307" }, { "page": "303" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 386", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155839 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "400" }, { "page": "393-94" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0386-01" ] }, { "cite": "571 S.E.2d 583", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 418", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511532 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0418-01" ] }, { "cite": "559 S.E.2d 5", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "10" }, { "page": "17" }, { "page": "11" }, { "page": "14" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "148 N.C. App. 310", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9365770 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "318" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/148/0310-01" ] }, { "cite": "365 S.E.2d 571", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "578-79" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 663", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2566745 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "675" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0663-01" ] }, { "cite": "457 S.E.2d 841", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "853", "parenthetical": "\"Evidence of other crimes committed by a defendant may be admissible under Rule 404(b" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "340 N.C. 264", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 790203 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "284", "parenthetical": "\"Evidence of other crimes committed by a defendant may be admissible under Rule 404(b" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/340/0264-01" ] }, { "cite": "678 S.E.2d 361", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "365" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "197 N.C. App. 682", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4168043 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "688" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/197/0682-01" ] }, { "cite": "725 S.E.2d 445", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "448" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "220 N.C. App. 495", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4356855 ], "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "499" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/220/0495-01" ] }, { "cite": "724 S.E.2d 154", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "159" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "220 N.C. App. 63", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4356276 ], "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "69" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/220/0063-01" ] }, { "cite": "389 S.E.2d 48", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "54" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 268", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5306215 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "278-79" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0268-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 N.C. App. 174", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8372826 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "176, 179-80" }, { "page": "178" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/187/0174-01" ] }, { "cite": "704 S.E.2d 276", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "364 N.C. 608", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 2010, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "697 S.E.2d 490", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "494-95", "parenthetical": "finding sufficient evidence of malice where defendant, whose license was revoked, drove more than 90 miles per hour, passed through a red light without stopping, and traveled the wrong way on a highway in order to evade arrest for breaking and entering and larceny" }, { "page": "494-95" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "206 N.C. App. 512", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4178002 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "518-19" }, { "page": "518" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/206/0512-01" ] }, { "cite": "354 N.C. 372", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 138413 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "408" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/354/0372-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1389, "char_count": 34092, "ocr_confidence": 0.752, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.6129919910375035e-08, "percentile": 0.35143342333858074 }, "sha256": "dc26df6953380b719408316ef3fcd6aadbf374c9362b9058dd9b610f53a6bc0a", "simhash": "1:8f25746a7c3fa5c6", "word_count": 5637 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:35:53.925153+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges ROBERT C. HUNTER and ROBERT N. HUNTER, JR. concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DEMARIO JAQUINTA ROLLINS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "GEER, Judge.\nDefendant Demario Jaquinta Rollins appeals from his conviction of second degree murder. Defendant, who had no license, collided with the victim\u2019s car during the course of a high speed chase by police. On appeal, defendant primarily argues that the State presented insufficient evidence of malice and, therefore, defendant could not be convicted of second degree murder. We find the evidence in this case materially indistinguishable from the evidence found sufficient in State v. Mack, 206 N.C. App. 512, 697 S.E.2d 490, disc. review denied, 364 N.C. 608, 704 S.E.2d 276 (2010), and State v. Lloyd, 187 N.C. App. 174, 652 S.E.2d 299 (2007). The trial court, therefore, properly denied defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the second degree murder charge.\nFacts\nThe State\u2019s evidence at trial tended to show the following facts. Defendant has never had a driver\u2019s license and twice \u2014 on 1 May 2009 and 19 May 2009 \u2014 -was cited for operating a motor vehicle without a license. Both citations were still pending on 22 May 2009.\nOn the afternoon of 22 May 2009, defendant and four women, Toni Jackson, Somona Johnson, Jalyssa Morris, and Jenesia Craig, decided to drive to Concord Mills Mall in defendant\u2019s Buick in order to shoplift. Defendant drove despite his lack of a license. Once at the mall, the group split up to shoplift, mostly taking clothes. They all left the mall, but then decided to go back to steal tennis shoes.\nA manager at Finish Line shoe store saw Ms. Craig put a pair of shoes in a shopping bag. When confronted, she ran from the store, and a store employee called the police. Ms. Jackson drove defendant\u2019s car through the mall parking lot to pick up Ms. Craig.\nOfficer Joel Patterson of the Concord Police Department was sitting in his patrol car at the mall when he received a call about a larceny in progress with a description of the woman involved. Officer Patterson drove around the mall parking lot until he saw a woman matching that description get into the backseat of a Buick later identified as defendant\u2019s car. The Buick pulled out onto a road on the outside of the mall parking lot, and Officer Patterson immediately pulled behind the Buick, activating his blue lights and siren. Officer Curtis Anderson of the Concord Police Department also responded and started driving behind Officer Patterson.\nMs. Jackson wanted to stop when the police pulled up behind her because she also did not have a driver\u2019s license. She slowed down, and Officer Patterson thought \u201c[i]t appeared that they were going to stop the vehicle.\u201d However, without the car ever actually stopping, defendant moved from the back seat to the front and took over driving.\nOnce defendant had control of the car, he immediately accelerated and made a sharp left hand turn onto Odell School Road and into the oncoming lane of traffic, although there were no cars in that lane. He continued to drive on the wrong side of the double yellow line in order to pass two cars that were in the right lane.\nDefendant and the officers continued down Odell School Road toward Mallard Creek Road. Defendant was driving between 60 and 70 miles per hour in an area with a 45 mile per hour speed limit. Odell School Road has one lane traveling in each direction. When defendant wanted to pass cars heading more slowly in the same direction that he was, he used a turning lane designed for entrance into a sports complex.\nAt the intersection of Odell School Road and Mallard Creek Road, cars were stopped at a stop sign. To avoid the stop sign, defendant drove diagonally right across a mowed corn field, went through a ditch, and then turned right onto Mallard Creek Road. The police officers followed defendant, but used the shoulder of the road to pass the cars stopped at the stop sign.\nDefendant then accelerated to 70 to 80 miles per hour, passing other cars stopped at a red light by using the left hand turn lane. At that point, Officer Patterson testified that he estimated defendant\u2019s vehicle was travelling at approximately 80 miles per hour. Defendant dropped off the right side of the road, jerked hard to the left, crossed the double yellow line, and went straight into oncoming traffic at the crest of a hill. Defendant\u2019s Buick crashed into another vehicle traveling in the opposite lane of travel. Defendant never hit his brakes.\nAn accident reconstruction expert, calculating the speed at impact conservatively, found the minimum speed for defendant\u2019s vehicle at the time of impact was 66 miles per hour. The posted speed limit is 45 miles per hour on that stretch of road.\nMs. Docia Barber, an 84-year-old widow on her way to pick up a prescription at Walgreens, was driving the other car \u2014 she was completely in her lane, traveling only about 25 or 30 miles per hour. The impact on Ms. Barber\u2019s vehicle, as described by the driver of the car immediately behind Ms. Barber (Jackie Stroman), was \u201cso hard like it exploded... all I could see was debris.\u201d Mr. Stroman swerved as defendant\u2019s Buick pushed Ms. Barber\u2019s car back toward Mr. Stroman\u2019s vehicle, but Mr. Stroman was unable to avoid colliding with Ms. Barber.\nAfter colliding with Ms. Barber\u2019s car, defendant\u2019s Buick hit an embankment. Officer Patterson parked behind the Buick, and all of the Buick\u2019s doors opened. When Officer Patterson walked up to the vehicle, defendant was trying to get out from under the steering wheel and the crumbled dashboard. Although the passenger in the front middle seat was only semi-conscious, defendant elbowed her repeatedly until he was able to drag himself over her and out the back passenger door, leaving the female passengers in the car. At that point, defendant was arrested.\nThe fire department had to cut the roof off of Ms. Barber\u2019s vehicle to reach her. Ms. Barber died at the scene after suffering a broken neck, numerous broken ribs, a broken left arm, a broken right thigh, broken lower legs, and a broken right ankle. Mr. Stroman was taken to the hospital, examined, and released. All the occupants of defendant\u2019s Buick survived.\nDefendant was indicted for second degree murder. At trial, defendant conceded he was guilty of manslaughter but argued that he was not guilty of second degree murder. After the jury found him guilty of second degree murder, the trial court sentenced him to a presumptive-range term of 180 to 225 months imprisonment. Defendant timely appealed to this Court.\nI\nDefendant first contends that the trial court erred under Rule 404(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence by admitting various pieces of evidence of bad acts he committed. Long ago, our Supreme Court established that \u201cRule 404(b) state [s] a clear general rule of inclusion of relevant evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts by a defendant, subject to but one exception requiring its exclusion if its only probative value is to show that the defendant has the propensity or disposition to commit an offense of the nature of the crime charged.\u201d State v. Coffey, 326 N.C. 268, 278-79, 389 S.E.2d 48, 54 (1990).\nWe apply a three-step test in determining whether evidence was properly admitted under Rule 404(b). \u201cFirst, is the evidence relevant for some purpose other than to show that defendant has the propensity for the type of conduct for which he is being tried? Second, is that purpose relevant to an issue material to the pending case? Third, is the probative value of the evidence substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice pursuant to Rule 403?\u201d State v. Foust, 220 N.C. App. 63, 69, 724 S.E.2d 154, 159 (2012). With respect to the first and second prongs, we review questions of relevance de novo although we give great deference to the trial court\u2019s relevancy determinations. State v. Houseright, 220 N.C. App. 495, 499, 725 S.E.2d 445, 448 (2012).\nA. Evidence of Shoplifting\nDefendant first contends the trial court committed plain error in admitting evidence regarding the details of the shoplifting expedition that took place immediately prior to the police chase that ended in the collision. We disagree.\nIt is well established that evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b) when the other bad acts are part of the chain of circumstances leading up to the event at issue or when necessary \u201cin order to provide a complete picture for the jury.\u201d State v. Madures, 197 N.C. App. 682, 688, 678 S.E.2d 361, 365 (2009). See also State v. White, 340 N.C. 264, 284, 457 S.E.2d 841, 853 (1995) (\u201cEvidence of other crimes committed by a defendant may be admissible under Rule 404(b) if it establishes the chain of circumstances or context of the charged crime. Such evidence is admissible if the evidence of other crimes serves to enhance the natural development of the facts or is necessary to complete the story of the charged crime for the jury.\u201d (internal citation omitted)).\nHere, the fact that defendant was part of a shoplifting group targeting the mall for clothes and sneakers helped explained why defendant took over driving from Ms. Jackson, who wanted to stop; why he did not want police to search the vehicle and, therefore, why there was a police chase; and, ultimately, why he was attempting so aggressively to evade the officers chasing him. Without information about defendant\u2019s participation in the shoplifting expedition, the jury would not have a complete picture of what occurred on 22 May 2009 and why.\nOur appellate courts have previously upheld the admission of similar evidence. In State v. Bray, 321 N.C. 663, 675, 365 S.E.2d 571, 578-79 (1988), the Supreme Court held that in a trial for the shooting of a highway patrol trooper, the trial court properly admitted evidence of the defendant\u2019s escape from jail and everything that happened from the time of the escape through the shooting because the defendant\u2019s desire to do whatever necessary to avoid capture gave him a motive for killing the trooper. The Court explained: \u201cThe chain of events from the time of [defendant and another individual\u2019s] escape demonstrates their attempt to avoid apprehension: they assaulted the jailer with a pipe to escape from jail; they broke into an Arkansas home and stole a rifle and a truck; they drove to North Carolina; they stole a South Carolina license plate for the truck; they borrowed a pistol; they shot a state trooper, stole his revolver, then fled the scene; they broke into another home, where they stole another gun.\u201d Id.\nJust as the evidence in Bray of an escape, an assault, and larcenies explained why defendant shot the trooper, the voluminous and organized nature of the shoplifting in this case explained why defendant was driving in the manner that he was for purposes of the malice requirement of second degree murder. See Mack, 206 N.C. App. at 518-19, 697 S.E.2d at 494-95 (finding sufficient evidence of malice where defendant, whose license was revoked, drove more than 90 miles per hour, passed through a red light without stopping, and traveled the wrong way on a highway in order to evade arrest for breaking and entering and larceny); Lloyd, 187 N.C. App. at 176, 179-80, 652 S.E.2d at 300, 301 (finding sufficient evidence of malice for second degree murder conviction when defendant, who knew his license was suspended, drove extremely dangerously in an effort to avoid arrest for having stolen the vehicle he was driving, including driving 85 to 90 miles per hour, passing several cars in a no-passing zone despite oncoming traffic, and forcing a car off the road).\nAlthough defendant argues that the specific details of the shoplifting should have been excluded, those details are important since a jury would not be able to understand why a person who had shoplifted a single shirt or DVD would be driving at speeds of up to 80 miles per hour in order to avoid arrest. We hold that the evidence regarding the shoplifting was relevant for a material purpose other than propensity and that this probative value was not outweighed by any unfair prejudice to defendant. The trial court did not, therefore, commit plain error in admitting the evidence of shoplifting.\nB. Defendant\u2019s Citations for Driving Without a License\nDefendant next contends that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence \u201cthe bare fact defendant received two criminal charges for no operator\u2019s license in May 2009\u201d and by instructing the jury that it could consider that evidence to prove malice. The State presented evidence that defendant received two citations for driving without a license in May 2009, including one only three days before the crash resulting in Ms. Barber\u2019s death.\nThese citations \u2014 showing that defendant had been repeatedly directed that driving without a license was unlawful but persisted in doing so \u2014 were relevant to malice. This Court held in Lloyd, id. at 178, 652 S.E.2d at 301 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added): \u201cWhether defendant knew that he was driving with a suspended license tends to show that he was acting recklessly, which in turn tends to show malice. Malice is an essential element of second degree murder. Thus, evidence that defendant was knowingly operating a motor vehicle without a valid license was relevant to the crime he was being tried for, and defendant\u2019s contention is without merit.\"\nDefendant, however, cites State v. Wilkerson, 148 N.C. App. 310, 318, 559 S.E.2d 5, 10 (Wynn, J., dissenting), rev\u2019d for reasons in dissenting opinion, 356 N.C. 418, 571 S.E.2d 583 (2002). Judge Wynn\u2019s dissent, adopted by the Supreme Court, concluded that the trial court erred, under Rule 404(b), in admitting \u201cthe bare fact of defendant\u2019s prior convictions\u201d for drug offenses. Id. at 329, 559 S.E.2d at 17.\nJudge Wynn reasoned that Rule 404(b) permits evidence of other crimes in order to prove purposes other than propensity, such as those enumerated in Rule 404(b), and a bare conviction, without the underlying facts, cannot in most cases prove any of the enumerated purposes. Id. at 319, 559 S.E.2d at 11. He noted, however, that a conviction for a traffic-related offense may \u201cshow the malice necessary to support a second-degree murder conviction,\u201d because it was \u201cthe underlying evidence that showed the necessary malice, not the fact that a trial court convicted the defendant.\u201d Id. at 325, 559 S.E.2d at 14.\nIn State v. Rich, 351 N.C. 386, 400, 527 S.E.2d 299, 307 (2000), one of the cases cited by Judge Wynn, the Supreme Court stressed that the defendant\u2019s prior speeding convictions were not offered to show that he was speeding at the time of collision, but rather \u201cshow that defendant knew and acted with a total disregard of the consequences, which is relevant to show malice,\u201d a proper purpose under Rule 404(b). Consistent with this emphasis on a defendant\u2019s knowledge \u2014 and not the bare fact of a prior conviction \u2014 this Court has held that pending charges as well as prior convictions can show the necessary knowledge to make the charges \u201cadmissible under Rule 404(b) as evidence of malice to support a second degree murder charge.\u201d State v. McAllister, 138 N.C. App. 252, 259, 530 S.E.2d 859, 864 (2000).\nThus, because Lloyd establishes that defendant\u2019s citations are relevant to malice for purposes of second degree murder, the analysis in Wilkerson does not apply. The trial court did not, therefore, err in admitting the evidence of defendant\u2019s citations for driving without a license.\nC. Defendant\u2019s Post-Collision Actions\nFinally, defendant contends that Officer Patterson should not have been allowed to testify about defendant\u2019s actions immediately after the collision. According to Officer Patterson, when he ordered everyone in the Buick to put their hands up,\nthe driver was elbowing the middle passenger in the neck and face area, hitting her several times, until her body finally laid over the front seat to the back seat. The driver then drug himself out from underneath the dashboard, drug himself over the middle passenger\u2019s body out the back rear passenger door.\nIn continuing to relate what he witnessed, Officer Patterson characterized defendant\u2019s actions as \u201chitting\u201d the semi-conscious woman in the middle seat and reported that \u201c[h]er head was snapping back every time he hit her.\u201d Officer Patterson then described defendant as dragging himself over the woman\u2019s entire body to get out the rear passenger door of the vehicle and away from Officer Patterson.\nDefendant claims this testimony was inadmissible evidence that he assaulted a female. However, Officer Patterson never testified that defendant \u201cassaulted\u201d the female passenger. Instead, he just described what he personally witnessed when he approached defendant\u2019s vehicle after the collision.\nAs for the evidence\u2019s admissibility under Rule 404(b), we note that defendant, as support for his contention that the State failed to prove malice, has argued that \u201cthe evidence about defendant\u2019s conduct after the accident shows lack of malice. Thus, defendant exited the wrecked Buick through an undamaged door, did not try to flee, promptly surrendered to police, allowed himself to be handcuffed, and waited patiently at the scene.\u201d The State\u2019s evidence \u2014 suggesting defendant was continuing to try to escape regardless of the collision and in callous disregard for the condition of his passengers\u2014 supports a finding of malice. See State v. Wilkerson, 295 N.C. 559, 581, 247 S.E.2d 905, 917 (1978) (holding that \u201cany act evidencing wickedness of disposition, hardness of heart, cruelty, recklessness of consequences, and a mind regardless of social duty and deliberately bent on mischief, though there may be no intention to injure a particular person is sufficient to supply the malice necessary for second degree murder\u201d (internal quotation marks omitted)). The trial court, therefore, properly admitted Officer Patterson\u2019s testimony about defendant\u2019s post-collision actions.\nII\nDefendant next argues that the trial court committed plain error by allowing Officers Patterson and Anderson to testify to legal conclusions regarding whether defendant committed the criminal offenses of felony speeding to elude an officer, careless and reckless driving, and speeding over 15 miles an hour above the speed limit. \u201cUnder the plain error rule, defendant must convince this Court not only that there was error, but that absent the error, the jury probably would have reached a different result.\u201d State v. Jordan, 333 N.C. 431, 440, 426 S.E.2d 692, 697 (1993).\nDuring the State\u2019s examination of Officer Patterson, he testified that the officers were not allowed to engage in a car pursuit or continue a pursuit unless they observed conduct that they believed to be a felony. According to Officer Patterson, he believed that the requirements for felony speeding to elude arrest had been met because defendant had, while fleeing the police, engaged in the crime of careless and reckless driving and the crime of speeding over 15 miles per hour above the speed limit. Officer Anderson similarly testified that \u201cthe manner in which he was driving became a felony insofar as felony speed to elude. His driving became very fast and it was reckless.\u201d He also testified that defendant was going 25 miles per hour over the speed limit.\nOur Supreme Court has previously recognized that some testimony of officers regarding violations of the law may constitute \u201ca shorthand statement of fact rather than ... a legal term of art or an opinion as to the legal standard the jury should apply,\u201d rendering the testimony admissible. State v. Anthony, 354 N.C. 372, 408, 555 S.E.2d 557, 581 (2001). In Anthony, the Supreme Court found no error when the officer testified that the defendant had violated a restraining order and that the officer, therefore, had authority to arrest him. The Court reasoned that the officer, based on his training and experience, \u201cdescribed the evidence available to him at the time; paraphrased the statute in neutral terms; then gave the opinion that under the statute, the facts described to him by [the victim\u2019s father] provided probable cause to arrest defendant.\u201d Id. The Court concluded that \u201c[i]n so doing, [the officer] was not providing an interpretation of the law,\u201d but instead \u201cwas offering an explanation of his actions.\u201d Id., 555 S.E.2d at 581-82.\nLikewise, here, the officers were not interpreting the law for the jury, but rather were testifying regarding their observations in order to explain why they pursued defendant in a high-speed chase. We hold that this testimony was admissible under Anthony.\nRegardless, we cannot conclude that even if the officers\u2019 testimony regarding the potential crimes had been excluded, the jury would probably have reached a different verdict. The same officers who testified regarding the potential felony fleeing to elude arrest and traffic crimes also testified that they did not believe defendant was driving \u201cso inherently dangerous, that somebody\u2019s going to get killed and he doesn\u2019t care.\u201d In other words, as defendant has vigorously argued, these officers testified contrary to the State\u2019s position regarding malice for purposes of second degree murder. Given the officers\u2019 entire testimony, we cannot conclude that the jury probably would have reached a different verdict in the absence of the challenged testimony.\nIll\nDefendant next contends that the trial court should have granted his motion to dismiss the second degree murder charge because of insufficient evidence of malice. \u201cThis Court reviews the trial court\u2019s denial of a motion to dismiss de novo.\u201d State v. Smith, 186 N.C. App. 57, 62, 650 S.E.2d 29, 33 (2007). \u201c \u2018Upon defendant\u2019s motion for dismissal, the question for the Court is whether there is substantial \u2022evidence (1) of each essential element of the offense charged, or of a lesser offense included therein, and (2) of defendant\u2019s being the perpetrator of such offense.\u2019 \u201d State v. Lowry, 198 N.C. App. 457, 465, 679 S.E.2d 865, 870 (2009) (quoting State v. Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 98, 261 S.E.2d 114, 117 (1980)). \u201cSubstantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence necessary to persuade a rational juror to accept a conclusion.\u201d State v. Mann, 355 N.C. 294, 301, 560 S.E.2d 776, 781 (2002). \u201cWhen reviewing a motion to dismiss based on insufficiency of the evidence, this Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, giving the State the benefit of all reasonable inferences.\u201d State v. Bullock, 178 N.C. App. 460, 466, 631 S.E.2d 868, 873 (2006).\nHere, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a reasonable juror could find the following facts. Defendant knowingly was driving without a license even though he had been cited twice for that offense in the prior three weeks. When another driver wanted to pull over for the police, defendant took control of the vehicle by climbing over the back seat without allowing the vehicle to come to a stop. He was attempting to evade the police because of a large volume of shoplifted items in his vehicle.\nWhile traveling at a high rate of speed well in excess of the speed limit, defendant crossed a yellow line in order to pass cars, twice passed vehicles using a dedicated turn lane, drove through a mowed com field and a ditch to get around cars stopped at a stop sign, and again crossed the center line to collide head-on with another vehicle while traveling 66 miles per hour and without having applied his brakes. Then, in a further attempt to avoid arrest, defendant repeatedly struck an apparently semi-conscious passenger in his efforts to get out of the vehicle and away from the police.\nThese facts are materially indistinguishable from those in Mack and Lloyd and, therefore, those decisions control. In Mack, we affirmed the denial of a motion to dismiss for second degree murder where \u201cdefendant, whose license was revoked, drove extremely dangerously in order to evade arrest for breaking and entering and larceny. The State presented evidence that when an officer attempted to stop defendant, because of the stolen televisions in his trunk, defendant fled, driving more than 90 miles per hour, passing through a red light without stopping, and traveling the wrong way on a highway....\u201d 206 N.C. App. at 518, 697 S.E.2d at 494-95.\nIn Lloyd, the defendant \u201cwas knowingly operating a motor vehicle without a valid license.\u201d 187 N.C. App. at 178, 652 S.E.2d at 301. He stole a van, was chased by the police, drove 85 to 90 miles per hour, and passed several cars in a no-passing zone where there was oncoming traffic. Id. at 176, 652 S.E.2d at 300.\nDefendant does not address Mack or Lloyd in his initial brief, but rather only very briefly discusses them in his reply brief. He attempts to distinguish the two cases by pointing to the testimony of Officers Patterson and Anderson, which he summarizes as showing\ndefendant had control over his vehicle, handled his car well, never ran a red light, maintained good lane control, and never came close to a \u201cnear miss\u201d or \u201cclose call\u201d until the moment of impact. Further, both officers testified defendant did not create a clear and unreasonable danger to others, did not drive dangerously in excess of safe speeds, did not drive in a manner inconsistent with due regard for the safety of others, and did not present a risk to the public. Still further, both officers testified they themselves never believed defendant\u2019s driving was so reckless as to threaten public safety, was inherently dangerous, was a clear and imminent danger to others, or would result in a fatality.\nDefendant also cites Officer Patterson\u2019s testimony that officers must abandon pursuit \u201cif there is a clear and unreasonable danger to the officer or other vehicles\u201d and that Officer Patterson did not discontinue pursuit in this case. Officer Anderson testified similarly. Defendant claims that the officers\u2019 testimony establishes that he acted without malice.\nThis purported distinction of Mack and Lloyd overlooks our standard of review. Defendant has, at best, pointed to inconsistencies in the State\u2019s evidence. It is, however, well established that \u201c [contradictions and discrepancies, even in the State\u2019s evidence, do not warrant the allowance of a motion to dismiss, these being for the jury to resolve.\u201d State v. Curry, 288 N.C. 660, 669, 220 S.E.2d 545, 552 (1975). Here, after the officers gave the testimony on which defendant relies, the State elicited evidence that Ms. Barber\u2019s family had filed a still pending lawsuit against the officers and the City of Concord, alleging that the officers had violated their department\u2019s pursuit policy. \u201c \u2018It is elementary that the jury may believe all, none, or only part of a witness\u2019 testimony[.]\u2019 \u201d State v. Barr, 218 N.C. App. 329, 340, 721 S.E.2d 395, 402 (2012) (quoting State v. Miller, 26 N.C. App. 440, 443, 216 S.E.2d 160, 162, aff'd, 289 N.C. 1, 220 S.E.2d 572 (1975)). Here, the jury reasonably could have chosen to credit the officers\u2019 and other witnesses\u2019 testimony about what defendant actually did while being chased, could have found that this conduct was sufficiently reckless to establish malice, and could have determined that the officers\u2019 claims that defendant presented no clear danger to others were self-serving and not credible.\nWhen we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the facts are virtually identical to those in Mack and Lloyd. Based on those decisions, the State presented sufficient evidence of malice, and the trial court properly denied the motion to dismiss.\nIV\nDefendant lastly contends that the trial court\u2019s instruction regarding the jury\u2019s duty to reach a verdict varied from the pattern jury instruction in a manner that \u201cunconstitutionally coerced the guilty verdict.\u201d The pattern instruction reads: \u201cAll twelve of you must agree to your verdict. You cannot reach a verdict by majority vote. When you have agreed upon a unanimous verdict(s) (as to each charge) your foreperson should so indicate on the verdict form(s).\u201d N.C.P.I. \u2014 Crim. 101.35 (2011). This pattern instruction is based upon N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1235(a) (2011), which states: \u201cBefore the jury retires for deliberation, the judge must give an instruction which informs the jury that in order to return a verdict, all 12 jurors must agree to a verdict of guilty or not guilty.\u201d\nHere, the trial court instructed: \u201cYou must be unanimous in your decision. In other words, all twelve jurors must agree. When you have agreed upon a unanimous verdict, your foreperson may so indicate on the verdict form that will be provided to you.\u201d Defendant claims that telling the jurors that they had to agree \u2014 rather than that they had to agree to a verdict \u2014 caused the jurors to \u201cerroneously construe\u201d the charge to be \u201ca mandatory instruction that a verdict must be reached.\u201d\nDefendant bases his argument on a quote from State v. Price, 326 N.C. 56, 388 S.E.2d 84, sentence vacated on other grounds, 498 U.S. 802, 112 L. Ed. 2d 7, 111 S. Ct. 29 (1990). In Price, after being told by the jury foreman that the jury was hung during the death penalty deliberation phase, the trial court instructed the jury that \u201c \u2018I am going to ask that you resume your deliberations in an attempt to return a recommendation. I have already instructed you that your recommendation must be unanimous, that is, each of you must agree on the recommendation.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 90, 388 S.E.2d at 104. Although the Court found no error in this instruction, the Court stressed that \u201cin telling a jury that its recommendation as to punishment must be unanimous, the trial court must be vigilant to inform the jurors that whatever recommendation they do make must be unanimous and not to imply that a recommendation must be reached.\u201d Id. at 92, 388 S.E.2d at 105.\nWhile the instruction at issue, standing alone, could be construed as implying that the jury was required to reach an agreement, we do not review a particular jury instruction in isolation. Instead, State v. Hooks, 353 N.C. 629, 634, 548 S.E.2d 501, 505 (2001) (quoting Rich, 351 N.C. at 393-94, 527 S.E.2d at 303).\n\u201c[t]he charge of the court must be read as a whole ... , in the same connected way that the judge is supposed to have intended it and the jury to have considered it .... It will be construed contextually, and isolated portions will not be held prejudicial when the charge as [a] whole is correct. If the charge presents the law fairly and clearly to the jury, the fact that some expressions, standing alone, might be considered erroneous will afford no ground for reversal.\u201d\nLooking at the instructions given in this case as a whole, we cannot agree that the jury instruction was coercive. The language that \u201call 12 jurors must agree\u201d comes directly from the statute. The sentences surrounding the language at issue both referenced unanimity in connection with an actual decision or verdict. Later, the trial court reiterated what the jury should do \u201c[w]hen you have unanimously agreed upon a verdict and are ready to announce it. . . .\u201d (Emphasis added.) Although the pattern instruction more carefully instructs the jury, we hold that the trial court\u2019s instruction, in this case, when viewed in context did not mislead the jury and was not, therefore, coercive of the jury\u2019s verdict.\nNo error.\nJudges ROBERT C. HUNTER and ROBERT N. HUNTER, JR. concur.\n. Defendant also claims that his conviction violates the Fourteenth Amendment. Because he did not raise this constitutional argument in the trial court, we will not address it for the first time on appeal. See State v. Gobal, 186 N.C. App. 308, 320, 651 S.E.2d 279, 287 (2007), aff\u2019d per curiam, 362 N.C. 342, 661 S.E.2d 732 (2008).", "type": "majority", "author": "GEER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General R. Marcus Lodge, for the State.", "Appellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender Daniel R. Pollitt, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DEMARIO JAQUINTA ROLLINS\nNo. COA11-969\n(Filed 15 May 2012)\n1. Evidence \u2014 prior crimes or bad acts \u2014 admitted for acceptable purpose \u2014 relevant\u2014not unduly prejudicial\nThe trial court did not err in a second-degree murder case arising out of a vehicular accident by admitting evidence of defendant\u2019s shoplifting, citations for driving without a license, and actions immediately after the collision. The evidence was relevant for purposes other than to show that defendant had the propensity for the type of conduct for which he was being tried, the purposes were relevant to an issue material to the pending case, and the probative value of the evidence substantially outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice pursuant to Rule 403 of the Rules of Evidence.\n2. Evidence \u2014 police officer testimony \u2014 legal conclusions\u2014 observations \u2014 no different outcome\nThe trial court did not commit plain error in a second-degree murder case arising out of a vehicular accident by allowing police officers to testify regarding their legal conclusions that defendant committed the criminal offenses of felony speeding to elude an officer, careless and reckless driving, and speeding over 15 miles an hour above the speed limit. The evidence was admissible under State v. Anthony, 354 N.C. 372, as the officers were not interpreting the law for the jury, but rather were testifying regarding their observations in order to explain why they pursued defendant in a high-speed chase. Furthermore, even if the officers\u2019 testimony had been excluded, the jury probably would not have reached a different verdict.\n3. Homicide \u2014 second-degree murder \u2014 malice\u2014sufficient evidence\nThe trial court did not err in a second-degree murder case by failing to dismiss the charge for insufficient evidence. The State presented sufficient evidence of all the elements of the crime, including malice.\n- 4. Jury \u2014 instructions\u2014duty to reach a verdict \u2014 not coercive\nAlthough the trial court\u2019s instruction regarding the jury\u2019s duty to reach a verdict varied from the pattern jury instruction, when viewed in context, the instruction did not mislead the jury and was not, therefore, coercive of the jury\u2019s verdict.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 6 July 2010 by Judge Calvin E. Murphy in Mecklenburg County Superior Co\u00fart. Heard in the Court of Appeals 14 December 2011.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General R. Marcus Lodge, for the State.\nAppellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender Daniel R. Pollitt, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0443-01", "first_page_order": 453, "last_page_order": 467 }