{ "id": 4357932, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA V. CHRIS ALAN JONES, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Jones", "decision_date": "2012-06-05", "docket_number": "No. COA10-475-2", "first_page": "236", "last_page": "241", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "221 N.C. App. 236" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "626 S.E.2d 271", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635151 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "286" }, { "page": "286", "parenthetical": "citations and internal quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/626/0271-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 S.E.2d 487", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "489", "parenthetical": "citing Chimel, 395 U.S. at 765, 23 L. Ed. 2d at 695" }, { "page": "489-90" }, { "page": "490" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 222", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4715156 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "226", "parenthetical": "citing Chimel, 395 U.S. at 765, 23 L. Ed. 2d at 695" }, { "page": "226-27" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0222-01" ] }, { "cite": "395 U.S. 752", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1772077 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "763" }, { "page": "694" }, { "page": "768" }, { "page": "697" }, { "page": "765" }, { "page": "695" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/395/0752-01" ] }, { "cite": "64 L. Ed. 2d 796", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "446 U.S. 941", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6277664, 6275708, 6276260, 6274984, 6278350, 6275343, 6278644, 6276539, 6279286, 6278967, 6277367, 6275996, 6278014 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/446/0941-08", "/us/446/0941-03", "/us/446/0941-05", "/us/446/0941-01", "/us/446/0941-10", "/us/446/0941-02", "/us/446/0941-11", "/us/446/0941-06", "/us/446/0941-13", "/us/446/0941-12", "/us/446/0941-07", "/us/446/0941-04", "/us/446/0941-09" ] }, { "cite": "257 S.E.2d 551", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "556" }, { "page": "557" }, { "page": "558" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 N.C. 86", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568503 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "92" }, { "page": "95" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/298/0086-01" ] }, { "cite": "324 S.E.2d 241", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "249" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 553", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4753359 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "563" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0553-01" ] }, { "cite": "166 L. Ed. 2d 116", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "549 U.S. 867", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 297", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3787721 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "316" }, { "page": "316" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0297-01" ] }, { "cite": "549 S.E.2d 897", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "901" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "145 N.C. App. 335", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11437432 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "340-41" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/145/0335-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-95", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(g)", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "703 S.E.2d 772", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 581, "char_count": 11593, "ocr_confidence": 0.759, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.315005732208552e-08, "percentile": 0.3884344222385166 }, "sha256": "3cc80388d808d87b450752caf86c906c0fc1c5974424ed88d1761399014105a7", "simhash": "1:ab651842ada6935a", "word_count": 1911 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:36:11.101860+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges STEPHENS and STROUD concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA V. CHRIS ALAN JONES, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MARTIN, Chief Judge.\nOur recitation of the facts is limited to those events deemed relevant to the issues before us on remand. Details regarding the underlying facts of this case can be found in State v. Jones, _N.C. App. _, 703 S.E.2d 772 (2010).\nOn 21 December 2010, this Court issued an opinion awarding defendant a new trial, finding that the trial court committed plain error when it admitted a State Bureau of Investigation (\u201cSBI\u201d) crime lab report into evidence without testimony by the analyst and allowed the arresting officer to testify that the substance seized pursuant to arrest was crack cocaine. This Court reasoned that the report was testimonial in nature and thus subject to Sixth Amendment protection, and that the officer\u2019s testimony alone was not sufficient to identify the substance beyond a reasonable doubt. Because this Court awarded a new trial on these grounds, it declined to address defendant\u2019s argument that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.\nThereafter, the State filed petitions for writ of supersedeas and discretionary review with the North Carolina Supreme Court, arguing that the Court of Appeals erred in ordering a new trial. The Court granted these petitions and both parties submitted briefs. The State then filed a motion to amend the record on appeal to include a copy of the crime lab report showing the substance to be cocaine and a copy of the N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(g)-notice provided to defense counsel by the District Attorney\u2019s Office on 8 September 2009, indicating an intent to introduce the report into evidence. These documents were omitted from the record which had been filed in the Court of Appeals and the State did not argue in its original brief that the N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(g)-notice had been given. The Court granted the motion to amend the record and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of the amended record.\nThe State contends the SBI crime lab report was admissible without testimony of the analyst. We agree.\nUnder N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(g),\n[w]henever matter is submitted to the North Carolina State Crime Laboratory . . . for chemical analysis to determine if the matter is or contains a controlled substance, the report of that analysis certified to upon a form approved by the Attorney General by the person performing the analysis shall be admissible without further authentication and without the testimony of the analyst in all proceedings in the district court and superior court divisions of the General Court of Justice as evidence of the identity, nature, and quantity of the matter analyzed. Provided, however, the provisions of this subsection may be utilized by the State only if:\n(1) The State notifies the defendant at least 15 business days before the proceeding at which the report would be used of its intention to introduce the report into evidence under this subsection and provides a copy of the report to the defendant, and\n(2) The defendant fails to file a written objection with the court, with a copy to the State, at least five business days before the proceeding that the defendant objects to the introduction of the report into evidence.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-95(g) (2011) (emphasis added). Here the State sent a copy of the lab report to defendant\u2019s counsel more than fifteen days before trial, during discovery, and provided him with notice that they intended to use it at trial. Defendant never objected. The notice of intent was not originally included in the record on appeal, according to the State, because defendant did not list the issue of \u201cwhether the trial court committed plain error when it permitted non-expert Officer Tucker to testify to the result of the chemical analysis performed by a SBI analyst that didn\u2019t testify\u201d as a proposed issue, but later included it in his brief after the record on appeal was settled.\nThus, the lab report should have been admitted into evidence without testimony from the SBI analyst, and would be sufficient in itself to identify the substance as cocaine. See State v. Carr, 145 N.C. App. 335, 340-41, 549 S.E.2d 897, 901 (2001). The State, therefore, would not need to rely on the testimony of Officer Tucker to identify the substance, which, on its own, would have been insufficient. For this reason, the grounds on which this Court previously awarded a new trial are no longer applicable.\nAccordingly, we now address defendant\u2019s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to file a motion to suppress the evidence found pursuant to the search of his jacket made incident to arrest. Defendant contends that had his counsel filed a motion to suppress the crack cocaine found in his jacket pocket, it would have succeeded because Officer Tucker exceeded the scope of the search incident to arrest. After careful consideration, we disagree.\n\u201cTo prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must first show that his counsel\u2019s performance was deficient and then that counsel\u2019s deficient performance prejudiced his defense.\u201d State v. Allen, 360 N.C. 297, 316, 626 S.E.2d 271, 286, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 867, 166 L. Ed. 2d 116 (2006). \u201c[I]f a reviewing court can determine at the outset that there is no reasonable probability that in the absence of counsel\u2019s alleged errors the result of the proceeding would have been different, then the court need not determine whether counsel\u2019s performance was actually deficient.\u201d State v. Braswell, 312 N.C. 553, 563, 324 S.E.2d 241, 249 (1985). \u201c[T]o establish prejudice, a defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel\u2019s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.\u201d Allen, 360 N.C. at 316, 626 S.E.2d at 286 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).\nAlthough searches conducted without search warrants are generally unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, there are specific exceptions. State v. Cherry, 298 N.C. 86, 92, 257 S.E.2d 551, 556 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 941, 64 L. Ed. 2d 796 (1980). One such exception is a search incident to lawful arrest. Id. Search incident to lawful arrest is justified by the need to ensure officer safety and preserve evidence. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685, 694 (1969). A search incident to lawful arrest is limited in scope to the area from which the arrested person might have obtained a weapon or some item that could have been used as evidence against him. Id. at 768, 23 L. Ed. 2d at 697. The parameters of search incident to arrest in a given case depend upon the particular facts and circumstances. State v. Parker, 315 N.C. 222, 226, 337 S.E.2d 487, 489 (1985) (citing Chimel, 395 U.S. at 765, 23 L. Ed. 2d at 695). \u201cThe effect of putting handcuffs on the person under arrest has not been held to negate the existing circumstances surrounding a search but is considered to be only one factor in determining the necessity of the search.\u201d Cherry, 298 N.C. at 95, 257 S.E.2d at 557. For this reason, a \u201cdefendant in custody need not be physically able to move about in order to justify a search within a limited area once an arrest has been made.\u201d Id. at 95, 257 S.E.2d at 558.\nThe North Carolina Supreme Court has upheld the legality of the search of a defendant\u2019s jacket, which was three or four feet away, incident to his arrest when the defendant, upon being confronted by police, made a motion towards his jacket, creating a belief in the officer that he was armed. Parker, 315 N.C. at 226-27, 337 S.E.2d at 489-90. Based on the totality of the circumstances, and bearing in mind the need to ensure officer safety, the Court determined that the search was reasonable in this scenario. Id. at 227, 337 S.E.2d at 490.\nHere, when Officer Tucker grabbed defendant by the wrists, he ran. While attempting to evade capture, defendant tried to punch Officer Tucker in the face while keeping his right hand inside his jacket. Defendant refused to remove his hand from his jacket pocket despite being ordered to do so. The jacket eventually came off during the struggle. Like the defendant\u2019s motion toward his jacket in Parker, this behavior led Officer Tucker to believe that defendant may be armed. After defendant was subdued, handcuffed, and placed in Officer Tucker\u2019s patrol vehicle, Officer Tucker walked about ten feet and retrieved the jacket from the ground. He then searched the jacket and retrieved a bag containing crack cocaine.\nAccordingly, we find that defendant\u2019s counsel\u2019s failure to file a motion to suppress the crack cocaine found pursuant to the search of the jacket was not prejudicial, because the search incident to defendant\u2019s arrest was lawful. This assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant further contends that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to Officer Tucker\u2019s testimony identifying the controlled substance as crack cocaine and reciting the results of the lab report, and to the lab report itself. We disagree.\nAs discussed above, the lab report itself was admissible under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(g). Because the lab report identifying the substance as crack cocaine was properly admitted, even if it was error to admit Officer Tucker\u2019s testimony, any such error could not have been prejudicial. Therefore, this argument is without merit and we decline to address it further.\nNo error.\nJudges STEPHENS and STROUD concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "MARTIN, Chief Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Catherine F. Jordan, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.", "Staples Hughes, Appellate Defender, by Charlesena Elliott Walker, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA V. CHRIS ALAN JONES, Defendant\nNo. COA10-475-2\n(Filed: 5 June 2012)\n1. Evidence \u2014 chemical analysis report \u2014 adequate notice of report given to defendant \u2014 no objection\n. The trial court did not err in a drugs case by admitting into evidence an SBI crime lab report detailing the results of a chemical analysis without testimony of the analyst. The State sent a copy of the lab report to defendant more than fifteen days before trial and provided defendant with notice that they intended to use it at trial. Defendant never objected.\n2. Constitutional Law \u2014 effective assistance of counsel \u2014 no motion to suppress filed \u2014 search lawful \u2014 no prejudice\nDefendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel in a drug case where his attorney did not file a motion to suppress the evidence found pursuant to the search of his jacket made incident to arrest. Because the search incident to defendant\u2019s arrest was lawful, defense counsel\u2019s failure to file a motion to suppress was not prejudicial.\n3. Constitutional Law \u2014 effective assistance of counsel \u2014 no objection to evidence \u2014 evidence admissible \u2014 no prejudice\nDefendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel in a drug case where his attorney did not object to a police officer\u2019s testimony identifying the controlled substance found in defendant\u2019s jacket as crack cocaine and reciting the results of an SBI lab report, and to the lab report itself. The lab report itself was admissible under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(g) and even if it was error to admit the officer\u2019s testimony, any such error could not have been prejudicial.\nOn remand from the North Carolina Supreme Court by order filed 9 March 2012 vacating the 21 December 2010 decision of the Court of Appeals and remanding the matter with instructions to reconsider in light of the amended record.\nRoy Cooper, Attorney General, by Catherine F. Jordan, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.\nStaples Hughes, Appellate Defender, by Charlesena Elliott Walker, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0236-01", "first_page_order": 246, "last_page_order": 251 }