{ "id": 4357307, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. LAWRENCE DONELL FLOOD, SR.", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Flood", "decision_date": "2012-06-19", "docket_number": "No. COA11-856", "first_page": "247", "last_page": "266", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "221 N.C. App. 247" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "646 S.E.2d 105", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12638717, 12638718, 12638719 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "109-10", "parenthetical": "some citations omitted" }, { "page": "110" }, { "page": "111" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/646/0105-01", "/se2d/646/0105-02", "/se2d/646/0105-03" ] }, { "cite": "411 S.E.2d 376", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "381", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "382" }, { "page": "381-82" }, { "page": "382" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 N.C. App. 675", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523656 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "681", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/104/0675-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 L.Ed.2d 604", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "494 U.S. 1023", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 4836, 5158, 4882, 5207, 5176 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/494/1023-04", "/us/494/1023-03", "/us/494/1023-05", "/us/494/1023-02", "/us/494/1023-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 S.E.2d 470", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "481" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 278", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2492599 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "299" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0278-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 S.E.2d 7", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "15" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 417", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4773087 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "430" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0417-01" ] }, { "cite": "567 S.E.2d 120", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "122" }, { "page": "154" }, { "page": "122-23" }, { "page": "123" }, { "page": "123" }, { "page": "123" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 150", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511282 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "154" }, { "page": "154" }, { "page": "155" }, { "page": "155" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0150-01" ] }, { "cite": "81 S.E.2d 364", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "365", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "365-66", "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "365-66" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "240 N.C. 171", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8596105 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "173", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "173-74" }, { "page": "173-74" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/240/0171-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 S.E.2d 374", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378" }, { "page": "378" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 519", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4772378 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "525" }, { "page": "526" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0519-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 350", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "356" }, { "page": "355" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 762", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4714140 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "770" }, { "page": "769" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0762-01" ] }, { "cite": "389 S.E.2d 48", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "54" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 268", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5306215 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "278-79" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0268-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 382", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3744653 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "386-89" }, { "page": "389" }, { "page": "390" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0382-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1430, "char_count": 47918, "ocr_confidence": 0.741, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.14845846225011575 }, "sha256": "b6c71123e3623ae0c813421eeeeae2e4efd6d162bdd1c9b73c79bc65465b6922", "simhash": "1:060e7030300584f0", "word_count": 7882 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:36:11.101860+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "' Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge CALABRIA concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. LAWRENCE DONELL FLOOD, SR." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "McGEE, Judge.\nJerrod Watlington (Watlington) was shot and killed on 11 August 2007 (the 2007 shooting). Evidence presented at trial showed that Watlington had spent the previous night of 10 August 2011 with Lester Slade (Slade) and Jennifer Small (Small) at their house (the house). Watlington, Slade, and Small all occasionally sold illegal drugs. Evidence at trial suggested that someone came by the house on the morning of 11 August 2007 to buy crack cocaine. There was no crack at the house to sell, so Watlington offered to try to find some. Watlington called Lawrence Donell Flood, Sr. (Defendant) and left to purchase crack from Defendant. Watlington returned, saying that Defendant did not have the amount of crack needed, but that Defendant would have more later in the day.\nAround lunchtime that day, Paul Lloyd (Lloyd) drove his uncle to the house to purchase crack. Watlington called Defendant several times and asked if he could purchase more crack from Defendant. Lloyd drove Watlington to Defendant\u2019s apartment at the Crescent Arms apartment complex (Crescent Arms) in.Graham, in order to procure the crack. Lloyd parked five parking spaces to the right of Defendant\u2019s front door. Lloyd remained in the car while Watlington went to purchase crack from Defendant. Watlington knocked on Defendant\u2019s front door, but nobody answered, so Watlington went around to the rear of the building. Defendant\u2019s apartment was on the end of the building, the farthest to the left when looking at the front of Defendant\u2019s apartment.\nAt approximately 2:30 p.m., a man identified as \u201cRock,\u201d approached Lloyd\u2019s car and shot Lloyd twice through the driver\u2019s side window. Rock was apparently living at Defendant\u2019s apartment, though Rock\u2019s relationship to Defendant was unclear from the testimony at trial. Someone called 911 at 2:32 p.m. to report the shooting. Lloyd survived his wounds.\nThe two key witnesses who testified at trial were Rasheem Currie (Currie), who said he witnessed Defendant shoot and kill Watlington inside Defendant\u2019s apartment sometime between 2:00 p.m. and 3:00 p.m. that same day; and Lloyd, who placed Watlington outside Defendant\u2019s apartment and alive at a time incompatible with the theory that Defendant killed Watlington in Defendant\u2019s apartment. For the jury to convict Defendant, it had to believe Currie and disbelieve Lloyd. The only forensic evidence linking Watlington to Defendant\u2019s apartment was a small amount of Watlington\u2019s blood recovered from the outside doorframe of the rear door to Defendant's apartment, and a small amount of blood recovered from the adjoining patio area that could possibly have come from Watlington and/or Defendant, or some unknown third party.\nThe State offered evidence of a shooting committed by Defendant in 1994, which Defendant moved to suppress. Defendant\u2019s motion to suppress was denied. The jury found Defendant guilty of first-degree murder on 9 December 2009, pursuant to the theory of malice, premeditation and deliberation, and pursuant to the felony murder rule. The jury also found Defendant guilty of first-degree kidnapping, and possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a felony. The jury recommended Defendant be sentenced to \u201clife imprisonment without parole.\u201d Defendant appeals.\nThe dispositive issues in this case are whether the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion to suppress and, if so, whether Defendant was prejudiced by this error. Additional relevant evidence will be discussed in the body of the opinion.\nI.\nDefendant contends in his first argument that the trial court erred by allowing the admission of evidence of facts surrounding a prior homicide committed by Defendant. We agree.\nDefendant filed a motion to exclude certain evidence relating to a 1994 homicide (the 1994 shooting) committed in New Jersey, in which Lorenzo Rue (Rue) was shot twice in the head and killed. The State sought to admit this evidence pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404(b). Defendant pleaded guilty in 1994 to two New Jersey felonies: \u201cFirst degree, aggravated manslaughter and unlawful possession of a weapon.\u201d The fact that Defendant had been convicted of these felonies was properly admitted in support of the charge of possession of a firearm by a felon. Defendant, however, challenged the admissibility of the underlying facts of the 1994 shooting. Defendant claimed there was not sufficient admissible evidence for the jury to find that the facts underlying the 1994 shooting were sufficiently similar to the facts in the present case.\nApplicable Law\nIn State v. Carpenter, 361 N.C. 382, 646 S.E.2d 105 (2007), our Supreme Court reviewed the law governing the admission of evidence of prior crimes or bad acts pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404(b):\nNorth Carolina Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides:\n(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. \u2014 Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake, entrapment or accident.\nWe have characterized Rule 404(b) as a \u201cgeneral rule of inclusion of relevant evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts by a defendant, subject to but one exception requiring its exclusion if its only probative value is to show that the defendant has the propensity or disposition to commit an offense of the nature of the crime charged.\u201d State v. Coffey, 326 N.C. 268, 278-79, 389 S.E.2d 48, 54 (1990). However, we have also observed that Rule 404(b) is \u201cconsistent with North Carolina practice prior to [the Rule\u2019s] enactment.\u201d State v. DeLeonardo, 315 N.C. 762, 770, 340 S.E.2d 350, 356 (1986); accord State v. McKoy, 317 N.C. 519, 525, 347 S.E.2d 374, 378 (1986). Before the enactment of Rule 404(b), North Carolina courts followed \u201c[t]he general rule . . . that in a prosecution for a particular crime, the State cannot offer evidence tending to show that the accused has committed another distinct, independent, or separate offense. This is true even though the other offense is of the same nature as the crime charged.\u201d State v. McClain, 240 N.C. 171, 173, 81 S.E.2d 364, 365 (1954) (citations omitted); see also DeLeonardo, 315 N.C. at 769, 340 S.E.2d at 355 (\u201cSince State v. McClain ... it has been accepted as an established principle in North Carolina that \u2018the State may not offer proof of another crime independent of and distinct from the crime for which defendant is being prosecuted even though the separate offense is of the same nature as the charged crime.\u2019 \u201d). As we explained in McClain, the general rule \u201crests on these cogent reasons\u201d:\n(1) Logically, the commission of an independent offense is not proof in itself of the commission of another crime.\n(2) Evidence of the commission by the accused of crimes unconnected with that for which he is being tried, when offered by the State in chief, violates the rule which forbids the State initially to attack the character of the accused, and also the rule that bad character may not be proved by particular acts, and is, therefore, inadmissible for that purpose.\n(3) Proof that a defendant has been guilty of another crime equally heinous prompts to a ready acceptance of and belief in the prosecution\u2019s theory that he is guilty of the crime charged. Its effect is to predispose the mind of the juror to believe the prisoner guilty, and thus effectually to strip him of the presumption of innocence.\n(4) Furthermore, it is clear that evidence of other crimes compels the defendant to meet charges of which the indictment gives him no information, confuses him in his defense, raises a variety of issues, and thus diverts the attention of the jury from the charge immediately before it. The rule may be said to be an application of the principle that the evidence must be confined to the point in issue in the case on trial.\n240 N.C. at 173-74, 81 S.E.2d at 365-66 (citations and quotation marks omitted); see also McKoy, 317 N.C. at 526, 347 S.E.2d at 378. Thus, while we have interpreted Rule 404(b) broadly, we have also long acknowledged that evidence of prior convictions must be carefully evaluated by the trial court.\nAccordingly, we have observed that evidence admitted under Rule 404(b) \u201cshould be carefully scrutinized in order to adequately safeguard against the improper introduction of character evidence against the accused.\u201d State v. Al-Bayyinah, 356 N.C. 150, 154, 567 S.E.2d 120, 122 (2002). When evidence of a prior crime is introduced, the \u201c \u2018natural and inevitable tendency\u2019 \u201d for a judge or jury \u201c \u2018is to give excessive weight to the vicious record of crime thus exhibited and either to allow it to bear too strongly on the present charge or to take the proof of it as justifying a condemnation, irrespective of the accused\u2019s guilt of the present charge.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 154, 567 S.E.2d at 122-23 (quoting IA John Henry Wigmore, Evidence \u00a7 58.2, at 1212 (Peter Tillers ed., 1983)). Indeed, \u201c[t]he dangerous tendency of [Rule 404(b)] evidence to mislead and raise a legally spurious presumption of guilt requires that its admissibility should be subjected to strict scrutiny by the courts.\u201d State v. Johnson, 317 N.C. 417, 430, 347 S.E.2d 7, 15 (1986).\nIn light of the perils inherent in introducing prior crimes under Rule 404(b), several constraints have been placed on the admission of such evidence. Our Rules of Evidence require that in order for the prior crime to be admissible, it must be relevant to the currently alleged crime. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 401 (2005). ... In addition, \u201cthe rule of inclusion described in Coffey is constrained\nby the requirements of similarity and temporal proximity.\u201d Al-Bayyinah, 356 N.C. at 154, 567 S.E.2d at 123. . . . Moreover, as to the \u201csimilarity\u201d component, evidence of a prior bad act must constitute \u201c \u2018substantial evidence tending to support a reasonable finding by the jury that the defendant committed [a] similar act.\u2019 \u201d Al-Bayyinah, 356 N.C. at 155, 567 S.E.2d at 123. \u201cUnder Rule 404(b) a prior act or crime is \u2018similar\u2019 if there are \u2018some unusual facts present in both crimes ....\u2019\u201d Finally, if the propounder of the evidence is able to establish that a prior bad act is both relevant and meets the requirements of Rule 404(b), the trial court must balance the danger of undue prejudice against the probative value of the evidence, pursuant to Rule 403.\nCarpenter, 361 N.C. at 386-89, 646 S.E.2d at 109-10 (some citations omitted).\nThe 1994 Shooting\nAt Defendant\u2019s suppression hearing, Jack Eutsey (Eutsey), a detective for the Newark, New Jersey Police Department in 1994 (now retired), testified that he investigated the 1994 shooting for which Defendant pleaded guilty. Eutsey testified that, at the time of the 1994 shooting, Rue was twenty-two years old, and Defendant was nineteen. Rue was having a sexual relationship with Yesenia Perez (Perez), Defendant\u2019s girlfriend. However, Defendant and Rue did not know each other. Eutsey testified that he did not \u201cthink [Defendant] had knowledge of [Rue] dealing with [Perez][,]\u201d but that Defendant \u201csuspected Ms. Perez of some other activities, and as a result, [Defendant] broke into the apartment when Mr. Rue . . . was in bed with her.\u201d Rue was unclothed at that time because he was in bed with Perez. Eutsey testified that he knew Rue was in bed with Perez only because Perez told him. Rue was discovered \u201cnude, laying face down on the bed.\u201d He had died from two gunshot wounds to the back of the head. Eutsey testified that Perez had indicated to him that \u201cshe was in fear from\u201d Defendant. Perez was the sole eyewitness to the events surrounding the 1994 shooting.\nPerez\u2019s initial story concerning the 1994 shooting did not involve Defendant. Perez first stated to police that \u201cthree black males, unknown black males had broke in.\u201d Perez eventually told police that Defendant had killed Rue. There was no indication the 1994 shooting had anything to do with drugs or any drug transaction, or any robbery attempt. Rue was killed by two shots fired from a .22 caliber handgun. Eutsey testified that, to his best recollection, the shots that killed Rue were fired from close range, but he could not remember if Rue\u2019s wounds were contact wounds \u2014 meaning that the barrel of the gun was touching Rue\u2019s head when the trigger was pulled. Perez told Eutsey that Rue pleaded for his life before Defendant shot him. The .22 caliber handgun used in the 1994 shooting was never recovered.\nState\u2019s evidence in the 2007 Shooting\nIn the case before us, Currie testified that Defendant shot Watlington one time in the back of the head. Timothy Myers (Myers), who had been in jail with Defendant, testified that Defendant had told him Watlington was crying and pleading for his life before Defendant shot him. Currie testified that he was afraid of Defendant because of the killing of Watlington. There was no evidence that Watlington was armed. The .38 caliber handgun used in the 2007 shooting was never recovered.\nThe Trial Court\u2019s Ruling\nThe trial court ruled that evidence surrounding the 1994 shooting could be admitted pursuant to Rule 404(b) for the purposes of showing identity, intent, and knowledge. The trial court seemed to particularly rely on the voir dire testimony of Eutsey, and on the testimony of Myers, that indicated both Watlington and Rue were crying and begging for their lives before being shot. The trial court also stated that it found as similarities between the 1994 shooting and the 2007 shooting that neither handgun was ever recovered; that the two eyewitnesses, Perez and Currie, were both fearful of Defendant; that in both instances Defendant was armed but the victims were not; and that \u201cit appear[ed] that Mr. Watlington had met [Defendant] on one occasion, and on the day of his death, was attempting ... a drug deal with [Defendant], The evidence tend[ed] to show that [Defendant\u2019s] relationship with Mr. Rue was that Mr. Rue was having sexual relations with [Defendant\u2019s] girlfriend.\u201d The trial court further found that both victims were killed with a handgun; one shot to the back of Watlington\u2019s head, and two shots to Rue\u2019s head; and that Rue was twenty-two years old when he was killed, and Watlington was sixteen years old when he was killed.\nKnowledge and Intent\nWe hold that the facts surrounding the 1994 shooting were not admissible to prove intent or knowledge in the 2007 shooting. The State argues that the facts surrounding the 1994 shooting were relevant to prove that Defendant had \u201cknowledge that the weapon used was lethal\u201d and to prove that Defendant had the intent to kill \u2014 specifically that Watlington did not die as the result of an accident. Watlington was killed when a .38 caliber handgun was placed against the back of his head and fired. Clearly the person who committed that act knew it was lethal, and was intended to kill. Whatever slight relevance the 1994 shooting may have had with respect to knowledge and intent in the 2007 shooting, the probative value of this evidence was minimal at best, and the potential for prejudice was great. With respect to knowledge and intent, the probative value of the facts surrounding the 1994 shooting was outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice. N.C.R. Evid. 403. Whether evidence from the 1994 shooting was admissible pursuant to Rule 404(b) for the purposes of proving identity requires more detailed analysis.\nLack of Similarity\nCertain findings of the trial court did not support the requirement of similarity. In 1994, both Defendant and Rue were young men. Defendant was nineteen, and Rue was twenty-two, making Defendant a few years younger than Rue. In 2007, Defendant was thirty-two and Watlington was sixteen. Defendant was a grown man and Watlington was still a youth. We find no similarities with regard to the ages of Rue and Watlington at the time they were killed. Age becomes even less of a similarity when Defendant\u2019s age, relative to the ages of Rue and Watlington, is considered.\nWe also find no relevant similarity in the trial court\u2019s recitation of how Rue and Watlington were linked to Defendant. According to evidence presented at trial, Defendant and Watlington had met before to transact drug business and, on the day he was killed, Watlington had talked to Defendant on the phone several times. The State\u2019s evidence tended to show that there was a drug-related relationship between Defendant and Watlington. There was no evidence of any relationship between Defendant and Rue prior to the 1994 shooting. Eutsey testified that his evidence showed Defendant and Rue were strangers. The fact that Rue and Perez had a sexual relationship, if true, had no bearing on the issue. The only connection between Defendant and Rue suggested by the evidence was that, when Defendant broke into Perez\u2019s apartment, Defendant found Rue (a stranger) in bed with his girlfriend and that Defendant killed him. We find more differences than similarities with this evidence. Carpenter, 361 N.C. at 389, 646 S.E.2d at 110. This \u201cevidence\u201d of similarity lacks probative value. State v. Artis, 325 N.C. 278, 299, 384 S.E.2d 470, 481 (1989), judgment vacated on other grounds, 494 U.S. 1023, 108 L.Ed.2d 604 (1990).\nOther \u201csimilarities\u201d found by the trial court fail to rise above mere generic behavior associated with crimes of this nature. Carpenter, 361 N.C. at 390, 646 S.E.2d at 111. Because they are easily carried and concealed, handguns are all too frequently used in shootings of the kind that occurred in 1994 and 2007. The handgun used in 1994 was a different caliber than the one used in 2007.\nIn the present case, the fact that neither Rue nor Watlington was armed, if true, is of little import. There is no reason to expect that Rue would have armed himself to engage in a romantic interlude with Perez. Further, all evidence suggests that Defendant could not have known whether there was anyone armed in Perez\u2019s apartment when he broke in. In other words, Defendant broke into the apartment without knowing, and apparently without caring, whether there might be an armed person inside.\nWe also give no weight to the fact, if true, that Perez and Currie were both frightened of Defendant. Primarily, the states of mind of Perez and Currie are irrelevant because Defendant had no control over their states of mind. Secondarily, assuming the facts as presented to be true, it would be more unusual in this kind of situation for eyewitnesses not to have been frightened. Perez and Currie were both, according to the State\u2019s evidence, in close proximity to what can fairly be termed executions. It is hard to imagine anything more generic than a feeling of fear in that situation \u2014 including the fear that the shooter might try to harm them if they discussed what they had seen.\nThe same applies to the State\u2019s evidence concerning the behavior of Rue and Watlington prior to being shot. We expect it is the rule, rather than the exception, that individuals who have guns placed to the backs of their heads are fearful and will plead for their lives. Whether such a victim is fearful or not, and whether a victim pleads or not, is again a product of the state of mind of the victim and does not reflect on the perpetrator.\nEvidence that a defendant made victims plead for their lives, for example, would be considered in a different light. That kind of evidence would reflect on the character and, potentially, the modus operandi of the perpetrator, not just the states of mind of the victims. Such are not the facts in this case.\nWe are left with evidence that both Rue and Watlington were killed from shots fired at close range to their heads. Evidence also suggests both victims were lying face down at the time the shots were fired. From the evidence presented, both killings may reasonably be called \u201cexecution style.\u201d\nRight to Confront Witness at Hearing\nDefendant argues that much of Eutsey\u2019s testimony violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the .United States Constitution. Specifically, Eutsey was allowed to testify on voir dire concerning statements Perez had made to him and other police officers in 1994. This testimony was allowed even though the State had apparently been in contact with Perez before the trial and could have subpoenaed her. Defendant\u2019s counsel argued:\nMs. Perez, Your Honor, is available. She is alive, well and can come here and testify. Our information is that the State has been in contact with her. We have, too. And they more recently told her they didn\u2019t need her. They want a secondhand witness to describe an investigation that he can\u2019t testify about.\nDefendant argued that he had not had any opportunity to cross-examine Perez, and that the State had made no showing that she was unavailable. Defendant argued: \u201cIn fact she is available. The State . . . actually had an order, material witness order that I think is still good to have her come from New Jersey.\u201d\nThe State, and the trial court, apparently agreed with Defendant, at least as a general proposition:\nCOURT: All right. I\u2019ve sent the jury back. Detective [Eutsey], if you\u2019d come on back around. Mr. Johnson and Mr. Boone [the attorneys for the State], I\u2019m assuming counsel for [Defendant is saying that a lot of this testimony that [Detective Eutsey\u2019s] testifying to is not admissible.\nMr. Boone: Your Honor, they\u2019re asking questions about facts that would be hearsay. But the questions that I\u2019ve asked [Detective Eutsey] about what he personally observed and circumstances surrounding the crime scene and the crime are such that they would be admissible, and we would contend would be of a type of evidence that would allow for a, a comparison between the two killings.\nThe State then argued to the trial court that \u201cthere are many similarities here that don\u2019t even have to bring into account hearsay or Crawford.\u201d The State further stated that, if the trial court wanted \u201cto go into the hearsay part of it,\u201d there was the testimony that both Rue and Watlington were begging for their lives.\nThe trial court appeared to state that it would not allow Eutsey to testify concerning statements Perez made, though this is not entirely clear from the transcript: Eutsey \u201chas testified that the [c]ourt will not allow him to testify completely what Ms. Perez has testified, but he\u2019s testified to Ms. Perez was a witness to the killing.\u201d\nWhile we find that Defendant raises a valid issue: whether the trial court can consider testimony that violates the Confrontation Clause in making its ruling on the admissibility of Rule 404(b) evidence, we need not answer that question here. This is because we hold that the testimony to which Defendant objects on Confrontation Clause grounds involved facts of the 1994 shooting that were not sufficiently similar to the 2007 shooting.\nAnalysis\nFacts surrounding the 1994 shooting will only be relevant, and thus admissible, if there are \u201c \u2018some unusual facts present\u2019 \u201d in both the 1994 shooting and the 2007 shooting which would allow a \u201c \u2018reasonable inference that the same person committed both the earlier and the later crimes.\u2019 \u201d State v. Haskins, 104 N.C. App. 675, 681, 411 S.E.2d 376, 381 (1991) (citations omitted). The unusual facts need not rise to the level of bizarre or unique signature elements. Id. In Haskins, this Court held that the State failed to provide sufficient 'unusual facts to support a reasonable inference that the defendant committed both an earlier robbery and the robbery for which he was on trial. Id. The State introduced evidence that in both robberies neither perpetrator wore a mask, and in both robberies the perpetrators yelled a demand for money. Id. at 682, 411 S.E.2d at 382. These \u201csimilarities\u201d were too generic to constitute unusual facts. Furthermore, there were numerous dissimilarities between the two robberies. The crimes occurred in different towns, one \u201coccurred on the deserted premises of a bank which was closed, involved gratuitous violence, and was committed by only one perpetrator.\u201d Id. at 682, 411 S.E.2d at 381-82. The other robbery was at a convenience store which was open for business, customers were present, \u201cno shooting took place, and two perpetrators were involved.\u201d Id. at 682, 411 S.E.2d at 382.\nIn the present case, considering all the evidence presented on voir dire, we find many dissimilarities between the 1994 shooting and the 2007 shooting. In 1994, Defendant was nineteen and Rue was twenty-two. In 2007, Defendant was thirty-two and Watlington was sixteen. The 1994 shooting occurred in New Jersey, while the 2007 shooting occurred in North Carolina. The 1994 shooting was a crime of passion. Defendant suspected Perez of being unfaithful, broke into her apartment while she was engaged in sexual activity with Rue, and shot Rue, a man Defendant had never met before, because Rue was being sexually intimate with Perez. Rue was shot in Perez\u2019s bed. Defendant initiated the contact with Rue in the 1994 shooting.\nWatlington (according to the State\u2019s evidence) was shot in Defendant\u2019s apartment. Currie testified that Watlington was shot in Defendant\u2019s kitchen. Watlington had initiated contact with Defendant for the purposes of obtaining drugs, and Watlington had contacted Defendant for drugs in the past. There is certainly no evidence Watlington was involved with any girlfriend of Defendant\u2019s, and there is no evidence that the shooting of Watlington was a crime of passion. There was testimony that, while Defendant was in jail awaiting trial, he told someone that he killed Watlington for the purpose of robbing Watlington. There was no evidence that the shooting of Rue was for the purpose of robbing Rue.\nDefendant made Perez leave the room so she would not witness the killing of Rue. Currie testified that Defendant called Jimmy Downey (Downey) and asked him to come to Defendant\u2019s apartment. Defendant invited Currie and Downey into his apartment and allowed them to witness him shooting Watlington and, in fact, left them alone with Watlington both before and after the shooting. Defendant used a .22 caliber handgun to shoot Rue twice in the head, while Watlington was shot once in the head with a .38 caliber handgun. There was no evidence that Defendant physically assaulted Rue before shooting him, but Currie testified that Defendant kicked Watlington in the head three times before shooting him. Defendant left Rue\u2019s body in Perez\u2019s apartment. Currie testified that Defendant told Downey to get Downey\u2019s car, and Defendant asked Currie to help him carry Watlington\u2019s body to the trunk of Downey\u2019s car. Defendant then instructed Currie and Downey to dispose of Watlington\u2019s body.\nAgainst these dissimilarities, we have the similarity in the manner in which, according to the State\u2019s evidence, both Rue and Watlington were killed \u2014 shots to the back of the head while they were prone. Though the execution-style nature of the killings of both Rue and Watlington was an appropriate factor to consider when making the 404(b) determination, in light of the myriad dissimilarities between the two shootings, we do not find that this single similarity constitutes \u201c \u2018substantial evidence tending to support a reasonable finding by the jury that [Defendant committed [a] similar act.\u2019 \u201d Al-Bayyinah, 356 N.C. at 155, 567 S.E.2d at 123. The primary impact of the evidence surrounding the 1994 shooting was that Defendant was shown to be the kind of person capable of shooting someone in the head because he had done it before in 1994. This is precisely the inference that Rules 403 and 404(b) were enacted to prevent. McClain, 240 N.C. at 173-74, 81 S.E.2d at 365-66. The trial court erred by allowing facts surrounding the 1994 shooting to be admitted at trial.\nII.\nDue to the highly inflammatory nature of the evidence surrounding Defendant\u2019s killing of Rue, and the contradictory evidence presented at Defendant\u2019s trial for the killing of Watlington, we cannot say that there is no reasonable possibility that, absent this error, a different result would have been reached at trial.\nBecause we have to determine the prejudice of the admission of the facts surrounding the 1994 shooting, we must examine the strengths and weaknesses of the State\u2019s case at trial. In doing so, we are not assuming the role of fact finder. We point out weaknesses in the State\u2019s case solely in support of our decision to grant a new trial. If this case is retried, it will be the sole province of the jury to determine weight and credibility with respect to the evidence.\nThe evidence presented at trial was replete with contradictions and internal inconsistencies, and so the prejudicial nature of the facts surrounding the 1994 shooting had a much greater potential to influence the jury\u2019s verdict. There were two narratives presented by the facts at trial. In the State\u2019s narrative, Defendant killed Watlington in Defendant\u2019s apartment \u2014 a killing that was witnessed, and testified to, by Currie. In Defendant\u2019s narrative, Watlington was alive and outside Defendant\u2019s apartment at a time inconsistent with Currie\u2019s narrative. Defendant\u2019s evidence suggested that Watlington was still alive when driven away from the Crescent Arms \u2014 possibly by Rock. Defendant\u2019s evidence suggested that Downey and, most importantly, Currie, were possibly involved in Watlington\u2019s murder.\nCurrie was fourteen on 11 August 2007. Currie testified that he was with his friend Downey, who was driving a silver Ford Taurus owned by Downey\u2019s friend Jennifer Evans, when Defendant called Downey several times and asked Downey and Currie to come to Defendant\u2019s apartment.\nAccording to Currie, when they arrived at Defendant\u2019s apartment, Defendant was holding a handgun and had Watlington lying on the kitchen floor. At one point, Defendant went upstairs, leaving Watlington alone with Currie and Downey before returning to the kitchen. There was no explanation as to why Currie did not attempt to leave the apartment when Defendant went upstairs. There was no evidence suggesting reasons Downey, or Watlington, who was not bound, did not attempt to leave the apartment. While Currie and Downey stood in the kitchen with Defendant and Watlington, Defendant stomped on Watlington\u2019s head two or three times, then shot him once in the head. Defendant went upstairs and Currie heard Defendant talking to a man; then Defendant returned with some black cloth which he wrapped around Watlington\u2019s head. Defendant still had the gun with him, and Currie was afraid to run away. Defendant and Currie carried Watlington\u2019s body out the back door, as Downey pulled the Taurus around to the side of the apartment building. They put Watlington\u2019s body in the trunk of the Taurus, and Defendant told Currie and Downey to dispose of the body. Downey and Currie drove around to the front of the apartment building, where Currie saw broken glass beside a car parked in front of Defendant\u2019s apartment building. Currie saw some Hispanic women standing near the area of the broken glass, and heard people saying to call the police. Downey drove on, and they exited the parking lot. At trial, Currie identified a photograph of Lloyd\u2019s car, taken after the shooting, as the vehicle he had seen next to the broken glass as he left the apartment complex. The first officer on the scene testified that the only glass in front of Defendant\u2019s apartment was glass beside Lloyd\u2019s car from the driver\u2019s side window that had been shot out.\nThe State\u2019s expert testified that Lloyd and Watlington were shot by the same gun. This evidence, combined with Currie\u2019s testimony, suggests that Lloyd was shot before Watlington, though Currie did not notice Lloyd or Lloyd\u2019s shot-up car when he first approached Defendant\u2019s apartment; and Currie did not hear any gunshots other than the one that he says killed Watlington. Defendant was in possession of the same gun that was used to shoot Lloyd at the time Currie and Downey entered Defendant\u2019s apartment. If Watlington was in Defendant\u2019s apartment, then Lloyd had to have been parked in front of Defendant\u2019s apartment building at the time Downey and Currie arrived. This is also inconsistent with the statement of Crescent Arms resident Indigo Lee (Lee) that Downey\u2019s car was parked in front of Defendant\u2019s apartment an hour and a half before Lloyd was shot.\nOther witness testimony makes it clear that immediately after Lloyd was shot, assistance was given to Lloyd, authorities were called, and police arrived. If the police were there when Downey and Currie arrived, they almost certainly would have noticed. If Lloyd had just been shot when Downey and Currie arrived, and the police had not yet arrived, the police would have arrived by the time Currie testified he and Downey drove off with Watlington\u2019s body. Currie, however, testified that people were shouting for someone to call 911 as he and Downey left with Watlington\u2019s body.\nLloyd\u2019s testimony was very clear that Rock was the man who shot him. Other witness testimony supports Lloyd\u2019s testimony in this regard. The State\u2019s theory of the case was that the shooting of Watlington \u201chad occurred immediately prior to the shooting of... Lloyd[.]\u201d Currie\u2019s testimony contradicts this theory as well, because the single handgun used to shoot both Lloyd and Watlington could not have been with Defendant and Rock simultaneously. Watlington could not have been with Defendant and Rock simultaneously, either. In brief, in order for the jury to have believed Currie\u2019s testimony, it had to disregard Lloyd\u2019s testimony as false.\nAccording to Currie, the only gunshot he heard was the one that killed Watlington, though according to the State\u2019s evidence, Lloyd was shot while Currie was only yards away. Currie testified that Downey drove to a house that he and Currie believed was unoccupied, removed Watlington\u2019s body from the trunk, and dumped it in a drainage ditch. Watlington\u2019s blood was found on the driveway of the house. Currie testified that Downey drove to two different self-service car wash businesses, where they used high pressure water hoses to wash blood out of the trunk of the car. Items recovered from the trunk, however, did not show signs of having been exposed to water.\nAccording to the State, Lloyd was shot after Watlington. The State\u2019s ballistics expert testified that Lloyd and Watlington were shot with the same gun. According to Currie\u2019s testimony, however, Defendant still had the gun with him as Defendant and Currie carried Watlington\u2019s body out of the apartment and placed it into the trunk of the car. According to Currie\u2019s testimony, Lloyd had already been shot at the time they drove off with Watlington\u2019s body.\nThe primary witness for Defendant was Lloyd, the other shooting victim that day. Lloyd\u2019s account was incompatible with the account given by Currie. Lloyd testified that he saw Watlington with Rock and another man (not Defendant) just before Rock shot Lloyd. Lloyd further testified that he believed Rock forced Watlington into a black SUV and then drove off in the SUV with Watlington. If Lloyd saw Watlington outside Defendant\u2019s apartment immediately prior to Lloyd\u2019s being shot, then Currie\u2019s account of the events could not have been correct.\nOther witnesses at Defendant\u2019s apartment complex gave testimony that supported Lloyd\u2019s testimony. Currie testified that the shot that killed Watlington was \u201cloud.\u201d Witnesses only reported two shots fired, not three. Lloyd was shot twice. Lee testified that she saw Rock approaching Lloyd\u2019s car and then heard two gunshots. Lee told Graham Police Detective Crystal Sharpe (Detective Sharpe) that she saw Rock get into the rear driver\u2019s side seat of a black SUV. Detective Sharpe testified:\n[Lee] said that [Downey] sped off behind the Expedition. The vehicles went past her apartment and exited the parking lot onto Larry Avenue. She said she previously seen [Downey]\u2019s car parked in the end parking spot in front of [Defendant\u2019s apartment] at about one o\u2019clock that day.\nAnd she said at the time of the incident, [Downey] was driving the car she identified as his, a silver car with plain windows and four doors. She said that the silver car left the parking lot and went in the same direction as the Expedition.\nLee and a friend went to help Lloyd while they waited for the authorities to arrive. A few minutes after the police arrived, Lee saw Defendant and Defendant\u2019s sister walking away from the apartment building. Defendant told Detective Shaipe that he was at his sister\u2019s apartment at the time of the shooting. The first officer arrived on the scene approximately three minutes after someone called and reported the shooting of Lloyd.\nCurrie testified that there was \u201ca lot\u201d of blood collected in the spot where Watlington had been shot. When asked if he saw \u201canything other than blood\u201d like \u201cany [other] kind of tissue,\u201d Currie answered that he saw \u201csome gray stuff, some gray looking material.\u201d However, no confirmed blood or other DNA evidence associated with Watlington was recovered from Defendant\u2019s kitchen. Lee\u2019s testimony, if believed, would not have given Defendant sufficient time to clean up the kitchen before he was seen leaving the apartment complex. Further, according to Detective Sharpe, Lee had seen Downey\u2019s car at the apartment an hour and a half before the time of the shooting, which conflicts with the time frame set out in Currie\u2019s testimony, and would have put Currie and Downey at Defendant\u2019s apartment before Watlington and Lloyd arrived.\nAt 4:17 p.m., Detective Sharpe called and left a message with Defendant\u2019s wife for Defendant to contact Detective Sharpe. Defendant called Detective Sharpe shortly thereafter, and agreed to come to the police station to speak with Detective Sharpe. Defendant, along with his girlfriend, arrived at the station shortly before 7:00 p.m., approximately four and a half hours after Watlington was killed. Defendant told Detective Sharpe that he and his girlfriend had been at his sister\u2019s apartment, and had not been in his apartment, since that morning. Detective Sharpe asked Defendant to submit to a gunshot residue test, and Defendant consented. The test was never submitted for analysis. Detective Sharpe testified that it is recommended that a gunshot residue test be administered within four hours of the firing of the weapon. It had been approximately four and one half hours since the shooting. Defendant then allowed police to come into his apartment and look around. Police saw no signs of foul play or cleanup, and did not smell bleach. Though the State presented some evidence of cleaning in Defendant\u2019s kitchen, there was no evidence presented concerning when this cleaning took place and, more importantly, none of the areas showing signs of having been cleaned were where Currie testified to having seen blood and brain matter. The State presented no evidence of blood, DNA, or cleaning from the spot in the kitchen where Currie testified he saw Defendant shoot Watlington in the head. There was no evidence presented that the areas that did show signs of cleaning were in any manner suspicious or out of the ordinary for normal kitchen cleaning.\nFurther, Currie testified that\n[Defendant] stomped [Watlington] in the back of the head and told him to lay his head down. And then [Defendant] had went upstairs, and when he came back, [Watlington] had lifted his head again. And then [Defendant] stomped, he hit him, he kicked him in the back of the head again. Then he just got over top of him, and he shot him.\nThe coroner testified that Watlington did not have any bruising to his head. Currie did not explain what Watlington was doing when Defendant went upstairs with the gun, leaving Watlington alone with Currie and Downey. Police received an anonymous tip that there had been a body in the trunk of \u201cthe car that [Defendant] was in.\u201d Police searched the trunk of Defendant\u2019s girlfriend\u2019s car, but found nothing. Apparently, the police were receiving multiple anonymous tips concerning Watlington.\nThe first officer arrived on the scene at 2:35 p.m. Jayson Prutzman (Prutzman), an EMS technician, was responding to a call at an apartment complex across the street from Defendant\u2019s apartment at approximately 2:25 p.m. that day. Prutzman testified that he heard what he thought were two gunshots coming from the area of Defendant\u2019s apartment, and used both his radio and his phone to call and immediately report the suspected shots. He testified he made these calls at approximately 2:28 p.m. or 2:30 p.m. At least three residents of the Crescent Arms also heard two shots.\nCrime scene tape was put up around the scene of Lloyd\u2019s shooting shortly after the first officer arrived, and this tape blocked off access to Defendant\u2019s front door. There still a police presence at Defendant\u2019s apartment at the time Defendant allowed Detective Sharpe to walk around in his apartment at about 8:30 p.m. No one reported seeing Defendant enter his apartment, or reported any activity at the apartment, between the time Defendant was seen leaving the area and the time Defendant allowed Detective Sharpe to walk around in the apartment. Lee had informed Detective Sharpe shortly after Lloyd\u2019s shooting that Rock was staying in Defendant\u2019s apartment. The police did not tape off or monitor the rear of Defendant\u2019s apartment building, and did not procure a warrant that day to search the apartment in which they had reason to believe Lloyd\u2019s shooter was staying.\nThe State\u2019s theory of the case was that Watlington was shot before Lloyd. For the State\u2019s theory to be correct, Defendant would have had to somehow have handed the gun over to Rock while Defendant was directing the disposal of Watlington\u2019s body. Currie, however, testified that Defendant retained the gun as Currie and Defendant carried Watlington\u2019s body out to Downey\u2019s vehicle. Currie testified that he never saw Rock. Currie\u2019s testimony tends to undermine this aspect of the State\u2019s theory of the case. However, parts of Currie\u2019s testimony are also incompatible with a scenario in which Lloyd was shot before Watlington.\nThe State argues that Lloyd\u2019s testimony is unreliable because Lloyd had a long history of prior convictions, and Lloyd had initially told police a different story concerning the events of that day. Currie also had a number of prior convictions, and Currie\u2019s account of what happened that day also changed over time. Currie admitted to disposing of Watlington\u2019s body. A jury certainly could decide that Currie had ample incentive to lie at trial. Currie was not charged with any crime, though his testimony was an admission to, inter alia, accessory after the fact to murder. The jury could conclude that Currie received favorable treatment by the State because he testified in a manner that was helpful to the State\u2019s case against Defendant. Downey refused to testify, invoking the Fifth Amendment. Defendant\u2019s request that Downey be granted limited immunity was denied. We cannot say that Currie\u2019s credibility was so unimpeachable, and that Lloyd\u2019s credibility was so suspect, that the credibility issue could be removed from the hands of the jury.\nAccording to the State\u2019s theory, Lloyd had not been shot when Downey and Currie backed into a space in front of Defendant\u2019s apartment, but Lloyd was waiting in his vehicle in front of Defendant\u2019s apartment. However, Lee testified that the car Downey was driving was at Defendant\u2019s apartment about an hour and a half before Lloyd was shot. If true, this testimony places Currie and Downey at the apartment long before Lloyd\u2019s shooting and, therefore, places them at the apartment long before Lloyd and Watlington arrived. Further, Defendant was in possession of the gun that was used to shoot Lloyd while Defendant, Currie and Downey were in Defendant\u2019s apartment, and Defendant did not leave the apartment until they were removing Watlington\u2019s body. According to the State\u2019s own evidence, Lloyd had been shot before Downey and Currie drove off with Watlington\u2019s body.\nLloyd, however, claims he saw Watlington alive in front of Defendant\u2019s apartment just before Rock shot Lloyd, and believes Watlington was forced into the black SUV. Lloyd was asked at trial if the prosecutors had asked him \u201cif [Defendant] shot Jerrod Watlington?\u201d Lloyd responded: \u201cI said couldn\u2019t have, because I seen the boy alive being pulled away to the SUV and taken off.\u201d Lee testified that she saw Rock near Lloyd\u2019s car, heard two shots, then saw Rock get into a black SUV. Lee then saw the SUV speed away, followed by Downey\u2019s silver car. Lee knew Defendant, Rock, Lloyd, and Downey. Lee was also familiar with Lloyd\u2019s and Downey\u2019s vehicles. According to Lee\u2019s testimony, assuming that Downey and Currie did leave the apartment complex in the silver car, they followed the black SUV out of the complex, or at least left at the same time. If Lee\u2019s testimony is believed, Downey and Currie left at the same time as Rock, which was immediately after Rock shot Lloyd. It is not at all clear how the handgun that killed both Watlington and Lloyd could have been passed between Defendant and Rock, and both shootings accomplished, in the timeframe established by the testimony. There was evidence presented at trial supporting a theory that Watlington was driven off alive from the Crescent Arms and killed elsewhere.\nThere was not overwhelming evidence of Defendant\u2019s guilt presented at trial unless Currie\u2019s testimony was believed. There was ample contradictory testimony, and a fair amount of evidence challenging Currie\u2019s testimony. It was for the jury to decide the weight and credibility of all the evidence, and we cannot say that, absent the improper admission of the facts surrounding the 1994 killing of Rue, there was no \u201creasonable possibility that... a different result would have been reached at the trial out of which the appeal arises.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1443(a) (2011). We therefore reverse and remand for a new trial.\nBecause of our holding above, we do not address Defendant\u2019s other arguments on appeal.\nNew trial.\n' Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge CALABRIA concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "McGEE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Mary Carla Hollis, for the State.", "Appellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender Anne M. Gomez, for Defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. LAWRENCE DONELL FLOOD, SR.\nNo. COA11-856\n(Filed 19 June 2012)\n1. Evidence \u2014 prior crimes or bad acts \u2014 homicide\u2014admission prejudicial error \u2014 knowledge\u2014intent\u2014victim\u2019s state of mind \u2014 Confrontation Clause\nThe trial court erred in a first-degree murder, first-degree kidnapping, and possession of a firearm by a felon case by allowing the admission of evidence of facts surrounding a prior homicide committed by defendant. With respect to knowledge and intent, the probative value of the facts surrounding the prior shooting was outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice. Further, whether a victim was fearful and pled for his life showed the victim\u2019s state of mind and did not reflect on the perpetrator. Finally, the testimony that defendant objected to on Confrontation Clause grounds involved facts of the prior shooting that were not sufficiently similar to this shooting.\n2. Evidence \u2014 prior crimes or bad acts \u2014 improper admission of prior homicide \u2014 new trial\nIt was for the jury to decide the weight and credibility of all the evidence in a first-degree murder, first-degree kidnapping, and possession of a firearm by a felon case, and it could not be said that absent the improper admission of the facts surrounding a prior homicide committed by defendant that there was no reasonable possibility that a different result would have been reached at trial. The case was reversed and remanded for a new trial.\nAppeal by Defendant from judgments entered 16 December 2009 by Judge J.B. Allen, Jr. in Superior Court, Alamance County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 10 January 2012.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Mary Carla Hollis, for the State.\nAppellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender Anne M. Gomez, for Defendant." }, "file_name": "0247-01", "first_page_order": 257, "last_page_order": 276 }