{ "id": 4357476, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JEROME ROBINSON, JR.", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Robinson", "decision_date": "2012-06-19", "docket_number": "No. COA11-1163", "first_page": "266", "last_page": "285", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "221 N.C. App. 266" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "379 S.E.2d 30", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "37", "parenthetical": "holding that \"a panel of the Court of Appeals is bound by a prior decision of another panel of the same court addressing the same question, but in a different case, unless overturned by an intervening decision from a higher court\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 N.C. 373", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2483734 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "384", "parenthetical": "holding that \"a panel of the Court of Appeals is bound by a prior decision of another panel of the same court addressing the same question, but in a different case, unless overturned by an intervening decision from a higher court\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/324/0373-01" ] }, { "cite": "327 S.E.2d 888", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that the Court of Appeals lacks the authority to overrule decisions of the Supreme Court of North Carolina and has a \"responsibility to follow those decisions, until otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 N.C. 324", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4724761 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that the Court of Appeals lacks the authority to overrule decisions of the Supreme Court of North Carolina and has a \"responsibility to follow those decisions, until otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/313/0324-01" ] }, { "cite": "464 S.E.2d 45", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "342 N.C. 407", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 796061 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/342/0407-01" ] }, { "cite": "454 S.E.2d 680", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "681-82" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 N.C. App. 106", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11916879 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "108" }, { "page": "108" }, { "page": "108-09" }, { "page": "116" }, { "page": "118" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/118/0106-01" ] }, { "cite": "557 U.S. 364", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3657901 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "2641" }, { "page": "364" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/557/0364-01" ] }, { "cite": "132 S. Ct. 1510", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "case_ids": [ 12189139 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1515" }, { "page": "574" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/566/0318-01" ] }, { "cite": "499 F.3d 711", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 3655811 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "719" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/499/0711-01" ] }, { "cite": "441 U.S. 520", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1780223 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "559" }, { "page": "1884" }, { "page": "481" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/441/0520-01" ] }, { "cite": "489 U.S. 602", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12032926 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "619", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" }, { "page": "1415", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" }, { "page": "661", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/489/0602-01" ] }, { "cite": "700 S.E.2d 926", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "364 N.C. 327", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 2010, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "500 U.S. 248", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6221328 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "250" }, { "page": "1803" }, { "page": "302" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/500/0248-01" ] }, { "cite": "688 S.E.2d 805", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 11, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "812" }, { "page": "812" }, { "page": "812" }, { "page": "815" }, { "page": "811" }, { "page": "815" }, { "page": "805" }, { "page": "809-10" }, { "page": "810" }, { "page": "818, 820" }, { "page": "823", "parenthetical": "emphasis in the original" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "202 N.C. App. 376", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4174496 ], "weight": 10, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "383" }, { "page": "383" }, { "page": "383" }, { "page": "388" }, { "page": "387-88" }, { "page": "376" }, { "page": "379" }, { "page": "379" }, { "page": "393, 396" }, { "page": "401" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/202/0376-01" ] }, { "cite": "263 S.E.2d 711", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "718" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 445", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575234 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "455" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0445-01" ] }, { "cite": "237 S.E.2d 301", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "304-05" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "34 N.C. App. 85", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8547176 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "89" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/34/0085-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 L. Ed. 1879", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "year": 1949, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "338 U.S. 160", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3943769 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1949, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/338/0160-01" ] }, { "cite": "411 S.E.2d 193", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "195", "parenthetical": "citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 93 L. Ed. 1879 (1949), State v. Wooten, 34 N.C. App. 85, 89, 237 S.E.2d 301, 304-05 (1977), and State v. Hardy, 299 N.C. 445, 455, 263 S.E.2d 711, 718 (1980)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 N.C. App. 724", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523891 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "728", "parenthetical": "citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 93 L. Ed. 1879 (1949), State v. Wooten, 34 N.C. App. 85, 89, 237 S.E.2d 301, 304-05 (1977), and State v. Hardy, 299 N.C. 445, 455, 263 S.E.2d 711, 718 (1980)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/104/0724-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 S.E.2d 637", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "642" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 N.C. 734", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573152 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "742" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/305/0734-01" ] }, { "cite": "167 L. Ed. 2d 169", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 S. Ct. 1386", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "549 U.S. 1258", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "457 F.3d 817", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 3790995 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "823" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/457/0817-01" ] }, { "cite": "876 A.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "9" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "274 Conn. 426", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Conn.", "case_ids": [ 3144649 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "441" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/conn/274/0426-01" ] }, { "cite": "462 U.S. 213", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6187462 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "235", "parenthetical": "other citations omitted" }, { "page": "2230", "parenthetical": "other citations omitted" }, { "page": "546", "parenthetical": "other citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/462/0213-01" ] }, { "cite": "460 U.S. 730", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6199658 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "742" }, { "page": "1543" }, { "page": "514" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/460/0730-01" ] }, { "cite": "333 S.E.2d 708", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "713" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 N.C. 337", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4695126 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "343" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0337-01" ] }, { "cite": "454 S.E.2d 229", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "234" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "339 N.C. 695", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2556863 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "703-04" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/339/0695-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167798 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/392/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "669 S.E.2d 290", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "294", "parenthetical": "internal citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 628", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4150837 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "632-33", "parenthetical": "internal citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0628-01" ] }, { "cite": "129 L. Ed. 2d 895", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 S. Ct. 2784", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "512 U.S. 1254", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 39539 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/512/1254-01" ] }, { "cite": "433 S.E.2d 144", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "160" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 N.C. 208", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2530367 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "237" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/334/0208-01" ] }, { "cite": "320 S.E.2d 670", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "673" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 34", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4753586 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "37" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0034-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 S.E.2d 579", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "585" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2550000 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "140-41" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "712 S.E.2d 874", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "878", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Brooks, 337 N.C. 132, 140-41, 446 S.E.2d 579, 585 (1994); State v. Baker, 312 N.C. 34, 37, 320 S.E.2d 670, 673 (1984); and State v. McCollum, 334 N.C. 208, 237, 433 S.E.2d 144, 160 (1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1254, 114 S. Ct. 2784, 129 L. Ed. 2d 895 (1994" }, { "page": "879" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "365 N.C. 162", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4153463 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "167-68", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Brooks, 337 N.C. 132, 140-41, 446 S.E.2d 579, 585 (1994); State v. Baker, 312 N.C. 34, 37, 320 S.E.2d 670, 673 (1984); and State v. McCollum, 334 N.C. 208, 237, 433 S.E.2d 144, 160 (1993" }, { "page": "168-69" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/365/0162-01" ] }, { "cite": "653 S.E.2d 414", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639957 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "418", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/653/0414-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 50", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4150658 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "55", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0050-01" ] }, { "cite": "464 S.E.2d 45", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "342 N.C. 407", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 796061 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/342/0407-01" ] }, { "cite": "454 S.E.2d 680", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "686" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "118 N.C. App. 106", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11916879 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "116" }, { "page": "111" }, { "page": "116" }, { "page": "118" }, { "page": "116" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/118/0106-01" ] }, { "cite": "688 S.E.2d 805", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "824", "parenthetical": "quotations and citations omitted" }, { "page": "817", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "202 N.C. App. 376", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4174496 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "403", "parenthetical": "quotations and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/202/0376-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1545, "char_count": 45406, "ocr_confidence": 0.75, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.3577427154586694e-08, "percentile": 0.3365018578303214 }, "sha256": "0d2fafb072d212209ef961b2562bff60fd3506e5700812f867e97dea5d3d9cb6", "simhash": "1:a381746237de24d6", "word_count": 7395 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:36:11.101860+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge BRYANT concurs.", "Judge ELMORE dissents by separate opinion." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JEROME ROBINSON, JR." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ERVIN, Judge.\nDefendant Jerome Robinson, Jr., appeals from a judgment imposing a four to five month suspended sentence upon Defendant and placing Defendant on supervised probation for a period of twenty-four months based on Defendant\u2019s plea of guilty to one count of felonious possession of cocaine. On appeal, Defendant challenges the denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized at the time of his arrest. After careful consideration of Defendant\u2019s challenge to the trial court\u2019s judgment in light of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that the trial court\u2019s judgment should remain undisturbed.\nI. Factual Background\nA. Substantive Facts\nShortly after midnight on 5 March 2009, Detective Brad Tisdale and Officer M.D. Pittman of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department were on patrol in a marked vehicle in the Lakewood community in Charlotte. At that time, the officers noticed three men sitting in a car parked in a parking lot on Grant Street, a two-way road that ran through the parking lot of an apartment complex. After the officers stopped the patrol vehicle and approached the car to talk with the men, Detective Tisdale went to the driver\u2019s side window while Officer Pittman moved towards the passenger side.\nAs he spoke with the driver, Detective Tisdale noticed that Defendant, who was located in the rear seat behind the driver, held a large number of bills of varying denominations. At the same time, Officer Pittman told Detective Tisdale that there was a machete in the front seat between the driver and the front seat passenger and asked the latter to get out of the car. While Detective Tisdale continued speaking with the driver, Defendant dropped the money that he was holding onto the floor of the car and \u201csuddenly move[d] back, lift[ed] up his waist area, and place[d] his hands behind his back.\u201d\nAfter the front seat passenger left the car, Officer Pittman observed crack cocaine \u201cin plain view\u201d in the front right passenger seat and placed the front right passenger \u201cinto custody for drug related offenses.\u201d At that point, Detective Tisdale \u201cordered [Defendant] to exit the vehicle\u201d and \u201cimmediately conducted a pat-down\u201d while Defendant stood \u201cnext to the vehicle.\u201d Detective Tisdale performed a complete pat-down, \u201cfrom the top to bottom,\u201d including reaching \u201cdown to the waistline .... all the way down past [Defendant\u2019s] knees to [his] ankles\u201d and moving his hands \u201cin a forward motion between [his] crotch and buttocks area.\u201d When Detective Tisdale \u201cmove[d] to [Defendant\u2019s] crotch area,\u201d he placed his \u201chand, flat hand, between his crotch area and his buttocks, [and] felt a hard-like substance between [Defendant\u2019s] buttocks.\u201d Based on his training and experience in \u201cencountering numerous subjects that concealed illegal narcotics in the buttocks area,\u201d Detective Tisdale \u201cimmediately placed [Defendant] in cuffs and escorted him over to [his] vehicle, to a secure area\u201d in order to \u201cconduct a more thorough search.\u201d\nDetective Tisdale\u2019s vehicle was located about twenty feet away from the point at which the pat-down had occurred. Upon reaching that location, Detective Tisdale opened the rear door of the car and positioned Defendant between that door and the passenger seat. Detective Tisdale testified that:\nI asked [Defendant] to lean forward by the waist. As he leaned forward by the waist, I had my flashlight. I looked down the rear of his pants where I [had] felt the hard-like substance. I saw a clear plastic bagg[ie] protruding out from his buttocks. I immediately asked [Defendant] to spread his buttocks apart so the item could fall out. He complied. The crack cocaine was packaged in a clear plastic bagg[ie]. It fell out of his pants. He was able to shake it down. It went down his pants leg and down to the ground. I then secured the cocaine.\nAlthough Detective Tisdale did not insert his hands or the flashlight into Defendant\u2019s pants or pull Defendant\u2019s pants down, he did have \u201c[Defendant] lean forward by the waist and spread [his] butt cheeks far\u201d and pulled the waistband of Defendant\u2019s pants back \u201cmaybe half a foot at most\u201d so he \u201cwas able to see down inside the rear of his pants.\u201d According to Detective Tisdale, no one else was present at the time that he searched Defendant and discovered the crack cocaine.\nB. Procedural History\nOn 5 March 2009, a Magistrate\u2019s Order charging Defendant with felonious possession of cocaine was issued. On 22 March 2010, the Mecklenburg County grand jury returned a bill of indictment charging Defendant with felonious possession of cocaine. On 27 September 2010, Defendant filed a motion seeking to have the evidence seized at the time of his arrest suppressed on the grounds that it had been obtained as the result of an \u201cillegal and unconstitutional stop and seizure.\u201d On 10 February 2011, Judge Kevin M. Bridges entered an order denying Defendant\u2019s suppression motion.\nOn 14 February 2011, Defendant filed a notice reserving the right to seek appellate review of the order denying his suppression motion in the event that he entered a plea of guilty. On the same date, Defendant entered a plea of guilty to felonious possession of cocaine pursuant to a plea agreement in which the State agreed, in return for Defendant\u2019s plea, to recommend that Defendant be sentenced to a term of four to five months imprisonment, with this sentence to be suspended and with Defendant to be placed on supervised probation. The trial court accepted the parties\u2019 plea arrangement and entered judgment accordingly. Defendant noted an appeal to this Court from the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nII. Legal Analysis\nA. Standard of Review\n\u201cThe standard of review in evaluating the denial of a motion to suppress is whether competent evidence supports the trial court\u2019s findings of fact and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law. However, when, as here, the trial court\u2019s findings of fact are not challenged on appeal, they are deemed to be supported by competent evidence and are binding on appeal. Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo and are subject to full review. \u2018Under a de novo review, the court considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment for that of the lower tribunal. State v. Biber, 365 N.C. 162, 167-68, 712 S.E.2d 874, 878 (2011) (citing State v. Brooks, 337 N.C. 132, 140-41, 446 S.E.2d 579, 585 (1994); State v. Baker, 312 N.C. 34, 37, 320 S.E.2d 670, 673 (1984); and State v. McCollum, 334 N.C. 208, 237, 433 S.E.2d 144, 160 (1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1254, 114 S. Ct. 2784, 129 L. Ed. 2d 895 (1994), and quoting State v. Williams, 362 N.C. 628, 632-33, 669 S.E.2d 290, 294 (2008) (internal citation omitted) (other citation omitted).\nB. \u201cSecond Search\u201d of Defendant\nIn his initial challenge to the denial of his suppression motion, Defendant argues that Detective Tisdale conducted two separate searches of his person, that the \u201csecond\u201d search violated his right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, and that, since Detective Tisdale found the hard object between his buttocks during this \u201csecond\u201d search, the evidence seized on that occasion should be suppressed. We do not find Defendant\u2019s argument persuasive.\nThe Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 20 of the North Carolina Constitution protect citizens from unlawful searches and seizures conducted by State officials. U.S. Const. amend. IV, XIV; N.C. Const. art. 1, \u00a7 20. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968), \u201cthe United States Supreme Court recognized the right of a law enforcement officer to detain a person for investigation of a crime without probable cause to arrest him if the officer can point to specific and articulable facts, which with inferences from those facts create a reasonable suspicion that the person has committed a crime. Any investigation that results must be reasonable in light of the surrounding circumstances.\u201d State v. Lovin, 339 N.C. 695, 703-04, 454 S.E.2d 229, 234 (1995).\nIn his brief, Defendant concedes that \u201cthe totality of the circumstances in the present case, including the presence of an unconcealed weapon and what appeared to be drugs in the front seat,\u201d provided ample justification for Detective Tisdale\u2019s decision to request that Defendant exit the car and to pat Defendant down for weapons. Defendant argues, however, that \u201cthe manner and scope of the search that was conducted unquestionably went beyond the limited search allowed by Terry.\u201d In essence, Defendant asserts that Detective Tisdale initially performed a complete pat-down of Defendant\u2019s person for the purpose of determining if Defendant had any weapons and then, having ascertained that Defendant was not armed, undertook an entirely new search of Defendant\u2019s person for the purpose of discovering unlawful drugs and found the \u201chard substance\u201d only \u201cafter the weapons search had already revealed that [Defendant] was not carrying a weapon.\u201d\nAlthough Defendant claims that his characterization of the record is supported by evidence elicited on cross-examination, we conclude that Detective Tisdale\u2019s testimony described a single pat-down search conducted in a fluid manner following Defendant\u2019s removal from the car:\n[PROSECUTOR] Can you describe how you patted the defendant down?\n[OFFICER] I patted the defendant down starting from the top to bottom, beginning with the shoulders. I then asked him to place his arms in the air or spread them out, starting with shoulders. I did a search, pat-down of the arms, going underneath the armpit come down to the waistline. After I go down to the waistline, I go all the way down past their knees to the ankles. Then I come in a forward motion between their crotch and buttocks area. I conducted a thorough pat-down moving my hand upward and come down to the next side, to the left side, and go all the way down past their knees and ankles.\n[PROSECUTOR] Is that what you did with [Defendant] on this date?\n[OFFICER] Yes, sir, I did.\n[PROSECUTOR] Did you note anything from your pat-down?\n[OFFICER] Yes, sir. During my pat-down and based on the sudden movements that I observed the defendant do, I suspected that he may have been concealing a weapon. During the search of the waist area, I did not feel a weapon. That is when my search began to move to his crotch area. As I placed my hand, flat hand, between his crotch area and his buttocks, I felt a hard-like substance between his buttocks.\nAlthough Detective Tisdale did testify that, \u201c[a]s I am searching him and I am not finding any weapons, that is when I went for the drug search,\u201d Detective Tisdale\u2019s testimony, viewed in context, does not support Defendant\u2019s assertion that two separate searches occurred.\n[COUNSEL] You then conducted a search of his person for weapons; true?\n[OFFICER] That\u2019s correct.\n[COUNSEL] Based on your report, it appears as though you did a second search. This is when you felt something inside [Defendant\u2019s] crotch?\n[OFFICER] I am trying to see where I did a second search. It doesn\u2019t say a second search. If I can elaborate on it.\n[COUNSEL] Sure. Please.\n[OFFICER] My statement says he was ordered out of the car. Based on that he was handcuffed and he was patted down for weapons, no weapons were located. Based on his movement [inside the car] and my training and experience, I then suspected that he was placing drugs inside his pants. As I am searching him and I am not finding any weapons, that is when I went for the drug search.\nThe fact that Detective Tisdale was concerned that Defendant possessed either a weapon or drugs and the fact that Detective Tisdale developed certain suspicions based on his training and experience does not transform what was clearly a single, brief, protective search into two separate events. As a result, after carefully reviewing the record, we conclude, consistently with Judge Bridges\u2019 findings of fact, that the essence of Detective Tisdale\u2019s testimony is that, during the course of a valid pat-down for weapons, he discovered a hard object between Defendant\u2019s buttocks. Thus, Defendant\u2019s argument in reliance upon this \u201ctwo search\u201d theory lacks merit.\nC. Probable Cause\nSecondly, Defendant argues that Judge Bridges erred by \u201cconcluding that probable cause arose\u201d \u201cwhen [Detective Tisdale] felt something hard between the defendant\u2019s buttocks.\u201d We disagree.\nThe law of probable cause is well established. An officer may make a warrantless arrest of any person the officer has probable cause to believe has committed a criminal offense. See N.C. [Gen. Stat.] \u00a7 15A-401(b) [(2011)]. \u201cProbable cause\u201d is defined as \u201cthose facts and circumstances within an officer\u2019s knowledge . . . which are sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the suspect had committed or was committing an offense.\u201d The Supreme Court has explained that probable cause \u201cdoes not demand any showing that such a belief be correct or more likely true than false. A practical, nontechnical probability that incriminating evidence is involved is all that is required.\u201d A probability of illegal activity, rather than a prima facie showing of illegal activity or proof of guilt, is sufficient.\nBiber, 365 N.C. at 168-69, 712 S.E.2d at 879 (quoting State v. Williams, 314 N.C. 337, 343, 333 S.E.2d 708, 713 (1985), and Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742, 103 S. Ct. 1535, 1543, 75 L. Ed. 2d 502, 514 (1983), and citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2230, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527, 546 (1983) (other citations omitted).\nIn its order, the trial court found as a fact that:\n7. . . . Detective Tisdale and Officer Pittman made voluntary contact with three individuals that were seated in a parked vehicle in the parking lot of 3317 Grant Street, Charlotte, NC.\n8. That Detective Tisdale, based on his training and experience, is familiar with this area and knows the area to have high drug and high crime activity.\n9. That at the time voluntary contact was made it was late at night, approximately 12:15 am.\n10. That the defendant was seated in the back seat directly behind the driver of the vehicle.\n11. That as Detective Tisdale was speaking with the driver of the vehicle, he observed the defendant holding a large amount of money in different denominations and that he observed the money fall onto the floorboard of the vehicle.\n12. That Detective Tisdale next observed the defendant make a quick movement by placing his right hand behind his back to his pants.\n13. That Officer Pittman notified Detective Tisdale that he observed a machete on the seat between the driver and the front passenger.\n14. That for officer safety Officer Pittman asked the front right passenger, Jeffrey Hairston, to exit the vehicle.\n15. That at this time Officer Pittman observed what he believed to be crack cocaine in plain view on the seat where Hairston had been seated.\n16. That Officer Pittman notified Detective Tisdale of the suspected crack cocaine in plain view.\n17. That Detective Tisdale then ordered the defendant to step out of the vehicle and then detained the defendant in handcuffs for officer safety.\n18. That Detective Tisdale then conducted a pat down of the defendant for weapons. No weapons were found on the defendant\u2019s person.\n19. That based on the totality of the circumstances and based on Detective Tisdale\u2019s training and experience, he believed the defendant may have been concealing illegal narcotics inside his pants.\n20. That Detective Tisdale then conducted a pat down search between the legs of the defendant and felt a hard like substance between the defendant\u2019s buttocks.\nBased on these and other findings, Judge Bridges concluded that \u201c [t]he Detective had probable cause to believe evidence of criminal activity was located on the defendant\u2019s person when he felt something hard between the defendant\u2019s buttocks outside of the defendant\u2019s clothing.\u201d We conclude that Judge Bridges did not err in reaching this conclusion.\nAt the hearing held with respect to Defendant\u2019s suppression motion, Detective Tisdale testified that:\n[OFFICER] ... As I placed my hand, flat hand, between his crotch area and his buttocks, I felt a hard-like substance between his buttocks.\n[PROSECUTOR] Based on your training and experience, what did you expect that might be?\n[OFFICER] From my training and experience and in encountering numerous subjects that concealed illegal narcotics in the buttocks area, I immediately placed the defendant in cuffs and escorted him over to my vehicle, to a secure area, so I could conduct a more thorough search.\nThus, Judge Bridges found that Detective Tisdale immediately inferred, based on his training and experience, that Defendant may have been hiding drugs after encountering a hard substance between his buttocks. The fact that \u201cthe substance was hidden in the cleft of the defendant\u2019s buttocks\u201d was significant, since that is \u201can unlikely place for carrying a legal substance.\u201d State v. Singleton, 274 Conn. 426, 441, 876 A.2d 1, 9 (2005). In addition, according to Judge Bridges\u2019 findings of fact, Detective Tisdale also knew that: (1) Defendant was sitting in a car parked in a high crime area; (2) a large machete was observed between the front passenger\u2019s seat and the driver\u2019s seat; (3) the front seat passenger possessed what appeared to be cocaine; (4) when law enforcement officers began speaking with the occupants of the car, Defendant dropped a large sum of cash onto the floor; and, (5) after dropping money on the floor, Defendant immediately made a quick movement behind his back. As a result, given Defendant\u2019s \u201csuspicious behavior during the traffic stop and [Detective Tisdale\u2019s] subsequent discovery of what he believed to be narcotics in [Defendant\u2019s] buttocks,\u201d Detective Tisdale had \u201cprobable cause to arrest\u201d Defendant. U.S. v. Davis, 457 F.3d 817, 823 (8th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1258, 127 S. Ct. 1386, 167 L. Ed. 2d 169 (2007) (citations omitted). Thus, Judge Bridges did not err by concluding that Detective Tisdale had probable cause to arrest Defendant, since the circumstances surrounding Detective Tisdale\u2019s encounter with Defendant \u201cclearly would warrant a man of reasonable caution in believing that the defendant was in the possession of drugs and was hiding evidence which would incriminate him.\u201d State v. Peck, 305 N.C. 734, 742, 291 S.E.2d 637, 642 (1982).\nD. \u201cStrip Search\u201d\nFinally, Defendant contends that Judge Bridges erred by concluding that the search of Defendant\u2019s buttocks \u201cwas not a strip search, [and] that exigent circumstances were not required.\u201d More specifically, Defendant asserts that Detective Tisdale\u2019s search of his person constituted a \u201cstrip search,\u201d making it necessary for Judge Bridges to find the existence of \u201cexigent circumstances\u201d as a precondition for upholding the challenged search. The State, on the other hand, argues that Detective Tisdale\u2019s search of Defendant was \u201cnot tantamount to a strip search\u201d and did not, for that reason, \u201crequir[e] additional circumstances of exigency.\u201d After carefully examining the reported decisions of this Court and the Supreme Court, we conclude that Judge Bridges did not err by denying Defendant\u2019s suppression motion.\n\u201cAn officer may conduct a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. A search is considered incident to arrest even if conducted prior to formal arrest if probable cause to arrest exists prior to the search and the evidence seized is not necessary to establish that probable cause.\u201d State v. Mills, 104 N.C. App. 724, 728, 411 S.E.2d 193, 195 (1991) (citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 93 L. Ed. 1879 (1949), State v. Wooten, 34 N.C. App. 85, 89, 237 S.E.2d 301, 304-05 (1977), and State v. Hardy, 299 N.C. 445, 455, 263 S.E.2d 711, 718 (1980)). \u201c \u2018The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness. The Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all state-initiated searches and seizures; it merely proscribes those which are unreasonable.\u2019 \u201d State v. Battle, 202 N.C. App. 376, 383, 688 S.E.2d 805, 812 (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250, 111 S. Ct. 1801, 1803, 114 L. Ed. 2d 297, 302 (1991)), disc. review denied, 364 N.C. 327, 700 S.E.2d 926 (2010). \u201c\u2018What is reasonable, of course, depends on all of the circumstances surrounding the search or seizure and the nature of the search or seizure itself. As a result, the permissibility of a particular practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual\u2019s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.\u2019 \u201d Battle, 202 N.C. App. at 383, 688 S.E.2d at 812 (quoting Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives\u2019 Ass\u2019n., 489 U.S. 602, 619, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1415, 103 L. Ed. 2d 639, 661 (1989) (internal citations omitted).\n\u201cThe test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application. In each case it requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails. Courts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted.\u201d\nBattle, 202 N.C. App. at 383, 688 S.E.2d at 812 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 1884, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447, 481 (1979)).\n\u201cCourts across the country are uniform in their condemnation of intrusive searches performed in public.\u201d Campbell v. Miller, 499 F.3d 711, 719 (7th Cir. 2007). Thus, \u201c[i]n order for a roadside strip search to pass constitutional muster, there must be both probable cause and exigent circumstances that show some significant government or public interest would be endangered were the police to wait until they could conduct the search in a more discreet location \u2014 usually at a private location within a police facility.\u201d Battle, 202 N.C. App. at 388, 688 S.E.2d at 815. However, we \u201cnote that neither the United States Supreme Court nor the appellate courts of this State have clearly defined the term \u2018strip search.\u2019 \u201d Battle at 381, 688 S.E.2d at 811. As the United States Supreme Court recently stated:\nThe opinions in earlier proceedings, the briefs on file, and some cases of this Court refer to a \u201cstrip search.\u201d The term is imprecise. It may refer simply to the instruction to remove clothing while an officer observes from a distance of, say, five feet or more; it may mean a visual inspection from a closer, more uncomfortable distance; it may include directing detainees to shake their heads or to run their hands through their hair to dislodge what might be hidden there; or it may involve instructions to raise arms, to display foot insteps, to expose the back of the ears, to move or spread the buttocks or genital areas, or to cough in a squatting position.\nFlorence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, _U.S. _, _, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1515, 182 L. Ed. 2d 566, 574 (2012). For that reason, there is no precise definition of what a \u201cstrip search\u201d actually is. Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has specifically stated that \u201cwe would not define strip search and its Fourth Amendment consequences in a way that would guarantee litigation about who was looking and how much was seen.\u201d Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, _, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2641, 174 L. Ed. 2d 354, 364 (2009). However:\n\u201c[a] valid search incident to arrest. . . will not normally permit a law enforcement officer to conduct a roadside strip search.\u201d Rather, \u201c[i]n order for a roadside strip search to pass constitutional muster, there must be both probable cause and exigent circumstances that show some significant government or public interest would be endangered were the police to wait until they could conduct the search in a more discreet location[.]\u201d\nState v. Fowler, _N.C. App. _, _, _S.E.2d _, _(1 May 2012) (quoting Battle, 202 N.C. App. at 387-88, 688 S.E.2d at 815).\nIn light of these general principles, we note that this Court and the Supreme Court have addressed the lawfulness of searches of a defendant\u2019s underwear or his or her anal or genital regions on at least three separate occasions in reported decisions. In the first of these decisions, an investigating officer \u201creceived a call from a source he had used [successfully] two times in the past\u201d to the effect that the defendant, who had $2,000 in his possession and was operating a red Ford Escort, \u201cwas going to an unknown location to purchase cocaine\u201d and that, after purchasing the cocaine, the defendant would return to a specific apartment to package the cocaine in aluminum foil before delivering it to a third location, at which the cocaine would be sold. State v. Smith, 118 N.C. App. 106, 108, 454 S.E.2d 680, 681-82, reversed, 342 N.C. 407, 464 S.E.2d 45 (1995). According to the informant, the defendant \u201c \u2018would have the cocaine concealed in his crotch, or under his crotch\u2019 \u201d at the time that he left the apartment at which he planned to package the cocaine. Smith, 118 N.C. App. at 108, 454 S.E.2d at 682. After the defendant left the apartment at which the cocaine was to be packaged, investigating officers stopped the Ford Escort that he was driving, conducted a pat-down of the defendant\u2019s person, and then conducted a more thorough search, during which the officer asked the defendant to open his trousers and then pulled down his underwear, resulting in the discovery of a paper towel containing crack cocaine underneath the defendant\u2019s scrotum. Smith, 118 N.C. App. at 108-09, 454 S.E.2d at 682. Although a majority of this Court held that the \u201cthe search of the defendant was intolerable in its intensity and scope and therefore unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment,\u201d Smith, 118 N.C. App. at 116, 454 S.E.2d at 686, the Supreme Court reversed that decision and upheld the denial of the defendant\u2019s suppression motion on the grounds that the officer took adequate steps to avoid exposing the defendant\u2019s private areas and that \u201cthe availability of . . . less intrusive means does not automatically transform an otherwise unreasonable search into a Fourth Amendment violation.\u201d Smith, 118 N.C. App. at 118, 454 S.E.2d at 687.\nIn Battle, 202 N.C. App. at 376, 688 S.E.2d at 805, investigating officers received a tip from a reliable informant that a vehicle operated by the defendant\u2019s boyfriend and containing the defendant and another passenger would be utilized in connection with the purchase of an ounce to an ounce and a half of cocaine. Based upon this information and the fact that a substance seized from the defendant\u2019s boyfriend on a prior occasion had tested positive for cocaine, investigating officers stopped the vehicle driven by the defendant\u2019s boyfriend. Although a search of the car revealed the presence of drug paraphernalia, no drugs were found on either the defendant\u2019s boyfriend or the third occupant of the vehicle. As a result, a female officer took the defendant to a spot between the open doors of a police vehicle, asked her to \u201cpull the bottom of her bra away from her body and shake the bra,\u201d and then \u201cconducted a pat-down search of Defendant.\u201d Battle, 202 N.C. App. at 379, 688 S.E.2d at 809-10. After feeling \u201cnothing that suggested [that the defendant] was carrying a weapon or contraband pursuant to this search,\u201d the officer pulled the defendant\u2019s pants open while a male colleague stood nearby with a Taser, pulled the defendant\u2019s underwear back, and discovered a five dollar bill, a crack pipe, and a plastic baggie containing a tan powder beneath the defendant\u2019s underwear. Battle, 202 N.C. App. at 379, 688 S.E.2d at 810. On appeal, this Court reversed the trial court\u2019s denial of the defendant\u2019s suppression motion on the grounds that the defendant \u201cwas strip searched on the side of a street in broad daylight\u201d and that the \u201cState presented no evidence of exigent circumstances\u201d justifying that action. Battle, 202 N.C. App. at 393, 396, 688 S.E.2d at 818, 820. The Court distinguished Smith on the grounds that \u201cthe confidential informant specifically stated that the defendant would be hiding the cocaine in the defendant\u2019s underpants, and perhaps underneath the defendant\u2019s scrotum;\u201d that the officer had \u201cmultiple sources indicating that the defendant was a serious drug dealer\u201d and \u201coperated out of multiple locations;\u201d and that \u201c[t]he search took place in the early morning hours\u201d without any indication \u201cthat there were other people in the immediate vicinity other than the officers.\u201d Battle, 202 N.C. App. at 401, 688 S.E.2d at 823 (emphasis in the original).\nRecently, in Fowler, _N.C. App. at _, _S.E.2d at _, the record tended to show that an officer had received information that the defendant planned to meet an informant to complete a drug transaction. After the informant failed to appear at the specified location, the defendant drove away. Subsequently, the officer stopped the defendant\u2019s vehicle for speeding, ascertained that the defendant\u2019s license had been permanently suspended, and placed him under arrest. Upon locating a small quantity of marijuana in the defendant\u2019s vehicle, the officer decided to search the defendant\u2019s person for the presence of drugs. After failing to locate any contraband in the defendant\u2019s pockets and waistband area, the officer \u201cundid defendant\u2019s belt and looked down into defendant\u2019s pants while asking defendant to sway back and forth in an attempt to \u2018loosen up anything that may have been hidden on his person.\u201d Fowler, _N.C. App at _, _ S.E.2d at _. Upon failing to find any contraband, the officer drove the defendant to a secluded spot, where he \u201cdropped defendant\u2019s pants down and searched defendant\u2019s pants down and searched defendant\u2019s boxer briefs with his hand,\u201d ultimately \u201cdiscover[ing] an object containing three grams of crack cocaine in the \u2018kangaroo pouch\u2019 of defendant\u2019s boxer briefs, or the \u2018fly area . . . where the two pieces of fabric overlap. Fowler,_N.C. App. at __, _S.E.2d at _. On appeal, this Court held that \u201cthe search[] of defendant\u2019s person constituted [a] strip search,\u201d noting that, \u201c[djuring [the] search]], defendant\u2019s private areas were observed by [the law enforcement officer].\u201d Fowler, _N.C. App. at _, _S.E.2d _. However, we also held that there was ample reason to believe that the defendant would be carrying drugs, that the second \u201cstrip search\u201d took place at a \u201cdiscreet\u201d location, and that exigent circumstances (consisting of the defendant\u2019s familiarity with processing procedures at the jail and his repeated requests not to be taken there) justified a strip search of the defendant. Fowler, _N.C. App. at _, _S.E.2d at _.\nAs should be obvious, the search at issue in Fowler was upheld on the basis that the record showed the existence of exigent circumstances justifying an immediate examination of the defendant\u2019s underwear and his anal and genital areas. In Battle, on the other hand, a similar search of the area beneath the defendant\u2019s underwear was invalidated given the absence of exigent circumstances of the type present in Fowler. Smith, on the other hand, upheld a search underneath the defendant\u2019s underwear despite the absence of any exigent circumstances of the sort found in Fowler. According to well-established principles of North Carolina law, we are bound by each of these decisions. Cannon v. Miller, 313 N.C. 324, 327 S.E.2d 888 (1985) (holding that the Court of Appeals lacks the authority to overrule decisions of the Supreme Court of North Carolina and has a \u201cresponsibility to follow those decisions, until otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court\u201d); In re Civil Penalty, 324 N.C. 373, 384, 379 S.E.2d 30, 37 (1989) (holding that \u201ca panel of the Court of Appeals is bound by a prior decision of another panel of the same court addressing the same question, but in a different case, unless overturned by an intervening decision from a higher court\u201d). A helpful manner in which to give content to each of these decisions without impermissibly rendering any of them a nullity is suggested by the fact that the Court in Battle distinguished Smith, in large part, on the grounds that the record was devoid of any indication that the defendant might be concealing weapons or contraband in her underclothing. As a result, we conclude that the mode of analysis outlined in Battle and adopted in Fowler only applies in the event that the investigating officers lack a specific basis for believing that a weapon or contraband is present beneath the defendant\u2019s underclothing. Unless we adopt such an understanding of the relevant cases, we will have effectively overruled Smith, an action that we lack the authority to take.\nThe undisputed evidence in the present record, as reflected in Judge Bridges\u2019 findings, indicates that various items of drug-related evidence were observed in the vehicle in which Defendant was riding, that Defendant made furtive movements towards his pants, and that Detective Tisdale felt a hard object between Defendant\u2019s buttocks. For that reason, it is clear that Detective Tisdale had ample basis for believing that contraband would be discovered beneath Defendant\u2019s underclothing. In addition, Judge Bridges\u2019 unchallenged findings of fact establish that Detective Tisdale took certain steps to protect Defendant\u2019s privacy. More specifically, Judge Bridges found as a fact:\n21. That Detective Tisdale then escorted the defendant over to his patrol vehicle to complete the search.\n22. That during the search the lights of the patrol vehicle were not turned on.\n23. That during the search there were no other individuals in the immediate area.\n24. That during the search Detective Tisdale shielded the defendant from public viewing by opening the rear door of the patrol vehicle and by standing directly behind the defendant.\n25. That during the search Detective Tisdale did not undo any buttons or zippers on the defendant\u2019s pants, nor did he put his hands or his flashlight down the defendant\u2019s pants.\n26. That the defendant was wearing bagg[y] clothes and Detective Tisdale pulled back the pants of the defendant but did not pull his pants down.\n27. That Detective Tisdale instructed the defendant to bend forward at the waist and then shined his flashlight inside the defendant\u2019s pants from behind and observed a clear plastic baggie between the defendant\u2019s buttocks.\n28. That Detective Tisdale asked the defendant to separate his buttocks and after doing so the plastic baggie feel out.\n29. That Detective Tisdale then collected the baggie and believed it to contain crack cocaine.\n30. That Detective Tisdale\u2019s flashlight was the only source of illumination in the immediate vicinity of the search of the defendant.\nAs a result, given that Detective Tisdale had ample basis for believing that Defendant had contraband beneath his underwear and given that Detective Tisdale took reasonable steps to protect Defendant\u2019s privacy, we conclude that this case is controlled by Smith, necessitating the conclusion that any failure on Judge Bridges\u2019 part to utilize the method of analysis outlined in Battle in reaching his decision was irrelevant. In view of the fact that Defendant\u2019s only challenge to the scope of the search of his person conducted by Detective Tisdale assumed the applicability of the approach adopted in Battle and in view of the fact that Battle is not controlling in this case, we necessarily determine that Defendant\u2019s final challenge to Judge Bridges\u2019 order lacks merit.\nIII. Conclusion\nThus, for the reasons discussed above, we conclude that Judge Bridges did not err by denying Defendant\u2019s suppression motion. As a result, the trial court\u2019s judgment should, and hereby does, remain undisturbed.\nNO ERROR.\nJudge BRYANT concurs.\nJudge ELMORE dissents by separate opinion.\n. In light of our determination that Detective Tisdale had probable cause to arrest and search Defendant, we need not address Defendant\u2019s argument that the \u201cplain feel\u201d doctrine did not provide an alternative basis for upholding the search of Defendant\u2019s person.\n. Although the decision to reverse the denial of the defendant\u2019s suppression motion was a unanimous one, only one of the three members of the panel joined the opinion discussed in the text. In subsequent decisions, however, the opinion discussed in the text has been treated as an opinion by the Court rather than an opinion by a single judge.\n. Our dissenting colleague argues that the form of analysis adopted in Battle is identical to that employed by both the majority opinion and the dissent (which was ultimately adopted by the Supreme Court) in Smith. However, neither the excerpt from the Smith majority opinion nor the excerpt from the Smith dissent quoted in the dissent in this case make any reference, as the dissent seems to suggest, to any issue relating to the lawfulness of a \u201cstrip search.\u201d Instead, the words \u201cwarrantless search\u201d appear where the dissent inserts the words \u201cstrip search\u201d in both of the quotations from Smith upon which the dissent relies. The appropriateness of the officer\u2019s decision to conduct a warrantless search of the defendant in Smith and the appropriateness of the manner in which the defendant in Smith was searched were two separate and distinct issues. Simply put, there is no discussion of the necessity for a showing that \u201cexigent circumstances\u201d exist in the discussion of the defendant\u2019s challenge to the manner in which he was searched in either the majority or dissenting opinion in Smith, a fact which we believe undermines our dissenting colleague\u2019s challenge to the result we have reached in this case.\n. Fowler was devoid of any specific basis for believing that contraband would be located underneath the defendant\u2019s underclothing or in the defendant\u2019s genital or anal area.\n. For this reason, we disagree with our dissenting colleague\u2019s argument that we have erred by failing to determine whether a \u201cstrip search\u201d did or did not occur in this instance.", "type": "majority", "author": "ERVIN, Judge." }, { "text": "ELMORE, Judge\ndissenting.\nI respectfully disagree with the holding of the majority that this Court\u2019s ruling in Battle is not controlling in the present case. Accordingly, I believe that the trial court erred in denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the roadside \u201cstrip search.\u201d\nDefendant presented two arguments on appeal with regards to this issue: 1) that the search of his person constituted a \u201cstrip search\u201d and 2) that it was necessary for the trial court to find the existence of \u201cexigent circumstances\u201d as a precondition for upholding the challenged search. I agree with defendant on both points, and I will address each argument in turn.\nRegarding defendant\u2019s first argument, I feel as though the majority has failed to properly address whether the search of defendant constituted a \u201cstrip search.\u201d The majority simply concludes that \u201cthere is no precise definition of what a \u2018strip search\u2019 actually is\u201d and then proceeds to address defendant\u2019s second argument. While it is true that our Courts have never precisely defined the term \u201cstrip search,\u201d there is nevertheless sufficient authority to properly classify the search at issue here as a \u201cstrip search.\u201d\nOur Supreme Court has held that \u201cpeople have a reasonable expectation not to be unclothed, involuntarily, to be observed unclothed or to have their private parts observed or touched by others.\u201d State v. Stone, 362 N.C. 50, 55, 653 S.E.2d 414, 418 (2007) (emphasis added). In Smith we found the search of defendant to be \u201cakin to a strip search.\u201d 118 N.C. App. at 116, 454 S.E.2d at 686. There, the officer pulled the defendant\u2019s pants down far enough that he could see a small comer of paper towel under defendant\u2019s scrotum. Likewise, in Fowler we concluded that \u201cthe searches of [the] defendant\u2019s person constituted strip searches\u201d because \u201c[the] defendant\u2019s private areas were observed by [the officer].\u201d _ N.C. App. at _, __S.E.2d at _. Here, defendant was instructed to bend forward at the waist, to pull the back of his pants outward six inches, and to spread his buttocks apart. Detective Tisdale then inspected the area near defendant\u2019s buttocks. Thus, I believe that the search of defendant here is properly classified as a \u201cstrip search.\u201d\nDefendant\u2019s second argument is that that it was necessary for the trial court to find the existence of \u201cexigent circumstances\u201d as a precondition for upholding the challenged search. Again, I agree with defendant.\nIn Battle we noted that \u201c[s]trip searches . . . are not a matter of course for searches incident either to arrest or detention\u201d and that \u201c[p]ublic intrusive searches of the body should never be commonplace but reserved for only the most unusual cases.\u201d 202 N.C. App. 376, 403, 688 S.E.2d 805, 824 (2010) (quotations and citations omitted). We then very clearly held that \u201c[f]or a [strip] search to comply with the requirements of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, there must be sufficient supporting facts and exigent circumstances prior to initiating a strip search to justify this heightened intrusion into a suspect\u2019s right to privacy.\u201d Id. at 392, 688 S.E.2d at 817 (emphasis added).\nHere, the finding of facts section of the trial court\u2019s order denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress makes no mention of exigent circumstances as required by Battle. As such, I believe that the trial court erred in denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress.\nThe majority concludes that Battle is not controlling in the present case because the analysis outlined in Battle contradicts the analysis outlined in Smith. By this logic, the majority determined that the only way to give content to both decisions without impermissibly rendering either of them a nullity is to conclude that Battle \u201conly applies in the event that the investigating officers lack a specific basis for believing that a weapon or contraband is present beneath the defendant\u2019s clothing.\u201d I disagree with this conclusion, and I find that the majority has misapplied the precedent established by Smith.\nIn Smith, this Court held that if \u201cprobable cause to search exists and the exigencies of the situation make [the] search necessary, it is lawful to conduct\u201d a \u201cstrip search.\u201d 118 N.C. App. at 111, 454 S.E.2d at 684 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). But we then reversed the trial court\u2019s denial of the defendant\u2019s suppression motion because we concluded that \u201cthe search of defendant was intolerable in its intensity and scope and therefore unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.\u201d 118 N.C. App. 106, 116, 454 S.E.2d 680, 686. Our Supreme Court then reversed our decision in that case \u201cfor the reasons stated in the dissenting opinion.\u201d State v. Smith, 342 N.C. 407, 464 S.E.2d 45 (1995). The reasons were that \u201cthe availability of those less intrusive means does not automatically transform an otherwise reasonable search into a Fourth Amendment violation.\u201d Smith, 118 N.C. App. at 118, 454 S.E.2d at 687. However, even in that dissent, Judge Walker affirmed that \u201cprobable cause and an exigency for [the] search\u201d must exist for the strip search to be valid. Smith, 118 N.C. App. at 116, 454 S.E.2d at 687.\nThus, I believe that this Court has clearly articulated in both Battle and Smith that for a roadside \u201cstrip search\u201d to be valid the officer must have 1) probable cause and 2) exigent circumstances to conduct the search. Since the trial court here failed to make the necessary findings regarding exigent circumstances, I would reverse the trial court\u2019s order denying defendant\u2019s suppression motion.", "type": "dissent", "author": "ELMORE, Judge" } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Associate Attorney General Erica Gamer, for the State.", "Unti & Lumsden LLP, by Sharon L. Smith, for Defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JEROME ROBINSON, JR.\nNo. COA11-1163\n(Filed 19 June 2012)\n1. Search and Seizure \u2014 motion to suppress drugs \u2014 single pat-down search conducted in fluid manner\nThe trial court did not err in a felonious possession of cocaine case by denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress even though defendant contended the detective conducted two separate searches of his person with the second search allegedly violating his rights. The detective\u2019s testimony described a single pat-down search conducted in a fluid manner following defendant\u2019s removal from the car.\n2. Search and Seizure \u2014 probable cause \u2014 possession of drugs\u2014 hiding evidence between buttocks \u2014 suspicious behavior\nThe trial court did not err in a felonious possession of cocaine case by concluding that probable cause arose when the detective felt something hard between the defendant\u2019s buttocks outside of defendant\u2019s clothing. The circumstances surrounding the detective\u2019s encounter with the suspicious behaving defendant would warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe that defendant was in possession of drugs and was hiding evidence which would incriminate him.\n3. Search and Seizure \u2014 search of defendant\u2019s buttocks \u2014 not a strip search \u2014 exigent circumstances not required \u2014 steps to protect privacy\nThe trial court did not err in a felonious possession of cocaine case by concluding that the search of defendant\u2019s buttocks was not a strip search and that exigent circumstances were not required. The detective had ample basis for believing that contraband would be discovered beneath defendant\u2019s underclothing, and the detective took certain steps to protect defendant\u2019s privacy.\nJudge ELMORE dissenting.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 14 February 2011 by Judge Robert T. Sumner in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 8 February 2012.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Associate Attorney General Erica Gamer, for the State.\nUnti & Lumsden LLP, by Sharon L. Smith, for Defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0266-01", "first_page_order": 276, "last_page_order": 295 }