{ "id": 4356949, "name": "SHANNON FATTA, Plaintiff v. M & M PROPERTIES MANAGEMENT, INC., Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Fatta v. M & M Properties Management, Inc.", "decision_date": "2012-06-19", "docket_number": "No. COA11-1397", "first_page": "369", "last_page": "376", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "221 N.C. App. 369" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "618 S.E.2d 750", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633880 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "754" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/618/0750-01" ] }, { "cite": "628 S.E.2d 413", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635584 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "414", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/628/0413-01" ] }, { "cite": "662 S.E.2d 20", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12641236 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "22", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/662/0020-01" ] }, { "cite": "595 S.E.2d 744", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "752", "parenthetical": "citing Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 119" }, { "page": "752", "parenthetical": "\"[I]t is not enough ... to disbelieve the employer; the factfinder must believe the plaintiff's explanation of intentional discrimination.\" (citation omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "164 N.C. App. 233", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8896766 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "242", "parenthetical": "citing Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 119" }, { "page": "243" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/164/0233-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 U.S. 133", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9413371 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "148-49" }, { "page": "120-21" }, { "page": "147" }, { "page": "119" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/530/0133-01" ] }, { "cite": "301 S.E.2d 78", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "83", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "308 N.C. 131", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4707236 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "138", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/308/0131-01" ] }, { "cite": "294 F. Supp. 2d 746", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9296776 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "756" }, { "page": "757-58", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "758", "parenthetical": "quotations and citations omitted" }, { "page": "759", "parenthetical": "citation and internal quotations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp-2d/294/0746-01" ] }, { "cite": "535 S.E.2d 357", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "361" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "139 N.C. App. 676", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9497637 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "682" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/139/0676-01" ] }, { "cite": "568 F. Supp. 2d 603", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3108472 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "614", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp-2d/568/0603-01" ] }, { "cite": "173 N.C. App. 218", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8353244 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/173/0218-01" ] }, { "cite": "302 F. Supp. 2d 471", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9281914 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "481" }, { "page": "481", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp-2d/302/0471-01" ] }, { "cite": "716 S.E.2d 420", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "426" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 95-241", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 3, "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(l)(a)", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "594 S.E.2d 809", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "811", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "811" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "164 N.C. App. 183", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8896347 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "186", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "186" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/164/0183-01" ] }, { "cite": "642 S.E.2d 537", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "539", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "182 N.C. App. 521", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8174072 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "523", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/182/0521-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 N.C. App. 258", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8301176 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "261", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/177/0258-01" ] }, { "cite": "298 S.E.2d 200", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "202", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "60 N.C. App. 170", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8519816 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "173", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/60/0170-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 N.C. App. 163", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4159941 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "165", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/191/0163-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 827, "char_count": 17264, "ocr_confidence": 0.756, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.283664737253076e-08, "percentile": 0.4335046174506699 }, "sha256": "b2a9a56bb21f4070b85d25227b464b96b560608db49936809292366ddbd804c5", "simhash": "1:0b80cd169e0e2557", "word_count": 2646 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:36:11.101860+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges HUNTER, JR., Robert N. and BEASLEY concur." ], "parties": [ "SHANNON FATTA, Plaintiff v. M & M PROPERTIES MANAGEMENT, INC., Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BRYANT, Judge.\nWhere the trial court did not err in granting defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff\u2019s Retaliatory Employment Discrimination Act and wrongful discharge claims, we affirm the order of the trial court.\nFacts and Procedural History\nPlaintiff Shannon Fatta was employed by defendant M&M Properties Management, Inc., from 18 January 2010 through 7 February 2010 as a property manager of Value Place Hotel in Shelby, North Carolina. Plaintiff alleged the following: on 21 January 2010, he was injured while cleaning a room as a part of his training; on 2 February 2010, he notified defendant of his injury; on 3 February 2010, defendant issued plaintiff a first and final written disciplinary documentation; on 7 February 2010, defendant terminated plaintiff\u2019s employment; on 12 February 2010, plaintiff was diagnosed with having a hernia by a doctor in Statesville, North Carolina; and that same day \u2014 12 February 2010, five days after his termination, plaintiff filed a worker\u2019s compensation claim, Form 18, with the North Carolina Industrial Commission. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff filed a REDA complaint with the North Carolina Department of Labor (\u201cNCDOL\u201d). On 4 May 2010, plaintiff received a right-to-sue letter from the NCDOL.\nOn 6 July 2010, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant alleging several causes of action relating to the Retaliatory Employment Discrimination Act (\u201cREDA\u201d) and wrongful termination in violation of North Carolina public policy. On 18 February 2011, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment as to all claims. Following a hearing held on 28 February 2011, the trial court granted defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment and dismissed plaintiff\u2019s claims with prejudice. From this order, plaintiff appeals.\nPlaintiff presents the following issues on appeal: whether the trial court erred by granting defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment where there were genuine issues of material fact regarding (I) plaintiff\u2019s REDA claim for his work injury; and (II) plaintiff\u2019s corresponding wrongful discharge claim. Because these arguments are closely related, we will address them together.\nStandard of Review\n\u201cSummary judgment when sought \u2018shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\u2019 \u201d Majestic Cinema Holdings, LLC v. High Point Cinema, LLC, 191 N.C. App. 163, 165, 662 S.E.2d 20, 22 (2008) (citation omitted).\n\u201c[T]he trial court is required to view the facts and permissible inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. All well pleaded factual allegations in the nonmoving party\u2019s pleadings are taken as true____\u201d Rose v. Guilford County, 60 N.C. App. 170, 173, 298 S.E.2d 200, 202 (1982) (citation omitted). However,\nthe movant has the burden of establishing that there are no genuine issues of material fact. The movant can meet the burden by either: 1) Proving that an essential element of the opposing party\u2019s claim is nonexistent; or 2) Showing through discovery that the opposing party cannot produce evidence sufficient to support an essential element of his claim nor [evidence] sufficient to surmount an affirmative defense to his claim.\nNoblot v. Timmons, 177 N.C. App. 258, 261, 628 S.E.2d 413, 414 (2006) (citation omitted). \u201cOn appeal, an order allowing summary judgment is reviewed de novo.\u201d Carson v. Grassmann, 182 N.C. App. 521, 523, 642 S.E.2d 537, 539 (2007) (citation omitted).\nI and II\nPlaintiff argues that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of defendant where there were genuine issues of material fact surrounding his REDA claim and corresponding wrongful discharge claim.\n\u201cThe North Carolina [REDA] prohibits discrimination or retaliation against an employee for filing a worker\u2019s compensation claim.\u201d Wiley v. UPS, Inc., 164 N.C. App. 183, 186, 594 S.E.2d 809, 811 (2004) (citation omitted). North Carolina General Statutes, section 95-241(a)(l)(a), provides that\n[n]o person shall discriminate or take any retaliatory action against an employee because the employee in good faith does or threatens to do any of the following: (1) File a claim or complaint, initiate any inquiry, investigation, inspection, proceeding or other action, or testify or provide information to any person with respect to any of the following: a. Chapter 97 of the General Statutes [(Workers\u2019 Compensation Act)].\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 95-241(a)(l)(a) (2011) (emphasis added). \u201c[A] plaintiff may pursue both a statutory claim under REDA and a common law wrongful discharge claim based on a violation of REDA.\u201d White v. Cochran, - N.C. App. - , -, 716 S.E.2d 420, 426 (2011).\nIn bringing a REDA claim, a plaintiff \u201cmay either proceed using direct evidence or may rely on inferential proof\u2019 under a burden-shifting scheme. Lilly v. Mastec N. Am., Inc., 302 F. Supp. 2d 471, 481 (M.D.N.C. 2004). \u201cUnder the burden-shifting model, plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case.\u201d Id. To accomplish this, plaintiff must show: \u201c(1) that he exercised his rights as listed under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 95-241(a), (2) that he suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) that the alleged retaliatory action was taken because the employee exercised his rights under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 95-241(a).\u201d Wiley, 164 N.C. App. at 186, 594 S.E.2d at 811. If plaintiff presents a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to \u201cshow that there was a valid reason for any actions it took regarding him.\u201d Lilly, 302 F. Supp. 2d at 481 (citations omitted). Once defendant meets this burden, \u201cplaintiff then has to demonstrate that the apparently valid reason was actually a pretext for discrimination.\u201d Id.\nPlaintiff contends he was clearly engaged in a protected activity pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 95-241(a) when he notified Tony Cuomo, defendant\u2019s director of operations who oversaw plaintiff\u2019s training, that \u201che may intend to file a claim for workers\u2019 compensation.\u201d\nDefendant, on the other hand, relying on Whitings v. Wolfson Casing Corp., 173 N.C. App. 218, 618 S.E.2d 750 (2005), asserts that the action of filing a workers\u2019 compensation claim is the activity that triggers REDA protection. Defendant argues that plaintiff\u2019s statements do no more than forecast a potential action and do not by themselves warrant REDA protection. Defendant\u2019s reliance is misplaced. In Whitings, our Court held that the plaintiff\u2019s request that her employer pay for a medical evaluation of a work-related injury did not constitute a protected activity under REDA. We also concluded that because the plaintiff failed \u201cto allege the filing of a workers\u2019 compensation claim at any time either prior or subsequent to her discharge, [the] plaintiff ha[d] failed to plead that she engaged in a legally protected activity.\u201d Id. at 223, 618 S.E.2d at 754.\nIn the instant case, plaintiff stated in his affidavit that he notified Cuomo of his work-related injury on 2 February 2010; told Cuomo that \u201cbefore reporting the injury to workers\u2019 compensation I wanted to make sure it was not simply a pulled muscle that would go away[;]\u201d and informed Cuomo that he would \u201cfile the appropriate paperwork to initiate a claim once I confirm the nature of the injury.\u201d On 3 February 2010, plaintiff received a first and final written warning from defendant; and on 7 February 2010, defendant terminated plaintiff stating \u201cLack of Demonstrated Leadership\u201d as the reason. Five days after being terminated by defendant, plaintiff filed a worker\u2019s compensation claim.\nViewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff and taking all of his factual allegations as true, we hold the allegations are sufficient to support the first two elements of a prima facie case: that plaintiff engaged in a protected activity pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 95-241(a) by threatening to file a workers\u2019 compensation claim; and that he suffered from the adverse employment action of termination.\nTo satisfy the third prong in establishing a prima facie case, \u201ca plaintiff may present evidence of close temporal proximity between the protected activity and the adverse employment action, or a pattern of conduct.\u201d Smith v. Computer Task Group, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 2d 603, 614 (M.D.N.C. 2008) (citation omitted); see also Johnson v. Trustees of Durham Tech. Cmty. Coll., 139 N.C. App. 676, 682, 535 S.E.2d 357, 361 (2000). \u201c[M]erely a closeness in time between the filing of a discrimination charge and an employer\u2019s firing an employee is sufficient to make a prima facie case of causality.\u201d Shoaf v. Kimberly-Clark Corp, 294 F. Supp. 2d 746, 756 (M.D.N.C. 2003). Here, plaintiff demonstrated that he was terminated from employment five days after informing defendant of his work-related injury and of his intention to file a worker\u2019s compensation claim, thereby fulfilling the last element of his prima facie case.\n\u201cThe ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.\u201d N.C. Dept. of Correction v. Gibson, 308 N.C. 131, 138, 301 S.E.2d 78, 83 (1983) (citation omitted). Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, \u201cthe employer\u2019s burden is satisfied if he simply explains what he has done or produces evidence of legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons.\u201d Id. (citation omitted).\nDefendant\u2019s President and Chief Operating Officer Glenn McFarland, stated in his affidavit that shortly after plaintiff began training on 18 January 2010, McFarland observed plaintiff\u2019s poor job performance. During the week of 25 January 2010, McFarland, defendant\u2019s district manager \u2014 Jenny Meyer, and defendant\u2019s regional operations manager \u2014 Mark Caney, all communicated about plaintiff\u2019s performance deficiencies. Specifically, they addressed \u201chis fatigue and constant yawning throughout training[,]\u201d and poor phone answering skills. Meyer stated in her affidavit that during training, defendant was difficult to train, appeared tired and fatigued throughout training, was not assertive at the front desk, and failed to understand cleanliness standards taught during training. Meyer stated that her concerns about defendant\u2019s performance began on the first day he trained with her, 25 January 2010. During the first week of training, Meyer, McFarland, and Caney agreed to issue defendant a written Corrective Action and planned on issuing it on 3 February 2010.\nDefendant\u2019s written warning to plaintiff explained that plaintiff had been late for work on several occasions, had been taking an excessive number of breaks from work each day, failed to demonstrate that he had learned defendant\u2019s workplace standards, and that plaintiff\u2019s lack of leadership was a concern to defendant. In plaintiff\u2019s termination letter, defendant stated that plaintiffs lack of demonstrated leadership, reflected through his tardiness during training, lack of demonstrated initiative, dealings with challenging customers, phone skills, and inability to embrace defendant\u2019s concepts versus trying to incorporate aspects of full service hotels, were the reason supporting plaintiff\u2019s termination.\nBased on the foregoing, defendant has demonstrated several legitimate, non-retaliatory grounds for plaintiff\u2019s termination. This is sufficient to successfully rebut plaintiff\u2019s prima facie case. \u201cPlaintiff now bears the burden of proving that [defendant's proffered reason was mere pretext for retaliation by showing \u2018both that the reason was false and that discrimination was the real reason\u2019 for the challenged conduct.\u201d Shoaf 294 F. Supp. 2d at 757-58 (citation omitted) (stating that plaintiff \u201ccannot rely on temporal proximity alone to establish pretext.\u201d).\nIn determining the suitability of summary judgment in this type of case, our United States Supreme Court has stated the following:\nWhether judgment as a matter of law is appropriate in any particular case will depend on a number of factors. Those include the strength of the plaintiff\u2019s prima facie case, the probative value of the proof that the employer\u2019s explanation is false, and any other evidence that supports the employer\u2019s case and that properly may be considered on a motion for judgment as a matter of law.\nReeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148-49, 147 L. Ed. 2d 105, 120-21 (2000). \u201c[I]t is not enough ... to disbelieve the employer; the factfinder must believe the plaintiff\u2019s explanation of intentional discrimination.\u201d Enoch v. Alamance County Dep\u2019t of Soc. Servs., 164 N.C. App. 233, 242, 595 S.E.2d 744, 752 (2004) (citing Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 119).\nIn the present case, plaintiff asserts that he can establish pretext through circumstantial evidence and temporal proximity. Plaintiff was terminated five days after reporting his work-related injury to Cuomo. Plaintiff argues he was given a first and final written warning on 3 February 2010, one day after he informed defendant of his injury; that he was given permission to sit down, but was terminated in part for sitting down; that on 3 February 2010, after speaking with another manager-in-training, plaintiff believed his paycheck was withheld while other managers were paid; that defendant did not offer to provide treatment for plaintiff\u2019s injury; and that after plaintiff\u2019s termination, defendant posted online an open position for property manager that had an additional job requirement of the ability to perform housekeeping functions. Moreover, plaintiff argues that all the paperwork relating to plaintiffs poor performance was generated after plaintiff reported his injury and made a threat to file a workers\u2019 compensation claim. Plaintiff contends that the foregoing evidence creates genuine issues of material fact regarding pretext.\nWith the exception of plaintiff\u2019s argument that all paperwork relating to plaintiff\u2019s poor performance was generated subsequent to plaintiff\u2019s report of his injury and threat to file a workers\u2019 compensation claim, none of plaintiff\u2019s circumstantial evidence establishes that defendant\u2019s stated grounds for plaintiff\u2019s termination were false. Further, plaintiff does not address defendant\u2019s explanation for why defendant fired him. As to plaintiff\u2019s evidence concerning the absence of documented evidence predating his injury report, affidavits from defendant\u2019s employees indicate their observations of and discussions surrounding plaintiff\u2019s poor job performance, which poor performance was noted at the very beginning of his training and throughout his employment.\nWe note that \u201ca plaintiff\u2019s own assertions of discrimination in and of themselves are insufficient to counter substantial evidence of legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for an adverse employment action. It is the perception of the decision maker which is relevant, not the self-assessment of the plaintiff.\u201d Shoaf, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 758 (quotations and citations omitted). \u201cEven in discrimination cases where motive and intent are critical to the analysis, summary judgment may be appropriate if the non-moving party rests merely upon conclusory allegations, improbable inferences and unsupported speculation.\u201d Id. at 759 (citation and internal quotations omitted).\nHere, plaintiff relies on weak inferences and unsupported speculation; plaintiff is unable to overcome defendant\u2019s evidence that it was plaintiff\u2019s poor, deficient job performance that led to his termination. While plaintiff attempts to meet his burden with conclusory allegations, he does not establish that defendant\u2019s stated reason for termination was false or a pretext for illegal discrimination.\nViewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, there is no genuine issue of material fact with respect to the pretext issue. See Enoch, 164 N.C. App. at 243, 595 S.E.2d at 752 (\u201c[I]t is not enough ... to disbelieve the employer; the factfinder must believe the plaintiff\u2019s explanation of intentional discrimination.\u201d (citation omitted)). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court\u2019s order granting summary judgment in favor of defendant\nAffirmed.\nJudges HUNTER, JR., Robert N. and BEASLEY concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "BRYANT, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Shannon Fatta, pro se plaintiff-appellant.", "Fisher & Phillips, LLP, by Margaret M. Kingston, for defendantappellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "SHANNON FATTA, Plaintiff v. M & M PROPERTIES MANAGEMENT, INC., Defendant\nNo. COA11-1397\n(Filed 19 June 2012)\nEmployer and Employee \u2014 Retaliatory Employment Discrimination Act \u2014 wrongful termination\nThe trial court did not err in a Retaliatory Employment Discrimination Act and wrongful termination case by granting summary judgment in favor of defendant. Although plaintiff contended that the paperwork related to plaintiffs poor performance was generated subsequent to plaintiffs report of an injury and threat to file a workers\u2019 compensation claim, plaintiff was unable to overcome defendant\u2019s evidence that it was plaintiff\u2019s poor job performance noted at the very beginning of his training and throughout his employment that led to his termination.\nAppeal by plaintiff from order entered 10 March 2011 by Judge Christopher M. Collier in Iredell County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 21 March 2012.\nShannon Fatta, pro se plaintiff-appellant.\nFisher & Phillips, LLP, by Margaret M. Kingston, for defendantappellee." }, "file_name": "0369-01", "first_page_order": 379, "last_page_order": 386 }