{ "id": 4357763, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JOSHUA EDWARD HARWOOD", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Harwood", "decision_date": "2012-07-03", "docket_number": "No. COA11-1513", "first_page": "451", "last_page": "464", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "221 N.C. App. 451" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "612 S.E.2d 326", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12632809, 12632810 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/612/0326-01", "/se2d/612/0326-02" ] }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 412", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12632806, 3801643, 3799341, 3799472, 3797969, 3798866, 3801046, 3801465, 3794842, 3804923 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/612/0324-01", "/nc/359/0412-08", "/nc/359/0412-02", "/nc/359/0412-07", "/nc/359/0412-05", "/nc/359/0412-01", "/nc/359/0412-03", "/nc/359/0412-06", "/nc/359/0412-04", "/nc/359/0412-09" ] }, { "cite": "645 S.E.2d 780", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12638620 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "790", "parenthetical": "quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 83 S. Ct. 407, 417, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 455 (1963) (quotation marks and citation omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/645/0780-01" ] }, { "cite": "658 S.E.2d 643", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640657 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "645" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/658/0643-01" ] }, { "cite": "670 S.E.2d 264", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12642367 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "267", "parenthetical": "quoting United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 200, 122 S. Ct. 2105, 2110, 153 L. Ed. 2d 242, 251 (2002)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/670/0264-01" ] }, { "cite": "538 U.S. 1040", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9088471, 9088356, 9088262, 9088423, 9088327, 9088253, 9088298, 9088395, 9088274, 9088343, 9088313, 9088380, 9088285, 9088447 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/538/1040-14", "/us/538/1040-09", "/us/538/1040-02", "/us/538/1040-12", "/us/538/1040-07", "/us/538/1040-01", "/us/538/1040-05", "/us/538/1040-11", "/us/538/1040-03", "/us/538/1040-08", "/us/538/1040-06", "/us/538/1040-10", "/us/538/1040-04", "/us/538/1040-13" ] }, { "cite": "614 S.E.2d 538", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633169, 12633170, 12633171 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/614/0538-01", "/se2d/614/0538-02", "/se2d/614/0538-03" ] }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 640", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3796929, 3798818, 3797669, 3802277, 3801669, 3795594, 3796906, 3803790, 3803571, 3797078, 3800984 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0640-02", "/nc/359/0640-03", "/nc/359/0640-10", "/nc/359/0640-01", "/nc/359/0640-09", "/nc/359/0640-08", "/nc/359/0640-07", "/nc/359/0640-05", "/nc/359/0640-04", "/nc/359/0640-11", "/nc/359/0640-06" ] }, { "cite": "485 S.E.2d 304", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 N.C. 758", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 53889, 53859, 54090, 53880, 54014 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/345/0758-01", "/nc/345/0758-03", "/nc/345/0758-05", "/nc/345/0758-04", "/nc/345/0758-02" ] }, { "cite": "478 S.E.2d 16", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "25" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "124 N.C. App. 462", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11889840 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "476" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/124/0462-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-112", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(2)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "606 S.E.2d 914", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "920" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "168 N.C. App. 98", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8468323 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "106" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/168/0098-01" ] }, { "cite": "677 S.E.2d 555", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "560" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "197 N.C. App. 522", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4167824 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "530-31" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/197/0522-01" ] }, { "cite": "722 S.E.2d 209", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2012, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "721 S.E.2d 356", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "360" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-95", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a) and (d)(2)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-415.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "371 U.S. 471", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 450611 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "488", "parenthetical": "quotation marks and citation omitted" }, { "page": "417", "parenthetical": "quotation marks and citation omitted" }, { "page": "455", "parenthetical": "quotation marks and citation omitted" }, { "page": "488" }, { "page": "417" }, { "page": "455" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/371/0471-01" ] }, { "cite": "184 N.C. App. 25", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8183865 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "40", "parenthetical": "quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 83 S. Ct. 407, 417, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 455 (1963) (quotation marks and citation omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/184/0025-01" ] }, { "cite": "418 S.E.2d 225", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "228" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "332 N.C. 123", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2505165 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "128" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/332/0123-01" ] }, { "cite": "681 S.E.2d 492", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "497" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "199 N.C. App. 236", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4170375 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "244" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/199/0236-01" ] }, { "cite": "683 S.E.2d 383", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 587", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "675 S.E.2d 682", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "686" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "196 N.C. App. 668", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4165780 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "673" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/196/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "529 U.S. 266", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9508406 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "272" }, { "page": "261" }, { "page": "272" }, { "page": "1379" }, { "page": "261", "parenthetical": "stating that \"an accurate description of a subject's readily observable location, while \"reliable\" by \"help[ing] the police correctly identify the person whom the tipster means to accuse,\" \"does not show that the tipster has knowledge of concealed criminal activity\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/529/0266-01" ] }, { "cite": "496 U.S. 325", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12122945 ], "weight": 11, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "329" }, { "page": "2415-16" }, { "page": "308" }, { "page": "329" }, { "page": "2415" }, { "page": "308" }, { "page": "2416" }, { "page": "309" }, { "page": "332" }, { "page": "2417" }, { "page": "310", "parenthetical": "upholding an investigative detention based upon an anonymous tip to the effect that (1) the defendant would be carrying drugs in a brown attache case; (2) the defendant would be leaving a specific apartment address and room number; (3" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/496/0325-01" ] }, { "cite": "462 U.S. 213", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6187462 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "237" }, { "page": "2332" }, { "page": "548" }, { "page": "245" }, { "page": "2335-36" }, { "page": "552" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/462/0213-01" ] }, { "cite": "693 S.E.2d 711", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "715", "parenthetical": "citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983)" }, { "page": "715" }, { "page": "715" }, { "page": "714-15" }, { "page": "715" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "204 N.C. App. 259", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4176413 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "263", "parenthetical": "citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983)" }, { "page": "264" }, { "page": "264" }, { "page": "263" }, { "page": "263" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/204/0259-01" ] }, { "cite": "449 U.S. 411", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11716341 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "417" }, { "page": "695" }, { "page": "629" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/449/0411-01" ] }, { "cite": "700 S.E.2d 224", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "364 N.C. 421", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4152551 ], "year": 2010, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/364/0421-01" ] }, { "cite": "684 S.E.2d 483", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "488" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "200 N.C. App. 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4171642 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "444" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/200/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "490 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 605100 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "7", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "1585", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "10", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/490/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 L. Ed. 2d 198", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "129 S. Ct. 264", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "555 U.S. 914", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "446 S.E.2d 67", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "70" }, { "page": "70" }, { "page": "70" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2549311 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "441" }, { "page": "442" }, { "page": "441" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 244", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4149866 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "247" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0244-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167798 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "21" }, { "page": "1880" }, { "page": "906" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/392/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "539 S.E.2d 625", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 9, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "630", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "631" }, { "page": "629" }, { "page": "630" }, { "page": "630" }, { "page": "631" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 200", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135935 ], "weight": 7, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "206-07", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "206-07" }, { "page": "207" }, { "page": "205" }, { "page": "206" }, { "page": "207" }, { "page": "208" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0200-01" ] }, { "cite": "501 U.S. 429", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1108039 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "434", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "2386", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "398", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "434" }, { "page": "2386" }, { "page": "398" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/501/0429-01" ] }, { "cite": "551 U.S. 249", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3573063 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "254", "parenthetical": "quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2386, 115 L. Ed. 2d 389, 398 (1991) (citation and quotation marks omitted)" }, { "page": "2405", "parenthetical": "quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2386, 115 L. Ed. 2d 389, 398 (1991) (citation and quotation marks omitted)" }, { "page": "138", "parenthetical": "quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2386, 115 L. Ed. 2d 389, 398 (1991) (citation and quotation marks omitted)" }, { "page": "254" }, { "page": "2405" }, { "page": "138" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/551/0249-01" ] }, { "cite": "536 U.S. 194", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1254966 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "200" }, { "page": "2110" }, { "page": "251" }, { "page": "201" }, { "page": "2110" }, { "page": "251" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/536/0194-01" ] }, { "cite": "194 N.C. App. 539", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4163236 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "542", "parenthetical": "quoting United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 200, 122 S. Ct. 2105, 2110, 153 L. Ed. 2d 242, 251 (2002)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/194/0539-01" ] }, { "cite": "718 S.E.2d 392", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "365 N.C. 361", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "714 S.E.2d 460", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "463" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "93 L. Ed. 2d 77", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "107 S. Ct. 133", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "479 U.S. 836", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6340738, 6341187, 6339651, 6340166, 6341416, 6339181, 6341774, 6340368, 6339954, 6340948, 6338904, 6339482, 6339803, 6341597, 6338527 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/479/0836-10", "/us/479/0836-12", "/us/479/0836-05", "/us/479/0836-08", "/us/479/0836-13", "/us/479/0836-03", "/us/479/0836-15", "/us/479/0836-09", "/us/479/0836-07", "/us/479/0836-11", "/us/479/0836-02", "/us/479/0836-04", "/us/479/0836-06", "/us/479/0836-14", "/us/479/0836-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 465", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "468" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 111", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4694881 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "116" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0111-01" ] }, { "cite": "488 S.E.2d 769", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "779", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "779" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "346 N.C. 365", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 139608 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "385", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "385" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/346/0365-01" ] }, { "cite": "558 S.E.2d 237", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "240" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "148 N.C. App. 290", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9365587 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "295" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/148/0290-01" ] }, { "cite": "723 S.E.2d 326", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "333", "parenthetical": "stating that, \" [t] o have an alleged error reviewed under the plain error standard, the defendant must 'specifically and distinctly' contend that the alleged error constitutes plain error\" (quoting N.C. R. App. P 10(a)(4)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "710 S.E.2d 414", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "418", "parenthetical": "holding that the defendant waived his right to appellate review of the denial of his suppression motion by failing to object to the admission of the challenged evidence when it was offered at trial" }, { "page": "418", "parenthetical": "declining to review the denial of the defendant's suppression motion under a plain error standard where the defendant failed to do more than simply state that the trial court committed plain error by admitting the challenged evidence" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "155 L. Ed. 2d 1074", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "123 S. Ct. 2087", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "572 S.E.2d 108", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "120", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 316", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511176 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "332", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0316-01" ] }, { "cite": "582 S.E.2d 371", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "373-74", "parenthetical": "internal citations and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "159 N.C. App. 209", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8955191 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "211-12", "parenthetical": "internal citations and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/159/0209-01" ] }, { "cite": "603 S.E.2d 831", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "834", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. McArn, 159 N.C. App. 209, 211-12, 582 S.E.2d 371, 373-74 (2003) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)" }, { "page": "833-34", "parenthetical": "reviewing the denial of a defendant's suppression motion using a plain error standard of review in a case in which the defendant, after failing to object to the admission of the challenged evidence at trial, specifically argued \"plain error\" on appeal" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "166 N.C. App. 711", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8413576 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "715", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. McArn, 159 N.C. App. 209, 211-12, 582 S.E.2d 371, 373-74 (2003) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)" }, { "page": "714" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/166/0711-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1343, "char_count": 35327, "ocr_confidence": 0.746, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.89950402824256e-08, "percentile": 0.3082339935648758 }, "sha256": "028c50750a3653613b9db4e7ef4965ca5876bd1d18efe489c6c974287817ae9a", "simhash": "1:a38744285e7f2cfe", "word_count": 5692 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:36:11.101860+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "JUDGES ROBERT C. HUNTER and STROUD concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JOSHUA EDWARD HARWOOD" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ERVIN, Judge.\nDefendant Joshua Edward Harwood appeals from a judgment sentencing him to twelve to fifteen months imprisonment based upon his convictions for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, possession of marijuana with intent to sell or deliver, possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, and simple possession of a schedule IV controlled substance. On appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress, admitting evidence obtained as the result of an unlawful detention of his person, and ordering the forfeiture of currency found in his possession and that his trial counsel\u2019s failure to object to the admission of the challenged evidence at trial constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. After careful consideration of Defendant\u2019s challenges to the trial court\u2019s judgment in light of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that Defendant is entitled to a new trial and that the order of forfeiture should be vacated pending further proceedings in the court below.\nI. Factual Background\nA. Substantive Facts\nOn 15 July 2010, Agent Mitch McAbee, a deputy with the Buncombe County Sheriffs Department who worked as a member of the Buncombe County Anticrime Task Force, received an anonymous tip indicating that, later that day, Defendant would be selling marijuana to an unidentified individual at a certain convenience store located in Weaverville and that Defendant would be driving a \u201cwhite vehicle.\u201d Although Agent McAbee had not previously encountered Defendant, he had learned from \u201ctalking to people in the community . . . since [being] on patrol\u201d that Defendant had been \u201csupposedly . . . selling illegal drugs in that part of the county for a long time.\u201d\nAfter obtaining a photograph of Defendant and reviewing Defendant\u2019s local criminal history, Agent McAbee and Agent Tim Goodridge, another member of the Buncombe County Anticrime Taskforce, drove to the convenience store in an unmarked vehicle which lacked blue lights or a siren. As Agent McAbee pulled into the convenience store parking lot, a white vehicle, beside which an individual was standing, began backing out of a parking space. As the white vehicle backed out, Agent McAbee identified Defendant as the driver and followed Defendant\u2019s vehicle onto the highway.\nAfter traveling a short distance, Agent McAbee observed Defendant\u2019s vehicle accelerate and then turn off the highway onto a secondary road and into a housing development. At that point, Defendant parked his vehicle in the driveway of a residence which had an address different than that of Defendant. As a result, Agent McAbee pulled into the driveway behind Defendant\u2019s vehicle. After Agent Goodridge observed that the front doors to Defendant\u2019s vehicle appeared to be open, both officers exited their vehicle with weapons drawn, identified themselves, and ordered Defendant and his passenger, David White, to exit Defendant\u2019s vehicle. Agent McAbee approached Defendant, \u201cplaced him on the ground and handcuffed him.\u201d\nAs other officers arrived, Agent McAbee escorted Defendant to the agents\u2019 vehicle in order to speak with him. At some point, Agent McAbee determined that there was an outstanding warrant for Defendant\u2019s arrest. Although Agent McAbee could not recall if he removed Defendant\u2019s handcuffs or read Defendant his Miranda rights, his standard practice would have been to do so. After Agent McAbee told Defendant about the anonymous tip that he had received and after a certain amount of additional conversation, Defendant admitted that he had traveled to the gas station for the purpose of selling marijuana. When Agent McAbee asked if Defendant had any more marijuana and if he would be \u201cwilling to let [agents] go back to his residence and look,\u201d Defendant agreed. As Agent McAbee was speaking with Defendant, Agent Goodridge took Mr. White aside, removed his handcuffs, and discovered a small amount of marijuana on his person which Mr. White indicated belonged to Defendant.\nAfter the agents and Defendant arrived at Defendant\u2019s residence, Defendant provided a key to the door. The agents and Defendant went inside the home and into Defendant\u2019s bedroom, where the agents found a loaded SKS rifle and two ammunition canisters containing quantities of marijuana, cocaine and pills, some of which were identified as Diazepam. After making this discovery, Defendant was placed under arrest based upon the outstanding warrant.\nB. Procedural History\nOn 9 November 2010, warrants for arrest charging Defendant with possession of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver, possession of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, and simple possession of a schedule IV controlled substance were issued. On 2 May 2011, the Buncombe County Grand Jury returned bills of indictment charging Defendant with possession of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver, possession of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, simple possession of a schedule IV controlled substance, and possession of a firearm by a felon. On 1 August 2011, Defendant filed a motion seeking the suppression of any evidence, including statements, obtained as the result of his encounter with Agent McAbee and the subsequent search of his residence on the grounds that the evidence in question was obtained in violation of his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.\nThe charges against Defendant came on for trial before the trial court and a jury at the 1 August 2011 criminal session of Buncombe County Superior Court. After conducting a pre-trial hearing, the trial court denied Defendant\u2019s suppression motion, reciting findings of fact on the record consistent with the factual statement set out above and concluding that (1) a traffic stop did not take place and (2) the officers possessed a \u201csufficient articulable suspicion that the [Defendant was involved with the possession and sale and distribution of illegal substances.\u201d At the conclusion of all of the evidence, Defendant\u2019s counsel renewed his suppression motion, which the trial court denied once again. Defendant\u2019s counsel did not, however, object when the State offered testimony concerning Defendant\u2019s consent to the search of his residence or when the firearm and controlled substances seized inside Defendant\u2019s residence were admitted into evidence.\nOn 3 August 2011, the jury returned verdicts convicting Defendant as charged. The trial court consolidated Defendant\u2019s convictions for judgment, sentenced Defendant to an active term of twelve to fifteen months imprisonment, and ordered that certain currency taken from Defendant be forfeited. Defendant noted an appeal to this Court from the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nII. Legal Analysis\nA. Standard of Review\nIn our review of trial court orders addressing suppression motions, \u201c \u2018the trial court\u2019s findings of fact are conclusive on appeal if supported by competent evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting. This Court must not disturb the trial court\u2019s conclusions if they are supported by the [trial] court\u2019s factual findings. However, the trial court\u2019s conclusions of law are fully reviewable on appeal.\u2019 \u201d State v. Leach, 166 N.C. App. 711, 715, 603 S.E.2d 831, 834 (2004) (quoting State v. McArn, 159 N.C. App. 209, 211-12, 582 S.E.2d 371, 373-74 (2003) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)), appeal dismissed, 359 N.C. 640, 614 S.E.2d 538 (2005).\n\u201c[A] pretrial motion to suppress evidence is not sufficient to preserve for appellate review the issue of whether the evidence was properly admitted if the defendant fails to object at the time the evidence is introduced at trial.\u201d State v. Barden, 356 N.C. 316, 332, 572 S.E.2d 108, 120 (2002) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1040, 123 S. Ct. 2087, 155 L. Ed. 2d 1074 (2003). In view of the fact that Defendant\u2019s counsel failed to object to the admission of the challenged evidence at trial, Defendant did not preserve his challenge to the denial of his suppression motion for appellate review. State v. Jackson, _ N.C. App. _, _, 710 S.E.2d 414, 418 (2011) (holding that the defendant waived his right to appellate review of the denial of his suppression motion by failing to object to the admission of the challenged evidence when it was offered at trial). However, given that Defendant has specifically argued that the trial court committed plain error by allowing the admission of the challenged evidence, State v. Lawrence, _ N.C. _, _, 723 S.E.2d 326, 333 (2012) (stating that, \u201c [t] o have an alleged error reviewed under the plain error standard, the defendant must \u2018specifically and distinctly\u2019 contend that the alleged error constitutes plain error\u201d (quoting N.C. R. App. P 10(a)(4)); Jackson, _N.C. App. at _, 710 S.E.2d at 418 (declining to review the denial of the defendant\u2019s suppression motion under a plain error standard where the defendant failed to do more than simply state that the trial court committed plain error by admitting the challenged evidence), we will review the trial court\u2019s denial of Defendant\u2019s suppression motion for plain error. Leach, 166 N.C. App. at 714, 603 S.E.2d at 833-34 (reviewing the denial of a defendant\u2019s suppression motion using a plain error standard of review in a case in which the defendant, after failing to object to the admission of the challenged evidence at trial, specifically argued \u201cplain error\u201d on appeal).\nAs this Court and the Supreme Court have frequently stated, plain error consists of an error that is \u201cso fundamental that it undermines the fairness of the trial, or [has] a probable impact on the guilty verdict.\u201d State v. Floyd, 148 N.C. App. 290, 295, 558 S.E.2d 237, 240 (2002). In order to obtain relief on plain error grounds, an appealing party must show \u201c(i) that a different result probably would have been reached but for the error or (ii) that the error was so fundamental as to result in a miscarriage of justice or a denial of a fair trial.\u201d State v. Bishop, 346 N.C. 365, 385, 488 S.E.2d 769, 779 (1997) (citations omitted). Given that \u201c[a] prerequisite to our engaging in a \u2018plain error\u2019 analysis is the determination that the [trial court\u2019s ruling] constitutes \u2018error\u2019 at all,\u201d State v. Torain, 316 N.C. 111, 116, 340 S.E.2d 465, 468, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 836, 107 S. Ct. 133, 93 L. Ed. 2d 77 (1986), we will initially determine if the trial court erred by denying Defendant\u2019s suppression motion and then ascertain whether any error committed by the trial court rose to the level of plain error.\nB. Substantive Legal Analysis\n1. Seizure\nThe first substantive issue that we must address is whether the trial court correctly determined that Defendant was not \u201cstopped\u201d because a traffic stop had not taken place. After carefully reviewing the record, we conclude that, although a traffic stop does not appear to have ever taken place, Defendant was subjected to a \u201cseizure.\u201d\nThe Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees \u201c[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.\u201d \u201c[T]here are generally two ways in which a person can be \u2018seized\u2019 for Fourth Amendment purposes: (1) by arrest, which requires a showing of probable cause; or (2) by investigatory detention, which must rest on a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity.\u201d State v. Carrouthers, _ N.C. App. _, _, 714 S.E.2d 460, 463 (2011), disc. review denied, 365 N.C. 361, 718 S.E.2d 392 (2011) (citation omitted). While \u201claw enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment\u2019s prohibition against unreasonable seizures \u2018merely by approaching individuals on the street or in other public places and putting questions to them if they are willing to listen,\u2019 \u201d State v. Isenhour, 194 N.C. App. 539, 542, 670 S.E.2d 264, 267 (2008) (quoting United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 200, 122 S. Ct. 2105, 2110, 153 L. Ed. 2d 242, 251 (2002)), such officers do effectuate a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes when, \u201c \u2018by means of physical force or show of authority,\u2019 [they] terminate[] or restraint] [a person\u2019s] freedom of movement[.]\u201d Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 254, 127 S. Ct. 2400, 2405, 168 L. Ed. 2d 132, 138 (2007) (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2386, 115 L. Ed. 2d 389, 398 (1991) (citation and quotation marks omitted)). The operative question for purposes of determining if a seizure occurred is whether \u201ca reasonable person would feel free to terminate the encounter[;]\u201d if so, \u201cthen he or she has not been seized.\u201d Drayton, 536 U.S. at 201, 122 S. Ct. at 2110, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 251.\nAs the trial court found in denying Defendant\u2019s suppression motion, the investigating officers, after following Defendant\u2019s vehicle, parked their vehicle directly behind Defendant\u2019s vehicle, drew their firearms, and ordered Defendant and his passenger to exit Defendant\u2019s vehicle. After Defendant got out of his vehicle, Agent McAbee placed Defendant on the ground and handcuffed him, thereby restraining Defendant\u2019s freedom of movement \u201c \u2018by means of physical force [and] . . . authority\u2019 \u201d and creating a situation in which a reasonable person would not have felt free to terminate the encounter. Brendlin, 551 U.S. at 254, 127 S. Ct. at 2405, 168 L. Ed. 2d at 138 (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S. Ct. at 2386, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 398). Thus, although the officers did not, in fact, initiate a traffic stop, Defendant was \u201cseized\u201d by the agents. As a result, \u201cin order [for the agents] to conduct [such] a warrantless, investigatory stop [of Defendant, they] must have [had] a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity.\u201d State v. Hughes, 353 N.C. 200, 206-07, 539 S.E.2d 625, 630 (2000) (citation omitted).\n2. Validity of Seizure\nHaving concluded that Defendant was seized for Fourth Amendment purposes, we must now address his claim that the investigating officers \u201clacked . . . reasonable suspicion to accost and frisk him, [so that Defendant\u2019s] statements and the physical evidence [seized as a result of that detention] should have been suppressed as the \u2018fruit of the poisonous tree\u2019 of [an] illegal seizure.\u201d A careful review of the record convinces us that the investigating officers lacked a sufficient basis for seizing Defendant.\n\u201cTerry v. Ohio and its progeny have taught us that in order to conduct a warrantless, investigatory stop, an officer must have a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity.\u201d Hughes, 353 N.C. at 206-07, 539 S.E.2d at 630 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968)). A law enforcement officer is permitted to conduct a brief stop and frisk of an individual if there are \u201cspecific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.\u201d Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S. Ct. at 1880, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 906. Under the \u201creasonable articulable suspicion\u201d standard, a stop must \u201c \u2018be based on specific and articulable facts, as well as the rational inferences from those facts, as viewed through the eyes of a reasonable, cautious officer, guided by his experience and training.\u2019 \u201d State v. Barnard, 362 N.C. 244, 247, 658 S.E.2d 643, 645 (quoting State v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437, 441, 446 S.E.2d 67, 70 (1994)), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 914, 129 S. Ct. 264, 172 L. Ed. 2d 198 (2008). For that reason, there must be a \u201cminimal level of objective justification, something more than an \u2018unparticularized suspicion or hunch,\u2019 \u201d Watkins, 337 N.C. at 442, 446 S.E.2d at 70 (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 1585, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1, 10 (1989) (citation and quotation marks omitted)), to justify an investigative detention. Thus, \u201cthe ultimate issue before the trial court in a case involving the validity of an investigatory detention is the extent to which the investigating officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion that the defendant might be engaged in criminal activity.\u201d State v. Mello, 200 N.C. App. 437, 444, 684 S.E.2d 483, 488 (2009), aff\u2019d, 364 N.C. 421, 700 S.E.2d 224 (2010). We consider \u201c \u2018the totality of the circumstances\u2019 \u201d in determining whether the requisite reasonable articulable suspicion required for a valid investigative detention exists. Watkins, 337 N.C. at 441, 446 S.E.2d at 70 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S. Ct. 690, 695, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621, 629 (1981)).\n\u201cWhere the justification for a warrantless stop is information provided by an anonymous informant, a reviewing court must assess whether the tip at issue possessed sufficient indicia of reliability to support the police intrusion on a detainee\u2019s constitutional rights.\u201d State v. Johnson, 204 N.C. App. 259, 263, 693 S.E.2d 711, 715 (2010) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983)). \u201c[I]f [the anonymous tip] does not [have sufficient indicia of reliability], then there must be sufficient police corroboration of the tip before the stop may be made.\u201d Hughes, 353 N.C. at 207, 539 S.E.2d at 630 (citing Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329, 110 S. Ct. 2412, 2415-16, 110 L. Ed. 2d 301, 308 (1990)). As a result, we must determine (1) whether the anonymous tip provided to Agent McAbee, taken as a whole, possessed sufficient indicia of reliability and, if not, (2) whether the anonymous tip could be made sufficiently reliable by independent corroboration in order to uphold the challenged investigative detention. Id. at 209, 539 S.E.2d at 631.\nAlthough determining whether an anonymous tip is sufficiently reliable to justify an investigative detention clearly hinges upon the \u201ctotality of the circumstances,\u201d the informant\u2019s \u201cveracity,\u201d \u201creliability\u201d and \u201cbasis of knowledge\u201d are \u201cimportant factors to consider.\u201d Id. 353 N.C. at 205, 539 S.E.2d at 629. As a general proposition, \u201can anonymous tip alone seldom demonstrates the informant\u2019s basis of knowledge or veracity inasmuch as ordinary citizens generally do not provide extensive recitations of the basis of their everyday observations and given that the veracity of persons supplying anonymous tips is \u2018by hypothesis largely unknown, and unknowable.\u2019 \u201d White, 496 U.S. at 329, 110 S. Ct. at 2415, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 308 (quoting Gates; 462 U.S. at 237, 103 S. Ct. at 2332, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 548). Furthermore, a sufficiently reliable anonymous tip should \u201ccontain[] a range of details relating not just to easily obtained facts and conditions existing at the time of the tip, but to future actions of third parties ordinarily not easily predicted.\u2019 \u201d Gates, 462 U.S. at 245, 103 S. Ct. at 2335-36, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 552. Finally, \u201c \u2018if a tip has a relatively low degree of reliability, more information will be required to establish the requisite quantum of suspicion than would be required if the tip were more reliable.\u2019 \u201d Hughes, 353 N.C. at 206, 539 S.E.2d at 630 (quoting White, 494 U.S. at 330, 110 S. Ct. at 2416, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 309).\n\u201cThe reasonable suspicion ... at issue [in an anonymous tip situation] requires that [the] tip be reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person.\u201d Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272, 120 S. Ct. 1375. 1379, 146 L. Ed. 2d 254, 261 (2000) (holding that an anonymous telephone call to the effect that \u201ca young black male standing at a particular bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun\u201d did not provide adequate support for an investigative detention given that \u201c[t]he anonymous call . . . provided no predictive information and therefore left the police without means to test the informant\u2019s knowledge or credibility,\u201d so that \u201c[a]ll the police had to go on . . . was the bare report of an unknown, unaccountable informant who neither explained how he knew about the gun nor supplied any basis for believing he had inside information about [the suspect]\u201d). \u201cThe type of detail provided in the tip and corroborated by the officers is critical in determining whether the tip can supply the reasonable suspicion necessary for the stop. Where the detail contained in the tip merely concerns identifying characteristics, an officer\u2019s confirmation of these details will not legitimize the tip.\u201d Johnson, 204 N.C. App. at 264, 693 S.E.2d at 715 (holding that an anonymous tip to the effect that a \u201cblack male suspect wearing a white shirt in a blue Mitsubishi with a certain license plate number\u201d was \u201cselling drugs and guns at the intersection of Pitt and Birch Streets\u201d and that the suspect \u201chad just left the area, but would return shortly,\u201d did not suffice to justify an investigative stop of the defendant\u2019s car given that there was \u201cnothing inherent in the tip . . . to allow a court to deem it reliable\u201d). A reviewing court is more likely to find that an anonymous tip provides the requisite \u201creasonable articulable suspicion\u201d when the information provided in the tip is specific and can be substantially corroborated. White, 496 U.S. at 332, 110 S. Ct. at 2417, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 310 (upholding an investigative detention based upon an anonymous tip to the effect that (1) the defendant would be carrying drugs in a brown attach\u00e9 case; (2) the defendant would be leaving a specific apartment address and room number; (3) the defendant would be leaving her room at a specific time, (4) the defendant\u2019s car had a detailed description; and (5) the specific destination to which the defendant would travel, with all of these details having been subsequently confirmed through surveillance).\nAfter analyzing the totality of the circumstances before us in this case, we conclude that the anonymous tip at issue here did not \u201cexhibit sufficient indices of reliability . . . .\u201d Johnson, 204 N.C. App. at 264, 693 S.E.2d at 715. The tip in question simply provided that Defendant would be selling marijuana at a certain location on a certain day and would be driving a white vehicle. \u201cThe record contains no information about who the caller was, no details about what the caller had seen, and no information even as to where the caller was located.\u201d State v. Peele, 196 N.C. App. 668, 673, 675 S.E.2d 682, 686, disc. review denied, 363 N.C. 587, 683 S.E.2d 383 (2009). Unlike the anonymous tip determined to be sufficient in White, the tip in this case lacked any detail concerning the nature of Defendant\u2019s present and planned activities, such as the time at which Defendant would be at the gas station, the type of vehicle that Defendant would be driving, the identity of the person to whom the sale would be made, or the manner in which the sale would be conducted. Put another way, \u201cwhile the tip at issue [here] included identifying details of a person and car allegedly engaged in illegal activity, it offered few details of the alleged crime, no information regarding the informant\u2019s basis of knowledge, and scant information to predict the future behavior of the alleged perpetrator.\u201d Johnson, 204 N.C. App. at 263, 693 S.E.2d at 714-15. As a result, since nothing inherent in the tip itself provided investigating officers with the \u201creasonable articulable suspicion\u201d required to justify detaining Defendant, the only way that Defendant\u2019s detention could be upheld would be in the event that the tip contained sufficient details, corroborated by the investigating officers, to warrant a reasonable belief that Defendant was engaging in criminal activity.\nNothing in the subsequent activities of the investigating officers \u201cbuttressed\u201d the tip through \u201csufficient police corroboration.\u201d Hughes, 353 N.C. at 207, 539 S.E.2d at 630. The information obtained by or known to Agent McAbee prior to observing Defendant at the convenience store did not provide any additional particularized justification for detaining him. Agent McAbee\u2019s knowledge of Defendant\u2019s previous drug activity, which consisted of \u201ctalking to\u201d unnamed individuals in the community, was not specific in nature and did nothing more than indicate that, as a general matter, Defendant engaged in the business of selling controlled substances. Upon arriving at the convenience store, investigating officers observed a white vehicle driven by an individual identified as Defendant backing out of a parking space. The observations made by the investigating officers at the convenience store consisted of nothing more than identifying a \u201cdeterminate person\u201d at a determinate location, a degree of corroboration that does not suffice to justify an investigative detention. J.L., 529 U.S. at 272, 120 S. Ct. at 1379, 146 L. Ed. 2d at 261 (stating that \u201can accurate description of a subject\u2019s readily observable location, while \u201creliable\u201d by \u201chelp[ing] the police correctly identify the person whom the tipster means to accuse,\u201d \u201cdoes not show that the tipster has knowledge of concealed criminal activity\u201d). Although Agent McAbee watched Defendant drive away from the convenience store and ultimately pull his vehicle into the driveway of a residence with an address that differed from his own, Defendant could just as easily have been visiting an acquaintance, giving Mr. White a ride home, or turning around as opposed to engaging in evasive or unlawful conduct. Thus, \u201cthe information provided [and known to Agent McAbee prior to the seizure] did not contain the \u2018range of details\u2019 required by White and Gates to sufficiently predict [Defendant's specific future action[;]\u201dit \u201cwas . . . peppered with uncertainties and generalities.\u201d Hughes, 353 N.C. at 208, 539 S.E.2d at 631. Therefore, \u201cgiven the limited details contained in the tip, and the failure of the officers to corroborate the tip\u2019s allegations of illegal activity, the tip lacked sufficient indicia of reliability to justify the warrantless stop in this case.\u201d Johnson, 204 N.C. App. at 263, 693 S.E.2d at 715. As a result, the investigating officers lacked the \u201creasonable articulable suspicion\u201d necessary to support their decision to detain Defendant.\n3. Plain Error\n\u201cEvidence that is discovered as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure is generally excluded at trial as fruit of the poisonous tree unless it would have been discovered regardless of the unconstitutional search.\u201d State v. Jackson, 199 N.C. App. 236, 244, 681 S.E.2d 492, 497 (2009). \u201c[I]f a person is illegally arrested [or seized], any inculpatory statement he makes [or evidence obtained during and after that time] must be suppressed unless the State can show the causal chain was broken by some independent circumstance which will show the statement was not caused by the arrest [or seizure].\u201d State v. Allen, 332 N.C. 123, 128, 418 S.E.2d 225, 228 (1992). In other words, we must determine \u201c \u2018whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.\u2019 \u201d State v. Barnard, 184 N.C. App. 25, 40, 645 S.E.2d 780, 790 (2007) (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 83 S. Ct. 407, 417, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 455 (1963) (quotation marks and citation omitted)), aff\u2019d, 362 N.C. 244, 658 S.E.2d 643, cert. denied, 555 U.S. 914, 129 S. Ct. 264, 172 L. Ed. 2d 198 (2008).\nA careful review of the record demonstrates that Defendant\u2019s statement admitting that he had sold marijuana at the convenience station directly resulted from the investigating officers\u2019 decision to detain him. Similarly, Defendant\u2019s subsequent decision to consent to the search of his residence, resulting in the discovery of the rifle and the seizure of various controlled substances, directly resulted from the investigating officers\u2019 detention of Defendant. For that reason, the challenged evidence could not have been discovered \u201c \u2018by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint,\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488, 83 S. Ct. at 417, 9 L. Ed. 2d at 455), and should have been suppressed. Moreover, absent the admission of the evidence obtained as a result of the unlawful investigative detention, the record would probably not have contained sufficient evidence to establish Defendant\u2019s guilt of the offenses for which he was convicted. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-415.1; N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-95(a) and (d)(2). For that reason, Defendant has shown that a \u201cdifferent result probably would have been reached but for the [trial court\u2019s] error\u201d in admitting the challenged evidence. Bishop, 346 N.C. at 385, 488 S.E.2d at 779. As a result, the trial court committed plain error by admitting the challenged evidence, so that Defendant is entitled to a new trial and to have the forfeiture order vacated pending further proceedings in the Buncombe County Superior Court. State v. Burrow, _ N.C. App. _, _, 721 S.E.2d 356, 360 (holding that the trial court committed plain error by admitting testimony and a laboratory report concerning the extent to which a particular substance was a controlled substance in violation of the Confrontation Clause given that, \u201c[a]bsent the erroneous admission of the ... report and testimony regarding the report, no chemical analysis evidence was presented to the jury to show the pills [the defendant allegedly possessed] were oxycodone\u201d), temporary stay allowed, _ N.C. _, 722 S.E.2d 209 (2012).\nIII. Conclusion\nThus, for the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the trial court committed plain error by admitting the challenged evidence. As a result, Defendant is entitled to a new trial and to have the order of forfeiture vacated pending further proceedings in the court below.\nNEW TRIAL; ORDER OF FORFEITURE VACATED.\nJUDGES ROBERT C. HUNTER and STROUD concur.\n. Although the State argues that Defendant failed to mention the \u201cplain error\u201d doctrine in the issues listed in the record on appeal and failed to adequately advance a \u201cplain error\u201d claim for that reason, we do not find the State\u2019s argument convincing given that Defendant clearly asserted plain error in his brief and given that N.C. R. App. P. 10(b) specifically provides that \u201c[proposed issues . . . are to facilitate the preparation of the record on appeal and shall not limit the scope of the issues presented on appeal in an appellant\u2019s brief.\u201d\n. In light of our determination that the investigating officers lacked an adequate justification for detaining Defendant, we need not address his contention that the circumstances surrounding his encounter with the officers constituted a full-scale arrest requiring probable cause rather than an investigative detention.\n. Although the State asserts in its brief that the existence of a warrant authorizing Defendant\u2019s arrest justified the decision of the investigating officers to take him into custody, it has not cited any authority in support of that proposition and we have not found any such authority in the course of our own research. A careful examination of the record discloses that the investigating officers did not know that this warrant existed at the time that they detained Defendant and decided to detain him because they believed that they had sufficient \u201creasonable articulable suspicion\u201d to do so. As a result, we take no position concerning the validity of the State\u2019s assertion.\n. In seeking to persuade us to reach a different result, the State relies upon State v. Garcia, 197 N.C. App. 522, 530-31, 677 S.E.2d 555, 560 (2009), in which we upheld the validity of an investigative detention because \u201cDetective Jones corroborated . . . information in the anonymous tips [to the effect that marijuana was being sold at a particular residence] through [examination of material contained in a computer database] and her days of surveillance at\u201d the residence and passed the information along to other officers, who \u201cfollowed [the defendant to a location known for drug activity.\u201d Garcia is readily distinguishable from the present case, however, since there is no evidence in the present record to the effect that the convenience store was \u201ca location known for drug activity\u201d and since the investigating officers did not observe the sort of activity detected during the surveillance which occurred in Garcia before detaining Defendant.\n. Aside from a generalized assertion that the trial court did not err, much less commit plain error, in admitting the challenged evidence, the State did not advance any argument in its brief specifically explaining why any error committed by the trial court did not rise to the level of plain error.\n. Having granted Defendant a new trial on plain error grounds, we need not address his ineffective assistance claim. See State v. Ewell, 168 N.C. App. 98, 106, 606 S.E.2d 914, 920, disc. review denied, 359 N.C. 412, 612 S.E.2d 326 (2005).\n. Since N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-112(a)(2), the relevant forfeiture statute, \u201cis a criminal, or in personam, forfeiture statute\u201d and since \u201c[c]riminal forfeiture... must follow criminal conviction\u201d, State v. Johnson, 124 N.C. App. 462, 476, 478 S.E.2d 16, 25 (1996), cert. denied, 345 N.C. 758, 485 S.E.2d 304 (1997), we need not address Defendant\u2019s challenge to the trial court\u2019s forfeiture order in any detail.", "type": "majority", "author": "ERVIN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Angel E. Gray, for the State.", "Russell J. Hollers III, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JOSHUA EDWARD HARWOOD\nNo. COA11-1513\n(Filed 3 July 2012)\n1. Appeal and Error \u2014 plain error \u2014 no objection at trial \u2014 not listed in issues in record \u2014 argued in brief\nThe denial of defendant\u2019s motion to suppress was reviewed for plain error after defense counsel did not object to the admission of challenged evidence at trial but specifically argued plain error on appeal. Even though defendant did not mention the plain error doctrine in the issues listed in the record on appeal, defendant clearly argued plain error in his brief.\n2. Search and Seizure \u2014 seizure of defendant \u2014 not a traffic stop \u2014 insufficient grounds\nThere was a seizure of defendant rather than a traffic stop where officers followed defendant as he drove away from a suspected drug sale, defendant pulled into the driveway of a residence not his own, the officers parked behind him, and the officers removed defendant from the car at gunpoint, placed him on the ground, and handcuffed him. The officers needed a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity.\n3. Search and Seizure \u2014 basis for seizure of defendant\u2014 anonymous tip \u2014 not sufficient\nInvestigating officers lacked a sufficient basis for seizing defendant where the justification was provided by an anonymous tip that contained limited details and the officers did not corroborate the tip\u2019s allegations of illegal activity.\n4. Search and Seizure \u2014 obtained after illegal seizure of person \u2014 plain error\nThe trial court committed plain error in a drugs case by admitting evidence obtained after defendant was seized without the necessary reasonable, articulable suspicion. Defendant\u2019s statement and his consent to a search of his residence resulted directly from the officer\u2019s decision to detain him and, without the evidence obtained as a result of that unlawful detention, the record would probably not have contained sufficient evidence to establish defendant\u2019s guilt.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 3 August 2011 by Judge James U. Downs in Buncombe County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 4 April 2012.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Angel E. Gray, for the State.\nRussell J. Hollers III, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0451-01", "first_page_order": 461, "last_page_order": 474 }