{ "id": 4357285, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. RODNEY LAMAR ROBINSON", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Robinson", "decision_date": "2012-07-17", "docket_number": "No. COA11-1584", "first_page": "509", "last_page": "522", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "221 N.C. App. 509" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "615 S.E.2d 404", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633275 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "407", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Sierra, 335 N.C. 753, 758, 440 S.E.2d 791, 794 (1994)" }, { "page": "407-08" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/615/0404-01" ] }, { "cite": "660 S.E.2d 111", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640835 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "115-16" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/660/0111-01" ] }, { "cite": "611 S.E.2d 445", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12632672 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "447" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/611/0445-01" ] }, { "cite": "400 S.E.2d 57", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "62" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 231", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2541929 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "238" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0231-01" ] }, { "cite": "440 S.E.2d 791", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "794" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "335 N.C. 753", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2529092 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "758" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/335/0753-01" ] }, { "cite": "171 N.C. App. 504", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8438014 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "509", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Sierra, 335 N.C. 753, 758, 440 S.E.2d 791, 794 (1994)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/171/0504-01" ] }, { "cite": "365 S.E.2d 571", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "576" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 663", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2566745 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "671" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0663-01" ] }, { "cite": "190 N.C. App. 158", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4158561 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "164" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/190/0158-01" ] }, { "cite": "175 S.E. 836", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1934, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "838" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "207 N.C. 6", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8621595 ], "year": 1934, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/207/0006-01" ] }, { "cite": "473 S.E.2d 3", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "5", "parenthetical": "quoting Weil v. Herring, 207 N.C. 6, 10, 175 S.E. 836, 838 (1934)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 N.C. 190", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 867543 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "194", "parenthetical": "quoting Weil v. Herring, 207 N.C. 6, 10, 175 S.E. 836, 838 (1934)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/344/0190-01" ] }, { "cite": "573 S.E.2d 870", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "880-81" }, { "page": "881" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 446", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511417 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "458" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0446-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 436", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12046400 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 S.E.2d 281", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "288" }, { "page": "288" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 N.C. 37", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 684981 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "45" }, { "page": "45" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/352/0037-01" ] }, { "cite": "334 S.E.2d 53", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "59", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "59" }, { "page": "60" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 N.C. 359", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4694660 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "368", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "367" }, { "page": "369" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0359-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 S.E.2d 618", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "619" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567694 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "134" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "248 S.E.2d 390", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "392", "parenthetical": "holding that where the trial court's determination that the defendant was mentally capable to proceed with trial was not supported by the evidence, the verdict and judgment must be vacated and the cause remanded for further proceedings against the defendant" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "38 N.C. App. 547", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8554966 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "550", "parenthetical": "holding that where the trial court's determination that the defendant was mentally capable to proceed with trial was not supported by the evidence, the verdict and judgment must be vacated and the cause remanded for further proceedings against the defendant" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/38/0547-01" ] }, { "cite": "170 N.C. App. 171", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9004728 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "174" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/170/0171-01" ] }, { "cite": "594 S.E.2d 71", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "78", "parenthetical": "hereinafter McRae II" }, { "page": "74", "parenthetical": "noting the proper remedy in cases where the trial court failed to conduct a competency hearing in violation of a defendant's due process rights is to remand the case to the trial court to (1) determine whether it is possible for a retrospective competency hearing to be held effectively, and (2" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "163 N.C. App. 359", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8917839 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "369", "parenthetical": "hereinafter McRae II" }, { "page": "361" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/163/0359-01" ] }, { "cite": "540 S.E.2d 713", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "730" }, { "page": "730" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 50", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135728 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "78" }, { "page": "78" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0050-01" ] }, { "cite": "577 S.E.2d 655", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "661" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "157 N.C. App. 22", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9184753 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "30" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/157/0022-01" ] }, { "cite": "448 S.E.2d 306", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "310", "parenthetical": "\"A defendant has the burden of proof to show incapacity or that he is not competent to stand trial.\"" }, { "page": "310-11", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "116 N.C. App. 390", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524175 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "395", "parenthetical": "\"A defendant has the burden of proof to show incapacity or that he is not competent to stand trial.\"" }, { "page": "395-96" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/116/0390-01" ] }, { "cite": "309 S.E.2d 498", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "501" }, { "page": "502" }, { "page": "502" }, { "page": "502" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "65 N.C. App. 277", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523438 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "282" }, { "page": "283" }, { "page": "284" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/65/0277-01" ] }, { "cite": "677 S.E.2d 507", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "511" }, { "page": "512" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "197 N.C. App. 543", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4168024 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "548" }, { "page": "549" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/197/0543-01" ] }, { "cite": "383 U.S. 375", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6171240 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "385" }, { "page": "822" }, { "page": "389-90" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/383/0375-01" ] }, { "cite": "420 U.S. 162", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11643095 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "171" }, { "page": "113" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/420/0162-01" ] }, { "cite": "533 S.E.2d 557", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "559", "parenthetical": "hereinafter McRae I" }, { "page": "559" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "139 N.C. App. 387", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9496800 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "389", "parenthetical": "hereinafter McRae I" }, { "page": "389" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/139/0387-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1286, "char_count": 33070, "ocr_confidence": 0.74, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.792801399660261e-08, "percentile": 0.3013633227265373 }, "sha256": "7ae60fc9408594593608f7889e0f852f3ce12108774dbb95c6e3da38336eb86b", "simhash": "1:01a9d46af6ee0054", "word_count": 5306 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:36:11.101860+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges CALABRIA and STEELMAN concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. RODNEY LAMAR ROBINSON" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "McCullough, Judge.\nOn 28 February 2011, a jury found Rodney Lamar Robinson (\u201cdefendant\u201d) guilty of first-degree murder. The trial court entered judgment on the verdict, sentencing defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. On appeal, defendant challenges the trial court\u2019s (1) denial of his motion requesting that he be evaluated by a mental health professional to determine his competency to proceed with trial, and (2) denial of his motion to suppress his statements made during a recorded interrogation at the police station during which he produced a handwritten statement. After careful review, we hold defendant received a fair trial free from prejudicial error.\nI. Background\nOn 16 August 2009, just before 2:00 p.m., defendant assaulted Angela Hart (\u201cHart\u201d) with a paring knife, and Hart died as a result of the loss of blood from the injuries inflicted during the assault. During the four months prior to her murder on 16 August 2009, Hart lived with defendant in defendant\u2019s mother\u2019s home located on Woodlawn Avenue in Asheville, North Carolina.\nOn the date of the assault, Hart contacted defendant by telephone, during which defendant lied to Hart and told her that his mother had a nervous breakdown and that she needed to come home. When she arrived at the house, defendant again lied to her and told her he had stored some of her belongings in the basement and that she should accompany him to the basement. At the top of the basement stairs, defendant first stabbed Hart in the neck with the paring knife. Hart attempted to run from defendant, and he chased her outside around the house onto Young Street, where he tackled her against a parked car. Defendant proceeded to stab Hart repeatedly. Hart again attempted to run away from defendant, but she fell down, upon which defendant caught her and began stabbing her repeatedly. Hart then tried to run towards a nearby house, as defendant followed and continued to stab her. When Hart no longer moved, defendant returned to his house.\nSeveral neighbors in the area heard a female screaming for help, saw defendant stabbing Hart multiple times, and called 911. Officer Robert Bingaman with the Asheville Police Department (\u201cOfficer Bingaman\u201d) was the first police officer to arrive at the scene at approximately 1:50 p.m. As Officer Bingaman approached the area, he observed defendant crossing the street in front of defendant\u2019s house with his hands, arms, bare chest, and pants covered in blood. Officer Bingaman exited his patrol vehicle and approached defendant in front of defendant\u2019s house, and defendant \u201cthrew his hands in the air\u201d and stated that he was \u201cnot resisting.\u201d Defendant complied with Officer Bingaman\u2019s order to get on the ground and was handcuffed. During this time, defendant stated that he \u201cjust killed a woman.\u201d When Officer Bingaman stood defendant up and asked defendant where the woman was, defendant motioned with his head and eyes in the direction of Hart\u2019s body and stated, \u201cShe\u2019s over there.\u201d After providing his name and address to Officer Bingaman, defendant spontaneously stated, \u201cI\u2019m glad this is over. I\u2019m about to meet my maker.\u201d A dispatcher riding with Officer Bingaman checked the location indicated by defendant and reported back to Officer Bingaman that he had observed a body. EMS personnel arrived soon thereafter and pronounced Hart dead at the scene.\nThe pathologist who conducted Hart\u2019s autopsy testified that Hart sustained a total of 57 sharp force injuries. Forty-four of those injuries were superficial, penetrating through the skin and soft tissue but no vital organs or major blood vessels. The remaining thirteen were deeper stab wounds, including four in Hart\u2019s back that penetrated both of her lungs. Thirty-six of the injuries were inflicted on Hart\u2019s face, head and neck, one of which penetrated her eyeball. The paring knife used in the assault was left imbedded in Hart\u2019s right cheek. At the scene, EMS personnel also asked defendant if he was injured, to which defendant responded that he had cut his hand when he was \u201ccutting that b \u2014 h.\u201d Defendant was arrested and taken to the Asheville Police Department.\nAt approximately 4:30 p.m., Detective Matthew Davis (\u201cDetective Davis\u201d), with defendant\u2019s consent, took swabs of the blood on defendant\u2019s chest and a swab from defendant\u2019s cheek for DNA. Defendant asked Detective Davis if Hart was dead or alive, to which Detective Davis responded that he did not know the status of her condition at that time. Defendant was then taken to a decontamination room where he was bathed and bandaged. Defendant was placed in an interview room equipped with an audio-video recording system and was given some food.\nAs defendant was finishing his meal, Detective Davis entered the interview room at approximately 7:00 p.m. and asked defendant if he was \u201cready to talk for a little bit[.]\u201d Defendant responded that he was ready, that he \u201cwanted to do the right thing,\u201d that he was \u201csorry for what he did,\u201d and that he had \u201casked God to forgive him.\u201d Detective Davis informed defendant that he would need to sign a waiver of his Miranda rights in order to speak with the detective about what had happened. Specifically, Detective Davis told defendant, \u201cYou\u2019ve got to waive your rights, basically saying you want to talk to me, that\u2019s all this is saying, and then we can move on and hear your story.\u201d Detective Davis confirmed that defendant could read and write and then read the Miranda rights to defendant from a pre-printed waiver form. Detective Davis had defendant initial beside each paragraph and sign the waiver form. Detective Davis then proceeded to question defendant about the assault. During the interrogation, Detective Davis asked defendant to make a written statement, with which defendant complied. Defendant\u2019s statements to Detective Davis revealed that he had become frustrated with Hart and that he had planned to kill her and commit suicide afterwards. However, his mother would not let him back inside the house after he assaulted Hart. After obtaining defendant\u2019s written statement, Detective Davis informed defendant that Hart had died and that defendant would be charged with first-degree murder.\nDefendant was indicted for first-degree murder on 5 April 2010. The case came on for trial on 21 February 2011 in Buncombe County Superior Court. At the call of the case, defense counsel presented to the trial court a motion questioning defendant\u2019s competency to proceed with the trial and seeking an assessment of his competency by a mental health professional. After conducting a brief hearing on the issue, the trial court denied the motion.\nDefense counsel also moved the court to suppress defendant\u2019s statements made during the interrogation by Detective Davis following his arrest. Defense counsel asserted defendant did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights, and therefore, his statements as a result of the interrogation must be excluded. The trial court conducted a voir dire hearing on the motion, and at the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court enunciated multiple findings of fact and a conclusion of law that defendant had knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights prior to making the challenged statements and therefore the statements were admissible.\nOn 28 February 2011, the jury returned a verdict finding defendant guilty of first-degree murder. The trial court entered judgment on the verdict, sentencing defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Defendant gave oral notice of appeal in open court.\nII. Motion for Competency Evaluation\nDefendant first argues the trial court erred in denying his motion requesting that he be evaluated by a mental health professional to determine his competency to proceed with trial.\n\u201c \u2018[A] person whose mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to trial.\u2019 \u201d State v. McRae, 139 N.C. App. 387, 389, 533 S.E.2d 557, 559 (2000) (hereinafter McRae I) (alteration in original) (quoting Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171, 43 L. Ed. 2d 103, 113 (1975)); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1001(a) (2011). \u201cFailure of the trial court to protect a defendant\u2019s right not to be tried or convicted while mentally incompetent deprives him of his due process right to a fair trial.\u201d McRae I, 139 N.C. App. at 389, 533 S.E.2d at 559 (citing Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385,15 L. Ed. 2d 815, 822 (1966)). Thus, \u201c[a] conviction cannot stand where defendant lacks capacity to defend himself.\u201d Id. at 389-90, 533 S.E.2d at 559.\nThe question of a defendant\u2019s mental capacity may be raised at any time on motion by the prosecutor, the defendant, defense counsel, or the court. State v. Goode, 197 N.C. App. 543, 548, 677 S.E.2d 507, 511 (2009). Section 15A-1002(b) of our General Statutes provides that \u201c[w]hen the capacity of the defendant to proceed is questioned, the court shall hold a hearing to determine the defendant\u2019s capacity to proceed.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1002(b) (2011). \u201cAlthough the present statute requires the court to conduct a hearing when a question is raised as to a defendant\u2019s capacity to stand trial, no particular procedure is mandated. The method of inquiry is still largely within the discretion of the trial judge.\u201d State v. Gates, 65 N.C. App. 277, 282, 309 S.E.2d 498, 501 (1983). The statutory hearing requirement \u201cappears to be satisfied as long as it appears from the record that the defendant, upon making the motion, is provided an opportunity to present any and all evidence he or she is prepared to present.\u201d Id. at 283, 309 S.E.2d at 502.\nThe burden rests upon the defendant to establish his mental incapacity. Goode, 197 N.C. App. at 549, 677 S.E.2d at 512; see also State v. O\u2019Neal, 116 N.C. App. 390, 395, 448 S.E.2d 306, 310 (1994) (\u201cA defendant has the burden of proof to show incapacity or that he is not competent to stand trial.\u201d). Ultimately, \u201cthe decision to grant a motion for an evaluation of a defendant\u2019s capacity to stand trial remains within the trial judge\u2019s discretion.\u201d Gates, 65 N.C. App. at 283, 309 S.E.2d at 502; see also State v. Wolfe, 157 N.C. App. 22, 30, 577 S.E.2d 655, 661 (2003).\nThe trial court may determine the question of capacity with or without a jury. When proceeding without a jury, the trial court\u2019s findings of fact are conclusive on appeal when there is competent evidence to support them, even if there is evidence to the contrary. The trial court has not erred if it does not make findings of fact where the evidence would compel the ruling made, but the better practice is to make findings and conclusions.\nO\u2019Neal, 116 N.C. App. at 395-96, 448 S.E.2d at 310-11 (citations omitted). \u201cWhere the procedural requirement of a hearing has been met, defendant must show that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion before reversal is required.\u201d Gates, 65 N.C. App. at 284, 309 S.E.2d at 502.\nWe note also that our Supreme Court has advised that \u201c[w]here a defendant demonstrates or where matters before the trial court indicate that there is a significant possibility that a defendant is incompetent to proceed with trial, the trial court must appoint an expert or experts to inquire into the defendant\u2019s mental health in accord with N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1002(b)(l).\u201d State v. Grooms, 353 N.C. 50, 78, 540 S.E.2d 713, 730 (2000).\nHere, at the call of the case for trial, defense counsel presented to the trial court a motion, supported by an affidavit by defense counsel and prior mental health evaluation reports, questioning defendant\u2019s capacity to proceed with trial and seeking an assessment of his competency by a mental health professional. The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion, considering the documentary evidence and arguments presented by defense counsel.\nIn both his affidavit and his arguments to the trial court, defense counsel reported that he had met with defendant on multiple occasions during the weeks leading up to trial and that he observed a \u201csubstantial deterioration\u201d in defendant\u2019s mental functioning on both the day before and the morning of trial. Defense counsel stated that defendant was agitated, was completely tangential in the sense that he could not carry on a rational conversation or stick to the point, could not follow a train of thought, and could not logically or rationally discuss any of the important issues involved in the defense of his case. Defense counsel also stated defendant was very animated and was unable to listen to or absorb the information and advice that defense counsel was trying to give him. Defense counsel further reported that defendant cycled back and forth between mania and depression within a single conversation and that defendant was not taking his prescribed antidepressant medication while in jail. Defense counsel asserted that defendant was not presently capable of assisting his defense in a reasonable and rational manner or comprehending his situation in reference to the proceedings.\nThe evidence from the prior psychiatric evaluation reports indicated that defendant had a history of significant mental disorders. Defendant\u2019s IQ level was determined to be 68 by the Department of Corrections in 2006, placing him in the mild mental retardation range. In 2007, defendant was committed to Broughton Hospital, where he was diagnosed with impulse control disorder. In 2008, defendant was diagnosed with major depressive disorder associated with his being HIV-positive for nearly 20 years. Also in 2008, defendant was diagnosed with affective mood disorder with agitation and depression and was prescribed an antidepressant medication.\nIn December 2009, defendant was evaluated by both Dr. David Bartholomew, a psychiatrist, and Dr. Lavonne Fox, a psychologist, at Central Regional Hospital to determine his competency to stand trial. Both physicians noted their opinion that defendant was competent to stand trial, although Dr. Fox noted that defendant \u201cshould be assessed further if he exhibits changes in his cognitive functioning.\u201d\nDefendant was again evaluated by both Dr. Claudia Coleman, a neuropsychologist, on 13 October 2010, although her report was dated 9 January 2011, and Dr. George Corvin, a psychiatrist, on 30 September and 23 November 2010, approximately three months prior to trial. Dr. Coleman found that defendant\u2019s cognitive functioning had \u201cworsened to some degree\u201d since his prior evaluations by Drs. Bartholomew and Fox. Dr. Coleman did not directly address defendant\u2019s competency to stand trial at that time, but noted that \u201c[i]n order for [defendant] to attend readily and process information in an ongoing manner required during trial[, defendant] will need to demonstrate a relatively stable mood with no obsessive, bizarre, or paranoid thinking.\u201d Similarly, Dr. Corvin opined that defendant was competent to stand trial at the time of his evaluation but noted that \u201cshould his overall symptom picture worsen to any appreciable degree as the stress of trial builds, he could easily decompensate to the extent that he would be viewed as not capable of proceeding.\u201d Accordingly, Dr. Corvin warned that defendant\u2019s \u201ccondition and degree of understanding of factors related to his case\u201d should be closely monitored as litigation proceeds.\nThis evidence, presented to and considered by the trial court during the competency hearing, does not support the trial court\u2019s conclusion to deny defendant\u2019s motion for a competency evaluation prior to proceeding to trial. Although defendant had been found competent to proceed in the prior psychiatric evaluations, those same evaluations indicated defendant\u2019s competency could decline to the point of incompetence to proceed prior to his trial. In fact, over a period of ten months, from December 2009 to October 2010, defendant\u2019s mental condition was found to have \u201cworsened to some degree.\u201d Defense counsel detailed in his affidavit his observation that defendant\u2019s mental condition had significantly declined during the week prior to trial, consistent with the warnings contained in the prior evaluations. \u201cBecause defense counsel is usually in the best position to determine that the defendant is able to understand the proceedings and assist in his' defense, it is well established that significant weight is afforded to a defense counsel\u2019s representation that his client is competent.\u201d State v. McRae, 163 N.C. App. 359, 369, 594 S.E.2d 71, 78 (2004) (hereinafter McRae II); see also State v. Blancher, 170 N.C. App. 171, 174, 611 S.E.2d 445, 447 (2005).\nThe entirety of the evidence presented to the trial court indicated a \u201csignificant possibility\u201d that defendant may have been incompetent to proceed with trial, necessitating the trial court to appoint an expert or experts to inquire into defendant\u2019s mental health, as defense counsel requested. See Grooms, 353 N.C. at 78, 540 S.E.2d at 730. Thus, because the evidence does not support the trial court\u2019s determination that defendant was competent to proceed with trial at the time of his competency hearing, the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant\u2019s motion to continue the proceedings until defendant\u2019s competency to stand trial could be evaluated and determined.\nThe proper remedy in a case where, as here, the trial court conducted a proper competency hearing but abused its discretion in proceeding to trial in light of the evidence indicating the defendant\u2019s incompetency to proceed is to vacate defendant\u2019s judgment and remand the case to the trial court for a new trial if and when defendant is properly determined competent to proceed with trial. Compare McRae II, 163 N.C. App. at 361, 594 S.E.2d at 74 (noting the proper remedy in cases where the trial court failed to conduct a competency hearing in violation of a defendant\u2019s due process rights is to remand the case to the trial court to (1) determine whether it is possible for a retrospective competency hearing to be held effectively, and (2) if so, to hold such a hearing to determine defendant\u2019s competency at the time of trial), with State v. Reid, 38 N.C. App. 547, 550, 248 S.E.2d 390, 392 (1978) (holding that where the trial court\u2019s determination that the defendant was mentally capable to proceed with trial was not supported by the evidence, the verdict and judgment must be vacated and the cause remanded for further proceedings against the defendant).\nNonetheless, in the present case, Dr. Corvin was called to testify on behalf of the defense on the fourth day of trial. During his testimony on direct examination, Dr. Corvin stated \u201cthere has been a time during my evaluation where I was somewhat concerned about [defendant\u2019s current competency to stand trial], although not currently.\u201d In light of that testimony, defense counsel did not proceed to question Dr. Corvin on any possibility of defendant\u2019s incompetency to stand trial. Given Dr. Corvin\u2019s presence at trial and his testimony that he was not currently concerned with defendant\u2019s competency to stand trial, we fail to see how the trial court\u2019s error prejudiced defendant. Accordingly, under the particular facts of this case, we must uphold the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nIII. Motion to Suppress\nDefendant next argues the trial court erred in failing to suppress both his statements made during the recorded interrogation at the police station and his handwritten statement. Defendant argues the trial court erred in failing to suppress this evidence because the State failed to show that these custodial statements were preceded by a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver by defendant of his Miranda rights. Defendant further challenges the adequacy of his Miranda warnings. Specifically, defendant argues that the officer did not convey in understandable terms that, despite his lack of means to pay a lawyer, the court would provide one at no expense to advise him before and during the interrogation unless he chose to waive that right.\nOur review of a trial court\u2019s denial of a motion to suppress is strictly limited to determining whether the trial court\u2019s underlying findings of fact are supported by competent evidence, and whether those factual findings in turn support the trial court\u2019s ultimate conclusions of law. State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 134, 291 S.E.2d 618, 619 (1982). \u201c[T]he trial court\u2019s findings of fact after a voir dire hearing concerning the admissibility of a confession are conclusive and binding on the appellate courts if supported by competent evidence. This is true even though the evidence is conflicting.\u201d State v. Simpson, 314 N.C. 359, 368, 334 S.E.2d 53, 59 (1985) (citations omitted). However, the trial court\u2019s conclusion of law that a defendant\u2019s statements were knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made is fully reviewable on appeal. Id.; see also State v. Hyde, 352 N.C. 37, 45, 530 S.E.2d 281, 288 (2000).\nIt is well established that the State is\nprohibited from using any statements resulting from a custodial interrogation of a defendant unless, prior to questioning, the defendant had been advised of his right to remain silent; that any statement may be introduced as evidence against him; that he has the right to have counsel present during questioning; and that, if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for him.\nSimpson, 314 N.C. at 367, 334 S.E.2d at 58-59 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966)). However, \u201ca defendant may waive effectuation of these rights by a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver.\u201d Id. The State bears the burden of showing that the waiver was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. Id. \u201cWhether a waiver is knowingly and intelligently made depends on the specific facts and circumstances of each case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.\u201d Id. at 367, 334 S.E.2d at 59. Similarly, our Courts consider the totality of the circumstances of the case in determining whether a defendant\u2019s statement was voluntary. Hyde, 352 N.C. at 45, 530 S.E.2d at 288. Factors to be considered include the defendant\u2019s familiarity with the criminal justice system, length of interrogation, amount of time without sleep, whether the defendant was held incommunicado, whether there were threats of violence, whether promises were made to obtain the confession, the age and mental condition of the defendant, and whether the defendant had been deprived of food. State v. Kemmerlin, 356 N.C. 446, 458, 573 S.E.2d 870, 880-81 (2002). \u201cThe presence or absence of any one of these factors is not determinative.\u201d Id. at 458, 573 S.E.2d at 881.\nHere, although defendant has not challenged any of the trial court\u2019s findings of fact, he argues the evidence does not support the trial court\u2019s conclusion that his statements were made after a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights. Rather, defendant contends the totality of the circumstances indicate his Miranda waiver was neither knowing and intelligent nor voluntary. Defendant contends Detective Davis misled him about Hart\u2019s condition, asked him if he was ready to talk before informing him of his Miranda rights, and instructed him to sign the waiver form without asking him if he understood the implications. Defendant also points to the evidence concerning his limited mental capacity and his previously determined IQ score placing him in the category of borderline mental retardation.\nHowever, in light of the foregoing principles, we disagree with defendant\u2019s arguments and conclude, as did the trial court, that the evidence is sufficient to demonstrate that defendant\u2019s waiver of his Miranda rights prior to making any incriminating statements was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The record reveals defendant was familiar with the criminal justice system, having four prior convictions, two of which were felony offenses. The record reveals no threats or promises were made to defendant prior to his agreeing to talk with Detective Davis. Although Detective Davis informed defend-ant that he did not know the status of Hart\u2019s condition, the record in no way indicates Detective Davis\u2019s statement misled defendant into talking about the incident when he otherwise would not have done so.\nFurther, the record reveals defendant was not deprived of any necessaries. To the contrary, defendant was given a shower, medical care, and food, as the trial court properly found. In addition, although there is evidence in the record documenting defendant\u2019s limited men-' tal capacity, the record in no way indicates defendant was confused at any time during the custodial interrogation, that he did not understand any of the rights as they were read to him, or that he was unable to comprehend the ramifications of his statements. Indeed, \u201cevidence of the defendant\u2019s below-average intelligence and his previous psychological problems do not compel suppression of the statement.\u201d Simpson, 314 N.C. at 369, 334 S.E.2d at 60. As the trial court\u2019s unchallenged findings of fact indicate, at all times during defendant\u2019s statements to Detective Davis, he \u201cappeared lucid,\u201d \u201cappeared to be awake,\u201d and \u201cwas alert.\u201d Thus, the evidence wholly indicates defendant was aware of his actions and wished to inform the officer about what had happened during his encounter with Hart.\nAs to defendant\u2019s argument regarding the adequacy of the language used to convey the fourth Miranda right to him, our Courts have long held that \u201cwhere a theory argued on appeal was not raised before the trial court, \u2018the law does not permit parties to swap horses between courts in order to get a better mount....\u2019\u201d State v. Sharpe, 344 N.C. 190, 194, 473 S.E.2d 3, 5 (1996) (quoting Weil v. Herring, 207 N.C. 6, 10, 175 S.E. 836, 838 (1934)). Here, the record indicates defendant presented both a written motion to suppress and arguments thereon to the trial court, contending defendant\u2019s statements must be suppressed in that they were not made after a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights. At no time before the trial court did defendant present the adequacy of the rights as given to defendant as a basis for the suppression of his statements. Thus, this argument is not properly before this Court for appellate review. See State v. Dewalt, 190 N.C. App. 158, 164, 660 S.E.2d 111, 115-16 (2008).\nNonetheless, defendant contends the adequacy of the language used by the detective to convey the Miranda rights to defendant is an issue to be considered in determining whether defendant properly understood his Miranda rights and made a knowing and intelligent waiver of those rights. Again, however, the record supports the trial court\u2019s conclusion that defendant\u2019s waiver was knowing and intelligent, especially in light of his previous history with law enforcement. Indeed, defendant told Detective Davis he cooperated with law enforcement at the time of his arrest because \u201c[he] knew [his] rights.\u201d\nFurthermore, even assuming, arguendo, that the trial court erred in failing to suppress defendant\u2019s statements, such error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in this case. Defendant contends that without the challenged statements, the jury would have been left with a reasonable doubt as to the elements of premeditation and deliberation necessary for a first-degree murder conviction. To the contrary, however, the State presented overwhelming evidence of defendant\u2019s premeditation and deliberation, notwithstanding defendant\u2019s statements to police.\nTo sustain a conviction for first-degree murder,\nthe State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant formed a specific intent to kill after premeditation and deliberation. Premeditation means that the defendant thought about killing the victim for some period of time, however short, before the killing. Deliberation means the execution of an intent to kill in a cool state of blood without legal provocation and in furtherance of a fixed design; it does not require reflection for any appreciable length of time.\nState v. Bray, 321 N.C. 663, 671, 365 S.E.2d 571, 576 (1988). \u201cPremeditation and deliberation \u2018are usually proven by circumstantial evidence because they are mental processes that are not readily susceptible to proof by direct evidence.\u2019 \u201d State v. Dennison, 171 N.C. App. 504, 509, 615 S.E.2d 404, 407 (2005) (quoting State v. Sierra, 335 N.C. 753, 758, 440 S.E.2d 791, 794 (1994)).\nAmong the circumstances from which premeditation and deliberation may properly be inferred in a prosecution for first-degree murder are:\n\u201c(1) lack of provocation on the part of the deceased, (2) the conduct and statements of the defendant before and after the killing, (3) threats and declarations of the defendant before and during the occurrence giving rise to the death of the deceased, (4) ill-will or previous difficulty between the parties, (5) the dealing of lethal blows after the deceased has been felled and rendered helpless, (6) evidence that the killing was done in a brutal manner, and (7) the nature and number of the victim\u2019s wounds.\u201d\nId. at 509, 615 S.E.2d at 407-08 (quoting State v. Vause, 328 N.C. 231, 238, 400 S.E.2d 57, 62 (1991)).\nHere, even had the trial court excluded the statements made by defendant to Detective Davis following his arrest, multiple witnesses testified that defendant chased Hart outside the house and through the neighborhood with a paring knife; stabbed her repeatedly, thirty-five of which were wounds to her face and one of which penetrated her eyeball; knocked her down on the ground where he continued to stab her repeatedly; told a neighbor who witnessed the event that he \u201chad to kill that b \u2014 h;\u201d and stated voluntarily to officers after the assault that he had \u201ckilled a woman\u201d and that he had cut his hand when he was \u201ccutting that b \u2014 .\u201d The overwhelming evidence indicates defendant\u2019s ill-will towards Hart at the time of the assault and establishes that he continued to stab her repeatedly and in a brutal manner, even after she had fallen and was rendered helpless. Moreover, defendant called two expert witnesses to testify, both of which testified that defendant had given them an account of the incident consistent with the statements he made to police. Thus, even if the trial court had excluded defendant\u2019s statements to Detective Davis for deficiencies in his Miranda warnings, any such error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under the facts of this case.\nIV. Conclusion\nGiven the evidence presented to the trial court indicating a significant possibility that defendant may have been incompetent to proceed with trial, the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant\u2019s motion to continue the proceedings until defendant\u2019s competency to stand trial could be evaluated and determined. Nonetheless, given the testimony by Dr. Corvin during the course of defendant\u2019s trial, we hold the trial court\u2019s error is harmless under the particular facts of this case. In addition, we hold the trial court did not err in denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress both his handwritten statement, and the incriminating statements he made to Detective Davis during interrogation, as they were made after defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. Thus, defendant received a fair trial free from prejudicial error.\nNo prejudicial error.\nJudges CALABRIA and STEELMAN concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "McCullough, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General L. Michael Dodd, for the State.", "Glover & Peterson, P.A., by James R. Glover, for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. RODNEY LAMAR ROBINSON\nNo. COA11-1584\n(Filed 17 July 2012)\n1. Constitutional Law \u2014 due process \u2014 competency to stand trial \u2014 evidence did not support determination \u2014 no prejudice\nThe trial court abused its discretion in a first-degree murder case by denying defendant\u2019s motion to be evaluated by a mental health professional to determine his competency to proceed with trial. The trial court conducted a proper competency hearing but the evidence did not support its determination that defendant was competent to proceed with trial. However, in light of a medical expert\u2019s testimony for the defense at trial that he was not concerned about defendant\u2019s current competency, the trial court\u2019s error did not prejudice defendant.\n2. Confessions and Incriminating Statements \u2014 Miranda rights \u2014 waiver\u2014voluntary\nThe trial court did not err in a first-degree murder case by failing to suppress defendant\u2019s statement. The evidence was sufficient to demonstrate that defendant\u2019s waiver of his Miranda rights prior to making any incriminating statements was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Further, defendant\u2019s argument that the language used to convey the fourth Miranda right to him was inadequate was not preserved for appellate review.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 28 February 2011 by Judge James U. Downs in Buncombe County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 24 May 2012.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General L. Michael Dodd, for the State.\nGlover & Peterson, P.A., by James R. Glover, for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0509-01", "first_page_order": 519, "last_page_order": 532 }