{ "id": 4357408, "name": "CAMERON JAMES, Petitioner v. CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Respondent", "name_abbreviation": "James v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg County Board of Education", "decision_date": "2012-07-17", "docket_number": "No. COA11-1376", "first_page": "560", "last_page": "572", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "221 N.C. App. 560" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "576 S.E.2d 316", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "319" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 642", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511442 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "647" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0642-01" ] }, { "cite": "559 S.E.2d 774", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "781", "parenthetical": "reviewing the Board's action \"to determine whether its decision was based upon 'wrongful procedure.' \"" }, { "page": "782" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "355 N.C. 225", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 220051 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "236", "parenthetical": "reviewing the Board's action \"to determine whether its decision was based upon 'wrongful procedure.' \"" }, { "page": "238" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/355/0225-01" ] }, { "cite": "443 S.E.2d 781", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "784", "parenthetical": "rejecting the petitioner's argument that the Board violated various sections of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-325 where the petitioner was not prejudiced or \"unduly prejudiced\" by the alleged procedural violations" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 N.C. App. 98", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12122298 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "102", "parenthetical": "rejecting the petitioner's argument that the Board violated various sections of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-325 where the petitioner was not prejudiced or \"unduly prejudiced\" by the alleged procedural violations" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/115/0098-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1150325", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(jl)(3)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "257 S.E.2d 71", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "74" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "42 N.C. App. 404", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8554596 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "409" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/42/0404-01" ] }, { "cite": "230 S.E.2d 769", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "771" }, { "page": "772" }, { "page": "771" }, { "page": "771-72", "parenthetical": "stressing the importance of adhering to the statutorily prescribed administrative scheme and stating, \"To allow the courts to prematurely interrupt or stop these administrative proceedings would completely negate the effectiveness and purpose for which they were statutorily created\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "31 N.C. App. 641", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8551784 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "645" }, { "page": "645" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/31/0641-01" ] }, { "cite": "260 S.E.2d 611", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "615", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 N.C. 715", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573981 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "721-22", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/298/0715-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 994, "char_count": 28591, "ocr_confidence": 0.755, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.5828155114230504e-08, "percentile": 0.28738219873050513 }, "sha256": "2d58b12fd1047572887f766969be1c3413685c9bf1f54ab1160bdceb0e58053a", "simhash": "1:fb4b1340473b37d2", "word_count": 4455 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:36:11.101860+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge ELMORE concur." ], "parties": [ "CAMERON JAMES, Petitioner v. CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Respondent" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge.\nCameron James (\u201cPetitioner\u201d) appeals from the trial court\u2019s order dismissing his petition for judicial review of the CharlotteMecklenburg County Board of Education\u2019s (\u201cthe Board\u201d) decision to terminate his employment. We affirm.\nI. Factual & Procedural Background\nPetitioner began his employment with the Charlotte-Mecklenburg School System (\u201cCMS\u201d) in January 2004 as a teacher at Cochrane Middle School. During the 2004-05 school year, CMS transferred Petitioner to West Mecklenburg High School and promoted him to the position of Dean of Students. Petitioner subsequently attained the position of Assistant Principal at West Mecklenburg High School for the 2005-06 school year before taking medical leave in May 2006 \u201cto treat advanced colorectal cancer.\u201d\nFollowing a successful operation in January 2007, Petitioner was cleared to return to work that April. CMS placed Petitioner as an assistant principal at Piedmont Middle School (\u201cPiedmont\u201d), where Petitioner\u2019s physicians believed the work would be \u201cless stressful\u201d than his previous position at West Mecklenburg High School.\nThat spring, Piedmont\u2019s principal, Dee Gardner (\u201cPrincipal Gardner\u201d), received complaints from teachers at the school that Petitioner was \u201cbeing too friendly\u201d and made them feel \u201cuncomfortable.\u201d The complaints stemmed from Petitioner\u2019s conduct and interactions with the female staff at after-school \u201cstress relief\u2019 social gatherings, which generally took place at local bars and restaurants. Principal Gardner discussed the complaints with Petitioner \u201cafter [she] observed him for a couple of months\u201d and also informed him in writing that she wanted him \u201cto be more professional and less casual with particularly the female staff.\u201d In addition, Principal Gardner expressed her concern (via the same writing) with Petitioner\u2019s \u201ccommunication and the intensity of his responses with parents and children.\u201d Nonetheless, Petitioner received a positive summative evaluation at the close of the 2006-07 school year, in which Principal Gardner noted that Petitioner had \u201conly been [at Piedmont] a short time but he ha[d] definitely established himself as a leader, a team player, an energizer, an enforcer, and a vital part of the administrative team.\u201d Following this evaluation and prior to the 2007-08 school year, CMS extended Petitioner a four-year contract to stay on as assistant principal at Piedmont.\nPetitioner\u2019s problems interacting with students and parents persisted throughout the 2007-08 school year. Consequently, Principal Gardner placed Petitioner on an action plan designed to improve Petitioner\u2019s ability to \u201c[c]ommunicate effectively when speaking with students, staff, and parents,\u201d which Petitioner reviewed with Principal Gardner and signed on 14 December 2007. Petitioner failed to complete the action plan as directed.\nIn January 2008, Principal Gardner was approached by a male teacher at Piedmont who expressed concern that some of the female staff members at the school \u201cwere being harassed\u201d by Petitioner. Principal Gardner interviewed the female staff members regarding their concerns and met with Petitioner to discuss his \u201cinappropriate remarks to female staff.\u201d Additionally, Principal Gardner completed her mid-year assessment of Petitioner\u2019s performance in February 2008, in which she instructed Petitioner to \u201c [eliminate inappropriate communication to female staff.\u201d\nIn June 2008, a female teacher at Piedmont, Alanda Singletary, complained to Principal Gardner that Petitioner had issued her a poor job performance evaluation and \u201ccontinued to harass her\u201d because \u201cshe would not succumb to his advances.\u201d She also stated that Petitioner showed her a text image of a \u201csmiley face with the middle finger up.\u201d Ms. Singletary set forth numerous allegations in a written memorandum to Principal Gardner dated 6 June 2008, including complaints that Petitioner had \u201cobtained [her] phone number without [her] permission\u201d from Piedmont\u2019s emergency telephone directory; that Petitioner \u201csent inappropriate/vulgar texts to [her] cell phone on a consistent basis;\u201d that Petitioner had once told her he \u201cpreferred to date black women;\u201d and that Petitioner had shown an \u201cinappropriate text\u201d to other teachers in the school cafeteria in the presence of a student. In light of these allegations, Principal Gardner launched an investigation through which she learned, among other things, that Petitioner had showed the smiley face image to 19 other staff members at Piedmont.\nOn 4 August 2008, Petitioner was suspended with pay pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-325(fl) pending allegations of sexual harassment and interference with an investigation after being instructed not to have contact with staff. By letter dated 5 September 2008, the CMS superintendent provided Petitioner with a written notice of charges and stated that he was considering recommending Petitioner\u2019s dismissal to the Board on grounds of inadequate performance and failure to comply with the reasonable requirements of the Board. By letter dated 19 September 2008, the superintendent notified Petitioner of his intent to recommend dismissal and of Petitioner\u2019s right to contest his dismissal as provided under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-325. The superintendent subsequently sent Petitioner an amended written notice of charges, in which the superintendent added \u201cinsubordination\u201d as a third asserted statutory ground for Petitioner\u2019s dismissal.\nPetitioner responded by requesting a hearing before a case manager, which was held at CMS\u2019 administrative offices on 23 and 24 November 2009. After hearing testimony and arguments from both sides, the case manager submitted his report and recommendation on 16 April 2010. The report included findings of fact relevant to each of the superintendent\u2019s three asserted grounds for dismissal and a recommendation that the grounds for dismissal were not substantiated by the evidence presented.\nNotwithstanding the case manager\u2019s recommendation, the superintendent notified Petitioner of his intent to recommend Petitioner\u2019s dismissal to the Board. Petitioner requested a hearing before the Board to contest his dismissal and, as discussed further in Part III(B) infra, the parties agreed to schedule the Board hearing outside the time period prescribed by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115-325Ql)(3). Petitioner took issue with the 27 May 2010 hearing date set by the Board, and Petitioner\u2019s counsel appeared at the Board hearing for the limited purpose of contesting the Board\u2019s jurisdiction over the matter in light of its alleged failure to schedule the hearing as prescribed by statute. When the Board rejected Petitioner\u2019s jurisdictional argument, Petitioner\u2019s counsel exited the hearing without presenting any arguments on the merits of Petitioner\u2019s dismissal. The Board voted to proceed with the hearing and heard arguments from the superintendent on the merits of the case. By resolution dated 1 June 2010, the Board unanimously voted to accept the superintendent\u2019s recommendation to dismiss Petitioner from his assistant principal position at Piedmont and to terminate Petitioner\u2019s employment with CMS.\nPetitioner filed a petition for judicial review with Mecklenburg County Superior Court on 28 June 2010. The Board filed an answer to the petition on 25 August 2010, in which it asserted numerous defenses, including claims that Petitioner had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and that Petitioner\u2019s right to seek judicial review was precluded \u201cby knowingly failing to attend the board hearing regarding his dismissal.\u201d The trial court agreed with the Board\u2019s position and, by order entered 22 July 2011, dismissed Petitioner\u2019s petition for judicial review based upon Petitioner\u2019s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. The trial court also stated an alternative basis for its decision, ruling that even assuming arguendo that Petitioner had exhausted his administrative remedies, the Board correctly followed the statutorily prescribed procedure and, further, that there was substantial evidence in the record to support Petitioner\u2019s dismissal. Petitioner appeals.\nII. Jurisdiction\nJurisdiction lies in this Court pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-27(b) (2011), as Petitioner appeals from a final order of the superior court as a matter of right.\nIII. Analysis\nA. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies\nPetitioner contends the trial court erred in concluding that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing a petition for judicial review. We agree.\nAs a general rule, where the legislature has provided by statute an effective administrative remedy, that remedy is exclusive and its relief must be exhausted before recourse may be had to the courts. This is especially true where a statute establishes, as here, a procedure whereby matters of regulation and control are first addressed by commissions or agencies particularly qualified for the purpose. In such a case, the legislature has expressed an intention to give the administrative entity most concerned with a particular matter the first chance to discover and rectify error. Only after the appropriate agency has developed its own record and factual background upon which its decision must rest should the courts be available to review the sufficiency of its process. An earlier intercession may be both wasteful and unwarranted. \u201cTo permit the interruption and cessation of proceedings before a commission by untimely and premature intervention by the courts would completely destroy the efficiency, effectiveness, and purpose of the administrative agencies.\u201d\nPresnell v. Pell, 298 N.C. 715, 721-22, 260 S.E.2d 611, 615 (1979) (citations omitted).\nSection 115C-325 of our General Statutes sets forth in exhaustive detail the procedures for employing, demoting, and dismissing public school teachers and administrators. This regime affords a school administrator the right to contest the superintendent\u2019s grounds for dismissal through an evidentiary hearing held before a case manager. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-325(h)(3) (2011). The superintendent may recommend dismissal to the board notwithstanding a finding by the case manager that the superintendent\u2019s grounds for dismissal are unsubstantiated, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-325(il)(3) (2011), in which case the school administrator may request a hearing before the board to challenge the superintendent\u2019s recommendation, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-325(jl)(l) (2011). If the board determines that dismissal is appropriate based upon its review of the record, the school administrator may appeal the board\u2019s decision to the superior court pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-325(n), which provides, in pertinent part:\n(n) Appeal. \u2014 Any career employee who has been dismissed . . . shall have the right to appeal from the decision of the board to the superior court for the superior court district or set of districts ... in which the career employee is employed. This appeal shall be filed within a period of 30 days after notification of the decision of the board. ... A career employee who has been demoted or dismissed, or a school administrator whose contract is not renewed, who has not requested a hearing before the board of education pursuant to this section shall not be entitled to judicial review of the board\u2019s action.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-325(n) (2011) (emphasis added). Although the plain language of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-325(n) requires only that the career employee request a hearing before the board, this Court has held that a request, alone, is not sufficient to exhaust one\u2019s administrative remedies. See Church v. Madison County Bd. of Educ., 31 N.C. App. 641, 645, 230 S.E.2d 769, 771 (1976). In Church, the plaintiff school principal requested a hearing before the board, but then prevented the hearing from taking place by filing an action for damages and injunctive relief in superior court. Id. \u201cInstead of filing an appeal with the superior court after the board hearing and after dismissal, [the plaintiff] brought the [] action in the superior court before either of these events took place.\u201d Id. We held \u201cthe plaintiff had not exhausted her administrative remedies before resorting to the courts\u201d and affirmed the trial court\u2019s dismissal of the plaintiff\u2019s petition. Id. at 647, 230 S.E.2d at 772.\nWe disagree with the Board\u2019s contention that our holding in Church required dismissal of Petitioner\u2019s petition for judicial review in the instant case. Petitioner exhausted his administrative remedies by adhering to the procedures prescribed in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-325, specifically, by requesting a hearing before the Board and subsequently appealing the Board\u2019s decision to the superior court in accordance with N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-325(n). Unlike the plaintiff in Church, Petitioner did not prematurely resort to the courts by petitioning for judicial review before the Board could rule on the matter.\nPetitioner\u2019s failure to argue the merits of his case at the hearing before the Board does not alter our conclusion. Petitioner presented evidence and arguments on the merits before the case manager, and these were part of the record upon which the Board reached its decision. There is no requirement in the exhaustive language of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-325 that a plaintiff be present at the board hearing, much less raise arguments on the merits of his case, in order to exhaust his administrative remedies. Indeed, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-325Q2)(6) (2011) generally prohibits parties from presenting new evidence at the board hearing, and N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-325(j2)(5) provides merely that the parties \u201cshall be permitted to make oral arguments to the board\u201d at the hearing, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-325(j2)(5) (2011) (emphasis added). We therefore decline to extend our holding in Church to require a plaintiff to argue the merits of his case before the board in order to exhaust his administrative remedies.\nLastly, we note our language in Church indicating the plaintiff\u2019s failure \u201cto present her side of the dismissal issue\u201d before the board as one reason supporting our conclusion that the plaintiff failed to exhaust her available administrative remedies. See Church, 31 N.C. App. at 645, 230 S.E.2d at 771. Notwithstanding this language, it is clear from our analysis in that case that the primary basis for our ruling was the plaintiff\u2019s bypass of the board hearing altogether and not the plaintiff\u2019s failure to present arguments on the merits of her case before the board. See id. at 645-47, 230 S.E.2d at 771-72 (stressing the importance of adhering to the statutorily prescribed administrative scheme and stating, \u201cTo allow the courts to prematurely interrupt or stop these administrative proceedings would completely negate the effectiveness and purpose for which they were statutorily created\u201d). Here, Petitioner did not bypass, interrupt, or prevent the Board hearing from taking place. Rather, Petitioner requested a hearing before the Board, the hearing took place, and the Board reached its decision on the merits of Petitioner\u2019s dismissal, all of which occurred before Petitioner appealed his case to the superior court. We hold this was sufficient to satisfy the exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement, and we proceed to address the merits of Petitioner\u2019s appeal.\nB. The Board\u2019s Jurisdiction\nPetitioner contends the Board lacked jurisdiction to hear his case because the Board \u201cfailed to comply with the mandatory requirements of \u00a7 115C-325(j)(l) [sic]\u201d in scheduling and conducting the Board hearing.\nWe recognize at the outset that a school board \u201cis permitted to operate under a more relaxed set of rules than is a court of law\u201d and is likewise afforded \u201ca wider latitude in procedure.\u201d Baxter v. Poe, 42 N.C. App. 404, 409, 257 S.E.2d 71, 74 (1979). A former version of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-325(jl)(3) sets forth the applicable timeframe for conducting a board hearing and provides, in pertinent part:\nWithin two days after receiving the superintendent\u2019s recommendation and before taking any formal action, the board shall set a time and place for the hearing and shall notify the career employee by certified mail or personal delivery of the date, time, and place of the hearing. The time specified shall not be less than seven nor more than 10 days after the board has notified the career employee, unless both parties agree to an extension.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1150325(jl)(3) (2009).\nHere, the superintendent notified Petitioner of his intent to recommend Petitioner\u2019s dismissal to the Board on 20 April 2010, Petitioner requested a hearing before the Board on 23 April 2010, and the matter came on before the Board on 27 May 2010. The record is silent with respect to several important facts, such as when the Board received the superintendent\u2019s recommendation and when the Board notified Petitioner of the hearing. Absent these facts, we cannot determine the relevant (\u201cnot [] less than seven nor more than 10 day[]\u201d) timeframe within which the Board hearing should have been held in order to comport with N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-325(jl)(3). Regardless, the record reveals correspondence between the parties indicating their agreement to schedule the hearing outside the statutorily prescribed period. In an email to the superintendent\u2019s attorney dated 28 April 2010, counsel for Petitioner stated: \u201cWe agreed that the time period would be extended through May 12th and that I am available on May 11 and May 12.\u201d The superintendent\u2019s attorney responded in an email dated 29 April 2010, stating, \u201cWe agreed that to accommodate schedules that we would extend the hearing date beyond the 10 day period set forth in the statute and that I would check my availability and that of the board to conduct the hearing May 11 or 12 which you have open.\u201d This correspondence, which is the only evidence of the parties\u2019 communication on this issue, indicates the parties agreed to conduct the Board hearing outside the statutory period prescribed in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-325(jl)(3), but failed to reach consensus regarding the date or dates on which the hearing would be held. As N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-325G1)(3) does not contemplate this precise situation, we conclude the Board\u2019s decision to conduct the hearing on 27 May 2010, approximately two weeks later than Petitioner\u2019s proposed dates for the hearing, was not unreasonable in light of the parties\u2019 inability to set a date. Significantly, we note that even if the Board erred in conducting the hearing outside the statutory period, we would nevertheless reject Petitioner\u2019s position on this issue, as Petitioner has failed to offer any argument concerning how he was prejudiced by the Board\u2019s delay. See Davis v. Pub. Sch. of Robeson County, Bd. of Educ., 115 N.C. App. 98, 102, 443 S.E.2d 781, 784 (1994) (rejecting the petitioner\u2019s argument that the Board violated various sections of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-325 where the petitioner was not prejudiced or \u201cunduly prejudiced\u201d by the alleged procedural violations). Absent a showing of prejudice, Petitioner\u2019s argument must fail and is accordingly overruled.\nC. The Board\u2019s Review of the Record\nPetitioner challenges the Board\u2019s review of the record in reaching its decision and contends \u201c[t]he Board\u2019s rejection of the case manager\u2019s report was contrary to the statute and the Ferris [sic] decision.\u201d Petitioner argues the Board was required to make alternative findings of fact or to remand to the case manager for additional findings upon determining the case manager\u2019s findings were not supported by substantial evidence, but instead \u201crelied on the recitation of the Superintendent\u2019s attorney of only that portion of the record that supported the Superintendent to reach its decision.\u201d\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 150B-51 provides that this Court may reverse or modify the Board\u2019s decision if it was \u201c[m]ade upon unlawful procedure.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 150B-51(b)(3) (2011); see Farris v. Burke County Bd. of Educ., 355 N.C. 225, 236, 559 S.E.2d 774, 781 (2002) (reviewing the Board\u2019s action \u201cto determine whether its decision was based upon \u2018wrongful procedure.\u2019 \u201d). We review the procedure employed by the Board de novo, see N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 150B-51(c), and we accordingly \u201cconsider[] the matter anew and freely substitute [] [our] own judgment for that of the [Board].\u201d In re Appeal of Greens of Pine Glen Ltd., 356 N.C. 642, 647, 576 S.E.2d 316, 319 (2003).\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-325(j2)(7) governs the Board\u2019s review of the case manager\u2019s findings of fact and provides, in pertinent part:\nThe board shall accept the [case manager\u2019s] findings of fact unless a majority of the board determines that the findings of fact are not supported by substantial evidence when reviewing the record as a whole. In such an event, the board shall make alternative findings of fact. If a majority of the board determines that the [case manager] did not address a critical factual issue, the board may remand the findings of fact to the [case manager] to complete the report to the board.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-325(j2)(7) (2011).\nOur review of the record indicates the Board rejected the case manager\u2019s findings of fact that it deemed unsupported by substantial evidence and substituted those findings with the alternative findings of fact submitted at the Board hearing by counsel for the superintendent. Both \u201c[t]he unsupported and alternative findings of fact [were] noted in the transcript of the Board hearing as presented by the attorney representing the Superintendent.\u201d This equated to the Board making alternative findings of fact in accordance with N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-325(j2)(7). Moreover, the instant case is distinguishable from Farris, the case upon which Petitioner predicates his argument on this issue. There, our Supreme Court held that the respondent board of education failed to comply with N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-325(j2)(7) by making additional, rather than alternative, findings of fact to those already made by the case manager and then mislabeling the additional findings as \u201calternative findings of fact.\u201d Farris, 355 N.C. at 238, 559 S.E.2d at 782. The Board here appropriately replaced the findings it deemed insufficiently supported by the evidence, and we conclude the Board\u2019s actions in this respect were sufficient to comply with N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1150325Q2)(7).\nFurthermore, Petitioner\u2019s contention that the Board accepted the superintendent\u2019s recommendation to terminate his employment based solely upon the superintendent\u2019s arguments before the Board and without considering the record as a whole is without merit. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-325Q2) sets forth the \u201cprocedures [that] shall apply to a hearing conducted by the board\u201d and provides that the Board shall consider the following in reaching its decision:\na. The whole record from the hearing held by the case manager, including a transcript of the hearing, as well as any other records, exhibits, and documentary evidence submitted to the case manager at the hearing.\nb. The case manager\u2019s findings of fact, including any supplemental findings prepared by the case manager ....\nc. The case manager\u2019s recommendation as to whether the grounds . . . submitted by the superintendent are substantiated.\nd. The superintendent\u2019s recommendation and the grounds for the recommendation.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-325(j2)(2) (2009). The Board shall also consider written statements submitted by the parties at least three days prior to the Board hearing in addition to the parties\u2019 oral arguments presented before the Board. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-325(j2)(4)-(5) (2011).\nHere, Petitioner offers no evidence in support of his assertion that the Board considered only the superintendent\u2019s arguments at the Board hearing in reaching its decision and, indeed, the evidence before us indicates that the Board reviewed the record as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-325 in reaching its decision. The Board\u2019s 1 June 2010 resolution, for instance, states that the \u201cBoard members had the opportunity to review the whole record of the case manager hearing\u201d prior to the Board hearing. Furthermore, the Board reached its decision based upon the \u201cBoard Record,\u201d which, as detailed in the Board\u2019s resolution, consisted of the transcript of the case manager hearing, copies of all exhibits, documents, and records submitted to the case manager, the case manager\u2019s findings of fact and recommendation, the superintendent\u2019s recommendation, and the testimony presented at the Board hearing. This indicates the Board considered all of the information mandated for consideration by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-325Q2) and Petitioner offers no evidence to the contrary. Petitioner\u2019s argument is overruled.\nLastly, we note Petitioner dedicates a substantial portion of the \u201cstatement of facts\u201d section of his brief to describing the evidence relevant to his dismissal, but fails to contest the sufficiency of the evidence to support his dismissal in a manner sufficient to preserve the issue for appellate review. Petitioner provides no argument specific to any one of the superintendent\u2019s three grounds for dismissal but rather states, in conclusory fashion, that \u201c[t]he record shows that [Petitioner\u2019s] actions and performance, taken in the context of the conduct of his peers including his fellow assistant principals was not inadequate, insubordinate, or harassing.\u201d Petitioner\u2019s recitation of the evidence in the facts section of his brief and failure to present reason or authority in the argument section of his brief is insufficient to preserve this argument for appellate review, and we accordingly deem the issue abandoned. See N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(6).\nIV. Conclusion\nFor the foregoing reasons, the trial court\u2019s order is\nAffirmed.\nChief Judge MARTIN and Judge ELMORE concur.\n. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-325Q'1)(3) has been amended to provide that \u201c[t]he time specified [for the board hearing] shall not be less than 10 nor more than SO days after the board has notified the career employee, unless the parties agree to an extension.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-325(jl)(3) (2011) (emphasis added).\n. We decline to address arguments improperly interposed in the facts section of Petitioner\u2019s brief. See N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(5).", "type": "majority", "author": null } ], "attorneys": [ "Tin Fulton Walker & Owen, P.L.L.G., by John W. Gresham, for Petitioner-appellant.", "Fisher & Phillips LLP, by J. Michael Honeycutt, for Respondentappellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "CAMERON JAMES, Petitioner v. CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Respondent\nNo. COA11-1376\n(Filed 17 July 2012)\n1. Administrative Law \u2014 Board of Education \u2014 termination of employment \u2014 administrative remedies exhausted\nThe trial court erred in a case involving petitioner\u2019s dismissal from employment as a school teacher by concluding that petitioner had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing a petition for judicial review. Petitioner exhausted his administrative remedies by adhering to the procedures prescribed in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 115C-325, specifically, by requesting a hearing before the Board of Education and subsequently appealing the Board\u2019s decision to the superior court in accordance with N.C.G.S. \u00a7 115C-325(n).\n2. Schools and Education \u2014 Board of Education \u2014 hearing date not unreasonable \u2014 no prejudice\nRespondent Board of Education did not lack jurisdiction to hear petitioner\u2019s case due to its failure to comply with the mandatory requirements of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 115C-325(j)(l). The Board\u2019s decision to conduct the hearing approximately two weeks later than petitioner\u2019s proposed dates for the hearing was not unreasonable in light of the parties\u2019 inability to set a date and petitioner was not prejudiced by any delay.\n3. Public Officers and Employees \u2014 Board of Education\u2014 whole record review \u2014 findings sufficient \u2014 sufficiency of evidence not contested\nRespondent Board of Education\u2019s review of the record in a case involving petitioner\u2019s dismissal from employment as a school teacher was not erroneous where the Board accepted the superintendent\u2019s recommendation to terminate petitioner\u2019s employment after considering the record as a whole. The Board appropriately replaced the findings it deemed insufficiently supported by the evidence and the Board\u2019s actions in this respect were sufficient to comply with N.C.G.S. \u00a7 115C-325(j2)(7). Furthermore, petitioner failed to contest the sufficiency of the evidence to support his dismissal in a manner sufficient to preserve the issue for appellate review.\nAppeal by Petitioner from order entered 22 July 2011 by Judge W. Robert Bell in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 21 May 2012.\nTin Fulton Walker & Owen, P.L.L.G., by John W. Gresham, for Petitioner-appellant.\nFisher & Phillips LLP, by J. Michael Honeycutt, for Respondentappellee." }, "file_name": "0560-01", "first_page_order": 570, "last_page_order": 582 }