{ "id": 4356936, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. HENRY LEWIS COLLINS", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Collins", "decision_date": "2012-07-17", "docket_number": "No. COA12-19", "first_page": "604", "last_page": "613", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "221 N.C. App. 604" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "643 S.E.2d 581", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12638097 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "583", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/643/0581-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-17", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 S.E.2d 759", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "763", "parenthetical": "\"An act is done wilfully when it is done purposely and deliberately in violation of law, or when it is done knowingly and of set purpose\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 N.C. 488", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4688604 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "495", "parenthetical": "\"An act is done wilfully when it is done purposely and deliberately in violation of law, or when it is done knowingly and of set purpose\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0488-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-34.5", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "335" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "575 S.E.2d 759", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 624", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511492, 1511623, 1511477, 1511227, 1511324 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0624-01", "/nc/356/0624-04", "/nc/356/0624-03", "/nc/356/0624-02", "/nc/356/0624-05" ] }, { "cite": "570 S.E.2d 142", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "147" }, { "page": "148", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "153 N.C. App. 326", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9249845 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/153/0326-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-34.2", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "457" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "594 S.E.2d 64", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "70" }, { "page": "70" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "163 N.C. App. 449", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8918420 ], "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/163/0449-01" ] }, { "cite": "487 S.E.2d 559", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "346 N.C. 284", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 139337, 139635, 139604, 139322, 139615 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/346/0284-04", "/nc/346/0284-05", "/nc/346/0284-02", "/nc/346/0284-01", "/nc/346/0284-03" ] }, { "cite": "483 S.E.2d 462", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "466" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "126 N.C. App. 30", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11708343 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "36" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/126/0030-01" ] }, { "cite": "711 S.E.2d 867", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "872", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "873", "parenthetical": "rejecting the defendant's argument that the indictment was not sufficient because the indictment tracked the relevant language of the statute, listed \"the essential elements of the offense[,]\" and provided the defendant \"with enough information to prepare a defense\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "558 S.E.2d 237", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "241", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" }, { "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "241", "parenthetical": "\"If the charge is a statutory offense, the indictment is sufficient when it charges the offense in the language of the statute.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "148 N.C. App. 290", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9365587 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "295", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "295" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/148/0290-01" ] }, { "cite": "683 S.E.2d 215", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 586", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "675 S.E.2d 406", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "409" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "196 N.C. App. 650", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4166258 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "652" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/196/0650-01" ] }, { "cite": "528 S.E.2d 326", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "341", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 481", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155877 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "503", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0481-01" ] }, { "cite": "442 S.E.2d 161", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "162", "parenthetical": "\"This Court has held that evidence that defendant signed a plea transcript and that the judge made careful inquiry of the defendant concerning his plea is sufficient to show that the plea was entered into freely, understandingly and voluntarily.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 N.C. App. 501", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527764 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "503", "parenthetical": "\"This Court has held that evidence that defendant signed a plea transcript and that the judge made careful inquiry of the defendant concerning his plea is sufficient to show that the plea was entered into freely, understandingly and voluntarily.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/114/0501-01" ] }, { "cite": "699 S.E.2d 919", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "364 N.C. 246", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 2010, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "687 S.E.2d 698", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "705" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "202 N.C. App. 18", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4174460 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "29" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/202/0018-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 S.E.2d 140", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "142", "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" }, { "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 N.C. App. 658", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12138596 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "661", "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/115/0658-01" ] }, { "cite": "583 S.E.2d 302", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "306", "parenthetical": "holding that \"[b]ased on the facts presented by the State and the defendant's stipulation [to the existence of a factual basis for his plea], the court properly determined a factual basis for the plea existed\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "159 N.C. App. 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8954617 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "166", "parenthetical": "holding that \"[b]ased on the facts presented by the State and the defendant's stipulation [to the existence of a factual basis for his plea], the court properly determined a factual basis for the plea existed\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/159/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-32.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 13, "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(e)" }, { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(e)" }, { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(e)" }, { "page": "(e)" }, { "page": "(e)" }, { "page": "(e)" }, { "page": "456" }, { "page": "(e)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 333", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3740710 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "336", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0333-01" ] }, { "cite": "716 S.E.2d 863", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "866", "parenthetical": "stating that \"our Supreme Court has held that when a trial court improperly accepts a guilty plea, the defendant may obtain appellate review of this issue only upon grant of a writ of certiorari\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "680 S.E.2d 212", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "213", "parenthetical": "holding that \"[although defendant is not entitled to appeal from his guilty plea as a matter of right,\" his arguments challenging the factual basis for his guilty plea are reviewable pursuant to a petition for writ of certiorari" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "198 N.C. App. 639", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4168457 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "641", "parenthetical": "holding that \"[although defendant is not entitled to appeal from his guilty plea as a matter of right,\" his arguments challenging the factual basis for his guilty plea are reviewable pursuant to a petition for writ of certiorari" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/198/0639-01" ] }, { "cite": "404 S.E.2d 848", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"While it is true that a defendant may challenge the jurisdiction of a trial court, such challenge may be made in the appellate division only if and when the case is properly pending before the appellate division.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 N.C. 264", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2553543 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"While it is true that a defendant may challenge the jurisdiction of a trial court, such challenge may be made in the appellate division only if and when the case is properly pending before the appellate division.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/329/0264-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 841, "char_count": 23685, "ocr_confidence": 0.739, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.39594351380728e-08, "percentile": 0.4823864248456184 }, "sha256": "245dcc79752f952e395c0d87bbcc2c57127dfd0e3a4f93b7df2ac5fc15241176", "simhash": "1:b348722a772a4ef6", "word_count": 3865 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:36:11.101860+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges ELMORE and GEER concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. HENRY LEWIS COLLINS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "THIGPEN, Judge.\nHenry Lewis Collins (\u201cDefendant\u201d) appeals from a judgment entered on his guilty plea to felony assault on a handicapped person. We must determine whether (I) the State failed to present a sufficient factual basis to support his guilty plea; (II) the terms of his plea agreement are sufficiently clear to constitute a valid plea agreement; and (III) the indictment is sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the trial court. After review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.\nI. Factual and Procedural History\nOn 9 October 2009, Defendant pled guilty to felony assault on a handicapped person, communicating threats, and carrying a concealed weapon. Pursuant to his plea arrangement, the trial court imposed a suspended sentence of 120 days on the charge of communicating threats, imposed a suspended sentence of 60 days on the charge of carrying a concealed weapon, and placed Defendant on supervised probation for 24 months. On the charge of felony assault on a handicapped person, the trial court continued judgment \u201cday to day and session to session until the [Sjtate prays [for] judgment. This is continued] for 24 [months] to review the [Defendant\u2019s] status.\u201d\nOn 9 August 2010, a probation revocation hearing was held, and the trial court revoked Defendant\u2019s probation and activated the suspended sentences for communicating threats and carrying a concealed weapon. On 4 August 2011, the State prayed for judgment on the charge of felony assault on a handicapped person. The trial court reviewed Defendant\u2019s status and determined that he \u201c[d]id not successfully complete the probation that he was sentenced to in the two misdemeanors.\u201d The trial court then entered judgment on felony assault on a handicapped person and sentenced Defendant to 23 to 28 months imprisonment to run concurrently with the misdemeanor judgments entered on 9 August 2010. Defendant appeals.\nWe note first that Defendant does not have an appeal as a matter of right to challenge the trial court\u2019s acceptance of his guilty plea or the indictment. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1444 (2011) (listing the issues that a defendant who has pled guilty is entitled to appeal as a matter of right); see also State v. Absher, 329 N.C. 264, 265 n. 1, 404 S.E.2d 848, 849 n. 1 (1991) (\u201cWhile it is true that a defendant may challenge the jurisdiction of a trial court, such challenge may be made in the appellate division only if and when the case is properly pending before the appellate division.\u201d). Accordingly, we grant the State\u2019s motion to dismiss Defendant\u2019s appeal. However, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1444(e) and N.C. R. App. P. 21, Defendant has petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari. We elect to grant Defendant\u2019s petition and review the issues. See State v. Keller, 198 N.C. App. 639, 641, 680 S.E.2d 212, 213 (2009) (holding that \u201c[although defendant is not entitled to appeal from his guilty plea as a matter of right,\u201d his arguments challenging the factual basis for his guilty plea are reviewable pursuant to a petition for writ of certiorari) (citations omitted); see also State v. Demaio, _ N.C. App. _, _, 716 S.E.2d 863, 866 (2011) (stating that \u201cour Supreme Court has held that when a trial court improperly accepts a guilty plea, the defendant may obtain appellate review of this issue only upon grant of a writ of certiorari\u201d) (citations and quotation marks omitted).\nII. Factual Basis to Support Guilty Plea\nDefendant first contends the trial court erred by determining that there was a factual basis to support his guilty plea to felony assault on a handicapped person because the State failed to show that the victim was handicapped or that Defendant used a crutch in a manner that was likely to cause death or serious injury. We disagree.\nPursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1022(c) (2011), a trial court \u201cmay not accept a plea of guilty . . . without first determining that there is a factual basis for the plea.\u201d This determination may be based upon information including, but not limited to, a statement of the facts by the prosecutor, a written statement of the defendant, an examination of the presentence report, sworn testimony, which may include reliable hearsay, or a statement of facts by the defense counsel. See id. \u201cThe five sources listed in the statute are not exclusive, and therefore the trial judge may consider any information properly brought to his attention.\u201d State v. Agnew, 361 N.C. 333, 336, 643 S.E.2d 581, 583 (2007) (citation and quotation marks omitted).\nDefendant pled guilty to felony assault on a handicapped person, a crime which is defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-32.1(e) (2011) as follows:\nA person commits an aggravated assault or assault and battery upon a handicapped person if, in the course of the assault or assault and battery, that person:\n(1) Uses a deadly weapon or other means of force likely to inflict serious injury or serious damage to a handicapped person; or\n(2) Inflicts serious injury or serious damage to a handicapped person; or\n(3) Intends to kill a handicapped person.\nA \u201chandicapped person\u201d is defined as a person who has a physical or mental disability or infirmity \u201cwhich would substantially impair that person\u2019s ability to defend himself.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-32.1(a) (2011).\nHere, Defendant stipulated to the existence of facts to support his plea in his Transcript of Plea and at his plea hearing. Furthermore, the prosecutor made the following statement summarizing the evidence at Defendant\u2019s plea hearing:\nOn December 12th of 2007, the victim in this case, Carol Bradley Collins, who\u2019s the mother of the defendant, is crippled in her knees with arthritis and requires a crutch to walk. The defendant, Henry Lewis Collins, is one of Ms. Carol Collins\u2019s sons. As a result, Carol Collins is 80 years of age. The defendant Henry was intoxicated and on unknown drugs at the time. The defendant told his mother that he would kill her and cut her heart out. He grabbed the victim Carol as she sat in the chair in her living room, slung her across the room twice and then hit her with her crutch that she uses for walking. This was witnessed by Shontelle Bradley, who called the police, Danny Hayes and Deana Collins and the three of them witnessed the assault.\nWhen asked by the trial court if he \u201cdesire [d] to make any corrections[,]\u201d to the prosecutor\u2019s summary, defense counsel responded, \u201cNo, sir.\u201d The trial court thereafter found that \u201cupon consideration of the record proper, evidence or factual presentation offered, answers of the defendant, statement for the lawyer for the defendant and the prosecutor, the Court finds, one, there is a factual basis for the entry of the plea[.]\u201d\nWe conclude that the summary of the facts presented by the prosecutor and Defendant\u2019s stipulations are sufficient to establish a factual basis for Defendant\u2019s guilty plea. Specifically, the prosecutor\u2019s statements that the victim \u201cis 80 years of age\u201d and \u201cis crippled in her knees with arthritis and requires a crutch to walk\u201d and that Defendant \u201ctold his mother that he would kill her and cut her heart out[,]\u201d \u201cgrabbed the victim[,]\u201d and \u201cslung her across the room twice and then hit her with her crutch\u201d provided a sufficient factual basis to support Defendant\u2019s guilty plea. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-32.1(a) & (e); see also State v. May, 159 N.C. App. 159, 166, 583 S.E.2d 302, 306 (2003) (holding that \u201c[b]ased on the facts presented by the State and the defendant\u2019s stipulation [to the existence of a factual basis for his plea], the court properly determined a factual basis for the plea existed\u201d). Accordingly, we conclude this argument has no merit.\nIII. Terms of Plea Agreement\nDefendant next argues the terms of his plea agreement were not sufficiently clear to constitute a valid plea agreement because he was not fully aware of the consequences of his plea, thereby rendering the plea involuntary and depriving Defendant of his constitutional rights. Specifically, Defendant contends he \u201cwas not made aware of all of the direct consequences of his guilty plea since neither the plea arrangement nor .the order continuing judgment\u201d explained that judgment would be entered on the offense of felony assault on a handicapped person if Defendant did not successfully complete probation for the two misdemeanors that he also pled guilty to. We disagree.\nPursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1022(b) (2011), \u201c[t]he judge may not accept a plea of guilty . . . from a defendant without first determining that the plea is a product of informed choice.\u201d \u201cAlthough a defendant need not be informed of all possible indirect and collateral consequences, the plea nonetheless must be entered by one fully aware of the direct consequencesf.]\u201d State v. Bozeman, 115 N.C. App. 658, 661, 446 S.E.2d 140, 142 (1994) (citations and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis omitted). \u201cDirect consequences have been defined as those which have a definite, immediate and largely automatic effect on the range of the defendant\u2019s punishment.\u201d Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).\nIn this case, the Transcript of Plea lists the plea arrangement as follows:\nPursuant to a pretrial conference, the defendant is to plead as charged and receive a sentence of 23 months minimum and 28 months maximum on the Felony Assault on a Handicap Person; however, the Court agrees to continue judgment for 24 months to review the defendant\u2019s status. As to the misdemeanors, the defendant is to receive consecutive sentences of 120 days plus 60 days for a total of 180 days to be suspended for a period of 24 months with supervised probation to include, but not limited to drug and alcohol conditions, not to assault the prosecuting witness, Carol Collins, and any other conditions deemed appropriate by the Court.\n(Emphasis added). Furthermore, at Defendant\u2019s plea hearing, the trial court summarized Defendant\u2019s plea arrangement as follows:\nIt says pursuant to pretrial conference, the defendant to plead as charged and you may \u2014 and underscore the word may \u2014 receive a sentence of 23 months minimum, 28 months maximum for felony assault on a handicap person contingent upon your performance on the misdemeanors. As to the misdemeanors, the Court agrees to continue judgment for 24 months to review the defendant\u2019s status on that charge.\n(Emphasis added). After this summary by the trial court, Defendant responded, \u201cRight.\u201d\nAdditionally, the transcript of Defendant\u2019s plea hearing reveals that the trial court personally addressed Defendant and inquired as to whether Defendant (1) understood the nature of the charges, (2) understood that he had the right to plead not guilty, (3) was satisfied with his lawyer\u2019s services, (4) was aware of the maximum possible sentence, and (5) understood that he was waiving his right to trial by jury. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1022(a). Defendant answered affirmatively to all of these questions. The trial court further inquired as to whether Defendant was threatened by anyone, or promised anything other than the plea agreement that caused him to enter the pleas against his wishes, to which Defendant answered, \u201cNo, sir.\u201d Finally the trial court asked if Defendant entered the pleas of his own free will, fully understanding what he was doing. Defendant answered, \u201cYeah, I do.\u201d In light of this colloquy, Defendant\u2019s signature on the Transcript of Plea, and the trial court\u2019s statement that Defendant\u2019s sentence for felony assault on a handicapped person was \u201ccontingent upon your performance on the misdemeanors[,]\u201d we hold the trial court did not err by accepting Defendant\u2019s guilty plea to felony assault on a handicapped person as a product of his informed choice. See State v. Salvetti, 202 N.C. App. 18, 29, 687 S.E.2d 698, 705 (holding that in light of the trial court\u2019s inquiry, the defendant\u2019s verbal responses, and the defendant\u2019s answers to the questions on the Transcript of Plea \u201cthe trial court did determine that defendant was fully informed of the consequences of his choice to enter an Alford plea\u201d), disc. review denied, 364 N.C. 246, 699 S.E.2d 919 (2010); State v. Daniels, 114 N.C. App. 501, 503, 442 S.E.2d 161, 162 (1994) (\u201cThis Court has held that evidence that defendant signed a plea transcript and that the judge made careful inquiry of the defendant concerning his plea is sufficient to show that the plea was entered into freely, understandingly and voluntarily.\u201d) (citations omitted).\nIV. Sufficiency of Indictment\nDefendant lastly contends the indictment for felony assault on a handicapped person is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the trial court because the indictment (A) failed to specify the nature of the victim\u2019s handicap and did not contain either of the statutory alternatives describing the nature of the victim\u2019s handicap as set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-32.1(a); (B) did not allege that Defendant knew or reasonably should have known of the victim\u2019s handicap; and (C) did not provide a reference to the statute allegedly violated, as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-924(a).\n\u201c[W]here an indictment is alleged to be invalid on its face, thereby depriving the trial court of its jurisdiction, a challenge to that indictment may be made at any time, even if it was not contested in the trial court.\u201d State v. Wallace, 351 N.C. 481, 503, 528 S.E.2d 326, 341 (2000) (citations omitted). \u201cOn appeal, we review the sufficiency of an indictment de novo.\u201d State v. McKoy, 196 N.C. App. 650, 652, 675 S.E.2d 406, 409 (citation omitted), appeal dismissed and disc. review denied, 363 N.C. 586, 683 S.E.2d 215 (2009).\nAn indictment must \u201ccharge all the essential elements of the alleged criminal offense.\u201d State v. Floyd, 148 N.C. App. 290, 295, 558 S.E.2d 237, 241 (2002) (citation and quotation marks omitted). \u201cIf the charge is a statutory offense, the indictment is sufficient when it charges the offense in the language of the statute.\u201d Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). The two purposes of an indictment are \u201cto make clear the offense charged so that the investigation may be confined to that offense, that proper procedure may be followed, and applicable law invoked; [and] ... to put the defendant on reasonable notice so as to enable him to make his defense.\u201d State v. Leonard, _ N.C. App. _, _, 711 S.E.2d 867, 872 (2011) (citation omitted).\nIn this case, the indictment at issue states as follows:\nTHE JURORS FOR THE STATE UPON THEIR OATH PRESENT that on or about the 12th day of December, 2007, in the County named above the defendant named above unlawfully, willfully and feloniously did assault and strike a handicapped person by throwing Carol Bradley Collins across a room and onto the floor and by striking her with a crutch on the arm. In the course of the assault the defendant used a deadly weapon, a crutch. This act was in violation of North Carolina General Statutes section 14-17.\nA. Nature of Victim\u2019s Handicap\nDefendant first argues the indictment is not sufficient because it failed to specify the nature of the victim\u2019s handicap. Defendant also contends the indictment is not sufficient because it did not contain either of the statutory alternatives describing the nature of the victim\u2019s handicap as set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-32.1(a). We disagree.\nHere, Defendant\u2019s indictment tracks the relevant language of the felony assault on a handicapped person statute and lists the essential elements of the offense. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-32.1(e); see also Floyd, 148 N.C. App. at 295, 558 S.E.2d at 241 (\u201cIf the charge is a statutory offense, the indictment is sufficient when it charges the offense in the language of the statute.\u201d) (citations and quotation marks omitted). The fact that \u201chandicapped person\u201d is defined in another section of the statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-32.1(a), does not make the definition an essential element of the crime pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-32.1(e). Therefore, we reject Defendant\u2019s argument that it is not sufficient for the indictment to \u201cmerely state that the victim was \u2018handicapped.\u2019 \u201d\nFurthermore, the indictment provided Defendant with enough information to prepare a defense for the offense of felony assault on a handicapped person. See Leonard, _ N.C. App. at _, 711 S.E.2d at 873 (rejecting the defendant\u2019s argument that the indictment was not sufficient because the indictment tracked the relevant language of the statute, listed \u201cthe essential elements of the offense[,]\u201d and provided the defendant \u201cwith enough information to prepare a defense\u201d); State v. Crisp, 126 N.C. App. 30, 36, 483 S.E.2d 462, 466 (holding that although the indictment did not track the exact language of the statute, \u201c[t]he indictment, when read as a whole, sufficiently stated facts which support every element of the crime charged and apprised defendant of the specific charge against him\u201d), appeal dismissed and disc. review denied, 346 N.C. 284, 487 S.E.2d 559 (1997). Accordingly, we conclude this argument is without merit.\nB. Knowledge of the Victim\u2019s Handicap\nDefendant next contends the indictment for felony assault on a handicapped person is not sufficient because it did not allege that Defendant knew or reasonably should have known of the victim\u2019s handicap. We disagree.\nDefendant recognizes that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-32.1(e) does not require knowledge of the victim\u2019s handicap, but he cites State v. Singletary, 163 N.C. App. 449, 594 S.E.2d 64 (2004), in support of his argument that knowledge is \u00bfn essential element of the crime that must be alleged in the indictment. In Singletary, this Court held that although N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-32.1(e) \u201cdoes not specifically require that defendant know his victim is handicapped,\u201d \u201cin order to convict an individual under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-32.1(e), the jury must find that defendant knew or had reasonable grounds to know the victim was a handicapped person.\u201d Id. at 456, 594 S.E.2d at 70. In reaching its holding, this Court looked for guidance \u201cfrom examination of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-34.2 (2003), which defines the charge of assault with a firearm on a law enforcement officer.\u201d Id. at 457, 594 S.E.2d at 70. Assault with a firearm on a law enforcement officer is another statutory offense in which \u201c[t]he knowledge requirement [that the defendant knew or should have known that the victim was an officer performing his official duties] has been imposed although the underlying statute is silent on the question of knowledge.\u201d Id (citation omitted).\nNeither party cites, nor does our review of North Carolina law reveal, a case interpreting the sufficiency of an indictment under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-32.1(e) since Singletary addressed the additional knowledge requirement. However, we find State v. Thomas, 153 N.C. App. 326, 570 S.E.2d 142, appeal dismissed and disc. review denied, 356 N.C. 624, 575 S.E.2d 759 (2002), instructive. In Thomas, the defendant argued that his conviction for assault with a firearm on a law enforcement officer pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-34.5(a), \u201cmust be vacated because the indictment failed to allege that he knew or had reasonable grounds to know that Officer Hall was a law enforcement officer.\u201d Id. at 335, 570 S.E.2d at 147. This Court held that although the indictment does not specifically allege \u201cthat defendant knew Officer Hall was a law enforcement officer, the indictment does allege defendant \u2018willfully\u2019 committed an assault on a law enforcement officer, which, as with the term \u2018intentionally,\u2019 indicates defendant knew that the person he was assaulting was a law enforcement officer.\u201d Id. at 336, 570 S.E.2d at 148 (citations omitted).\nLike in Thomas, the indictment in the instant case alleged that Defendant \u201cunlawfully, willfully and feloniously did assault and strike a handicapped person[.]\u201d (Emphasis added). Following Thomas, we conclude that although the indictment does not specifically allege that Defendant knew or had reason to know that the victim was handicapped, the fact that the indictment states that Defendant \u201cwillfully\u201d assaulted a handicapped person \u201cindicates [Defendant knew that the person he was assaulting was\u201d handicapped. See id.; see also Akzona, Inc. v. Southern Railway. Co., 314 N.C. 488, 495, 334 S.E.2d 759, 763 (1985) (\u201cAn act is done wilfully when it is done purposely and deliberately in violation of law, or when it is done knowingly and of set purpose\u201d) (citation omitted). Thus, this argument has no merit.\nC. Incorrect Reference to Statute\nDefendant lastly contends the indictment is not sufficient because it did not provide a reference to the statute allegedly violated, as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-924(a) (2011). We disagree.\nDefendant correctly contends the indictment for felony assault on a handicapped person \u201cerroneously cited N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-17, the statute governing murder.\u201d However, Defendant also recognizes that the indictment\u2019s failure to reference the correct statute, \u201cdid not, by itself, amount to a fatal defect.\u201d See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-924(a)(6) (stating that a criminal pleading must contain \u201ca citation of any applicable statute . . . alleged therein to have been violated. [However,] [e]rror in the citation or its omission is not ground for dismissal of the charges or for reversal of a conviction.\u201d). Because we conclude the indictment for felony assault on a handicapped person is otherwise sufficient, this argument has no merit.\nAFFIRMED.\nJudges ELMORE and GEER concur.\n. We note that the offense of assault with a firearm on a law enforcement officer is currently defined in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-34.5 (2011).", "type": "majority", "author": "THIGPEN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Joseph L. Hyde, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.", "Staples Hughes, Appellate Defender, by Hannah Hall, Assistant Appellate Defender, for the defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. HENRY LEWIS COLLINS\nNo. COA12-19\n(Filed 17 July 2012)\n1. Criminal Law \u2014 guilty plea \u2014 assault on handicapped person \u2014sufficient factual basis\nThe trial court did not err in a felony assault on a handicapped person case by determining that there was a factual basis to support defendant\u2019s guilty plea to felony assault on a handicapped person. The summary of the facts presented by the prosecutor along with defendant\u2019s stipulations were sufficient to establish a factual basis for defendant\u2019s guilty plea.\n2. Criminal Law \u2014 guilty plea \u2014 assault on handicapped person \u2014informed choice\nThe trial court did not err by accepting defendant\u2019s guilty plea to felony assault on a handicapped person. The trial court\u2019s colloquy, defendant\u2019s signature on the transcript of plea, and the trial court\u2019s statement was sufficient to show that defendant\u2019s plea was a product of his informed choice.\n3. Indictment and Information \u2014 assault on a handicapped person \u2014 indictment sufficient\nDefendant\u2019s indictment for felony assault on a handicapped person was sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the trial court. The indictment tracked the relevant language of the felony assault on a handicapped person statute, listed the essential elements of the offense, and provided defendant with enough information to prepare a defense. Further, although the indictment did not specifically allege that defendant knew or had reason to know that the victim was handicapped, the fact that the indictment stated that defendant \u201cwillfully\u201d assaulted a handicapped person indicated defendant knew that the person he was assaulting was handicapped. Finally, the indictment\u2019s failure to reference the correct statute did not, by itself, amount to a fatal defect.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 4 August 2011 by Judge James Floyd Ammons, Jr., in Cumberland County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 26 April 2012.\nRoy Cooper, Attorney General, by Joseph L. Hyde, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.\nStaples Hughes, Appellate Defender, by Hannah Hall, Assistant Appellate Defender, for the defendant." }, "file_name": "0604-01", "first_page_order": 614, "last_page_order": 623 }