{ "id": 4357034, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JONATHAN EUGENE BRUNSON", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Brunson", "decision_date": "2012-07-17", "docket_number": "No. COA12-85", "first_page": "614", "last_page": "622", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "221 N.C. App. 614" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "523 U.S. 1031", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11514466, 11514499, 11514435, 11514533, 11514566, 11514409, 11514679, 11514382, 11514637, 11514355, 11514709, 11514613, 11514743, 11514333 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/523/1031-06", "/us/523/1031-07", "/us/523/1031-05", "/us/523/1031-08", "/us/523/1031-09", "/us/523/1031-04", "/us/523/1031-12", "/us/523/1031-03", "/us/523/1031-11", "/us/523/1031-02", "/us/523/1031-13", "/us/523/1031-10", "/us/523/1031-14", "/us/523/1031-01" ] }, { "cite": "669 S.E.2d 77", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12642326 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "84" }, { "page": "84" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/669/0077-01" ] }, { "cite": "660 S.E.2d 540", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640904, 12640905, 12640903 ], "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/660/0540-02", "/se2d/660/0540-03", "/se2d/660/0540-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 242", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12640897, 12640702, 12640904, 12640905, 12640909, 12640910, 12640894, 12640895 ], "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/660/0538-02", "/se2d/659/0002-01", "/se2d/660/0540-02", "/se2d/660/0540-03", "/se2d/660/0542-01", "/se2d/660/0542-02", "/se2d/660/0537-02", "/se2d/660/0537-03" ] }, { "cite": "652 S.E.2d 688", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639739 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "694", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "694" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/652/0688-01" ] }, { "cite": "202 S.E.2d 496", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "498", "parenthetical": "\"In order to entitle defendant to a new trial, the error complained of. must be prejudicial to him.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "20 N.C. App. 727", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8555308 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "729", "parenthetical": "\"In order to entitle defendant to a new trial, the error complained of. must be prejudicial to him.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/20/0727-01" ] }, { "cite": "140 L.Ed. 2d 486", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "494 S.E.2d 427", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 N.C. 406", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 551360, 551397, 551211, 551276, 551317 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/347/0406-05", "/nc/347/0406-01", "/nc/347/0406-02", "/nc/347/0406-03", "/nc/347/0406-04" ] }, { "cite": "487 S.E.2d 846", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "852" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 N.C. App. 54", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11792010 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "61" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/127/0054-01" ] }, { "cite": "244 S.E.2d 654", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "662" }, { "page": "663" }, { "page": "663" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "295 N.C. 189", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561983 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "205" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/295/0189-01" ] }, { "cite": "723 S.E.2d 326", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "334", "parenthetical": "citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "431 S.E.2d 755", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "760-61", "parenthetical": "applying Hudson to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-606, the applicable statute here" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 N.C. 18", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2531370 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "27-28", "parenthetical": "applying Hudson to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-606, the applicable statute here" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/334/0018-01" ] }, { "cite": "245 S.E.2d 686", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "689-90", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "689" }, { "page": "689-90" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "295 N.C. 427", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563410 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "430-31", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "430-31" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/295/0427-01" ] }, { "cite": "676 S.E.2d 305", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 136", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "194 N.C. App. 131", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4162739 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "141" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/194/0131-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 N.C. App. 597", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8159009 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "605", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "605" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/186/0597-01" ] }, { "cite": "175 L.Ed. 2d 362", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "678 S.E.2d 618", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "634" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 10", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4151736 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "35" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/363/0010-01" ] }, { "cite": "480 U.S. 39", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1131144 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "60" }, { "page": "59" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/480/0039-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 881, "char_count": 20615, "ocr_confidence": 0.756, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.14844340345711274 }, "sha256": "e87234b530681ee98ed3a33248ae365521f0b9c3f28f3363db01d884543839b2", "simhash": "1:82cb523a776799fa", "word_count": 3308 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:36:11.101860+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges CALABRIA and McCULLOUGH concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JONATHAN EUGENE BRUNSON" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "STROUD, Judge.\nDefendant appeals judgments convicting him of numerous sexual offenses. For the following reasons, we find no error.\nI. Background\nThis case involves the long-term sexual abuse of Jane perpetrated by her stepfather, defendant. The State\u2019s evidence tended to show that over the course of a few years defendant perpetrated multiple sexual acts upon Jane, his minor stepdaughter, including showing Jane pornography; shaving Jane\u2019s pubic hair; attempting to insert objects, his fingers, and his penis into Jane\u2019s vagina; encouraging Jane to experiment sexually with another; sending Jane explicit text messages; having Jane perform oral sex on him; and performing oral and anal sex on Jane. In August of 2005, Jane\u2019s mother found explicit text messages from defendant to Jane.\nAfter a trial by jury, on or about 17 June 2011, the jury found defendant guilty of attempted statutory rape of a thirteen year old; eight counts of sexual activity by a substitute parent by cunnilingus and fellatio; seven counts of taking indecent liberties with a child; statutory sexual offense of a fourteen year old by cunnilingus, fellatio, and penetration; four counts of committing a crime against nature by cunnilingus and fellatio; four counts of statutory sexual offense of a fifteen year old by cunnilingus, fellatio, and penetration; and attempted statutory rape of a fifteen year old. The trial court entered judgments on defendant\u2019s various offenses. Defendant appeals.\nII. In Camera Review\nDefendant first contends that his constitutional rights to confrontation, a fair trial, and due process were violated when the trial court failed to conduct an in camera review of certain Department of Social Services (\u201cDSS\u201d) and medical documents. Defendant directs this Court\u2019s attention to Pennsylvania v. Ritchie which stated \u201cthat [the defendant\u2019s] interest... in ensuring a fair trial can be protected fully by requiring that the [Children and Youth Services] files be submitted ... to the trial court for in camera review.\u201d 480 U.S. 39, 60, 94 L.Ed. 2d 40, 59 (1987).\nHowever, defendant fails to direct this Court\u2019s attention to where he preserved this issue for appeal. Defendant instead states that \u201c[t]o the extent this error was not properly preserved, defendant raises it as plain error.\u201d However, \u201c[p]lain error analysis applies to evidentiary matters and jury instructions.\u201d State v. Garcell, 363 N.C. 10, 35, 678 S.E.2d 618, 634, cert. denied, __ U.S. _, 175 L.Ed. 2d 362 (2009).\nDefendant\u2019s argument here is not regarding jury instructions or evidentiary matters. Hypothetically, if the trial court had conducted an in camera review it may have found some \u201cevidence\u201d which was helpful to defendant. However, the issue before us is not regarding what the trial court may have discovered, but instead about whether the trial court should have conducted an in camera review. Furthermore, defendant\u2019s failure to request the trial court to review the documents in camera was not an \u201cevidentiary\u201d failure as when a defendant fails to object to inadmissible testimony; rather it is a failure to request a judicial ruling on a matter. Defendant argues only that the trial court failed to review certain documents and that this failure resulted in the possibility that defendant was unaware of material evidence. As this issue does not arise from \u201cevidentiary matters [or] jury instructions[,]\u201d the issue of whether the trial court should have conducted an in camera review in this situation is not proper for a plain error analysis. Id. As such, we will not review this issue.\nIII. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel\nDefendant argues that he \u201cis entitled to a new trial because he did not receive effective assistance of counsel[.]\u201d (Original in all caps.) Defendant was represented by four different attorneys. Throughout the course of the case, defendant repeatedly requested that his various attorneys be discharged from his case, filed over 70 pro se motions or documents, and ultimately chose to represent himself at trial. \u201c[A] defendant who elects to represent himself cannot thereafter complain that the quality of his own defense amounted to a denial of effective assistance of counsel.\u201d State v. Petrick, 186 N.C. App. 597, 605, 652 S.E.2d 688, 694 (2007) (citation and quotation marks omitted), disc. review denied and appeal dismissed, 362 N.C. 242, 660 S.E.2d 540 (2008); see State v. Rogers, 194 N.C. App. 131, 141, 669 S.E.2d 77, 84 (2008) (\u201cFour times the trial court appointed counsel for defendant, one time counsel was required to withdraw on account of a conflict of interest, defendant fired the other three for no good reason appearing in the record. Defendant made his choice, as was his constitutional right. He is entitled to no special exception for the quality of his particular self-representation or his lack of access to legal materials. See Brincefield, 43 N.C. App. at 52, 258 S.E.2d at 84 (\u2018Whatever else a defendant may raise on appeal, when he elects to represent himself he cannot thereafter complain that the quality of his own defense amounted to a denial of effective assistance of counsel.\u2019). Accordingly, this argument is overruled.\u201d (quotation marks omitted)), disc. review denied, 363 N.C. 136, 676 S.E.2d 305 (2009). Defendant chose to dismiss all of his attorneys, some before they likely even had a reasonable opportunity to research his case fully, develop a legal strategy, and make effective motions and requests. As defendants\u2019 plethora of pro se motions and documents and his decision to represent himself at trial demonstrate, defendant\u2019s only true \u201ccounsel\u201d was himself; accordingly, we find defendant\u2019s claim for ineffective assistance of counsel to have no merit. See id. at 141, 669 S.E.2d at 84; Petrick, 186 N.C. App. at 605, 652 S.E.2d at 694.\nIV. Probable Cause Hearing\nDefendant next contends that he was denied \u201chis statutory right to a probable cause hearing ... [which] resulted in a violation of [his] constitutional rights to due process, a fair trial and confrontation.\u201d (Original in all caps.) Defendant argues that he was deprived \u201cof discovery and impeachment evidence at a time that was critical to preparation to defend against the charges.\u201d However, in State v. Hudson,\n[the] [defendant contended] that the State deliberately prevented him from having a probable cause hearing thereby depriving him of a valuable tool of discovery.\nA probable cause hearing may afford the opportunity for a defend-ant to discover the strengths and weaknesses of the State\u2019s case. However, discovery is not the purpose for such a hearing. The function of a probable cause hearing is to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that the defendant committed it. The establishment of probable cause ensures that a defendant will not be unjustifiably put to the trouble and expense of trial.\nIn the case sub judice, probable cause that a crime was committed and that defendant committed it was twice established. Defendant was arrested upon warrants, and the magistrate issuing these warrants was required by statute to first determine the existence of probable cause. Further, defendant was tried upon indictments returned by a grand jury and that body had the function of determining the existence of probable cause.\nThere is no constitutional requirement for a preliminary hearing, and it is well settled that there is no necessity for a preliminary hearing after a grand jury returns a bill of indictment.\nWe are aware of the provisions of G.S. 15A-605 which provide, in part, that the judge must schedule a preliminary hearing unless the defendant waives in writing his right to such a hearing and absent such waiver the district court judge must schedule a hearing not later than fifteen working days following the initial appearance before him. We are also aware of the provisions of G.S. 15A-1443 which apparently codifies existing case law. We quote a portion of that statute:\n(a) A defendant is prejudiced by errors relating to rights arising other than under the Constitution of the United States when there is a reasonable possibility that, had the error in question not been committed, a different result would have been reached at the trial out of which the appeal arises. The burden of showing such prejudice under this subsection is upon the defendant. Prejudice also exists in any instance in which it is deemed to exist as a matter of law or error is deemed reversible per se.\nHere defendant has failed to carry the burden of showing a reasonable possibility that a different result would have been reached in this trial had he been given a preliminary hearing.\n295 N.C. 427, 430-31, 245 S.E.2d 686, 689-90 (1978) (citations omitted); see State v. Wiggins, 334 N.C. 18, 27-28, 431 S.E.2d 755, 760-61 (1993) (applying Hudson to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-606, the applicable statute here).\nHere, defendant was arrested upon warrants and tried upon indictments, thus probable cause \u201cwas twice established.\u201d Hudson, 295 N.C. at 430-31, 245 S.E.2d at 689. Based on defendant\u2019s argument regarding his speculations regarding potential discovery and impeachment evidence, we too conclude that \u201cdefendant has failed to carry the burden of showing a reasonable possibility that a different result would have been reached in this trial had he been given a preliminary hearing.\u201d Id. at 431, 245 S.E.2d at 689-90. This argument is overruled.\nV. Hearsay\nDefendant next contends that \u201cthe trial court erred when it allowed . . . [Jane\u2019s mother] to tell the jurors a physician diagnosed her daughter\u2019s joint disease as caused by trauma.\u201d (Original in all caps.) Defendant failed to object at trial and thus argues plain error.\nFor error to constitute plain error, a defendant must demonstrate that a fundamental error occurred at trial. To show that an error was fundamental, a defendant must establish prejudice that, after examination of the entire record, the error had a probable impact on the jury\u2019s finding that the defendant was guilty. Moreover, because plain error is to be applied cautiously and only in the exceptional case, the error will often be one that seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings[.]\nState v. Lawrence, _N.C. _, __, 723 S.E.2d 326, 334 (2012) (citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).\nAssuming arguendo, that Jane\u2019s mother\u2019s testimony regarding \u201ctrauma\u201d was hearsay and therefore inadmissible, due to Jane\u2019s extensive, detailed testimony regarding the numerous offenses defendant committed against her, we cannot see how \u201cthe error had a probable impact on the jury\u2019s finding that the defendant was guilty.\u201d Id.\nVI. Quashed Subpoena\nOn 15 August 2008, the district court entered an ex parte domestic violence order of protection (\u201cex parte DVPO\u201d) pursuant to North Carolina General Statutes \u00a7\u00a7 50B-2, -3, -3.1, against defendant in an action brought by Jane\u2019s mother as the petitioner/plaintiff. In the ex parte DVPO, the district court found that defendant had committed first degree rape, first degree sexual offense, and sexual battery. During the trial, the trial court allowed defendant to question Jane\u2019s mother about \u201cwhether or not she told Judge Franks that on 8/14/08 the defendant committed first-degree rape and first-degree sex offense because that was a finding of the Court.\u201d Jane\u2019s mother denied telling Judge Franks that defendant had committed first-degree rape or first-degree sex offense and stated that she had tried to convey to Judge Franks her understanding of the pending charges against defendant which were the same charges as noted above arising from the sexual abuse of Jane. The trial court eventually quashed defendant\u2019s subpoena for Judge Franks. Defendant argues that the trial court erred in ordering the subpoena be quashed. Defendant contends that \u201c[i]f Judge Franks had testified [that Jane\u2019s mother] told him the defendant committed rape, it would have gone to the credibility of [Jane\u2019s mother\u2019s] allegations at trial.\u201d\nWe believe that this case is similar to State v. House, in which after the State had rested, the defendant requested that he be allowed to subpoena certain witnesses. 295 N.C. 189, 205, 244 S.E.2d 654, 662 (1978). The trial court denied the request. Id. This Court found no error in denying the request in part because the defendant had waited so long to make the request, but also in part because the defendant did not show that the testimony was material. Id. at 206, 244 S.E.2d at 663. House stated,\nG.S. 15A-801 provides for the issuance of subpoenas for proposed witnesses in a criminal proceeding and provides that these shall be issued and served in the manner provided in Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, G.S. 1A-1, for the issuance and service of subpoenas in civil actions. That rule provides for the issuance of subpoenas by the Clerk of the Superior Court, but also provides for the issuance of subpoenas over the signature of the party or his counsel. . . .\n... [I]t does not appear that the testimony which the defendant hoped to elicit from any of these proposed witnesses would have been material in the trial of this action. According to the defendant\u2019s responses to the inquiries of the court, two of them were men whom he suspected of having committed adultery with his wife. Assuming, which seems unlikely, that these men, if called to the witness stand, would acknowledge such conduct, it would not be material to the trial of the present action in view of the fact that it occurred, if at all, ten and eleven years prior to the defendant\u2019s shooting of his wife and after he, with knowledge thereof, condoned the misconduct and he and his wife became reconciled and renewed their marital relations. Another was a minister, not shown to have any knowledge of any circumstance related to the shooting, or of the defendant\u2019s mental or emotional condition, or of his character or reputation.\nId. at 205-06, 244 S.E.2d at 663.\nIn this case, Judge Franks filed an affidavit and it appears that he had no independent recollection of Jane\u2019s mother\u2019s case. But even if we were to assume arguendo that Judge Franks could have testified that Jane\u2019s mother told him that defendant had committed first degree rape and/or first-degree sex offense, this testimony would not have made any difference to defendant\u2019s case. Jane\u2019s mother\u2019s testimony made it clear that she informed Judge Franks regarding the acts that she understood defendant to be charged with, although she may have been unaware of the exact legal terminology for these acts. Assuming Judge Franks could testify that Jane\u2019s mother was wrong about the legal name of the crimes she told Judge Franks defendant had been charged with or committed, at most this shows a lay person\u2019s confusion with legal terms such as \u201cfirst degree sexual offense\u201d rather than an attempt to convey false information. Also, the majority of the evidence upon which defendant was convicted came from Jane, and we do not believe defendant\u2019s inability to attempt to attack Jane\u2019s mother\u2019s credibility through Judge Franks resulted in any prejudicial error. See State v. Hurst, 127 N.C. App. 54, 61, 487 S.E.2d 846, 852 (\u201c[T]o obtain reversal based on any error in the trial court\u2019s ruling, the defendant must show prejudicial error. The test for prejudicial error is whether there is a reasonable possibility that a different result would have been reached at trial had the error not been committed.\u201d (citation and quotation marks omitted)), disc. review denied and appeal dismissed, 347 N.C. 406, 494 S.E.2d 427 (1997), cert denied, 523 U.S. 1031, 140 L.Ed. 2d 486 (1998); see also State v. Valentine, 20 N.C. App. 727, 729, 202 S.E.2d 496, 498 (1974) (\u201cIn order to entitle defendant to a new trial, the error complained of. must be prejudicial to him.\u201d). Accordingly, this argument is overruled.\nVII. Redirect Examination\nLastly, defendant contends that the trial court erred when on redirect .examination it allowed the State to question Jane again about the offenses defendant had committed against her as this had not been raised on cross-examination. However, at one point during the redirect examination, the trial court specifically stated, \u201cAll right. That\u2019s outside. We\u2019re not gonna keep repeating things. That\u2019s outside the scope of cross-examination.\u201d Thus, the trial court did eventually forbid the prosecution from impermissible re-questioning. Defendant now contends that by the time the trial court intervened \u201cthe prejudice had already occurred.\u201d As to any potential prejudice that might have occurred before the trial court stopped the State\u2019s re-questioning, defendant could have requested a limiting instruction or other remedy. However, defendant did not nor does the defendant argue that the trial court erred in not issuing one here. Accordingly, this argument is overruled.\nVIII. Conclusion\nFor the foregoing reasons, we find no error.\nNO ERROR.\nJudges CALABRIA and McCULLOUGH concur.\n. A pseudonym will be used to protect the identity of the minor child.\n. Defendant has also filed a motion for appropriate relief requesting that this Court \u201c[v]acate his convictions and sentence and order that a new trial be conducted\u201d or \u201c[r]emand the case to the Superior Court of Cumberland County so that the pertinent records may be ordered and reviewed in camera and a determination made as to whether failure to produce these records at trial resulted in a violation of Due Process].]\u201d As we are unable to address this motion based upon the record before us, defendant\u2019s motion is dismissed without prejudice to his right to file a motion for appropriate relief with the trial court.", "type": "majority", "author": "STROUD, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney General Sherri G. Homer, for the State.", "Marilyn G. Ozer, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JONATHAN EUGENE BRUNSON\nNo. COA12-85\n(Filed 17 July 2012)\n1. Appeal and Error \u2014 preservation of issues \u2014 failure to argue constitutional issue at trial \u2014 not proper for plain error review\nDefendant failed to preserve for appellate review the argument that his constitutional rights to confrontation, a fair trial, and due process were violated in a child sex offenses case when the trial court failed to conduct an in camera review of certain Department of Social Services and medical documents. Defendant failed to request a judicial hearing on this matter and the issue of whether the trial court should have conducted an in camera review in this situation was not proper for plain error analysis.\n2. Constitutional Law \u2014 effective assistance of counsel \u2014 pro se defendant \u2014 no error\nDefendant\u2019s claim for ineffective assistance of counsel in a child sex offenses case had no merit where defendant dismissed all of his attorneys and chose to represent himself.\n3. Constitutional Law \u2014 due process \u2014 probable cause hearing \u2014 probable cause established \u2014 discovery violation speculative\nThe trial court in a child sex offenses case did not violate defendant\u2019s constitutional rights to due process, a fair trial and confrontation by not holding a probable cause hearing. As defendant was arrested upon warrants and tried upon indictments, probable cause was twice established. Further, defendant\u2019s speculative argument regarding potential discovery and impeachment evidence was overruled as defendant failed to show a reasonable possibility that a different result would have been reached in this trial had he been given a preliminary hearing.\n4. Evidence \u2014 witness testimony \u2014 no probable impact on jury\u2019s finding of guilt\nThe trial court did not commit plain error in a child sex offense case by allowing the victim\u2019s mother to testify that a physician diagnosed her daughter\u2019s joint disease as caused by trauma. Assuming arguendo that the evidence was inadmissible due to the victim\u2019s extensive, detailed testimony regarding the numerous offenses defendant committed against her, the error did not have a probable impact on the jury\u2019s finding that defendant was guilty.\n5. Sexual Offenses \u2014 against child \u2014 prosecutor questioning\u2014 no limiting instruction requested\nDefendant\u2019s argument that the trial court erred in a child sex offenses case by allowing the State to question the victim again about the offenses defendant had committed against her was rejected. Defendant did not ask for a limiting instruction and did not argue that the trial court erred in not issuing one.\nAppeal by defendant from judgments entered on or about 17 June 2011 by Judge Mary Ann Tally in Superior Court, Cumberland County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 24 May 2012.\nAttorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney General Sherri G. Homer, for the State.\nMarilyn G. Ozer, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0614-01", "first_page_order": 624, "last_page_order": 632 }