{ "id": 4033799, "name": "CEDAR GREENE, LLC, et al and O'LEARY GROUP WASTE SYSTEMS, LLC, Plaintiffs v. CITY OF CHARLOTTE, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Cedar Greene, LLC v. City of Charlotte", "decision_date": "2012-08-07", "docket_number": "No. COA12-212", "first_page": "1", "last_page": "19", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "222 N.C. App. 1" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "643 S.E.2d 435", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12638081 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "438" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/643/0435-01" ] }, { "cite": "649 S.E.2d 920", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639305 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "923", "parenthetical": "alteration in original" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/649/0920-01" ] }, { "cite": "643 S.E.2d 607", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12638131 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "610" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/643/0607-01" ] }, { "cite": "665 S.E.2d 103", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12641722 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "123" }, { "page": "123" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/665/0103-01" ] }, { "cite": "398 S.E.2d 55", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "56", "parenthetical": "holding this Court is without authority to entertain an appeal where there has been no entry of judgment on the issue or claim being appealed" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "100 N.C. App. 723", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527547 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "725", "parenthetical": "holding this Court is without authority to entertain an appeal where there has been no entry of judgment on the issue or claim being appealed" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/100/0723-01" ] }, { "cite": "182 N.C. App. 585", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8174530 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "589" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/182/0585-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 N.C. App. 17", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8154366 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "20", "parenthetical": "alteration in original" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/186/0017-01" ] }, { "cite": "675 S.E.2d 625", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "628", "parenthetical": "quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 56(c) [2011]" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 140", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4150629 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "142", "parenthetical": "quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 56(c) [2011]" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/363/0140-01" ] }, { "cite": "183 N.C. App. 75", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8201578 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "80" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/183/0075-01" ] }, { "cite": "707 S.E.2d 243", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2011, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "365 N.C. 188", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 2011, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 S.E.2d 801", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "803" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "68 N.C. App. 246", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526962 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "249" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/68/0246-01" ] }, { "cite": "705 S.E.2d 757", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "765", "parenthetical": "quoting Carolina First Nat'l Bank v. Douglas Gallery of Homes, 68 N.C. App. 246, 249, 314 S.E.2d 801, 803 (1984)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "710 S.E.2d 3", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2011, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "365 N.C. 198", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 2011, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "136 Wis.2d 281", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wis. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8668726 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wis-2d/136/0281-01" ] }, { "cite": "376 S.E.2d 449", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "452", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Labor and Indus. Review Comm'n, 136 Wis.2d 281, 287 n.2, 401 N.W.2d 585, 588 n.2 (1987)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 N.C. 100", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2482395 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "103", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Labor and Indus. Review Comm'n, 136 Wis.2d 281, 287 n.2, 401 N.W.2d 585, 588 n.2 (1987)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/324/0100-01" ] }, { "cite": "704 S.E.2d 329", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "341", "parenthetical": "quoting Higgins v. Simmons, 324 N.C. 100, 103, 376 S.E.2d 449, 452 (1989) (quoting State v. Labor and Indus. Review Comm'n, 136 Wis.2d 281, 287 n.2, 401 N.W.2d 585, 588 n.2 (1987))" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "388 S.E.2d 538", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "555" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 100", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5305276 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "129" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0100-01" ] }, { "cite": "669 S.E.2d 279", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "282", "parenthetical": "quoting River Birch Assocs. v. City of Raleigh, 326 N.C. 100, 129, 388 S.E.2d 538, 555 (1990)" }, { "page": "283" }, { "page": "282", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 640", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4150246 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "642-43", "parenthetical": "quoting River Birch Assocs. v. City of Raleigh, 326 N.C. 100, 129, 388 S.E.2d 538, 555 (1990)" }, { "page": "644" }, { "page": "643" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0640-01" ] }, { "cite": "504 U.S. 555", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11730070 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "560-61" }, { "page": "364" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/504/0555-01" ] }, { "cite": "607 S.E.2d 14", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "16" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "168 N.C. App. 175", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8468656 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "177" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/168/0175-01" ] }, { "cite": "560 S.E.2d 875", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "878" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 N.C. App. 320", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9127650 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "324" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/149/0320-01" ] }, { "cite": "574 S.E.2d 48", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "51", "parenthetical": "quoting Aubin v. Susi, 149 N.C. App. 320, 324, 560 S.E.2d 875, 878 (2002)" }, { "page": "52" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "155 N.C. App. 110", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9249087 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "113", "parenthetical": "quoting Aubin v. Susi, 149 N.C. App. 320, 324, 560 S.E.2d 875, 878 (2002)" }, { "page": "114" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/155/0110-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 S.E.2d 437", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "440" }, { "page": "440" }, { "page": "440" }, { "page": "440-41" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 N.C. App. 82", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521065 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "87" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/99/0082-01" ] }, { "cite": "321 S.E.2d 476", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "479" }, { "page": "477-78" }, { "page": "478" }, { "page": "479" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "71 N.C. App. 192", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524628 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "195" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/71/0192-01" ] }, { "cite": "78 S.E.2d 290", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1953, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "298" }, { "page": "298", "parenthetical": "\"There must be no unreasonable discrimination between those receiving the same kind and degree of service.\" (emphasis added)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "238 N.C. 451", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8611484 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1953, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "462" }, { "page": "462" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/238/0451-01" ] }, { "cite": "255 S.E.2d 739", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "745" }, { "page": "745", "parenthetical": "\"Numerous cases have recognized the rule that the statutory authority of a city to fix and enforce rates for public services furnished by it and to classify its customers is not a license to discriminate among customers of essentially the same character and services.\" (emphasis added)" }, { "page": "741" }, { "page": "745" }, { "page": "745" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "41 N.C. App. 649", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8551374 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "659" }, { "page": "659" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/41/0649-01" ] }, { "cite": "237 S.E.2d 484", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 8, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "486" }, { "page": "486" }, { "page": "485" }, { "page": "486" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "34 N.C. App. 146", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8547519 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "149" }, { "page": "149" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/34/0146-01" ] }, { "cite": "379 S.E.2d 712", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "714" }, { "page": "714" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 N.C. App. 117", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526646 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "120" }, { "page": "120" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/94/0117-01" ] }, { "cite": "280 S.E.2d 490", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "492" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "53 N.C. App. 210", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520356 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "212-13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/53/0210-01" ] }, { "cite": "517 S.E.2d 874", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "881", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "881" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "350 N.C. 805", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 132228 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "816", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "816" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/350/0805-01" ] }, { "cite": "287 S.E.2d 851", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "853" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 N.C. 248", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567388 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "250-51" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/305/0248-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 N.C. App. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4160685 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "27" }, { "page": "27" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/192/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "637 S.E.2d 876", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637332 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "882" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/637/0876-01" ] }, { "cite": "123 S.E.2d 582", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "589", "parenthetical": "\"Only those persons may call into question the validity of a statute who have been injuriously affected thereby in their persons, property or constitutional rights.\" (emphasis added)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "256 N.C. 155", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571604 ], "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "166", "parenthetical": "\"Only those persons may call into question the validity of a statute who have been injuriously affected thereby in their persons, property or constitutional rights.\" (emphasis added)" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/256/0155-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 26", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3743674 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "35" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0026-01" ] }, { "cite": "669 S.E.2d 279", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "282", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "282", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 640", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4150246 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "642" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0640-01" ] }, { "cite": "504 U.S. 555", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11730070 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "560" }, { "page": "364" }, { "page": "560" }, { "page": "364", "parenthetical": "noting that one of the three elements of federal standing is an \" 'injury in fact' \" that is \"concrete and particularized\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/504/0555-01" ] }, { "cite": "607 S.E.2d 14", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "16" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "168 N.C. App. 175", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8468656 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "177" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/168/0175-01" ] }, { "cite": "574 S.E.2d 48", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "52" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "155 N.C. App. 110", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9249087 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "114" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/155/0110-01" ] }, { "cite": "321 S.E.2d 476", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "479", "parenthetical": "\"There must be substantial differences in service or conditions to justify differences in rates. There must be no unreasonable discrimination between those receiving the same kind and degree of service.\"" }, { "page": "479" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "71 N.C. App. 192", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524628 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "195", "parenthetical": "\"There must be substantial differences in service or conditions to justify differences in rates. There must be no unreasonable discrimination between those receiving the same kind and degree of service.\"" }, { "page": "195" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/71/0192-01" ] }, { "cite": "78 S.E.2d 290", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1953, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "299" }, { "page": "300", "parenthetical": "\"Classification must be based on substantial difference.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "238 N.C. 451", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8611484 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1953, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "464" }, { "page": "465" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/238/0451-01" ] }, { "cite": "255 S.E.2d 739", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "745", "parenthetical": "Recognizing that the statute does not grant cities \"a license to discriminate among customers,\" but not establishing that a city could discriminate among service providers" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "41 N.C. App. 649", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8551374 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "659", "parenthetical": "Recognizing that the statute does not grant cities \"a license to discriminate among customers,\" but not establishing that a city could discriminate among service providers" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/41/0649-01" ] }, { "cite": "237 S.E.2d 484", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "486", "parenthetical": "Holding that \"a city has 'the right to classify consumers' \" but included no language to suggest the statute applies exclusively to consumers" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "34 N.C. App. 146", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8547519 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "149", "parenthetical": "Holding that \"a city has 'the right to classify consumers' \" but included no language to suggest the statute applies exclusively to consumers" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/34/0146-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1349, "char_count": 46025, "ocr_confidence": 0.76, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.055231026182732e-08, "percentile": 0.3169053485357641 }, "sha256": "5801fbad1e982b2d6a7f7b38acc84df0bd4abbe39fe3861d5ad596918da6ec90", "simhash": "1:1b29d5f626771e59", "word_count": 7298 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:23:21.020165+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge BRYANT concurs.", "Judge CALABRIA dissents." ], "parties": [ "CEDAR GREENE, LLC, et al and O\u2019LEARY GROUP WASTE SYSTEMS, LLC, Plaintiffs v. CITY OF CHARLOTTE, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "McCullough, Judge.\nDefendant City of Charlotte (\u201cthe City\u201d) appeals from the trial court\u2019s summary and declaratory judgment finding and concluding that the City\u2019s reimbursement policy for the disposal of supplemental solid waste collected from multi-family complexes constitutes unlawful, unreasonable, and arbitrary discrimination in the provision of a public enterprise service in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-314 (2011). On appeal, the City argues the trial court erred in (1) denying its motion to dismiss with respect to both plaintiffs under Rule 12(b)(1) of our Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) granting plaintiffs\u2019 motion for summary judgment and denying its motion for summary judgment after finding the City\u2019s reimbursement policy is discriminatory in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-314; and (3) imposing a specific injunctive remedy against the City to correct the discriminatory practice. After careful review, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.\nI. Background\nBy local ordinance, and pursuant to statutory authority to engage in \u201cpublic enterprises\u201d under Chapter 160A of our General Statutes, the City furnishes solid waste services to multi-family complexes, including apartment complexes, condominiums, and trailer parks, that maintain dumpsters or compactors for the storage and collection of solid waste within its corporate limits. The City provides to each multi-family complex a fixed number of solid waste collections per week in accordance with a formula based on the ratio of residential units to dumpsters at the complex. This primary collection is provided by the City through a private contractor, Republic Services, Inc. (\u201cRepublic\u201d). If a multi-family complex desires to receive any additional weekday collections, the complex must privately contract for such supplemental collection service.\nIn addition to its primary collection service, the City provides for the disposal of solid waste collected from multi-family complexes through the reimbursement of disposal fees charged by the City\u2019s designated landfill for the disposal of residential solid waste. Pursuant to the City\u2019s ordinances, the City levies on each separate multi-family complex an annual disposal fee for the disposal of all solid waste collected from the complex. This annual disposal fee, in the amount of $27 per residential unit, corresponds to the fees charged by the City\u2019s designated landfill to dispose of the total amount of solid waste that a unit within a multi-family complex produces during one year. Accordingly, the annual disposal fee is calculated to account for the cost of the disposal of all solid waste collected from each multi-family complex through both the primary collection and any supplemental collections.\nPursuant to its contractual agreement with Republic, the City provides reimbursement to Republic for all disposal fees paid on account of both the primary collection and any supplemental collections for which Republic is hired. However, the City does not provide any reimbursement of disposal fees to supplemental collection service providers other than Republic. Republic was awarded the contract with the City after submitting a bid for the services, as did five other companies. In order to obtain the lowest possible rate for its primary collection service, the City included its reimbursement policy for disposal fees as a provision in the guidelines for consideration by the companies choosing to submit a bid for the services.\nPlaintiff Cedar Greene, LLC (\u201cCedar Greene\u201d) owns and operates a residential apartment complex comprised of 224 units, known as Cedar Greene Apartments, within the corporate limits of the City. Accordingly, Cedar Greene Apartments is entitled to receive such solid waste services from the City. Based on the City\u2019s formula, Cedar Greene Apartments receives primary collection once per week by the City through Republic.\nCedar Greene sought to engage plaintiff O\u2019Leary Group Waste Systems, LLC (\u201cO\u2019Leary,\u201d collectively with Cedar Greene, \u201cplaintiffs\u201d) to provide supplemental collection services at a rate lower than that charged by Republic, on condition that the City provide reimbursement of the supplemental collection disposal fees. Specifically, O\u2019Leary offered to provide supplemental collection service at a rate of $12.50 per pickup from dumpsters and $125.00 for pickup from compactors, versus Republic\u2019s rates of $16.95 per pickup from dumpsters and $168.98 per pickup from compactors.\nO\u2019Leary represented to the City that it was prepared and willing to meet all uniformly applicable requirements the City may impose on providers of supplemental collection, including those requirements imposed on Republic under the City\u2019s contractual agreement, in order to receive reimbursement from the City of the supplemental collection disposal fees. Such requirements include (1) using designated vehicles for supplemental collection of solid waste from multi-family complexes, (2) not commingling solid waste from multi-family complexes with waste from other sources, (3) disposal of such solid waste at the designated landfill, (4) submitting to monetary penalties if it disposes of waste not from multi-family complexes, and (5) allowing the City to monitor collection to ensure compliance with these requirements. Nonetheless, the City informed O\u2019Leary that it would continue to reimburse disposal fees for supplemental waste collected from multi-family complexes only to Republic and that it would not reimburse such disposal fees to O\u2019Leary or any other supplemental collection provider. O\u2019Leary did not previously submit a bid for the City\u2019s waste disposal business.\nOn 23 May 2011, plaintiffs commenced the present action by filing a verified complaint for declaratory judgment in Mecklenburg County Superior Court, alleging that the City\u2019s program of reimbursing supplemental collection disposal fees, for which Cedar Greene had already paid the City by way of the annual disposal fee levied on all multi-family complexes, to only those multi-family complexes who hire Republic for supplemental collection services, violated N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-314 and the equal protection clauses of the North Carolina and United States Constitutions. After the City removed the case to federal court based on the federal constitutional claim, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on 27 June 2011 removing the federal claim, and the case was then remanded pursuant to the parties\u2019 joint motion to remand. On 26 July 2011, the City filed its answer to plaintiffs\u2019 amended complaint and a motion to dismiss plaintiffs\u2019 action pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of North Carolina\u2019s Rules of Civil Procedure, alleging that neither plaintiff had standing to bring the claims set forth in their amended complaint.\nOn 22 September 2011, plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment, and on 4 November 2011, the City also filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court conducted a hearing on the parties\u2019 respective motions on 15 November 2011, and on 14 December 2011, the trial court entered a summary and declaratory judgment denying the City\u2019s motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment and granting plaintiffs\u2019 motion for summary judgment. The trial court\u2019s order concluded the City\u2019s policy of supplemental collection disposal fee reimbursement was in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-314. In light of that conclusion, the trial court made no ruling on plaintiffs\u2019 constitutional equal protection argument. The trial court ordered the City to\ncommence within 30 days of entry of this judgment the provision of disposal services for supplemental waste through the reimbursement of Disposal Fees for the benefit of all MultiFamily Complexes equally, without regard to the provider the Multi-Family Complex may choose to hire to provide Supplemental Collection, so long as that collection provider agrees to and complies with those uniformly-applicable requirements the City may prescribe for such service.\nOn 22 December 2011, the City filed a motion for reconsideration, or in the alternative, to amend or alter the judgment, or in the alternative, for relief from the judgment, pursuant to Rules 59(e), 60(b), and 62(b) of our Rules of Civil Procedure. The City also filed a contemporaneous motion for stay of execution of the judgment. By order dated 3 January 2012, the trial court modified the judgment only to extend the time within which the City must comply with the judgment, giving the City a new compliance deadline of 2 February 2012. On 5 January 2012, the City entered timely written notice of appeal to this Court from the trial court\u2019s 14 December 2011 judgment. The City also filed a contemporaneous motion for stay with the trial court, seeking a stay of the 14 December 2011 judgment pending appeal. On 18 January 2012, the trial court denied the City\u2019s motion for stay.\nOn 25 January 2012, the City filed a petition for writ of supersedeas and motion for temporary stay with this Court. On 26 January 2012, this Court granted the City\u2019s motion for temporary stay, and on 9 February 2012, this Court allowed the City\u2019s petition for writ of supersedeas. We now reach the merits of the City\u2019s appeal from the trial court\u2019s 14 December 2011 summary and declaratory judgment.\nII. Discussion\nA. Public Enterprise Statutes\nArticle 16 of Chapter 160A of our General Statutes authorizes all cities in North Carolina to \u201coperate\u201d or \u201ccontract for the operation of\u2019 those endeavors defined as \u201cpublic enterprises.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-312(a) (2011); see City of Asheville v. State, 192 N.C. App. 1, 27, 665 S.E.2d 103, 123 (2008). Public enterprises are defined to include \u201c[s]olid waste collection and disposal systems and facilities.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-311(6) (2011). The City admits that its policy of reimbursing Republic\u2019s disposal costs associated with supplemental collection of solid waste from multi-family complexes is a component of the City\u2019s chosen method for solid waste disposal under the public enterprise statutes.\nPursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-314(a), cities are empowered to \u201cestablish and revise from time to time schedules of rents, rates, fees, charges, and penalties for the use of or the services furnished by any public enterprise.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-314(a) (2011). When a municipality sets rates or fees for public enterprise services, those rates or fees \u201cmay vary according to classes of service[.]\u201d Id. \u201cThis rate-making function is a proprietary rather than a governmental one, limited only by statute or contractual agreement.\u201d Town of Spring Hope v. Bissette, 305 N.C. 248, 250-51, 287 S.E.2d 851, 853 (1982). \u201c \u2018[U]nder this broad, unfettered grant of authority, the setting of such rates and charges is a matter for the judgment and discretion of municipal authorities, not to be invalidated by the courts absent some showing of arbitrary or discriminatory action.\u2019 \u201d Smith Chapel Baptist Church v. City of Durham, 350 N.C. 805, 816, 517 S.E.2d 874, 881 (1999) (emphasis added) (quoting Town of Spring Hope v. Bissette, 53 N.C. App. 210, 212-13, 280 S.E.2d 490, 492 (1981), aff\u2019d, 305 N.C. 248, 287 S.E.2d 851 (1982)); see also City of Asheville, 192 N.C. App. at 27, 665 S.E.2d at 123.\nOur case law has established that a city \u201cmay not discriminate in the distribution of services or the setting of rates.\u201d City of Wilson v. Carolina Builders, 94 N.C. App. 117, 120, 379 S.E.2d 712, 714 (1989). \u201c[T]he statutory authority of a city to fix and enforce rates for its services and to classify its customers is not a license to discriminate among customers of essentially the same character and services.\u201d Town of Taylorsville v. Modern Cleaners, 34 N.C. App. 146, 149, 237 S.E.2d 484, 486 (1977); see also Wall v. City of Durham, 41 N.C. App. 649, 659, 255 S.E.2d 739, 745 (1979). \u201cThere must be substantial differences in service or conditions to justify differences in rates. There must be no unreasonable discrimination between those receiving the same kind and degree of service.\u201d Utilities Commission v. Mead Corp., 238 N.C. 451, 462, 78 S.E.2d 290, 298 (1953). Ultimately, a municipality engages in unreasonable discrimination by charging different rates for public enterprise services to similarly situated customers. Cabarrus County v. City of Charlotte, 71 N.C. App. 192, 195, 321 S.E.2d 476, 479 (1984). \u201cThe burden of proof is on the party-claiming that a rate-setting ordinance is unreasonable or discriminatory.\u201d Ricks v. Town of Selma, 99 N.C. App. 82, 87, 392 S.E.2d 437, 440 (1990).\nB. Standing to Maintain Discrimination Claim under Statute\nWe first address the City\u2019s argument that plaintiffs lacked the requisite standing to maintain a claim of discrimination under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-314, and therefore, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter its summary and declaratory judgment in favor of plaintiffs. \u201c \u2018Standing is a necessary prerequisite to a court\u2019s proper exercise of subject matter jurisdiction.\u2019 \u201d Neuse River Found., Inc. v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 155 N.C. App. 110, 113, 574 S.E.2d 48, 51 (2002) (quoting Aubin v. Susi, 149 N.C. App. 320, 324, 560 S.E.2d 875, 878 (2002)). \u201cIf a party does not have standing to bring a claim, a court has no subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claim.\u201d Estate of Apple v. Commercial Courier Express, Inc., 168 N.C. App. 175, 177, 607 S.E.2d 14, 16 (2005).\nStanding consists of three main elements:\n\u201c(1) \u2018injury in fact\u2019 \u2014 an invasion of a legally protected interest that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; .and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.\u201d\nId. (quoting Neuse River Found., 155 N.C. App. at 114, 574 S.E.2d at 52 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351, 364 (1992))). \u201cThe issue of standing generally turns on whether a party has suffered injury in fact.\u201d Id. Our Supreme Court has clarified that \u201c[i]t is not necessary that a party demonstrate that injury has already occurred, but a showing of \u2018immediate or threatened injury\u2019 will suffice for purposes of standing.\u201d Mangum v. Raleigh Bd. of Adjustment, 362 N.C. 640, 642-43, 669 S.E.2d 279, 282 (2008) (quoting River Birch Assocs. v. City of Raleigh, 326 N.C. 100, 129, 388 S.E.2d 538, 555 (1990)).\n\u201c \u2018 \u201cStanding typically refers to the question of whether a particular litigant is a proper party to assert a legal position.\u201d \u2019 \u201d Town of Midland v. Morris,_N.C. App._,_, 704 S.E.2d 329, 341 (2011) (quoting Higgins v. Simmons, 324 N.C. 100, 103, 376 S.E.2d 449, 452 (1989) (quoting State v. Labor and Indus. Review Comm\u2019n, 136 Wis.2d 281, 287 n.2, 401 N.W.2d 585, 588 n.2 (1987))), disc. review denied, 365 N.C. 198, 710 S.E.2d 3 (2011). Accordingly, in order to have standing to initiate a lawsuit, a party must, by substantive law, have \u201c \u2018the legal right to enforce the claim in question.\u2019 \u201d Mitchell, Brewer, Richardson, Adams, Burge & Boughman, PLLC v. Brewer, _ N.C. App. _, _, 705 S.E.2d 757, 765 (2011) (quoting Carolina First Nat\u2019l Bank v. Douglas Gallery of Homes, 68 N.C. App. 246, 249, 314 S.E.2d 801, 803 (1984)), disc. review denied, 365 N.C. 188, 707 S.E.2d 243 (2011). \u201cIn our de novo review of a motion to dismiss for lack of standing, we view the allegations as true and the supporting record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.\u201d Mangum, 362 N.C. at 644, 669 S.E.2d at 283.\nIn the present case, the City contends O\u2019Leary lacks standing to maintain a discrimination claim under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-314 because O\u2019Leary is not a customer of public enterprise services. The City maintains that the anti-discrimination principle embodied in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-314 as enunciated under our case law protects only customers of public enterprise services, not service providers, and therefore, O\u2019Leary lacks standing to maintain a discrimination claim under the substantive law of this statute. We agree.\nAs explained above, under this statute and our case law interpreting that statute, a city has broad discretion in setting rates and charges for the provision of public enterprise services, with the single limitation being that the city cannot act in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner in setting such rates and charges or in providing such services. Smith Chapel, 350 N.C. at 816, 517 S.E.2d at 881; City of Wilson, 94 N.C. App. at 120, 379 S.E.2d at 714. As the City points out, the statute at issue, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-314, and the line of cases establishing that statute\u2019s non-discrimination principle focus entirely on the discriminatory effect of a city\u2019s rate structure on the customer or consumer. See Mead Corp., 238 N.C. at 462, 78 S.E.2d at 298 (\u201cThere must be no unreasonable discrimination between those receiving the same kind and degree of service.\u201d (emphasis added)); Modern Cleaners, 34 N.C. App. at 149, 237 S.E.2d at 486 (\u201c[T]he statute must be read as a codification of the general rule that a city has the right to classify consumers under reasonable classifications based upon such factors as the cost of service ... or any other matter which presents a substantial difference as a ground of distinction.\u201d (first emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Wall, 41 N.C. App. at 659, 255 S.E.2d at 745 (\u201cNumerous cases have recognized the rule that the statutory authority of a city to fix and enforce rates for public services furnished by it and to classify its customers is not a license to discriminate among customers of essentially the same character and services.\u201d (emphasis added)). Given this authority, we must construe the statute and the cases interpreting that statute as conferring a claim for discrimination only on those consumers or customers who are adversely affected by a city\u2019s differing rate structure or disparate provision of services.\nAs the City points out, the crux of plaintiffs\u2019 arguments in the present case center on the alleged \u201cdual rate structure\u201d that plaintiffs contend is effected by the City\u2019s policy of reimbursing disposal fees associated with supplemental collection to Republic only. Plaintiffs\u2019 argument under the statute ultimately contends the City is treating similarly situated multi-family complexes differently by paying for the supplemental collection disposal fees for those complexes who hire Republic and not those who hire another supplemental collection provider, as those complexes who choose to hire a supplemental collection provider other than Republic are, in effect, forced to pay for disposal fees twice, having already paid the City the annual fee for all disposal and then having to pay again for disposal fees the City refuses to reimburse to the supplemental collection provider.\nHowever, as the City correctly contends, these arguments do not pertain to O\u2019Leary. O\u2019Leary is not assessed an annual disposal fee by the City, and O\u2019Leary is not a customer or consumer for whom the City provides solid waste services. Thus, O\u2019Leary cannot be injured by the City\u2019s alleged discriminatory dual rate structure under the provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-314. Although O\u2019Leary contends that it is injured by the City\u2019s reimbursement policy because the City\u2019s policy prevents it from effectively competing in the market for supplemental collection services, such is not the requisite legal position for standing under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-314. Accordingly, we fail to see how O\u2019Leary can demonstrate it has standing to maintain a discrimination claim under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-314, and the trial court erred in failing to grant the City\u2019s motion to dismiss that claim with respect to O\u2019Leary for lack of standing.\nThe City also contends that Cedar Greene lacks standing to maintain a discrimination claim under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-314 because Cedar Greene cannot demonstrate an injury in fact. The City maintains that because Cedar Greene currently benefits from the City\u2019s reimbursement policy by hiring Republic for supplemental collection services, Cedar Greene cannot show it has suffered an injury in fact. The City\u2019s arguments, however, are misguided.\nThe City recognizes that Cedar Greene is a customer under the public enterprise statute at issue in this case. In viewing the record in the light most favorable to Cedar Greene, we must conclude Cedar Greene has demonstrated an immediate or threatened injury by the City\u2019s actions. Considering the allegations in Cedar Greene\u2019s complaint as true, as a result of the City\u2019s policy of reimbursing only Republic for disposal of supplemental solid waste collected from multi-family complexes, Cedar Greene is faced with the choice of either losing the benefit of a portion of the disposal fee it pays to the City each year for the disposal of all solid waste collected from Cedar Greene Apartments and, in effect, paying twice for such disposal if it hires O\u2019Leary for supplemental collection, or accepting the rates for supplemental collection service charged by Republic, which are higher than those of O\u2019Leary, thereby preventing Cedar Greene from obtaining monetary savings in the collection and disposal of its supplemental solid waste. The fact that Cedar Greene has not already suffered either alleged monetary loss is inapposite for standing purposes, since \u201ca showing of immediate or threatened injury will suffice for purposes of standing.\u201d Mangum, 362 N.C. at 643, 669 S.E.2d at 282 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, because Cedar Greene has shown a threatened injury by the City\u2019s alleged discriminatory policy in the provision of disposal of supplemental solid waste collected from Cedar Greene Apartments, Cedar Greene has demonstrated the requisite standing to maintain the present discrimination action under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-314.\nC. Discriminatory Provision of Services\nWe next consider the City\u2019s argument that Cedar Greene cannot meet its burden of showing a violation by the City of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-314, and therefore, the trial court erred both in granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs and in denying summary judgment in favor of the City. On appeal from an order granting or denying summary judgment, our standard of review is de novo. Baum v. John R. Poore Builder, Inc., 183 N.C. App. 75, 80, 643 S.E.2d 607, 610 (2007).\nThe standard for granting summary judgment is well established. Summary judgment is proper when \u201cthe pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\u201d\nCrocker v. Roethling, 363 N.C. 140, 142, 675 S.E.2d 625, 628 (2009) (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 56(c) [2011]). Where, as here, the parties have filed cross motions for summary judgment, and there is no dispute as to any material fact, \u201c \u2018[w]e need only determine whether summary judgment was properly entered in plaintiffs\u2019 favor, or conversely should have been entered in favor of defendant.\u2019 \u201d McDowell v. Randolph Cty., 186 N.C. App. 17, 20, 649 S.E.2d 920, 923 (2007) (alteration in original) (quoting Geitner v. Mullins, 182 N.C. App. 585, 589, 643 S.E.2d 435, 438 (2007)).\nAs noted previously, Cedar Greene presents the argument that the effect of the City\u2019s reimbursement policy is to create a dual rate structure which results in higher disposal costs for certain customers who choose not to hire Republic, the City\u2019s preferred contractor. Plaintiffs liken the facts of this case to a line of prior cases before this Court finding a city\u2019s rate structure to be discriminatory under the statute.\nThe first of these cases is Town of Taylorsville v. Modern Cleaners, 34 N.C. App. 146, 237 S.E.2d 484 (1977). In Modern Cleaners, the Town of Taylorsville had established a different rate scale for customers of both sewer and water services and customers of sewer-only service. Id. at 147, 237 S.E.2d at 485. Under the rate scale at issue in Modem Gleaners, charges for sewer service were approximately fifteen percent higher for customers of sewer-only service than for customers of both sewer and water services. Id. The defendant in that case, a dry cleaning, laundry, and washerette business, was the only customer of the town\u2019s sewer-only service. Id. Upon review of such a rate scale, this Court noted the evidence in that case revealed there existed no difference in the type of service provided nor in the cost of providing sewer services to customers of sewer-only service versus both sewer and water services. Id. at 149, 237 S.E.2d at 486. Thus, we held the town\u2019s policy of charging a different rate for the same service to different customers was discriminatory in violation of its statutory rate-setting authority. Id.\nSimilarly, in Wall v. City of Durham, 41 N.C. App. 649, 255 S.E.2d 739 (1979), this Court reviewed the City of Durham\u2019s \u201cdecapping\u201d policy, a procedure utilized by the city to calculate water usage rates for certain apartment complexes. Under the decapping policy at issue in Wall, \u201cthe water usage shown by the meter [was] divided by the number of apartments served through the meter; then the water and sewer charge for the quantity resulting from this division [was] calculated; and, finally, this amount [was] multiplied by the number of apartments served through the meter.\u201d Id. at 652, 255 S.E.2d at 741. This Court noted the decapping policy resulted in higher charges for water services to customers living in apartment complexes subject to the policy versus other customers not subject to such a policy who consumed an identical quantity of the same service. Id. at 659, 255 S.E.2d at 745. Accordingly, we ruled such a policy was discriminatory in violation of the statute. Id. at 659-60, 255 S.E.2d at 745.\nLikewise, in Cabarrus County v. City of Charlotte, 71 N.C. App. 192, 321 S.E.2d 476 (1984), the City of Charlotte operated a sanitary landfill located in Cabarrus County and charged a set fee schedule for all users of the landfill. Id. at 192-93, 321 S.E.2d at 477-78. In response to the city\u2019s fee schedule, Cabarrus County enacted an ordinance providing that residents of Cabarrus County would not be required to pay a fee for disposal of solid waste in the county\u2019s landfills. Id. at 193, 321 S.E.2d at 478. Upon review of the county\u2019s ordinance, this Court held that the county\u2019s ordinance creating differing fee schedules for disposal of solid waste based on residence was arbitrary and discriminatory where the same kind of service was being provided to all customers. Id. at 194-95, 321 S.E.2d at 479.\nFinally, in Ricks v. Town of Selma, 99 N.C. App. 82, 392 S.E.2d 437 (1990), the Town of Selma established a disparate water and sewer service rate structure for multiple-unit establishments. Under the Town of Selma\u2019s rate structure, a customer who used both water and sewer service paid one flat fee for each service and a usage rate for each service. Id. at 87, 392 S.E.2d at 440. However, a customer who used only one of the services paid one flat fee for the service received, a usage rate for the service received, and for the service available but not received, one flat fee for each unit in the establishment. Id. at 86-87, 392 S.E.2d at 440. This Court held that the Town of Selma could properly charge an availability fee for services made available by the town but not used, but such availability fee could not be arbitrary and could not coerce customers to use the town\u2019s service. Id. In Ricks, the town\u2019s rate structure resulted in a differing fee for those customers using both services, who paid a single flat fee, versus those customers using only one service, who were required to pay the same fee but on a per unit basis rather than once. Thus, we held such a rate structure was discriminatory in violation of the statute. Id. at 87-88, 392 S.E.2d at 440-41. Here, however, unlike Ricks, we fail to see how the fact that the City provides reimbursement to Republic for disposal costs associated with supplemental collection coerces any multi-family complex, including Cedar Greene, into contracting for supplemental collection service in the first instance.\nIn addition, unlike Modern Cleaners, Wall, Cabarrus County, and Ricks, the City has not established a differing rate structure for customers of solid waste services. Rather, as the City argues, it currently charges the same disposal fee, $27 per unit per year, to all multi-family complexes, regardless of their need for supplemental collection. In accordance with that fee, all complexes have equal opportunity to receive the same service provided by the City. The resulting difference in costs for supplemental collection and disposal, about which Cedar Greene presently complains, results solely from the decisions by the complex to hire or not a service provider for supplemental collection and if so, which service provider to hire.\nAlthough the City\u2019s reimbursement policy with its preferred contractor may play a factor in a complex\u2019s decision-making process regarding which supplemental collection provider to hire, the decision whether to contract for supplemental collection services at all and with whom still remains with the complex, and any resulting differences are a product of the complex\u2019s decision. If a complex chooses to hire O\u2019Leary or some other supplemental collection service provider rather than Republic, the City\u2019s policy of charging an annual disposal fee and reimbursing its preferred contractor pursuant to its contractual obligation does not become a discriminatory \u201cdual rate structure.\u201d Under the City\u2019s current policy, all complexes who make the same decision, whether to hire Republic or to hire O\u2019Leary or some other supplemental collection service provider, pay the same rate. In Modern Cleaners, Wall, Cabarrus County, and Ricks, this Court found the respective municipalities\u2019 rate structures to be discriminatory because the direct actions of the municipality caused similarly situated customers to pay differing rates. In those cases, no action or decision by the customer caused the resulting rate or service disparities with respect to the specific service being provided by the City. Such is not the case here, where the City\u2019s policy makes no differentiation among similarly situated multi-family complexes in the provision of collection and disposal of solid waste.\nNotably, the reimbursement policy at issue deals directly, with the supplemental collection service provider, not the individual multifamily complexes. Rather than being a product of an arbitrary rate structure or discriminatory provision of services to customers, the reimbursement of disposal fees to supplemental collection service providers is limited only by the City\u2019s contractual agreement with Republic \u2014 a contractual agreement for which the City announced the guidelines and accepted competing bids from six different service providers, not including O\u2019Leary. As the City properly contends, by contracting with one service provider and providing that service equally to all customers, the City has not exceeded its authority under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-314.\nTo the extent Cedar Greene argues the City\u2019s calculation of the $27 annual disposal fee is too high and that the City is profiting from the unused portion of the annual disposal fee, such arguments are inapposite under their statutory discrimination claim, which concerns only arbitrary or discriminatory action either in setting rates or in the provision of public enterprise services. Cedar Greene has failed to show how the City\u2019s arithmetic in setting the annual disposal fee is arbitrary or discriminatory. Further, to the extent Cedar Greene maintains the City\u2019s policy stifles market competition in the provision of supplemental collection services or creates an effective monopoly for Republic, such is not a proper legal position for proceeding with a discrimination claim under the public enterprise statutes.\nUnder these facts, we fail to see how the City\u2019s chosen method of contracting with a single service provider for collection and disposal of solid waste, and providing the same uniform terms of that service to all multi-family complexes, results in the arbitrary or discriminatory provision of solid waste services or the rates charged therefor. Specifically, Cedar Greene has failed to show how it is being treated differently by the City from other similarly situated multi-family complexes, all of which pay the same annual disposal fee and have access to the same provision of services by the City. Accordingly, we hold the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Cedar Greene on its discrimination claim under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-314, and the trial court should have granted summary judgment in favor of the City on that issue. In light of this holding, we need not address the City\u2019s remaining argument concerning the propriety of the trial court\u2019s injunctive remedy.\nUpon ruling that the City\u2019s policy was discriminatory under the statute at issue, the trial court made no ruling on plaintiffs\u2019 remaining claim under the equal protection clause of the North Carolina Constitution. Because the trial court made no ruling on plaintiffs\u2019 constitutional claim in the judgment from which the City presently appeals, any such argument as to that issue is not properly before this Court. N.C. R. App. P. 10(a) (2012); see Searles v. Searles, 100 N.C. App. 723, 725, 398 S.E.2d 55, 56 (1990) (holding this Court is without authority to entertain an appeal where there has been no entry of judgment on the issue or claim being appealed). Having reversed the trial court\u2019s ruling on the statutory claim, we must therefore remand the cause back to the trial court for further proceedings on plaintiffs\u2019 constitutional claim.\nHI. Conclusion'\nWe hold that O\u2019Leary, a supplemental collection service provider, has failed to demonstrate the requisite standing to maintain a discrimination claim under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-314(a), in light of our case law interpreting that claim in favor of customers or consumers of public enterprise services. Thus, the trial court erred in failing to grant the City\u2019s motion to dismiss the statutory discrimination claim with respect to O\u2019Leary. However, Cedar Greene has shown a threatened financial injury by the City\u2019s alleged discriminatory reimbursement policy, and therefore, as a consumer or customer of the City\u2019s solid waste services, Cedar Greene has demonstrated sufficient standing to maintain a discrimination claim under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-314. Thus, the trial court did not err in failing to grant the City\u2019s motion to dismiss the statutory discrimination claim with respect to Cedar Greene.\nHowever, on the undisputed facts of this case, we fail to see how the City\u2019s reimbursement policy treats Cedar Greene differently from other multi-family complexes in the provision of solid waste disposal services. Accordingly, we hold the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs on their statutory discrimination claim. That judgment is therefore reversed.\nBecause the trial court made no ruling on plaintiffs\u2019 remaining claim under the equal protection clause of the North Carolina Constitution, we must remand the cause back to the trial court for further proceedings on plaintiffs\u2019 remaining constitutional claim.\nReversed and remanded.\nJudge BRYANT concurs.\nJudge CALABRIA dissents.", "type": "majority", "author": "McCullough, Judge." }, { "text": "CALABRIA, Judge,\ndissenting.\nI concur with the majority that plaintiff Cedar Greene, LLC (\u201cCedar Greene\u201d) has standing to maintain a discrimination claim pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-314. However, I disagree with the majority that O\u2019Leary Group Waste Systems, LLC (\u201cO\u2019Leary\u201d) lacks standing. Therefore, the trial court properly granted plaintiffs\u2019 motion for summary judgment on their statutory discrimination claim. In addition, because the court found that the city exceeded its authority by setting rates and classifying customers under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-314, the trial court properly decided it was unnecessary to address plaintiffs\u2019 Equal Protection claim and made no ruling in that regard. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.\nI. Standing\nThe majority concludes that O\u2019Leary is not a proper party and does not have standing because O\u2019Leary is not a customer or consumer for whom the City provides solid waste services. The majority also concludes that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-314 protects only customers, not service providers, by citing cases involving customers. Although the cases cited by the majority involved customers, the cases did not limit the application of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-314(a) to only customers. In Utilities Com. v. Mead Corp., 238 N.C. 451, 464, 78 S.E.2d 290, 299 (1953), the Court held \u201cwhen the dealings between [a parent company and its subsidiary] affect the rights of others,\u201d the power company could not discriminate among customers. However, the Court said nothing to suggest that discrimination among service providers is permissible. Id. See also Town of Taylorsville v. Modern Cleaners, 34 N.C. App. 146, 149, 237 S.E.2d 484, 486 (1977) (Holding that \u201ca city has \u2018the right to classify consumers\u2019 \u201d but included no language to suggest the statute applies exclusively to consumers) (citation omitted); Wall v. City of Durham, 41 N.C. App. 649, 659, 255 S.E.2d 739, 745 (1979)(Recognizing that the statute does not grant cities \u201ca license to discriminate among customers,\u201d but not establishing that a city could discriminate among service providers). In addition, the language of the subsection of the statute at issue does not address customers at all, but the services provided. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-314(a) (2011) (\u201cSchedules of rents, rates, fees, charges, and penalties may vary according to classes of service[.]\" (emphasis added)). The law does not explicitly limit discrimination solely to customers, but instead provides guidelines that different rates must be justified by a difference in the class of service.\nSince the law is not restricted solely to customers, O\u2019Leary\u2019s standing depends on whether it meets the criteria for standing. The majority cites the federal standard for standing found in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351, 364 (1992), cited by this Court in Estate of Apple v. Commercial Courier Express, Inc., 168 N.C. App. 175, 177, 607 S.E.2d 14, 16 (2005) and Neuse River Found., Inc. v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 155 N.C. App. 110, 114, 574 S.E.2d 48, 52 (2002). However, our Supreme Court in Goldston v. State, 361 N.C. 26, 637 S.E.2d 876 (2006) and Mangum v. Raleigh Bd. of Adjust., 362 N.C. 640, 669 S.E.2d 279 (2008) set a different standard. The Court in Goldston specifically found that while the federal standard\ncan be instructive as to general principles . . . and for comparative analysis, the nuts and bolts of North Carolina standing doctrine are not coincident with federal standing doctrine. Compare Piedmont Canteen Serv., Inc. v. Johnson, 256 N.C. 155, 166, 123 S.E.2d 582, 589 (1962) (\u201cOnly those persons may call into question the validity of a statute who have been injuriously affected thereby in their persons, property or constitutional rights.\u201d (emphasis added)), with Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560, 119 L.Ed.2d at 364 (noting that one of the three elements of federal standing is an \u201c \u2018injury in fact\u2019 \u201d that is \u201cconcrete and particularized\u201d).\n361 N.C. at 35, 637 S.E.2d at 882.\nWhen determining standing, the question for the Court to decide \u201cis whether the party seeking relief has \u2018alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation^] of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.\u2019 \u201d Mangum, 362 N.C. at 642, 669 S.E.2d at 282 (citations omitted). A party is not required to show that an injury has already occurred, but that an injury is threatened or imminent. Id. at 642-43, 669 S.E.2d at 282 (emphasis added).\nIn the instant case, the City of Charlotte refuses to reimburse Disposal Fees incurred by O\u2019Leary for Supplemental Collection. Therefore, if O\u2019Leary provides Supplemental Collection for MultiFamily Complexes, it must either absorb the cost of the Disposal Fees or charge their customers higher rates. Such a development directly interferes with O\u2019Leary\u2019s business. Cedar Greene, as a potential customer, chose to utilize Republic instead of O\u2019Leary due to the disparity in rates directly caused by the City\u2019s policy. This loss of business constituted a threatened or imminent injury to O\u2019Leary\u2019s business, under Goldston and Mangum. Therefore, O\u2019Leary has standing to maintain a claim of discrimination since the City of Charlotte\u2019s policy meets the criteria of a threatened or imminent injury under Goldston and Mangum.\nII. Equal Protection\nFinally, the trial court properly did not address plaintiffs\u2019 Equal Protection claim in its 14 December 2011 order. The order itself discussed the statutory provisions, and the trial court found for the plaintiffs based on N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-314. The trial court found that the City\u2019s policy exceeded its authority by setting rates and classifying customers under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-314. See Cabarrus County v. City of Charlotte, 71 N.C. App. 192, 195, 321 S.E.2d 476, 479 (1984) (\u201cThere must be substantial differences in service or conditions to justify differences in rates. There must be no unreasonable discrimination between those receiving the same kind and degree of service.\u201d); Mead Corp., 238 N.C. at 465, 78 S.E.2d at 300 (\u201cClassification must be based on substantial difference.\u201d).\nThe City, through its representative Carl Terrell, has admitted that the solid waste disposal service provided, whether by Republic, O\u2019Leary, or another disposal service, is effectively the same. The identity of the provider does not indicate a different class of service. However, in refusing to pay any provider other than Republic, the City effectively subjects Multi-Family Complexes to pay elevated rates for their solid waste disposal. If a Multi-Family Complex hires Republic, they are subject to Republic\u2019s higher rates. If a Multi-Family Complex hires a different solid waste disposal service, they are subject to the Disposal Fees. In its order, the trial court found that the City\u2019s policy only reimbursed disposal fees to those Multi-Family Complexes that hired Republic to provide Supplemental Collection. The trial court determined that the City\u2019s policy constituted \u201cunlawful, unreasonable, and arbitrary discrimination in the provision of a public enterprise service and rates charged for such service\u201d violated N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-314.1 agree.\nIn Cabarrus County, a case also based on N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-314, this Court held that if there are \u201csound statutory grounds\u201d to substantiate a holding, the Court need not go further and address an Equal Protection claim. 71 N.C. App. at 195, 321 S.E.2d at 479. In this case, the trial court properly based its order on the sound statutory grounds of the claim. Therefore, it was-unnecessary for the trial court to address the Equal Protection claim. Id. I would affirm the trial court\u2019s decision.\nIII. Conclusion\nThe majority correctly holds that plaintiff Cedar Greene has standing but mistakenly concludes that plaintiff O\u2019Leary does not have standing. Our state Supreme Court has articulated the standard for the state in Goldston and again in Mangum. Therefore, O\u2019Leary does have standing and the trial court also properly granted plaintiffs\u2019 motion for summary judgment because the court found that the city exceeded its authority by setting rates and classifying customers under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-314.\nUnder the precedent of Cabarrus County, I would affirm the trial court\u2019s decision that it was unnecessary to address plaintiffs\u2019 Equal Protection claim and also affirm that he made no ruling in that regard.", "type": "dissent", "author": "CALABRIA, Judge," } ], "attorneys": [ "Robinson, Bradshaw & Hinson, RA., by Richard A. Vinroot, A. Ward McKeithen, and Matthew F. Tilley, for plaintiff appellees.", "Office of the City Attorney, by Senior Assistant City Attorney S. Mujeeb Shah-Khan and Assistant City Attorney Thomas E. Powers, III, for defendant appellant.", "K&L Gates LLP, by Roy H. Michaux, Jr., for Greater Charlotte Apartment Association amicus curiae." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "CEDAR GREENE, LLC, et al and O\u2019LEARY GROUP WASTE SYSTEMS, LLC, Plaintiffs v. CITY OF CHARLOTTE, Defendant\nNo. COA12-212\n(Filed 7 August 2012)\n1. Jurisdiction \u2014 standing\u2014anti-discrimination principle\u2014 public enterprise services \u2014 reimbursement policy\nThe trial court erred by failing to grant defendant City\u2019s motion to dismiss the claim with respect to plaintiff O\u2019Leary for lack of standing. The anti-discrimination principle embodied in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 160A-314 protects only customers of public enterprise services, not service providers. However, the trial court did not err in failing to grant the City\u2019s motion to dismiss the statutory discrimination claim with respect to plaintiff Cedar Greene. Cedar Greene demonstrated the requisite standing based on its showing of a threatened financial injury by the City\u2019s alleged discriminatory reimbursement .policy.\n2. Cities and Towns \u2014 statutory discrimination claim \u2014 solid waste disposal services \u2014 multi-family complexes\nThe trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs on their statutory discrimination claim. The City\u2019s reimbursement policy did not treat Cedar Greene differently from other multi-family complexes in the provision of solid waste disposal services.\nJudge CALABRIA dissenting.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 14 December 2011 by Judge H. William Constangy in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 7 June 2012.\nRobinson, Bradshaw & Hinson, RA., by Richard A. Vinroot, A. Ward McKeithen, and Matthew F. Tilley, for plaintiff appellees.\nOffice of the City Attorney, by Senior Assistant City Attorney S. Mujeeb Shah-Khan and Assistant City Attorney Thomas E. Powers, III, for defendant appellant.\nK&L Gates LLP, by Roy H. Michaux, Jr., for Greater Charlotte Apartment Association amicus curiae." }, "file_name": "0001-01", "first_page_order": 11, "last_page_order": 29 }