{ "id": 4034102, "name": "IN THE MATTER OF HENRY EDWARD MURDOCK", "name_abbreviation": "In re Murdock", "decision_date": "2012-08-07", "docket_number": "No. COA12-79", "first_page": "45", "last_page": "51", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "222 N.C. App. 45" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "638 S.E.2d 579", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637393 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "583" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/638/0579-01" ] }, { "cite": "655 S.E.2d 402", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640208 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/655/0402-01" ] }, { "cite": "647 S.E.2d 679", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12638976 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "686" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/647/0679-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 N.C. App. 302", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8373782 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "307" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/181/0302-01" ] }, { "cite": "155 S.E.2d 303", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "305", "parenthetical": "quotation marks and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "270 N.C. 655", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569982 ], "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "658", "parenthetical": "quotation marks and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/270/0655-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 S.E. 737", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1924, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "737" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "187 N.C. 469", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8654088 ], "year": 1924, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "470" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/187/0469-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-33", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(c)(1)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 N.C. 191", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568922 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "197", "parenthetical": "analyzing N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-223 and stating that \"[violence or direct force is not necessarily an element of the crime of resisting an officer\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/298/0191-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 703", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3735905, 3743043, 3746508, 3743410, 3738611, 3744404, 3735988, 3737112, 3740671 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0703-04", "/nc/361/0703-05", "/nc/361/0703-03", "/nc/361/0703-06", "/nc/361/0703-07", "/nc/361/0703-09", "/nc/361/0703-01", "/nc/361/0703-02", "/nc/361/0703-08" ] }, { "cite": "185 N.C. App. 227", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8209211 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "235" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/185/0227-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-223", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-415.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 L.Ed.2d 173", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 S. Ct. 197", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "464 U.S. 865", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6401817 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/464/0865-01" ] }, { "cite": "301 S.E.2d 308", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "319" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "308 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4710595 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "18" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/308/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "726 S.E.2d 812", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2012, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "715 S.E.2d 586", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "594", "parenthetical": "quotation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "403 S.E.2d 291", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "294", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "294", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 651", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2538925 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "656", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "656" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0651-01" ] }, { "cite": "703 S.E.2d 738", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2010, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "364 N.C. 599", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "weight": 2, "year": 2010, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "689 S.E.2d 510", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "513", "parenthetical": "quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "517" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "201 N.C. App. 354", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4173701 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "357", "parenthetical": "quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "364" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/201/0354-01" ] }, { "cite": "689 S.E.2d 468", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "472", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "472-73", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "201 N.C. App. 212", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4172984 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "217", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/201/0212-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 685, "char_count": 16969, "ocr_confidence": 0.763, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.12664174629486122 }, "sha256": "cf09315d08c829daf8d7734c95e648ae28f095c3defd6f8ea27d36d69d63dd34", "simhash": "1:2f39fbc536ffe674", "word_count": 2755 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:23:21.020165+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges BRYANT and STEPHENS concur." ], "parties": [ "IN THE MATTER OF HENRY EDWARD MURDOCK" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "THIGPEN, Judge.\nHenry Edward Murdock (\u201cDefendant\u201d) appeals from two involuntary commitment orders following the determination that he was incapable of proceeding to trial. We must decide whether the trial court erred by concluding that Defendant was charged with a violent crime pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1003(a) (2011). We hold the trial court did not err by conducting a fact-based analysis in determining whether Defendant was charged with a violent crime under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1003(a). We further hold that based on the underlying factual scenario giving rise to Defendant\u2019s charges, the trial court did not err by concluding that Defendant was charged with a violent crime. Accordingly, we affirm.\nI. Factual and Procedural Background\nOn 5 October 2009, Defendant was indicted for possession of a firearm by a felon, misdemeanor resisting an officer, and habitual felon status. Defendant\u2019s counsel moved to have his client evaluated to determine his capacity to proceed to trial. A capacity hearing was held on 15 September 2010. The State presented evidence, including a report from Dr. David Hattem, a psychologist who had evaluated Defendant. Dr. Hattem\u2019s report concluded that Defendant lacked capacity to proceed, and the trial court found Defendant incapable of proceeding to trial. The trial court then conducted a hearing pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1003 to determine whether Defendant met the criteria for involuntary commitment.\nAt the N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1003 hearing, James Munger, an officer with the Laurinburg Police Department, testified that on 16 July 2009, he and Officer Wilkerson went to Defendant\u2019s residence to serve a trespassing warrant on Defendant. When they arrived, Defendant was sitting on the porch drinking a beer. The officers advised Defendant that they were there to arrest him for trespassing. Defendant became agitated, said he wasn\u2019t going, and ran into the house. The officers followed him into the back bedroom where Officer Wilkerson observed an open lock box on the bed and yelled, \u201cgun.\u201d The lock box contained a loaded revolver that was within \u201chand\u2019s reach\u201d of Defendant. Officer Munger grabbed Defendant and a \u201ctussle\u201d ensued. Defendant was subsequently taken to the ground and handcuffed. Officer Munger testified that Defendant resisted when he removed Defendant from the bedroom, and Defendant also resisted while being handcuffed. As a result of the events on 16 July 2009, Defendant was charged with possession of a firearm by a felon and misdemeanor resisting an officer.\nBased on the evidence presented at the N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1003 hearing, the trial court found that Defendant was incapable of proceeding and had been charged with a violent crime. The trial court also made the following findings in its 16 September 2010 involuntary commitment orders:\n[Defendant] is charged with a violent crime in violation of [N.C. Gen. Stat.] 14-415.1; 14-223, in that the Defendant] upon being informed that he was to be arrested, fled from the officers by moving from his porch to his bedroom, where the officers in immediate pursuit, found the Defendant] within arms reach of a firearm; that the Defendant], again within arms reach of the firearm, fought with the officers as they attempted to arrest him.\nThe trial court ordered Defendant taken into custody and transported to Cherry Hospital, a 24-hour facility, for \u201ctemporary custody, examination and treatment pending a district court hearing.\u201d\nOn 10 October 2011, Defendant filed a petition for writ of certiorari seeking review of the 16 September 2010 involuntary commitment orders. This Court entered an order granting Defendant\u2019s petition on 25 October 2011.\nDefendant\u2019s sole argument on appeal is that the trial court erred by concluding that Defendant was charged with a violent crime pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1003(a). Specifically, Defendant contends the trial court erred by applying a fact-based analysis in determining whether Defendant was charged with a violent crime.\nII. Analysis\nAs a preliminary matter, we note that although Defendant\u2019s term of involuntary commitment has expired, \u201ca prior discharge will not render questions challenging the involuntary commitment proceeding moot.\u201d In re Webber, 201 N.C. App. 212, 217, 689 S.E.2d 468, 472 (2009) (citation and quotation marks omitted). \u201cWhen the challenged order may form the basis for future commitment or may cause other collateral legal consequences for the respondent, an appeal of that order is not moot.\u201d Id. at 217, 689 S.E.2d at 472-73 (citation omitted). We, therefore, address the merits of this appeal.\n\u201cWhere an appeal presents a question of statutory interpretation, full review is appropriate, and we review a trial court\u2019s conclusions of law de novo.\u201d State v. Davison, 201 N.C. App. 354, 357, 689 S.E.2d 510, 513 (2009) (quotation marks omitted), disc. review denied, 364 N.C. 599, 703 S.E.2d 738 (2010). \u201cIn matters of statutory construction, our primary task is to ensure that the purpose of the legislature, the legislative intent, is accomplished. Legislative purpose is first ascertained from the plain words of the statute.\u201d Electric Supply Co. of Durham, Inc. v. Swain Elec. Co., Inc., 328 N.C. 651, 656, 403 S.E.2d 291, 294 (1991) (citations omitted). \u201cDictionaries may be used to determine the plain meaning of words.\u201d Moore v. Proper,_N.C. App._,_, 715 S.E.2d 586, 594 (2011) (quotation omitted), aff\u2019d in part and remanded,_N.C._, 726 S.E.2d 812 (2012). \u201cCourts also ascertain legislative intent from the policy objectives behind a statute\u2019s passage and the consequences which would follow from a construction one way or another.\u201d Electric Supply, 328 N.C. at 656, 403 S.E.2d at 294 (citation and quotation marks omitted).\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1003 governs the referral of an incapable defendant for civil commitment proceedings and provides in relevant part:\nIf the defendant was charged with a violent crime, including a crime involving assault with a deadly weapon, the judge\u2019s custody order shall require a law-enforcement officer to take the defendant directly to a 24-hour facility as described in G.S. 122C-252; and the order must indicate that the defendant was charged with a violent crime and that he was found incapable of proceeding.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1003(a).\nDefendant contends the term \u201cviolent crime\u201d in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1003(a) indicates the legislature\u2019s intent to look at the elements of the offense charged in determining what constitutes a violent crime rather than looking at the underlying facts of the case. Thus, Defendant contends the trial court erred by applying a fact-based analysis instead of an elements-based analysis in determining whether Defendant was charged with a violent crime. The State, however, argues that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1003(a) \u201callows for either a fact based analysis or an element based analysis\u201d; thus, the trial court did not err. We agree with the State.\nThe relevant portion of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1003(a) uses the words \u201cviolent crime\u201d followed by the parenthetical phrase \u201cincluding a crime involving assault with a deadly weapon[.]\u201d First, we must determine whether the legislature intended the words \u201cviolent crime\u201d to mean an element based offense or a factually based offense.\nBlack\u2019s Law Dictionary defines \u201cviolent crime\u201d as \u201c[a] crime that has as an element the use, attempted use, threatened use, or substantial risk of use of physical force against the person or property of another.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 378 (7th ed. 1999) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Thus, the definition of violent crime suggests that the legislature intended for courts to apply an elements-based analysis under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1003(a). See also State v. Davison, 201 N.C. App. 354, 364, 689 S.E.2d 510, 517 (2009) (holding that \u201c[t]he General Assembly\u2019s repeated use of the term \u2018conviction\u2019 compels us to conclude that, when making a determination pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-208.40A [of whether the defendant committed an \u2018aggravated offense\u2019 for purposes of sex offender monitoring], the trial court is only to consider the elements of the offense of which a defendant was convicted and is not to consider the underlying factual scenario giving rise to the conviction\u201d), disc. review denied, 364 N.C. 599, 703 S.E.2d 738 (2010).\nHowever, our analysis does not end here. We must also look to the parenthetical phrase of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1003(a) which states, \u201cincluding a crime involving assault with a deadly weapon[.[\u201d In interpreting the parenthetical phrase, we find a comparison to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(3) instructive. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-2000(e) (2011) lists the aggravating circumstances that may be considered in determining whether a defendant found guilty of a capital felony should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment, including that \u201c[t]he defendant had been previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person[.[\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(3). In interpreting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(3), our Supreme Court has stated:\nThe statute does not state that the jury may only consider as an aggravating circumstance those felonies in which the use or threat of violence to the person is an element of the offense. The statute contains the word \u201cinvolving,\u201d which indicates an interpretation much more expansive than one restricting the jury to consider only felonies having the use or threat of violence to the person as an element. Crimes that do not have violence as an element may be committed by the use or threat of violence. By using \u201cinvolving\u201d instead of language delimiting consideration to the narrow class of felonies in which violence is an element of the offense, we find the legislature intended the prior felony in N.C.G.S. 15A-2000(e)(3) to include any felony whose commission involved the use or threat of violence to the person. Thus we hold that for purposes of N.C.G.S. 15A-2000(e)(3), a prior felony can be either one which has as an element the involvement of the use or threat of violence to the person, such as rape or armed robbery, or a felony which does not have the use or threat of violence to the person as an element, but the use or threat of violence to the person was involved in its commission.\nState v. McDougall, 308 N.C. 1, 18, 301 S.E.2d 308, 319 (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865, 104 S. Ct. 197, 78 L.Ed.2d 173 (1983).\nFollowing McDougall, we conclude that the legislature\u2019s inclusion of the parenthetical phrase in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1003(a) and its use of the word \u201cinvolving\u201d indicate an intent for courts to apply a fact-based analysis. We note, however, that the term \u201cinvolving\u201d is used only in the parenthetical phrase. We believe the legislature\u2019s choice to use the term \u201cinvolving\u201d only in the parenthetical phrase indicates its intent for a fact-based analysis to apply only to the determination of whether assault with a deadly weapon was involved in the commission of the crime charged.\nAccordingly, considering the entirety of the relevant statutory language, we hold that in determining whether a defendant is charged with a violent crime pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1003(a), courts may consider the elements of the offense a defendant is charged with and the underlying factual scenario giving rise to the charge. However, pursuant to the plain language of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1003(a), in conducting the fact-based analysis, courts are to determine only whether the crime charged involved assault with a deadly weapon. Thus, we hold that for purposes of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1003(a), a \u201cviolent crime\u201d can be either one which has as an element \u201cthe use, attempted use, threatened use, or substantial risk of use of physical force against the person or property of another[,]\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 378, or a crime which does not have violence as an element, but assault with a deadly weapon was involved in its commission.\nIn this case, Defendant was charged with possession of a firearm by a felon pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-415.1 and resisting an officer pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-223. Violence is not an element of either of these offenses. See State v. Wood, 185 N.C. App. 227, 235, 647 S.E.2d 679, 686 (stating that the elements of possession of a firearm by a felon are that \u201c(1) defendant was previously convicted of a felony; and (2) thereafter possessed a firearm\u201d), disc. review denied, 361 N.C. 703, 655 S.E.2d 402 (2007); see also State v. Hardy, 298 N.C. 191, 197, 257 S.E.2d426, 430 (1979) (analyzing N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-223 and stating that \u201c[violence or direct force is not necessarily an element of the crime of resisting an officer\u201d). Thus, in applying an elements-based analysis, neither of the crimes Defendant was charged with is a violent crime.\nHowever, in applying a fact-based analysis, we examine the underlying facts giving rise to Defendant\u2019s charges to determine whether assault with a deadly weapon was involved in the commission of the crimes. The elements of assault with a deadly weapon are: (1) an assault of a person; (2) with a deadly weapon. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-33(c)(1) (2011). A gun is a deadly weapon. State v. Smith, 187 N.C. 469, 470, 121 S.E. 737, 737 (1924). Our Supreme Court defines the common law offense of assault as follows:\nan overt act or an attempt, or the unequivocal appearance of an attempt, with force and violence, to do some immediate physical injury to the person of another, which show of force or menace of violence must be sufficient to put a person of reasonable firmness in fear of immediate bodily harm.\nState v. Roberts, 270 N.C. 655, 658, 155 S.E.2d 303, 305 (1967) (quotation marks and citations omitted).\nIn this case, based on the underlying factual scenario giving rise to Defendant\u2019s charges, we believe an assault with a deadly weapon was involved in the commission of the crime of resisting an officer. Specifically, Defendant\u2019s actions of stating that he wasn\u2019t going with the officers, running into the bedroom where he stood within arm\u2019s reach of a loaded revolver, and resisting while being handcuffed and removed from the bedroom were an \u201cunequivocal appearance of an attempt, with force and violence, to do some immediate physical injury to\u201d the officers. Id.; see also State v. Barksdale, 181 N.C. App. 302, 307, 638 S.E.2d 579, 583 (2007) (holding that \u201cwe are not persuaded by defendant\u2019s contention that an assault did not take place because he never \u2018made physical contact with the weapon.\u2019 In light of the evidence showing that the gun was only inches from defendant\u2019s outstretched hand and that defendant was actively, forcefully, and to some degree successfully resisting the officers\u2019 attempt to arrest him, we do not believe, in light of our State\u2019s definition of assault, that defendant\u2019s failure to physically touch the weapon precludes the commission of an assault with the firearm.\u201d) (citation omitted).\nIn sum, the trial court did not err by conducting a fact-based analysis in determining whether Defendant was charged with a \u201cviolent crime\u201d pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1003(a). Furthermore, based on the underlying factual scenario giving rise to Defendant\u2019s charges, the trial court did not err by concluding that Defendant was charged with a violent crime because the crime of resisting an officer involved an assault with a deadly weapon.\nAFFIRMED.\nJudges BRYANT and STEPHENS concur.\n. At the district court commitment hearing on 23 September 2010, Defendant was committed for a period not to exceed 90 days. On 16 December 2010, Defendant was discharged into the custody of the sheriff.", "type": "majority", "author": "THIGPEN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Richard Slipsky, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.", "Staples Hughes, Appellate Defender, by Emily H. Davis, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE MATTER OF HENRY EDWARD MURDOCK\nNo. COA12-79\n(Filed 7 August 2012)\n1. Appeal and Error \u2014 appealability\u2014mootness\u2014prior discharge \u2014 involuntary commitment\nAlthough defendant\u2019s term of involuntary commitment was expired, a prior discharge would not render questions challenging the involuntary commitment proceeding moot.\n2. Mental Illness \u2014 involuntary commitment \u2014 violent crime\u2014 fact-based analysis \u2014 resisting an officer \u2014 assault with deadly weapon\nThe trial court did not err in an involuntary commitment case by conducting a fact-based analysis in determining whether defendant was charged with a violent crime under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1003(a). Based on the underlying factual scenario giving rise to defendant\u2019s charges, the trial court did not err by concluding that defendant was charged with a violent crime because the crime of resisting an officer involved an assault with a deadly weapon.\nAppeal by defendant from orders entered 16 September 2010 by Judge Richard T. Brown in Scotland County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 6 June 2012.\nRoy Cooper, Attorney General, by Richard Slipsky, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.\nStaples Hughes, Appellate Defender, by Emily H. Davis, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0045-01", "first_page_order": 55, "last_page_order": 61 }