{ "id": 4032951, "name": "ANTHONY E. SCOTT, Plaintiff v. NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CRIME CONTROL AND PUBLIC SAFETY, NORTH CAROLINA HIGHWAY PATROL, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Scott v. North Carolina Department of Crime Control & Public Safety", "decision_date": "2012-08-07", "docket_number": "No. COA12-67", "first_page": "125", "last_page": "132", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "222 N.C. App. 125" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "388 S.E.2d 463", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 710", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2490312, 2491791, 2489047, 2488601, 2490847 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0710-04", "/nc/325/0710-05", "/nc/325/0710-02", "/nc/325/0710-01", "/nc/325/0710-03" ] }, { "cite": "382 S.E.2d 226", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "230" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "95 N.C. App. 103", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8519611 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "109-10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/95/0103-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-38", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 4, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "276 S.E.2d 472", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "475" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "51 N.C. App. 275", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 2644506 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "279" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/51/0275-01" ] }, { "cite": "510 S.E.2d 159", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "163", "parenthetical": "citing High Rock Lake Assoc. v. Environmental Management Comm., 51 N.C. App. 275, 279, 276 S.E.2d 472, 475 (1981)" }, { "page": "163" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "350 N.C. 39", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 132016 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "45", "parenthetical": "citing High Rock Lake Assoc. v. Environmental Management Comm., 51 N.C. App. 275, 279, 276 S.E.2d 472, 475 (1981)" }, { "page": "45" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/350/0039-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 S.E.2d 379", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "385", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 620", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575681 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "629", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0620-01" ] }, { "cite": "507 S.E.2d 284", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "290" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 290", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571505 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "297" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0290-01" ] }, { "cite": "548 S.E.2d 513", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "517", "parenthetical": "citing Polaroid Corp. v. Offerman, 349 N.C. 290, 297, 507 S.E.2d 284, 290 (1998)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 659", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135857 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "664", "parenthetical": "citing Polaroid Corp. v. Offerman, 349 N.C. 290, 297, 507 S.E.2d 284, 290 (1998)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0659-01" ] }, { "cite": "689 S.E.2d 590", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "592", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "202 N.C. App. 509", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4175288 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "511", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/202/0509-01" ] }, { "cite": "454 S.E.2d 255", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "339 N.C. 614", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2556193, 2559269, 2556240, 2556593, 2558195 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/339/0614-05", "/nc/339/0614-02", "/nc/339/0614-01", "/nc/339/0614-03", "/nc/339/0614-04" ] }, { "cite": "451 S.E.2d 351", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "355" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "117 N.C. App. 318", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525281 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "324" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/117/0318-01" ] }, { "cite": "353 S.E.2d 673", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "675", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 N.C. App. 666", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12169132 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "667", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/84/0666-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 782, "char_count": 18370, "ocr_confidence": 0.738, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.12982294956584e-08, "percentile": 0.322875773838552 }, "sha256": "28ec9e3b4473e08c7a47527deecd74a50dba01b3f8f0429ff1c195fe37892b10", "simhash": "1:8aab59b2f40f39f7", "word_count": 2962 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:23:21.020165+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges MCGEE and STEELMAN concur." ], "parties": [ "ANTHONY E. SCOTT, Plaintiff v. NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CRIME CONTROL AND PUBLIC SAFETY, NORTH CAROLINA HIGHWAY PATROL, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ERVIN, Judge.\nPlaintiff Anthony E. Scott appeals from an order granting a dismissal motion filed by Defendant North Carolina Department of Crime Control and Public Safety predicated on the fact that Plaintiff failed to satisfy a jurisdictional prerequisite for the consideration of his petition for a contested case hearing by the Office of Administrative Hearings given that he did not pay the required filing fee simultaneously with the submission of his petition. On appeal, Plaintiff contends that the trial court erroneously granted Defendant\u2019s motion given that payment of the requisite filing fee at the time that a petition is filed with the OAH is not a prerequisite to the invocation of OAH\u2019s jurisdiction. After careful consideration of Plaintiff\u2019s challenges to the trial court\u2019s order in light of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that the trial court\u2019s order should be reversed and that this case should be remanded to the Wake County Superior Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.\nI. Factual Background\nA. Substantive Facts\nOn 19 August 2009, North Carolina Highway Patrol Internal Affairs Captain P.A. Poole initiated an investigation concerning Plaintiff, who was, at that time, a Master Trooper with the North Carolina State Highway Patrol. At the conclusion of Captain Poole\u2019s investigation, Plaintiff was charged with several violations of Highway Patrol policy, including engaging in conduct unbecoming a trooper, failing to activate his in-car video camera during traffic stops, abusing his official position, willfully violating a direct order, and neglecting his duties. In light of the institution of these charges, Colonel W.R. Glover, the commander of the State Highway Patrol, demoted Plaintiff from Master Trooper to Trooper and reduced his salary by 15%. Although Plaintiff initially agreed to accept Colonel Glover\u2019s disciplinary decision, he submitted a challenge to that decision for consideration by Secretary Reuben F. Young of the Department of Crime Control and Public Safety on 22 December 2009 following his reassignment to a different location.\nUpon receipt of Plaintiff\u2019s submission, Secretary Young requested that an Employee Advisory Committee be convened to hear Plaintiff\u2019s appeal. Although the Employee Advisory Committee recommended upholding the discipline that had been imposed upon Plaintiff, Secretary Young directed Plaintiff to attend a Pre-Dismissal Conerence after concluding that the initial allegations that had been made against Plaintiff were valid and that Plaintiff had made false statements both at the time of the initial investigation and on appeal. Although Plaintiff attempted to \u201cinvoluntarily\u201d resign from his employment with the Highway Patrol based upon alleged \u201c[d]uress, [c]oercion, and [intolerable [c]onditions,\u201d Secretary Young declined to accept Plaintiffs resignation and rescheduled the Pre-Dismissal Conference. On 9 February 2010, Secretary Young terminated Plaintiffs employment for the reasons set forth in the notice convening the Pre-Dismissal Conference.\nB. Procedural History\nOn 11 March 2010, Plaintiff electronically filed a Petition for a Contested Case Hearing with the OAH for the purpose of challenging Secretary Young\u2019s decision to terminate his employment. On the same date, Plaintiff mailed two signed copies of the petition to the Clerk of the OAH. Plaintiff did not pay the required filing fee at the time that he filed and mailed the petition. On 17 March 2010, the OAH notified Plaintiff by means of a letter dated 16 March 2010 that \u201c[y]ou must include a filing fee of $20.00 in order for your petition to be processed.\u201d On the same date, Plaintiff\u2019s counsel mailed an official check to the Clerk of the OAH; however, the check in question was neither returned nor cashed. As a result, Plaintiff\u2019s counsel mailed another official check to the Clerk of the OAH on 22 March 2010. On 23 March 2010, the OAH received Plaintiff\u2019s check and began processing his petition.\nOn 10 September 2010, Defendant filed a motion seeking the dismissal of Plaintiff\u2019s petition based upon his alleged failure to pay the required filing fee in a timely manner. On 26 October 2010, Senior Administrative Law Judge Fred G. Morrison Jr., denied Defendant\u2019s dismissal motion, granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff, and ordered that Plaintiff be reinstated at the rank and salary that he held in the immediate aftermath of his demotion. Although Defendant challenged Judge Morrison\u2019s decision before the State Personnel Commission, the Commission upheld Judge Morrison\u2019s order.\nOn 3 February 2011, Defendant filed a Petition for Judicial Review in the Wake County Superior Court for the purpose of obtaining review of the State Personnel Commission\u2019s final decision. On 30 June 2011, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the petition that Plaintiff had filed with the OAH on the grounds that Plaintiff\u2019s failure to pay the required filing fee at the time that he filed the petition deprived the OAH of jurisdiction over Plaintiff\u2019s challenge to Secretary Young\u2019s dismissal decision. Defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss came on for hearing before the trial court at the 19 July 2011 civil session of Wake County Superior Court. On 22 July 2011, the trial court entered an order concluding that Plaintiff\u2019s failure to pay the required filing fee on or before 11 March 2010 deprived both the OAH and the State Personnel Commission of jurisdiction over Plaintiff\u2019s challenge to Secretary Young\u2019s dismissal decision, necessitating the entry of an order dismissing Plaintiff\u2019s petition. On 8 August 2010, Plaintiff filed a motion seeking relief from the trial court\u2019s order pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat \u00a7 1A-1, Rules 59 and 60. After further filings by both parties, the trial court entered an order denying Plaintiff\u2019s motion on 6 September 2011. Plaintiff noted an appeal to this Court from the 22 July 2011 and 6 September 2011 orders.\nII. Legal Analysis\nA. Standard of Review\n\u201cSubject matter jurisdiction refers to the power of the court to deal with the kind of action in question.\u201d Harris v. Pembaur, 84 N.C. App. 666, 667, 353 S.E.2d 673, 675 (1987) (citation omitted). Without jurisdiction over the subject matter of a particular proceeding, a tribunal lacks the authority to address the merits of the matter which has come before it for decision. Id. \u201cIn order for the OAH to have jurisdiction over [a] petitioner\u2019s appeal . . . petitioner is required to follow the statutory requirements outlined in Chapter 126 [of the General Statutes] for commencing a contested case.\u201d Nailing v. UNC-CH, 117 N.C. App. 318, 324, 451 S.E.2d 351, 355 (1994), disc. review denied, 339 N.C. 614, 454 S.E.2d 255 (1995). \u201cWhether a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, reviewed de novo on appeal.\u201d McKoy v. McKoy, 202 N.C. App. 509, 511, 689 S.E.2d 590, 592 (2010) (citation omitted).\nB. Timing of Filing Fee\nAs we have already noted, the trial court dismissed Plaintiff\u2019s OAH petition because he failed to pay the required filing fee at the time that he filed his petition for a contested case hearing. In essence, the trial court concluded that Plaintiff\u2019s failure to pay the filing fee on or before the date upon which his petition was due raised \u201can issue of jurisdiction, which is dispositive.\u201d Plaintiff, on the other hand, contends that the extent to which he paid the required filing fee simultaneously with the filing of his petition for a contested case does not have jurisdictional implications, so that any failure on his part to make the required payment on 11 March 2010 does not necessitate the dismissal of Plaintiff\u2019s OAH petition. Plaintiff\u2019s argument has merit.\nA proper resolution, of the issue before the Court in this case hinges upon an interpretation of the Administrative Procedure Act\u2019s provisions governing the time within which a contested case must be commenced. \u201cThe principal goal of statutory construction is to accomplish the legislative intent.\u201d Lenox, Inc. v. Tolson, 353 N.C. 659, 664, 548 S.E.2d 513, 517 (2001) (citing Polaroid Corp. v. Offerman, 349 N.C. 290, 297, 507 S.E.2d 284, 290 (1998)). \u201cThe best indicia of that intent are the language of the statute . . . , the spirit of the act and what the act seeks to accomplish.\u201d Concrete Co. v. Board of Commissioners, 299 N.C. 620, 629, 265 S.E.2d 379, 385 (1980) (citation omitted). \u201cThe interpretation of a statute given by the agency charged with carrying it out is entitled to great weight.\u201d Frye Reg\u2019l Med. Ctr. v. Hunt, 350 N.C. 39, 45, 510 S.E.2d 159, 163 (1999) (citing High Rock Lake Assoc. v. Environmental Management Comm., 51 N.C. App. 275, 279, 276 S.E.2d 472, 475 (1981)).\nAccording to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 150B-23(a), \u201c[a] contested case shall be commenced by paying a fee in an amount established in [N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7] 150B-23.2 and by filing a petition with the Office of Administrative Hearings ....\u201d Although \u201cthe general limitation for the filing of a petition in a contested case is 60 days\u201d from the date \u201cwhen notice is given of the agency decision to all persons aggrieved,\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 150B-23(f), \u201c[a]n employee appealing any decision or action [involving issues arising under the State Personnel Act] shall file a petition for a contested case with the [OAH] ... no later than 30 days after receipt of the notice of the decision or action which triggers the right of appeal.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-38. \u201cAll fees that are required to be assessed, collected, and remitted under [N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 150B-23(a)] shall be collected by the [OAH] at the time of commencement of the contested case (except in suits in forma pauperis).\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 150B-23.2(b).\nAn analysis of the plain language in which the relevant statutory provisions are couched indicates that the 30 day time limit specified in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-38 only applies to the filing of the petition and not to the payment of the required fee. On the contrary, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-38 indicates that the applicable temporal requirement is satisfied if the petition for a contested case hearing is filed within 30 days of the date upon which the employee receives \u201cnotice of the decision or action which triggers the right of appeal.\u201d Although N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 150B-23(a) treats both the filing of the petition and the payment of the required fee as necessary to permit the commencement of a contested case and although N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 150B-23.2(b) requires the OAH to collect any required fees \u201cat the time of the commencement of the contested case,\u201d nothing in the relevant statutory language requires the payment of the required fee simultaneously with the filing of the petition as a precondition for the invocation of the OAH\u2019s jurisdiction. Simply put, the relevant statutory provisions treat the filing of a petition and the payment of the required fee as two distinct acts, the first of which must occur as of the date specified in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 150B-23(f), or some other applicable statutory provision, such as N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 126-38, and the second of which involves efforts by the OAH to collect any required fee \u201cat the time of the commencement of the contested case.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 150B-23.2(b). According to the procedures set out in 26 N.C.A.C. 03.0103, to which we are required to give deference, Frye Reg\u2019l, 350 N.C. at 45, 510 S.E.2d at 163, given their consistency with our understanding of the applicable statutory provisions, the OAH commences its efforts to collect the required fee simultaneously with the filing of a petition seeking to initiate a contested case and affords the litigant a reasonable time within which to make the required payment. The relevant statutory provisions do not, as we understand them, require more. As a result, the trial court erred by concluding that Plaintiff\u2019s failure to pay the required filing fee on or before 11 March 2010 deprived the OAH of jurisdiction to consider Plaintiff\u2019s challenge to Defendant\u2019s dismissal decision.\nIII. Conclusion\nThus, for the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the trial court erred by granting Defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss Plaintiff\u2019s petition for a contested case on jurisdictional grounds. In light of its decision to dismiss Plaintiff\u2019s OAH petition on jurisdictional grounds, the trial court refrained from addressing Defendant\u2019s remaining challenge to the State Personnel Commission\u2019s decision to uphold Judge Morrison\u2019s order granting summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff. For that reason, additional proceedings must be conducted in the trial court in order to fully resolve the issues raised by Defendant\u2019s petition for judicial review. Star Auto. Co. v. Jaguar Cars, Inc., 95 N.C. App. 103, 109-10, 382 S.E.2d 226, 230 (holding that, since the trial court erred by concluding that the plaintiff failed to comply with the applicable statutory notice requirement, \u201cwe remand the cause to the superior court for consideration on the merits the issues of the adequacy of the good cause alleged for nonrenewal and Jaguar\u2019s good faith\u201d), disc. review denied, 325 N.C. 710, 388 S.E.2d 463 (1989). As a result, the trial court\u2019s order should be, and hereby is, reversed and this case should be, and hereby is, remanded to the Wake County Superior Court for consideration of the remaining issues raised in Plaintiff\u2019s petition for judicial review.\nREVERSED AND REMANDED.\nJudges MCGEE and STEELMAN concur.\n. According to 26 N.C.A.C. 03.0101(d), OAH \u201cpermit[s] the filing of contested case documents and other pleadings by facsimile (fax) or electronic mail,\u201d with \u201c[t]he faxed or electronic documents [to] be deemed a filing\u201d as long as \u201cthe original signed document, one copy and the appropriate filing fee (if a fee is required by [N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7] 150B-23.2) is received by the OAH within seven business days following the faxed or electronic transmission.\u201d\n. The amount of the required filing fee is specified in 26 N.C.A.C. 03.0103 and in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 150B-23.2(a).\n. The permissible methods for paying the required filing fee are cash, money order, certified check, or a \u201ccheck drawn on an attorney\u2019s trust account or operating account.\u201d 26 N.C.A.C. 03.0103(g).\n. Judge Morrison reached this conclusion because Defendant \u201cdid not give [Plaintiff] notice of the filing fee requirement!;]\u201d because Plaintiff \u201ctimely mailed the filing fee to the [OAH], though it was not received!;]\u201d because Plaintiff subsequently \u201cmailed the filing fee to the [OAH] and it was received!;]\u201d and because \u201cthe filing fee requirement, being waivable, is not jurisdictional[.]\u201d\n. Although Defendant notes that the trial court also referenced the doctrine of sovereign immunity in dismissing Plaintiffs OAH petition and argues that Plaintiff\u2019s failure to challenge this determination on appeal requires us to uphold the trial court\u2019s order regardless of our decision with respect to the impact of Plaintiff\u2019s failure to pay the required filing fee on or before 11 March 2011, it is clear from a careful reading of the trial court\u2019s order that the existence of a sovereign immunity bar stemmed solely from \u201c[Plaintiffs] fail[ure] to comply with the statutorily prescribed requirements for timely commencing his contested case.\u201d As a result, by challenging the trial court\u2019s decision that Plaintiff\u2019s failure to pay the required filing fee on or before 11 March 2010 necessitated the dismissal of his OAH petition, Plaintiff clearly attacked the trial court\u2019s resolution of the sovereign immunity issue as well.\n. The same is true of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 150B-23(f), which indicates that the temporal requirement set out in that statutory subsection is satisfied in the event that the petition is filed within 60 days of the date upon which the aggrieved party receives notice of the challenged agency action.\n. The OAH does not, of course, lack authority to dismiss a petition based upon a litigant\u2019s failure to pay the required filing fee in a timely manner in appropriate circumstances. According to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 41(b), which applies in contested case proceedings pursuant to 26 N.C.A.C. 03.0101(b), the OAH retains the authority to involuntarily dismiss a contested case in the event that the litigant fails \u201cto comply with these rules or any order of court.\u201d However, given that Defendant has not challenged the validity of Judge Morrison\u2019s discretionary decision to refrain from dismissing Plaintiff\u2019s petition for a contested case hearing based upon Plaintiff\u2019s failure to pay the required filing fee within the time specified in 26 N.C.A.C. 03.0101(d), we need not address this issue in order to decide the present case.\n. The parties engaged in an extensive discussion of decisions from other jurisdictions concerning the extent, if any, to which a litigant\u2019s failure to pay a required filing fee at the time that that litigant filed a complaint or a petition constituted a jurisdictional defect. However, given our conclusion that the relevant statutory provisions applicable to this case clearly establish that a litigant\u2019s failure to pay the required filing fee on or before the date specified for the filing of the petition seeking to initiate a contested case proceeding does not deprive the OAH of jurisdiction, we need not analyze those decisions in any detail for purposes of deciding this case.", "type": "majority", "author": "ERVIN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Barry Nakell for Plaintiff-Appellee.", "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Tamara Zmudafor Defendant-Appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "No. COA12-67\n(Filed: 7 August 2012)\nANTHONY E. SCOTT, Plaintiff v. NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CRIME CONTROL AND PUBLIC SAFETY, NORTH CAROLINA HIGHWAY PATROL, Defendant\nNo. COA12-67\n(Filed 7 August 2012)\nAdministrative Law \u2014 contested case \u2014 petition for judicial review \u2014 jurisdiction\u2014payment of filing fee\nThe trial court erred by concluding that plaintiff state trooper\u2019s failure to pay the required filing fee on or before 11 March 2010 deprived the Office of Administrative Hearings of jurisdiction to consider plaintiff\u2019s challenge to defendant\u2019s dismissal decision. Additional proceedings were required to be conducted in the trial court in order to fully resolve the issues raised by defendant\u2019s petition for judicial review.\nAppeal by plaintiff from judgment entered 22 July 2011 by Judge Marvin K. Blount, III, in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 22 May 2012.\nBarry Nakell for Plaintiff-Appellee.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Tamara Zmudafor Defendant-Appellant." }, "file_name": "0125-01", "first_page_order": 135, "last_page_order": 142 }