{ "id": 4033509, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ROBERT LEE EARL JOE", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Joe", "decision_date": "2012-08-07", "docket_number": "No. COA10-1037-2", "first_page": "206", "last_page": "213", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "222 N.C. App. 206" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "711 S.E.2d 842", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2011, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "637 S.E.2d 868", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637331 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "872" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/637/0868-01" ] }, { "cite": "656 S.E.2d 281", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640334, 12640335 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/656/0281-01", "/se2d/656/0281-02" ] }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 89", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12640330, 12640331, 12640332, 12640333, 12640334, 12640211, 12640351 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/656/0279-02", "/se2d/656/0280-01", "/se2d/656/0280-02", "/se2d/656/0280-03", "/se2d/656/0281-01", "/se2d/655/0406-01", "/se2d/656/0592-02" ] }, { "cite": "649 S.E.2d 646", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639267 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "648" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/649/0646-01" ] }, { "cite": "602 F.2d 726", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1448601 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "730", "parenthetical": "holding that when the defendant threw contraband from his car after being illegally stopped, the relinquishment was not voluntary, and it would be \"sheer fiction to presume [it was] caused by anything other than the illegal stop.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/602/0726-01" ] }, { "cite": "953 F.2d 116", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10516801 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "127", "parenthetical": "holding that the officers' discovery of contraband was \"clearly the direct result of the illegal seizure\" of the defendant and reversing an order denying the defendant's motion to suppress" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/953/0116-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 S.E.2d 728", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "731", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "55 N.C. App. 221", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527000 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "225", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/55/0221-01" ] }, { "cite": "390 S.E.2d 707", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "711", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "98 N.C. App. 290", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524114 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "297", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/98/0290-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 S.E.2d 618", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567694 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "282 S.E.2d 800", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "806" }, { "page": "807", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "54 N.C. App. 33", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520134 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "41" }, { "page": "42" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/54/0033-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 53", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3743190 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "58" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0053-01" ] }, { "cite": "333 S.E.2d 708", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "713", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 N.C. 337", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4695126 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "343", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0337-01" ] }, { "cite": "226 S.E.2d 852", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "854" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "30 N.C. App. 311", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8553826 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "314" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/30/0311-01" ] }, { "cite": "379 U.S. 89", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11728831 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "91" }, { "page": "145" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/379/0089-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167798 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "16" }, { "page": "903" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/392/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "320 S.E.2d 670", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "673", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 34", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4753586 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "37", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0034-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 N.C. App. 701", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8212517 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "702" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/185/0701-01" ] }, { "cite": "711 S.E.2d 842", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 13, "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "843-44" }, { "page": "847-48" }, { "page": "848" }, { "page": "849" }, { "page": "847", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "846", "parenthetical": "citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 824, "char_count": 16853, "ocr_confidence": 0.75, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.7817273071113374e-08, "percentile": 0.30040013915869224 }, "sha256": "9a6869435c8df41343e74c74bbaf27814d3994356d6e231267bd92c2d68ff7c2", "simhash": "1:832b7cea53379cc1", "word_count": 2719 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:23:21.020165+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges HUNTER, ROBERT C., and ERVIN concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ROBERT LEE EARL JOE" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "STEPHENS, Judge.\nProcedural Background and Evidence\nThe essential procedural and factual background was recapped in this Court\u2019s prior opinion:\nOn 24 October 2008, the State charged Defendant Robert Lee Earl Joe with resisting, delaying, and obstructing Winston-Salem Police Officer J.E. Swaim and possession with the intent to sell and deliver cocaine. Defendant was subsequently indicted by a grand jury on these charges, as well as having attained habitual felon status.\nOn 31 March 2009, Defendant filed a motion to suppress all evidence seized in a search of Defendant after his arrest on 24 October 2008. Defendant alleged that Swaim was \u201cwithout probable cause and/or lacked reasonable suspicion to order [] Defendant to stop/detain him.\u201d Defendant also filed a motion to dismiss the charge of resist, delay, or obstruct (\u201cRDO\u201d).\nThe State called the matter for trial on 18 May 2010 before the Honorable Patrice A. Hinnant. Before the jury was impaneled, an evidentiary hearing was held on Defendant\u2019s motions. The trial court orally granted Defendant\u2019s motions on that date, whereupon the State dismissed the possession of cocaine charge and the habitual felon indictment. By written order entered 19 May 2010, the trial court dismissed the RDO charge, suppressed all evidence obtained as a result of Swaim\u2019s stop or arrest of Defendant, and ordered that \u201call charges, inclusive of the habitual felon indictmenty are hereby dismissed.\u201d\nAt the hearing on the motions to suppress and dismiss, the State offered the- following evidence: Swaim testified that on the date of the incident at issue, he was a police officer on the street crimes unit of the Winston-Salem Police Department. That unit patrolled high crime areas and attempted to address prostitution, alcohol, and drug violations. Swaim had personally investigated more than 200 drug-related crimes and made over 100 drug-related arrests in the previous year. Swaim had also assisted other officers with narcotics investigations and been involved in surveillance operations for narcotics investigations.\nOn the afternoon of 24 October 2008, Swaim was patrolling the Greenway Avenue Homes apartment complex, located at the intersection of Gilmer Avenue and Inverness Street. He had personally made \u201cno less than 10 drug arrests\u201d in that area, including one that month, and had assisted with \u201cno less than 50 of those same type[s] of investigations in that area.\u201d Swaim was aware of citizen complaints \u201cmainly [for] illegal drugs\u201d in the apartment complex.\nSwaim and other officers were riding in an unmarked Ford van, commonly known as \u201cthe jump-out van.\u201d Swaim was dressed in a black t-shirt with the word \u201cPolice\u201d written in yellow, bold letters on the front and back, and was wearing his duty belt, pistol, radio, handcuffs, and badge.\nAt approximately 2:00 p.m., as the van drove down Inverness Street, Swaim saw a black male, later identified as Defendant, wearing a red shirt and a navy blue jacket with the hood over his head, standing alone at the comer of the apartment building on Inverness Street. The weather was cloudy, \u201cchilly, and it was raining.\u201d\nWhen the van was approximately 50 feet from Defendant, Defendant \u201clooked up.\u201d His eyes \u201cgot big when he seen [sic] the van, and he immediately turned and walked behind the apartment building[.]\u201d Swaim got out of the van and \u201cwalked behind the apartment building to, you know, engage in a consensual conversation\u201d with Defendant. When Swaim got behind the building, he saw Defendant running away. Swaim yelled \u201cpolice\u201d several times in a loud voice to get Defendant to stop. However, Defendant kept running so Swaim began to chase him.\nSwaim chased Defendant for about two or three city blocks and continued to yell \u201c[pjolice, stop[.]\u201d Swaim lost sight of Defendant for a short while, but when Swaim reached 30th Street, he saw Defendant sitting \u201cwith his back against a house beside the air conditioning unit, like he was trying to hide.\u201d Defendant appeared to be \u201cmanipulating something to the left with his hand[.]\u201d Swaim walked toward Defendant and ordered him to put his hands up, but Defendant did not comply. Swaim grabbed Defendant\u2019s arm, put him \u201con his chest on the ground and handcuffed him[,]\u201d and placed him under arrest for resisting a public officer. Swaim then checked the area around where Defendant had been seated and found a clear, plastic bag containing an off-white, rock-like substance that was consistent with crack cocaine.\nState v. Joe, _ N.C. App. _, _, 711 S.E.2d 842, 843-44 (2011).\nBy order dated 19 May 2010, the trial court decreed Defendant\u2019s arrest for RDO illegal and dismissed that charge, suppressed the evidence obtained as a result of the illegal arrest, and as a result, dismissed the remaining charges against Defendant.\nIn our original opinion, we held that \u201cthe trial court did not err in granting Defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the charge of resisting a pub-lie officer.\u201d Id. at_, 711 S.E.2d at 847-48. In addition, we affirmed the trial court\u2019s dismissal of the felony possession of cocaine charge and habitual felon indictment on the basis that the prosecutor\u2019s remarks to the trial court had amounted to a voluntary dismissal in open court. Id. at_, 711 S.E.2d at 848. Having upheld the State\u2019s dismissal of the possession charge and habitual felon indictment, there no longer existed any case to which the evidence suppressed by the trial court\u2019s 19 May 2010 order was relevant, and accordingly, we concluded that we lacked jurisdiction to address the State\u2019s contentions of error in that suppression order. See id. at_, 711 S.E.2d at 849.\nEffect of the Supreme Court\u2019s Per Curiam Opinion\nIn a per curiam opinion filed 13 April 2012, the North Carolina Supreme Court vacated and remanded in part this Court\u2019s opinion in State v. Joe,_N.C. App._, 711 S.E.2d 842 (2011), vacated and remanded in part, disc. review improvidently allowed in part,_ N.C._,_S.E.2d_(2012).\nIn vacating our decision \u201cto the extent it may be read as affirming the trial court\u2019s dismissal of charges on its own motion[,]\u201d the Supreme Court also held that discretionary review had been improvidently allowed as to \u201call other issues\u201d and remanded for consideration of the State\u2019s argument regarding Defendant\u2019s motion to suppress. Id.\nWe note that the Supreme Court\u2019s per curiam opinion leaves unchanged our resolution of the State\u2019s argument that the trial court erred in granting Defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the charge of resisting a public officer because \u201cthere was probable cause to support that [Defendant ignored [Swaim\u2019s] lawful command to stop.\u201d In rejecting the State\u2019s argument, we concluded that,\n[c]onsidering all the circumstances surrounding the encounter prior to Defendant\u2019s flight, we conclude that a reasonable person would have felt at liberty to ignore Swaim\u2019s presence and go about his business. At the time Defendant turned and walked behind the apartment building, Swaim was still inside the van, and a reasonable person would not have felt compelled to wait on the street corner in the rain to determine if an officer inside the van desired to talk with him. Furthermore, the State acknowledged that Swaim exited the van and rounded the corner of the apartment building not with the intent to effectuate an investigatory stop but, rather, to \u201cengage in a consensual conversation\u201d with Defendant.\nId. at_, 711 S.E.2d at 847 (citation omitted). Thus, it is the law of this case that Swaim lacked probable cause to arrest Defendant. Id.\nMotion to Suppress\nThe State argues that the trial court erred in granting Defendant\u2019s motion to suppress the cocaine found following Defendant\u2019s arrest. We disagree.\nThe trial court\u2019s findings of fact regarding a motion to suppress are conclusive and binding on appeal if supported by competent evidence. This Court determines if the trial court\u2019s findings of fact support its conclusions of law. Our review of a trial court\u2019s conclusions of law on a motion to suppress is de novo.\nState v. Edwards, 185 N.C. App. 701, 702, 649 S.E.2d 646, 648 (citations and quotation marks omitted), disc. review denied, 362 N.C. 89, 656 S.E.2d 281 (2007).\nHere, the State has not challenged any of the findings of fact in the trial court\u2019s order as unsupported by competent evidence, and as a result, they are binding on appeal. See State v. Baker, 312 N.C. 34, 37, 320 S.E.2d 670, 673 (1984) (citation omitted). Rather, the State contends that suppression' of the cocaine was erroneous on two bases: (1) that Swaim had reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop of Defendant, making his seizure legal, and (2) that in the event Defendant\u2019s seizure was illegal, the cocaine was not found as a result of the unlawful conduct.\nConstitutional protections against unreasonable searches arise when a person is \u201cseized\u201d in the form of either a \u201cstop\u201d or an \u201carrest.\u201d Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 903 (1968). Under our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, these two types of seizures require different levels of justification, commensurate with the invasiveness of the search each seizure permits. See, e.g., id. at 19 n. 15, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 904 n. 15 (\u201c[T]he sounder course is to recognize that the Fourth Amendment governs all intrusions by agents of the public upon personal security, and to make the scope of the particular intrusion, in light of all the exigencies of the case, a central element in the analysis of reasonableness.\u201d).\nAn investigatory stop is a brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information. An investigatory stop must be justified by a reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the individual is involved in criminal activity.\nJoe,_N.C. App. at_, 711 S.E.2d at 846 (citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted). In contrast, \u201c[t]he constitutional validity of [a] search [incident to arrest], . . must depend upon the constitutional validity of the . . . arrest.\u201d Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 13 L. Ed. 2d 142, 145 (1964). \u201cUnder the Constitution, an arrest is valid when the officer has probable cause to make it.\u201d State v. Mangum, 30 N.C. App. 311, 314, 226 S.E.2d 852, 854 (1976). In turn, probable cause is defined as \u201cthose facts and circumstances within an officer\u2019s knowledge and of which he had reasonably trustworthy information which are sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the suspect had committed or was committing an offense.\u201d State v. Williams, 314 N.C. 337, 343, 333 S.E.2d 708, 713 (1985) (citations omitted).\nHere, the trial court found:\n8. Officer [] Swaim testified that he then proceeded to arrest [] Defendant for the charge of Resist, Delay or Obstruct due to [] Defendant fleeing from the officer.\n9. Subsequent to [D]efendant\u2019s arrest, a baggie with an off[-] white colored substance was located in the area where [] Defendant was found.\n(Emphasis added). Thus, the evidence Defendant sought to suppress was not obtained as the result of an investigatory stop, but instead was discovered following Defendant\u2019s arrest. As noted supra, it is res judicata that Swaim lacked probable cause to arrest Defendant, and thus, any evidence found during a search incident to that invalid arrest must be suppressed.\nHowever, the State contends the cocaine was not found as a result of the illegal seizure, but rather was abandoned by Defendant. Specifically, the State notes that the cocaine was discovered not on Defendant\u2019s person, but instead \u201cwas located in the area where [] Defendant was found [following his arrest].\u201d After careful review, we disagree.\nEvidence obtained as the result of an illegal search or seizure must be suppressed. State v. McKinney, 361 N.C. 53, 58, 637 S.E.2d 868, 872 (2006). An individual\u2019s right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, protected under the Fourth Amendment, is based on a defendant\u2019s \u201creasonable expectation of freedom from government intrusion.\u201d State v. Cooke, 54 N.C. App. 33, 41, 282 S.E.2d 800, 806 (1981), affirmed, 306 N.C. 132, 291 S.E.2d 618 (1982) (citation omitted). One loses his reasonable expectation of privacy when he voluntarily abandons his property. Id.\nBecause one no longer has an expectation of privacy in abandoned property, \u201cthe property [] abandoned may be seized without probable cause.\u201d State v. Johnson, 98 N.C. App. 290, 297, 390 S.E.2d 707, 711 (1990) (citations omitted). Abandonment occurs only \u201c[w]hen one voluntarily puts property under the control of another[.]\u201d Cooke, 54 N.C. App. at 42, 282 S.E.2d at 807 (emphasis added). However, when a suspect \u201cdiscards property as the product of [] illegal police activity, he will not be held to have voluntarily abandoned the property or to have necessarily lost his reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to it.\u201d State v. Cromartie, 55 N.C. App. 221, 225, 284 S.E.2d 728, 731 (1981) (citation omitted).\nWhile not binding precedent, we find persuasive the analysis of a recent unpublished opinion from a case with virtually indistinguishable facts:\nAt the time [the] defendant abandoned the contraband, he was being arrested [illegally]. After securing him, the police found the contraband on the ground where [the] defendant was handcuffed. Because his abandonment of the contraband was the product of his illegal arrest, it cannot be said to have been voluntarily abandoned. Therefore, the trial court was correct in granting [the] defendant\u2019s motion to suppress the contraband.\nState v. Springs, _N.C. App. _, _, _S.E.2d_, __ (2012) (unpublished).\nHere, as in Springs, the unchallenged findings of fact reveal that the officers discovered the bag of cocaine near where Defendant had been found and seized it only after Defendant was unlawfully arrested and handcuffed. \u201cBecause his abandonment of the contraband was the product of his illegal arrest, it cannot be said to have been voluntarily abandoned.\u201d Id. Accordingly, the cocaine was obtained as the result of unlawful police conduct, and the court properly suppressed it.\nConclusion\nThe portion of the trial court\u2019s order dismissing the possession of cocaine charge and habitual felon indictment is vacated; the portion of the order dismissing the RDO charge and allowing Defendant\u2019s motion to suppress is affirmed. We remand to the trial court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.\nAffirmed in part; vacated in part and remanded.\nJudges HUNTER, ROBERT C., and ERVIN concur.\n. This holding is consistent with the analysis employed and results reached on similar facts in other jurisdictions. See U.S. v. Wilson, 953 F.2d 116, 127 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that the officers\u2019 discovery of contraband was \u201cclearly the direct result of the illegal seizure\u201d of the defendant and reversing an order denying the defendant\u2019s motion to suppress); U.S. v. Beck, 602 F.2d 726, 730 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that when the defendant threw contraband from his car after being illegally stopped, the relinquishment was not voluntary, and it would be \u201csheer fiction to presume [it was] caused by anything other than the illegal stop.\u201d).", "type": "majority", "author": "STEPHENS, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Derrick C. Mertz, for the State.", "Glover & Petersen, P.A., by Ann B. Petersen, for Defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ROBERT LEE EARL JOE\nNo. COA10-1037-2\n(Filed 7 August 2012)\n1. Arrest \u2014 law of case \u2014 lack of probable cause \u2014 resist, delay, or obstruct charge\nIt was the law of this possession of cocaine case that the police officer lacked probable cause to arrest defendant. Thus, the portion of the order dismissing the resist, delay, or obstruct charge was affirmed.\n2. Search and Seizure \u2014 motion to suppress cocaine \u2014 not investigatory stop \u2014 res judicata \u2014 result of arrest\nThe trial court erred by granting defendant\u2019s motion to suppress the cocaine found following his arrest. The evidence defend-ant sought to suppress was not obtained as the result of an investigatory stop, but instead was discovered following his arrest. It was res judicata that the police officer lacked probable cause to arrest defendant, and thus, any evidence found during a search incident to that invalid arrest must be suppressed.\nAppeal by the State from order entered 19 May 2010 by Judge Patrice A. Hinnant in Forsyth County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 22 February 2011. An opinion was filed by this Court on 5 July 2011, affirming the trial court\u2019s 19 May 2010 order. See State v. Joe,_N.C. App. __, 711 S.E.2d 842 (2011). By opinion filed 13 April 2012, the North Carolina Supreme Court vacated our opinion in part, dismissed its allowance of discretionary review as improvidently allowed in part, and remanded for consideration of Defendant\u2019s remaining issue on appeal, not addressed in our original opinion. See State v. Joe, ._N.C._,_S.E.2d_(2012).\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Derrick C. Mertz, for the State.\nGlover & Petersen, P.A., by Ann B. Petersen, for Defendant." }, "file_name": "0206-01", "first_page_order": 216, "last_page_order": 223 }