{ "id": 4032931, "name": "GROVER M. ENSLEY, Employee, Plaintiff v. FMC CORPORATION, Employer, SELF-INSURED (BROADSPIRE, a CRAWFORD COMPANY, Servicing Agent), Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Ensley v. FMC Corp.", "decision_date": "2012-08-21", "docket_number": "No. COA12-255", "first_page": "386", "last_page": "396", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "222 N.C. App. 386" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "635 S.E.2d 60", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636865 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/635/0060-01" ] }, { "cite": "620 S.E.2d 533", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12634183 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "539", "parenthetical": "quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88.1" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/620/0533-01" ] }, { "cite": "298 S.E.2d 681", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "684", "parenthetical": "stating that \"[t]he language of. . . G.S. 97-88.1 clearly indicates that an award of attorneys' fees is not required to be granted. Such language places the decision of whether to award attorneys' fees within the sound discretion of the Industrial Commission.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 392", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562490 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "397", "parenthetical": "stating that \"[t]he language of. . . G.S. 97-88.1 clearly indicates that an award of attorneys' fees is not required to be granted. Such language places the decision of whether to award attorneys' fees within the sound discretion of the Industrial Commission.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0392-01" ] }, { "cite": "696 S.E.2d 716", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "723", "parenthetical": "\"An award of attorney's fees under this section [97-88.1] requires the Commission to find that the original hearing 'has been brought, prosecuted, or defended without reasonable ground.' \" " } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "205 N.C. App. 381", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 3734549 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "391", "parenthetical": "\"An award of attorney's fees under this section [97-88.1] requires the Commission to find that the original hearing 'has been brought, prosecuted, or defended without reasonable ground.' \" " } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/205/0381-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 545", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3790787, 3792621, 3790321, 3787794, 3791418, 3786559 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0545-03", "/nc/360/0545-05", "/nc/360/0545-01", "/nc/360/0545-06", "/nc/360/0545-02", "/nc/360/0545-04" ] }, { "cite": "173 N.C. App. 134", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8353036 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "143", "parenthetical": "quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88.1" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/173/0134-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "502 S.E.2d 419", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "422", "parenthetical": "quotation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "130 N.C. App. 220", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11466277 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "225", "parenthetical": "quotation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/130/0220-01" ] }, { "cite": "703 S.E.2d 896", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "899", "parenthetical": "internal citations and quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "902" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "669 S.E.2d 582", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "584", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 657", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4149368 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "660", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0657-01" ] }, { "cite": "2011 WL 883638", "category": "reporters:specialty_west", "reporter": "WL", "weight": 6, "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "unpublished" }, { "page": "*7" }, { "page": "*7" }, { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 12, "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "and (II)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 692, "char_count": 21348, "ocr_confidence": 0.745, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.138363859351185e-08, "percentile": 0.47184044320730667 }, "sha256": "19b228e2b633f41fb17d006a930aa2edd657882afd3c34ac63cb5a32f5e66d57", "simhash": "1:8a1bfe8b9abb6f15", "word_count": 3366 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:23:21.020165+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges BRYANT and STEPHENS concur." ], "parties": [ "GROVER M. ENSLEY, Employee, Plaintiff v. FMC CORPORATION, Employer, SELF-INSURED (BROADSPIRE, a CRAWFORD COMPANY, Servicing Agent), Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "THIGPEN, Judge.\nGrover M. Ensley' (\u201cPlaintiff\u201d) and FMC Corporation (\u201cDefendant\u201d) appeal from an Amended Opinion and Award of the North Carolina Industrial Commission (\u201cthe Commission\u201d). We must decide whether (I) the Commission erred by awarding attorney\u2019s fees pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88.1 (2011); (II) the Commission erred by reducing the amount of the attorney\u2019s fees awarded; and (III) the Amended Opinion and Award contains a clerical error with respect to the date from which ongoing disability benefits were awarded to Plaintiff. Because the Commission did not err by finding and concluding that Defendant defended this claim without reasonable grounds, we affirm the Commission\u2019s award of attorney\u2019s fees pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88.1. Additionally, we hold the Commission was not precluded from altering the amount of attorney\u2019s fees awarded in its original opinion. Finally, we remand the portion of the Amended Opinion and Award awarding benefits \u201cbeginning January 30, 2006\u201d and direct the Commission to correct this clerical error to award disability benefits to begin as of 18 June 2006.\nI. Factual and Procedural History\nThis case is back before this Court after being reversed and remanded in part to the Commission. Specifically, this Court (I) remanded to the Commission for additional findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding whether Defendant brought, prosecuted, or defended this action without reasonable grounds and (II) reversed and remanded with instructions for the Commission \u201cto order disability benefits to begin as of 18 June 2006.\u201d Ensley v. FMC Corp., No. COA10-522, 2011 N.C. App. LEXIS 494, 2011 WL 883638 (filed 15 March 2011) (unpublished) (\u2018Ensley I\u201d). For a summary of the facts giving rise to the workers\u2019 compensation claim, reference is made to this Court\u2019s prior opinion. See id.\nFollowing this Court\u2019s opinion reversing and remanding this case in part, the Commission filed an Amended Opinion and Award on 19 October 2011. In the Amended Opinion and Award, the Commission made the following pertinent findings of fact and conclusion of law:\nFindings of Fact\n21. The Full Commission finds based upon the greater weight of the credible evidence that Plaintiff suffers from asbestosis and silicosis as a result of his employment with Defendant-Employer. The Full Commission further finds that as of June 18, 2006, Plaintiff is permanently and totally disabled as a result of his asbestosis.\n22. Based on the foregoing findings, the Full Commission finds that Defendants defended this claim without reasonable grounds.\nConclusions of Law\n7. As Defendants defended this claim without reasonable grounds, Plaintiff is entitled to have Defendants pay for the costs of this action including reasonable attorney\u2019s fees. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88.1. The Full Commission finds that $12,000.00 is a reasonable attorney[\u2019]s fee for Plaintiffs counsel to be charged to Defendants.\nThe Commission awarded the following:\n1.Subject to the attorney\u2019s fees hereinafter approved, Defendants shall pay to Plaintiff permanent total disability benefits at the rate of $730.00 per week beginning January 30, 2006 and continuing for the remainder of Plaintiff\u2019s life. . . .\n3. A reasonable attorneyfs] fee in the amount of 25 percent of the compensation approved and awarded for Plaintiff is approved and allowed for Plaintiff\u2019s counsel. In addition, Defendants shall pay to Plaintiff\u2019s counsel a reasonable attorney\u2019s fee of $12,000, not to be deducted from the sums due to Plaintiff, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88.1 as part of the cost of this action. The attorney\u2019s fee shall be paid directly to Plaintiff\u2019s attorney.\nPlaintiff and Defendant appeal from the Amended Opinion and Award. Defendant contends (I) the Commission erred by awarding attorney\u2019s fees pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88.1 and (II) the Amended Opinion and Award contains a clerical error with respect to the date from which ongoing disability benefits were awarded to Plaintiff. Plaintiff contends the Commission erred by reducing the amount of attorney\u2019s fees awarded. We will address each appeal in turn.\nII.Standard of Review\n\u201c[0]n appeal from an award of the Industrial Commission, review is limited to consideration of whether competent evidence supports the Commission\u2019s findings of fact and whether the findings support the Commission\u2019s conclusions of law.\u201d Richardson v. Maxim Healthcare/Allegis Group, 362 N.C. 657, 660, 669 S.E.2d 582, 584 (2008) (citation omitted).\nIII.Defendant\u2019s Appeal\nA. Attorney\u2019s Fees\nDefendant first contends that the Commission erred in awarding Plaintiff attorney\u2019s fees under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88.1 because Defendant had reasonable grounds to defend Plaintiff\u2019s claim. We disagree.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88.1 provides that \u201c[i]f the Industrial Commission shall determine that any hearing has been brought, prosecuted, or defended without reasonable ground, it may assess the whole cost of the proceedings including reasonable fees for defendant\u2019s attorney or plaintiff\u2019s attorney upon the party who has brought or defended them.\u201d\nThe standard of review for an award or denial of attorney\u2019s fees under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88.1 is a two-part analysis:\nFirst, whether the defendant had a reasonable ground to bring a hearing is reviewable by this Court de novo. If this Court concludes that a party did not have reasonable ground to bring or defend a hearing, then we review the decision of whether to make an award and the amount of the award for an abuse of discretion. In conducting the first step of the analysis, the reviewing court should consider the evidence presented at the hearing to determine reasonableness of a defendant\u2019s claim. As such, the burden is on the defendant to place in the record evidence to support its position that it acted on reasonable grounds.\nBlalock v. Southeastern Material, _N.C. App. _, _, 703 S.E.2d 896, 899 (2011) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). \u201cThe test is not whether the defense prevails, but whether it is based in reason rather than in stubborn, unfounded litigiousness.\u201d Cooke v. P.H. Glatfelter/Ecusta, 130 N.C. App. 220, 225, 502 S.E.2d 419, 422 (1998) (quotation and quotation marks omitted).\nHere, Defendant challenges finding of fact number 22 and conclusion of law number 7 which both state that \u201cDefendants defended this claim without reasonable grounds.\u201d Although Defendant does not dispute that four doctors testified that Plaintiff had asbestosis as a result of his employment with FMC Corporation, Defendant contends that none of the doctors or the vocational counselor testified that Plaintiff was actually disabled as a result of his asbestosis. Plaintiff contends that Defendant\u2019s denial of the claim was unreasonable because Defendant\u2019s medical expert, Dr. Selwyn Spangenthal, \u201cdetermined that Plaintiff was disabled due to the asbestosis.\u201d We agree with Plaintiff.\nDefendant first contends that none of Plaintiff\u2019s three medical experts \u2014 Drs. Jill Ohar, Fred Dula, and Stephen Proctor \u2014 gave an opinion on whether Plaintiff was disabled. Although Dr. Dula testified that he did not make a disability determination in this case, the record shows that Drs. Ohar and Proctor did testify regarding Plaintiff\u2019s disability. Dr. Proctor stated that although he did not do a disability evaluation, he agreed that the results of Plaintiff\u2019s breathing tests would \u201cbe consistent with someone who\u2019s disabled because of their breathing problems[.]\u201d Moreover, when Dr. Ohar was asked whether she agreed that Plaintiff \u201cis disabled from working\u201d based upon \u201cvocational findings and his physical defects, including the breathing impairments\u201d caused by asbestosis and silicosis, Dr. Ohar stated, \u201cYeah, I would believe that. I agree with that.\u201d\nDefendant also points to Dr. Spangenthal\u2019s statement that Plaintiff \u201cmight be comfortable sitting at a desk\u201d but could not do any physical activity, as evidence that Plaintiff was not disabled from all activity. However, Dr. Spangenthal, who performed an independent medical evaluation at Defendant\u2019s request, also testified as follows regarding Plaintiff\u2019s disability:\nQ. And you had talked about, you were talking about disability and I think on your report you put he is disabled as a result of his lung disease.\nA. That\u2019s correct.\nQ. And you are saying that he\u2019s disabled from doing any work, any type of work?\nA. Right. So the thing is that when he spoke to me and he gave me the history, he said that over the past ten years he had noticed a gradual worsening of shortness of breath. . . . The other problem that he did have was that he had a chronic cough that was irritating and occurred throughout the day. And so that might limit his ability to work as well. So both of those factors would play a role. So in terms of doing any type of physical activity in his employment, I think he would be disabled.\nDr. Spangenthal further stated:\nQ. Finally, Doctor, it is plaintiff\u2019s position that Mr. Ensley was exposed to various dust, including asbestos, during his employment with FMC, and as a result of that exposure he developed [the] lung disease of asbestosis, that the lung disease is severe and has rendered him unable to work in any employment. Do you agree with the plaintiffs argument in this case?\nA. Yes, I do.\nIn direct contradiction to Defendant\u2019s arguments, the record shows that Dr. Ohar and Dr. Spangenthal each testified that Plaintiff is disabled as a result of asbestosis. Defendant presented no evidence to the contrary. Thus, the expert medical testimony in this case demonstrates that there was no genuine basis for Defendant\u2019s denial or defense of Plaintiff\u2019s claim. See Blalock,_N.C. App. at__, 703 S.E.2d at 902 (stating that \u201cDefendants\u2019 ignorance, or affirmative disregard, of these longstanding opinions [of three medical experts] directly contradicting their position renders their defense unreasonable and unfoundedly litigious under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88.1\u201d) (citation omitted). We hold the Commission did not err by finding and concluding that Defendant defended this claim without reasonable grounds. Accordingly, we reject Defendant\u2019s argument that the Commission erred in awarding Plaintiff attorney\u2019s fees under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88.1.\nB. Clerical Error\nDefendant next contends the Amended Opinion and Award contains a clerical error with respect to the date from which ongoing disability benefits were awarded to Plaintiff. Specifically, Defendant argues the date from which ongoing disability benefits should be awarded is 18 June 2006, rather than 30 January 2006. We agree.\nIn Ensley I, this Court held that because Plaintiff was not diagnosed with asbestosis until 18 June 2006, \u201cthe Commission erred by ordering disability benefits to begin on 30 January 2006. This ruling is reversed and remanded to the Commission with instructions to order disability benefits to begin as of 18 June 2006.\u201d Ensley, 2011 N.C. App. LEXIS 494 at *20, 2011 WL 883638 at *7. Accordingly, in its Amended Opinion and Award, the Commission found as fact that \u201cas of June 18, 2006, Plaintiff is permanently and totally disabled as a result of his asbestosis.\u201d The Commission also concluded that \u201cas a result of Plaintiff\u2019s asbestosis, Plaintiff is permanently and totally disabled from any employment and is entitled to receive permanent total disability compensation . . . beginning June 18, 2006.\u201d However, the Commission awarded Plaintiff permanent total disability benefits \u201cbeginning January 30, 2006[.]\u201d\nConsidering this Court\u2019s holding in Ensley I and the Amended Opinion and Award as a whole, the Commission\u2019s language awarding benefits \u201cbeginning January 30, 2006\u201d appears to be a clerical error. Thus, we remand the portion of the Amended Opinion and Award awarding benefits \u201cbeginning January 30, 2006[,]\u201d and we direct the Commission to correct this error to award disability benefits to begin as of 18 June 2006.\nIV. Plaintiff\u2019s Appeal\nPlaintiff\u2019s sole argument on appeal is that the Commission erred by reducing the amount of the attorney\u2019s fee sanction from 25 percent of the compensation awarded to Plaintiff to $12,000. We disagree.\nA. Summary of the Original and Amended Opinion and Award\nIn its Opinion and Award filed 29 December 2009 (\u201c2009 Opinion and Award\u201d), the Commission, citing N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88, entered the following award:\n3. A reasonable attorneyfs] fee in the amount of 25 percent of the compensation approved and awarded for [P]laintiff is approved and allowed for [P]laintiff\u2019s counsel. The attorney\u2019s fee shall not be deducted from the compensation due [P]laintiff but paid as a part of the cost of this action. The attorney\u2019s fee shall be paid directly to [P]laintiff\u2019s counsel.\nIn Ensley I, this Court noted that the reference to section 97-88, rather than section 97-88.1, was likely a typographical error. Ensley I, 2011 N.C. App. LEXIS 494 at *18, 2011 WL 883638 at *7. We then held:\nThe Opinion and Award is devoid of any findings of fact or conclusions of law regarding whether defendants brought, prosecuted, or defended this action without reasonable grounds. This issue must be remanded to the Commission for further findings of fact and conclusions of law. Upon remand, the Commission should make certain that it cites the statutory provision upon which any award of attorney\u2019s fees is based.\nId. (citation omitted). Ensley I did not require the Commission to make findings of fact and conclusions of law in support o/its award of attorney\u2019s fees in the 2009 Opinion and Award, but rather instructed the Commission to make findings and conclusions on the question of the reasonableness of Defendant\u2019s defense of Plaintiff\u2019s claim, and additionally, to cite the statute under which \u201cany award of attorney\u2019s fees is based.\u201d Id. Thus, on remand, the Commission\u2019s task was to make findings of fact and conclusions of law on the question of whether Defendant acted without reasonable grounds, and in turn, to award attorney\u2019s fees if and as it saw fit.\nIn its Amended Opinion and Award entered 19 October 2011, the Commission made findings of fact about the unreasonableness of Defendant\u2019s action in defending Plaintiff\u2019s claim and concluded, inter alia,\n7. As defendants defended this claim without reasonable grounds, Plaintiff is entitled to have Defendants pay for the costs of this action including reasonable attorney\u2019s fees. N.C. Gen Stat. \u00a7 97-88.1. The Full Commission finds that $12,000.00 is a reasonable attomey[\u2019]s fee for Plaintiff\u2019s counsel to be charged to Defendant.\nBased on its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Commission entered the following award:\n3. A reasonable attorney[\u2019s] fee in the amount of 25 percent of the compensation approved and awarded for Plaintiff is approved and allowed for Plaintiff\u2019s counsel. In addition, Defendants shall pay to Plaintiff\u2019s counsel a reasonable attorney\u2019s fee of $12,000.00, not to be deducted from the sums due Plaintiff, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88.1 as a part of the cost of this action. The attorney\u2019s fee shall be paid directly to Plaintiff\u2019s attorney.\nThe attorney\u2019s fee award in the Amended Opinion and Award thus differs in three respects from the award in the 2009 Opinion and Award: First, the Commission awarded Plaintiff\u2019s counsel attorney\u2019s fees of both 25 percent of the compensation awarded to Plaintiff, and, \u201c[i]n addition,\u201d $12,000.00 pursuant to section 97-88.1. Second, the Commission chose to award Plaintiff\u2019s counsel an attorney\u2019s fee of $12,000.00 from Defendant, \u201cnot to be deducted from the sums due Plaintiff.\u201d Finally, in awarding an attorney\u2019s fee of 25 percent of Plaintiff\u2019s compensation, the Commission chose not to provide that this award should not be deducted from the compensation due Plaintiff. Thus, this portion of the award of the attorney\u2019s fee will come out of Plaintiffs compensation award, rather than be paid in addition to it.\nB. Analysis\nOn appeal, Plaintiff essentially argues that, on remand from this Court, the Commission was precluded from altering the amount of attorney\u2019s fees awarded in its original opinion and was limited to making findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of its 2009 Opinion and Award. We disagree.\n\u201cUnder [section 97-88.1], before making an award, the Commission must determine that a hearing \u201c \u2018has been brought, prosecuted, or defended without reasonable ground.\u2019 \u201d Swift v. Richardson Sports, Ltd., 173 N.C. App. 134, 143, 620 S.E.2d 533, 539 (2005) (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-88.1) (emphasis added), disc. review denied, 360 N.C. 545, 635 S.E.2d 60 (2006). Accordingly, any award of attorney\u2019s fees pursuant to section 97-88.1 must be supported by findings of fact and conclusions of law. Id.; see also Price v. Piggy Palace, 205 N.C. App. 381, 391, 696 S.E.2d 716, 723 (2010) (\u201cAn award of attorney\u2019s fees under this section [97-88.1] requires the Commission to find that the original hearing \u2018has been brought, prosecuted, or defended without reasonable ground.\u2019 \u201d ).\nWithout such findings of fact and conclusions of law, an award of attorney\u2019s fees under the statute cannot stand and is, in effect, a nullity. Put another way, the competent evidence before the Commission dictates its findings of fact which in turn lead to its conclusions of law, upon which basis the Commission then makes its award, if any. The Commission does not determine an award and then work backward to the necessary findings of fact. To hold, as Plaintiff would have this Court do, that an award of attorney\u2019s fees, unsupported by statutorily-required findings of fact and conclusions of law, cannot be altered on remand would be to render the Commission\u2019s failure to make findings of fact and conclusions of law nothing more than a clerical error.\nOn remand, the Commission could have made findings of fact and conclusions of law which led it to award attorney\u2019s fees under section 97-88.1, or under section 97-88, or under both statutes, or under neither statute. Here, after making the findings of fact necessary to \u201cdetermine that any hearing has been brought, prosecuted, or defended without reasonable ground,\u201d the Commission concluded in its discretion that an award of attorney\u2019s fees pursuant to section 97-88.1 was appropriate as described in its Amended Opinion and Award. This the Commission was entitled to do under our statutory and case law. Accordingly, we reject Plaintiff\u2019s argument.\nAFFIRMED IN PART, REMANDED IN PART.\nJudges BRYANT and STEPHENS concur.\n. Following Ensley I, Defendant filed petitions for Writ of Supersedeas and for discretionary review of this Court\u2019s opinion. The North Carolina Supreme Court denied the petitions on 16 June 2011.\n. Defendant also challenges \u201call the Findings of Fact to the extent they imply Defendants\u2019 defense of the matter was unreasonable or omit relevant testimony establishing that Defendants\u2019 defense was in fact reasonable[.]\u201d\n. Even where a defendant is found to have acted unreasonably in defending an action, the Commission has the discretion to award or not to award attorney\u2019s fees under the statute. See Taylor v. J.P. Stevens Co., 307 N.C. 392, 397, 298 S.E.2d 681, 684 (1983) (stating that \u201c[t]he language of. . . G.S. 97-88.1 clearly indicates that an award of attorneys\u2019 fees is not required to be granted. Such language places the decision of whether to award attorneys\u2019 fees within the sound discretion of the Industrial Commission.\u201d).", "type": "majority", "author": "THIGPEN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Wallace & Graham, P.A., by Edward L. Pauley, for the plaintiff", "Hedrick, Gardner, Kincheloe & Garofalo, L.L.P., by Deepa P. Tungare and M. Duane Jones, for the defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "GROVER M. ENSLEY, Employee, Plaintiff v. FMC CORPORATION, Employer, SELF-INSURED (BROADSPIRE, a CRAWFORD COMPANY, Servicing Agent), Defendant\nNo. COA12-255\n(Filed 21 August 2012)\n1. Workers\u2019 Compensation \u2014 attorney fees \u2014 defending without reasonable grounds\nThe Industrial Commission did not err by finding and concluding that defendant had defended a workers\u2019 compensation claim without reasonable grounds and awarding attorney fees where defendant contended that none of plaintiff\u2019s experts had given an opinion on whether plaintiff was disabled, but the record showed that one of plaintiff\u2019s medical experts and defendant\u2019s medical expert testified that plaintiff was disabled as a result of asbestosis.\n2. Workers\u2019 Compensation \u2014 disability award \u2014 beginning date \u2014 clerical error\nA workers\u2019 compensation disability award for asbestosis was remanded for correction of a clerical error regarding the date from which disability benefits were awarded.\n3. Workers\u2019 Compensation \u2014 unreasonable defense \u2014 attorney fee award \u2014 reduced on remand\nThe Industrial Commission did not err in a workers\u2019 compensation case after remand from the Court of Appeals by reducing the amount of attorney fees awarded as a sanction for defending the claim without reasonable grounds. The remand required findings and conclusions on whether defendant acted without reasonable grounds and an award of attorney fees if the Commission saw fit. The Commission made the necessary findings and then concluded in its discretion that an award of attorney fees pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-88.1 was appropriate.\nAppeal by plaintiff and defendant from the Amended Opinion and Award entered 19 October 2011 by the North Carolina Industrial Commission. Heard in the Court of Appeals 6 June 2012.\nWallace & Graham, P.A., by Edward L. Pauley, for the plaintiff\nHedrick, Gardner, Kincheloe & Garofalo, L.L.P., by Deepa P. Tungare and M. Duane Jones, for the defendant." }, "file_name": "0386-01", "first_page_order": 396, "last_page_order": 406 }