{ "id": 4034073, "name": "CLYDE VERNON LOVETTE, Petitioner v. THE NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, ALVIN KELLER in his capacity as Secretary of Correction, and RUDY FOSTER in his capacity as Administrator of Dan River Prison Work Farm, Respondents; CHARLES LYNCH, Petitioner v. THE NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, ALVIN KELLER in his capacity as Secretary of Correction, and TIM KERLEY in his capacity as Administrator of Catawba Correctional Center, Respondents", "name_abbreviation": "Lovette v. North Carolina Department of Correction", "decision_date": "2012-08-21", "docket_number": "No. COA11-1081", "first_page": "452", "last_page": "471", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "222 N.C. App. 452" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "364 N.C. 249", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4153103 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/364/0249-01" ] }, { "cite": "668 S.E.2d 107", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12642152 ], "weight": 7, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "108" }, { "page": "108" }, { "page": "109" }, { "page": "110", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/668/0107-01" ] }, { "cite": "193 N.C. App. 597", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4161318 ], "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/193/0597-01" ] }, { "cite": "436 S.E.2d 106", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "111" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "335 N.C. 120", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2528320 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "130" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/335/0120-01" ] }, { "cite": "698 S.E.2d 49", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 9, "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "52" }, { "page": "57" }, { "page": "56" }, { "page": "57", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "56", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 17-33", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(2)", "parenthetical": "allowing for summary proceedings pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-2", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 5, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "597-98" }, { "page": "601" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "364 N.C. 249", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4153103 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/364/0249-01" ] }, { "cite": "668 S.E.2d 107", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12642152 ], "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/668/0107-01" ] }, { "cite": "722 S.E.2d 492", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "495" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "269 S.E.2d 142", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "149" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "301 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561018 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "11" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/301/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 S.E.2d 793", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "805" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "276 N.C. 641", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563176 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "660" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/276/0641-01" ] }, { "cite": "680 S.E.2d 239", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "243", "parenthetical": "acknowledging that the Court of Appeals must follow Supreme Court precedent" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "198 N.C. App. 443", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4169311 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "447", "parenthetical": "acknowledging that the Court of Appeals must follow Supreme Court precedent" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/198/0443-01" ] }, { "cite": "683 S.E.2d 208", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 621", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4151285 ], "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/363/0621-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 L. Ed. 2d 935", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "case_ids": [ 12459367, 12459368, 12459369, 12459370, 12459371, 12459372, 12459373 ], "year": 2011, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/l-ed-2d/179/0935-01", "/l-ed-2d/179/0935-02", "/l-ed-2d/179/0935-03", "/l-ed-2d/179/0935-04", "/l-ed-2d/179/0935-05", "/l-ed-2d/179/0935-06", "/l-ed-2d/179/0935-07" ] }, { "cite": "131 S. Ct. 2150", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "case_ids": [ 12459366, 12459367, 12459368, 12459369, 12459503 ], "year": 2011, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/l-ed-2d/179/0934-06", "/l-ed-2d/179/0935-01", "/l-ed-2d/179/0935-02", "/l-ed-2d/179/0935-03", "/l-ed-2d/179/0952-02" ] }, { "cite": "193 N.C. App. 597", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4161318 ], "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/193/0597-01" ] }, { "cite": "698 S.E.2d 49", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 26, "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "54-58" }, { "page": "54-58" }, { "page": "54" }, { "page": "55" }, { "page": "55" }, { "page": "55-56" }, { "page": "56" }, { "page": "56" }, { "page": "55" }, { "page": "56" }, { "page": "56" }, { "page": "56" }, { "page": "56" }, { "page": "56" }, { "page": "57" }, { "page": "57-58" }, { "page": "58" }, { "page": "57" }, { "page": "58" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-2", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 12, "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "364 N.C. 249", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4153103 ], "weight": 10, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "255-60" }, { "page": "255-60" }, { "page": "255" }, { "page": "256" }, { "page": "257" }, { "page": "256" }, { "page": "257" }, { "page": "259" }, { "page": "259-60" }, { "page": "260" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/364/0249-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1167, "char_count": 48017, "ocr_confidence": 0.751, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.12663942955747612 }, "sha256": "41466e78c6f931f9bf8a85eaee7174f982c5f654708d600516ffb1a3b9fc2915", "simhash": "1:cf7bf136f6ebe350", "word_count": 7556 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:23:21.020165+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge ELMORE concurs.", "Judge ERVIN dissents in separate opinion." ], "parties": [ "CLYDE VERNON LOVETTE, Petitioner v. THE NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, ALVIN KELLER in his capacity as Secretary of Correction, and RUDY FOSTER in his capacity as Administrator of Dan River Prison Work Farm, Respondents CHARLES LYNCH, Petitioner v. THE NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, ALVIN KELLER in his capacity as Secretary of Correction, and TIM KERLEY in his capacity as Administrator of Catawba Correctional Center, Respondents" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BRYANT, Judge.\nWhere the trial court held that petitioners had fully served their life sentences after credits had been applied to their unconditional release dates, we affirm the trial court\u2019s order.\nFacts and Procedural History\nClyde Vernon Lovette and Charles Lynch (petitioners) were both inmates of the North Carolina Department of Correction (hereinafter \u201cDOC\u201d) system, serving sentences of life imprisonment. On 15 October 2010, petitioners filed applications for writs of habeas corpus commanding respondents, the DOC, Alvin Keller in his capacity as Secretary of the DOC, Rudy Foster in his capacity as Administrator of Dan River Prison Work Farm, and Tim Kerley in his capacity as Administrator of Catawba Correctional Center, to grant them unconditional release from prison. Petitions for writ of habeas corpus were simultaneously filed for thirteen other inmates.\nPetitioners were each sentenced to life imprisonment pursuant to former N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-2 (1974) which provided that a life sentence should be considered as imprisonment for eighty years. Petitioners alleged that while incarcerated in the DOC, they had earned sentence reduction credits for \u201cgain time,\u201d \u201cgood time,\u201d and \u201cmeritorious service.\u201d Based on these credits as well as days actually served, petitioners alleged that they had served their entire sentences and were entitled to be discharged from incarceration pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 17-33(2) (2010) (allowing for summary proceedings pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus).\nOn 6 December 2010, respondents filed motions to deny petitioners\u2019 applications for writ of habeas corpus. Petitioners filed a Joint Motion for Summary Judgment on their applications for writ of habeas corpus as well as a Joint Response in Opposition to [respondents\u2019] Motion to Dismiss petitioners\u2019 applications for writ .of habeas corpus.\nFollowing a hearing on the parties\u2019 motions held on 14 February 2011, the trial court denied summary judgment to both parties and denied respondents\u2019 Motion to Deny Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus.\nSubsequent to a second hearing, on 15 April 2011, the trial court joined petitioners\u2019 applications for hearing and concluded the following: \u201cGiven the stipulation that Petitioners\u2019 total credits, if applied to the unconditional release date, are sufficient to fully satisfy each Petitioners\u2019 sentence, the Petitioners have fully served their sentences\u201d and therefore the \u201ccontinued detention of Petitioners is unlawful.\u201d The trial court allowed the writs of habeas corpus and ordered petitioners to be discharged by 17 June 2011.\nRespondents filed with this Court a petition for writ of certiorari, a motion for supersedeas, and a motion for temporary stay. On 24 June 2011, our Court issued a writ of certiorari to review the 16 June 2011 order, allowed the petition for writ of supersedeas, and stayed the 16 June 2011 order pending disposition of respondents\u2019 appeal.\nRespondents\u2019 sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred by ordering petitioners\u2019 unconditional release from prison.\nRespondents argue the trial court erred by concluding that it was bound by the decision in Jones v. Keller, 364 N.C. 249, 698 S.E.2d 49 (2010), but ignoring the reasoning of Jones. While the trial court\u2019s findings of fact are binding on appeal if supported by competent evidence, the trial court\u2019s conclusions of law are reviewable de novo. State v. Barber, 335 N.C. 120, 130, 436 S.E.2d 106, 111 (1993).\nIn the 16 June 2011 order, the trial court made the following pertinent conclusions of law:\n1. This Court is bound by the holding in Jones v. Keller, 364 N.C. 249; 698 S.E.2d 49 (2010), (hereinafter, \u201cJones\u2019\u2019), which was decided by the North Carolina Supreme Court subsequent to the decision by the North Carolina Court of Appeals in Bowden.\n2. The Jones decision clearly and on its face limited its decision to inmates serving life sentences for first-degree murder between 8 April 1974 and 30 June 1978 (See Jones at 252: \u201cit is this limited group that we consider in this opinion\u201d).\n3. This Court now considers Petitioners, two inmates that are part of a distinguishable subset of the Bowden class, different than those considered in Jones: those who were sentenced to life imprisonment between 8 April 1974 and 30 June 1978 based on lesser convictions, for crimes other than first-degree murder.\nIn State v. Bowden, 193 N.C. App. 597, 668 S.E.2d 107 (2008), the defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and sentenced to two life sentences in 1975, at a time where N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-2 (1974) provided that a life sentence should be considered as imprisonment for 80 years. Id. at 597-98, 668 S.E.2d at 108. The Bowden defendant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and argued that after applying all of his sentence reduction credits, he had completed his 80-year sentence and was entitled to immediate release from prison. Id. The trial court denied his petition and the Bowden defendant appealed to this Court. We treated the matter as a motion for appropriate relief, vacated the trial court\u2019s order, and remanded the matter, ordering the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing to resolve issues of fact raised in the defendant\u2019s petition. Later, the trial court denied defendant\u2019s claim for relief and concluded that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-2 (1974) only required the DOC to treat the defendant\u2019s life sentence as a term of 80 years for purposes of parole eligibility. Id. at 598, 668 S.E.2d at 108.\nThe State asserted that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-2 did not govern the length of the defendant\u2019s sentence in prison but only applied when determining his eligibility for parole and that a life sentence deemed a person to be imprisoned for the term of his natural life. Id. at 599, 668 S.E.2d at 109. Our Court concluded the following:\nThe plain language of the statute states that life imprisonment shall be considered as a sentence of imprisonment for a term of 80 years in the State\u2019s prison without any limitation or restriction. . . . Had our Legislature intended that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-2 (1974) only apply when determining a prisoner\u2019s parole eligibility, it would have been a simple matter to have included that explicit phrase.\nId. at 601, 668 S.E.2d at 110 (citations omitted). Accordingly, our Court reversed the trial court\u2019s order and remanded for a hearing to determine defendant\u2019s sentence reduction credit eligibility and to whom those credits would apply. Id.\nSubsequent to Bowden, in Jones v. Keller, 364 N.C. 249, 698 S.E.2d 49 (2010), the North Carolina Supreme Court was asked to determine whether the defendant was entitled to habeas corpus relief on the grounds that once his good time, gain time, and merit time were credited toward his life sentence, statutorily defined as eighty years, he was entitled to unconditional release. Id. at 251, 698 S.E.2d at 52. Earlier, the trial court had concluded that because the Jones defendant was entitled to credits awarded by the DOC, had served the entirety of his sentence, and was entitled to relief, his petition for habeas corpus should be allowed and ordered that the Jones defendant be released. The DOC appealed to the North Carolina Supreme Court which allowed DOC\u2019s motion for temporary stay and granted its petition for writ of certiorari. Id.\nThe DOC \u201cassert[ed] that it never considered that [its] regulations applied to [the defendant] Jones or other inmates similarly situated for the purpose of calculating an unconditional release date.\u201d Id. at 258, 698 S.E.2d at 57. The Supreme Court noted that although DOC\u2019s regulations defined good time, gain time, and merit time as \u201c[t]ime credits applied to an inmate\u2019s sentence that reduce [] the amount of time to be served[,]\u201d these credits were not to be used to calculate an unconditional release date. Id. at 258, 698 S.E.2d at 56. Accordingly, the trial court\u2019s judgment was reversed with the North Carolina Supreme Court specifically stating that\n[i]n light of the compelling State interest in maintaining public safety, we conclude that these regulations do not require that DOC apply time credits for purposes of unconditional release to those who committed first-degree murder during the 8 April 1974 through 30 June 1978 timeframe and were sentenced to life imprisonment.\nId. at 258, 698 S.E.2d at 57 (emphasis added). The Jones court emphasized the fact that the State\u2019s \u201cinterest in ensuring public safety [was] particularly pronounced when dealing with those convicted of first-degree murder.\u201d Id. at 257, 698 S.E.2d at 56 (citations omitted).\nBased upon the language of the Jones court, the trial court in the instant case concluded that it was bound by the Jones decision regarding the application of time credits for purposes of unconditional release to those convicted of first-degree murder. Further, the trial court concluded that petitioners were distinguishable from the Jones defendant and distinguishable from the limited group the Jones decision addressed. The Jones decision only applied to inmates who committed first-degree murder during the time period from 8 April 1974 through 30 June 1978 and were subsequently sentenced to life imprisonment for first-degree murder. In the case before us, petitioners were sentenced to life imprisonment during the relevant time period but were convicted of lesser crimes than first-degree murder: Lovette for second-degree murder; and Lynch for second-degree burglary.\nConsidering both Bowden and Jones, we cannot say the trial court erred by concluding that petitioners were \u201cpart of a distinguishable subset of the Bowden class, different than those considered in Jones [.]\u201d Like the trial court, we think the Supreme Court went to great lengths to distinguish the Jones defendants \u2014 those who committed first-degree murder and were sentenced to life imprisonment for first-degree murder \u2014 from other defendants serving life terms under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-2 (1974). Petitioners were serving life sentences statutorily set at eighty years with unconditional release dates to which credits could be applied. Therefore, the trial court did not err by concluding it was bound by the Jones decision but then differentiating the petitioners from the limited scope of the Jones decision.\nNext, respondents contend the trial court could not alter the effect of sentences imposed on petitioners as it changed the determinations made by other superior courts. Specifically, respondents argue that \u201c[t]he trial court\u2019s order erroneously overlooks that terms of years sentences were provided by statute for the crimes committed by [petitioners], but the sentencing courts imposed life sentences.\u201d Respondents\u2019 argument is misplaced.\nThe trial court held that \u201c [petitioners, though sentenced to terms of life imprisonment, were actually serving sentences statutorily set at eighty years... [and] like others serving sentences of a determinate length, had unconditional release dates to which credits should be applied.\u201d As stated above, petitioners were sentenced to life imprisonment under former N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-2 (1974), which provided that a life sentence should be considered as imprisonment for eighty years. The trial court did not change the sentences imposed on petitioners, but rather, the trial court held that credits should be applied to their unconditional release dates, like similar prisoners who were serving sentences of a determinate length.\nLast, respondents argue the 16 June 2011 order violated the separation of powers doctrine \u201cby invading the provinces of the legislative and executive branches.\u201d By ordering petitioners\u2019 unconditional release, respondents\u2019 argue that the trial court \u201cusurped the authority of the legislature in (i) providing for parole for their life sentences and (ii) delegating to the Parole Commission sole authority in this matter.\u201d Respondents also argue that the trial court usurped the authority of the executive branch by preventing the. Governor from pardoning or commuting petitioners\u2019 sentences by preventing the Parole Commission from exercising its discretionary authority regarding parole. The trial court\u2019s order applied credits to petitioners\u2019 unconditional release dates, holding that petitioners had fully served their sentences. This ruling of the trial court, which is upheld, that petitioners are entitled to unconditional release by operation of law, does not violate the separation of powers doctrine.\nBased on the foregoing, the trial court\u2019s order is affirmed.\nJudge ELMORE concurs.\nJudge ERVIN dissents in separate opinion.\n. Petitioner Lovette was charged with a first-degree murder that was committed in 1978 but plead guilty to second-degree murder. Petitioner Lynch was charged with two counts of second-degree burglary and one count of assault with intent to commit rape, offenses that were committed in 1978. Lynch\u2019s charges were consolidated and a single life sentence was imposed for second-degree burglary.\n. While titled \u201cJoint Response in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss,\u201d petitioners\u2019 motion was in direct response to respondents\u2019 6 December 2010 \u201cMotion to Deny Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus.\u201d", "type": "majority", "author": "BRYANT, Judge." }, { "text": "ERVIN, Judge,\ndissenting.\nAfter a careful review of the record in light of the applicable law, I am compelled to conclude, contrary to the result reached by my colleagues, that the trial court\u2019s order should be reversed. Simply put, I believe that we are required to utilize the analysis employed by the Supreme Court in Jones v. Keller, 364 N.C. 249, 255-60, 698 S.E.2d 49, 54-58 (2010), cert. denied,_U.S._, 131 S. Ct. 2150, 179 L. Ed. 2d 935 (2011), based upon the facts of this case in determining whether Petitioners are entitled to have their earned time credits utilized in calculating their unconditional release date, a step which the Court fails to take. After conducting an analysis of the type employed in Jones, I conclude that Petitioners are not entitled to have their earned time credits applied against their sentences for purposes of calculating their unconditional release date and respectfully dissent from the Court\u2019s decision to affirm the trial court\u2019s order.\nI. Factual Background and Trial Court\u2019s Order\nAs I understand the record, Petitioner Lovette was convicted of second degree murder and Petitioner Lynch was convicted of second degree burglary. Petitioners were both sentenced to life imprisonment pursuant to former N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-2 (1974), which provided that a life sentence should be considered as imprisonment for a term of eighty years. In their petitions, Petitioners have alleged that, while incarcerated, they earned sufficient credits for \u201cgain time,\u201d \u201cgood time,\u201d and \u201cmeritorious service\u201d to entitle them to unconditional release from their confinements. According to Petitioners, the DOC\u2019s refusal to utilize these earned time credits in calculating their unconditional release dates violated their rights to due process and equal protection, constituted an ex post facto clause violation, and contravened fundamental notions of separation of powers. After holding a hearing, the trial court entered an order in which it found facts in accordance with the undisputed record evidence and concluded as a matter of law that:\n1. This Court is bound by the holding in [Jones], which was decided by the North Carolina Supreme Court subsequent to the decision by the North Carolina Court of Appeals in [State v.] Bowden[, 193 N.C. App. 597, 668 S.E.2d 107 (2008), disc. review improvidently granted, 363 N.C. 621, 683 S.E.2d 208 (2009).]\n2. The Jones decision clearly and on its face limited its decision to inmates serving life sentences for first-degree murder between 8 April 1974 and 30 June 1978 (See Jones at 252: \u201cit is this limited group that we consider in this opinion\u201d).\n3. This Court now considers Petitioners, two inmates that are part of a distinguishable subset of the Bowden class, different than those considered in Jones: those who were sentenced to life imprisonment between 8 April 1974 and 30 June 1978 based on lesser convictions, for crimes other than first-degree murder.\n4. The controlling statute then in effect is the same as that in the Jones case, and it provides that a \u201csentence of life imprisonment shall be considered as a sentence of 80 years in the State\u2019s prison.\u201d [N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7] 14-2 (Cum. Supp. 1974).\n5. Therefore, the term of imprisonment for all Bowden-class inmates is clear: it is a term of eighty years. The question before this Court, as it was in Jones, is the application or administration of that sentence by DOC.\n6. The only material difference in the cases at bar and the Jones case is that Jones\u2019s life sentence was based upon a conviction for first-degree murder, whereas the Petitioners were convicted of lesser charges.\n7. The Jones analysis of DOC regulations, under the doctrine of separation of powers, defers to the administrative agency\u2019s interpretation of its own rules. DOC has the power to create rules and regulations governing inmates, including the awarding of various types of credit. \u201cDOC\u2019s application of its own regulations to accomplish these ends is \u2018strictly administrative\u2019 and outside the purview of the courts.\u201d (citations omitted, Jones at 255).\n8. Jones, however, goes on to say that \u201cDOC does not have carte blanche.\u201d (Jones at 254.)\n9. The due process rights of the inmates in the case at bar are limited; but indeed, a liberty interest has been created by DOC in its promulgation of rules and regulations regarding various credits available to inmates, as well as the application of credits for specific purposes.\n10. Petitioners[\u2019] liberty interests in having good time, gain time, and merit time used for purposes of calculating a date of unconditional release is no longer de minimis when compared to the State\u2019s compelling interest in keeping inmates incarcerated until they can be safely released. While the Court in Jones determined that a specific class of Bowden inmates (those sentenced to life on a conviction of first-degree murder) had only a de minimis liberty interest, there can be no other reason for limiting its decision to that class other than a recognition that other inmates serving life sentences for lesser crimes have an elevated liberty interest, one that soars above the minimal interest set forth in Jones.\n11. Additionally, the Jones court clearly saw a weighty State interest in protecting the public from those convicted of first-degree murder, quoting with approval several North Carolina and United States Supreme Court cases. Compare, e.g., \u201cthis most serious crime,\u201d and \u201cdefendants who do not kill. . . are categorically less deserving of the most serious forms of punishment.\u201d (citations omitted, Jones at 257-8).\n12. On balance, Petitioners\u2019 liberty interest is anything but de minimis, and that significant liberty interest outweighs an important, but far less compelling, State interest in protecting the public from inmates who long ago committed crimes that, though horrific, fall far short of first-degree murder under any rational measure.\n13. With regards to Petitioners\u2019 equal protection claims, the analysis applied by the Jones court again leads to a different result.\n14. In Jones, the Supreme Court, applying the appropriate rational basis standard, determined that a person serving a sentence for first-degree murder presents a greater threat to society than inmates convicted of other offenses, and thus DOC has a rational basis to decline to award credit for purposes of conditional release, \u201ceven though these same credits have been awarded for that purpose to other prisoners with determinate sentences.\u201d (Jones at 260).\n15. The Jones Court on multiple occasions went to great length to differentiate the public safety concerns of the State as they relate to first-degree murderers, as opposed to those who commit any other crimes. Petitioners\u2019 convictions are, of course, for second-degree murder and second-degree burglary. Nowhere in its opinion does the Jones court allow for the possibility that other classes of crimes may rise to the same level of concern for public safety as first-degree murder. It is clear that the equal protection analysis undertaken in Jones leads to a different result for Petitioners.\n16. Petitioners were convicted of crimes that, since at least 1995, carry determinate sentences. Many, if not most, defendants convicted of these same crimes, even at the time Petitioners were convicted, received sentences of determinate length. These other defendants, therefore, had good time, gain time, and merit time credits applied to their cases for purposes of unconditional release. Petitioners, though sentenced to terms of life imprisonment, were actually serving sentences statutorily set at eighty years. Petitioners, like others serving sentences of a determinate length, had unconditional release dates to which credits should be applied. Therefore, there is no rational basis for DOC to refuse to apply these credits to Petitioners.\n17. In light of the liberty interest of Petitioners, and of the denial of equal protection of Petitioners, or either standing alone, this Court finds that DOC regulations do require DOC to apply all time credits (good time, gain time, and merit time) for purposes of unconditional release of Petitioners.\n18. Given the stipulation that Petitioners\u2019 total credits, if applied to the unconditional release date, are sufficient to fully satisfy each Petitioner's] sentence, the Petitioners have fully served their sentences.\n19. The court finds that no law or regulation has retroactively altered the sentence reduction credits of Petitioners, and therefore, no ex post facto violations have occurred.\n20. The continued detention of Petitioners is unlawful.\nBased upon these findings and conclusions, the trial court ordered that Petitioners be unconditionally discharged from imprisonment on 17 June 2011. Respondents noted an appeal to this Court from the trial court\u2019s order, contending that the trial court (1) ignored the reasoning utilized in Jones in determining that Petitioners\u2019 due process and equal protection rights had been violated; (2) impermissibly changed the determinations that had been made by the original sentencing courts; and (3) violated the separation of powers doctrine.\nII. Jones\nAlthough the Court correctly recognizes that we are bound by Jones, State v. Davis, 198 N.C. App. 443, 447, 680 S.E.2d 239, 243 (2009) (acknowledging that the Court of Appeals must follow Supreme Court precedent), it states that \u201cthe Supreme Court went to great lengths to distinguish the Jones defendants \u2014 those who committed first-degree murder and were sentenced to life imprisonment for first-degree murder-from other defendants serving life terms under [N.C. Gen. Stat.] \u00a7 14-2 (1974)\u201d and holds, based on that determination, that the trial court correctly concluded that Petitioners were \u201cpart of a distinguishable subset of the Bowden class, different than those considered in Jones[.]\u201d After reaching this conclusion, however, my colleagues have failed to take what strikes me as the next step logically required by Jones, which is to utilize the analytical approach adopted in Jones for the purpose of determining whether the same constitutional arguments that were deemed insufficient with respect to individuals convicted of first degree murder in Jones are sufficient to require the unconditional release of individuals convicted of offenses other than first degree murder. After independently examining the record before the Court in this case using the analytical framework set out in Jones, I feel compelled to conclude that the trial erred by ordering that the Petitioners be unconditionally released.\nIn Jones, the Supreme Court examined whether the DOC\u2019s refusal to utilize earned time credits for the purpose of calculating the petitioner\u2019s unconditional release date violated his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. 364 N.C. at 255-60, 698 S.E.2d at 54-58. As both the trial court and my colleagues have recognized, the only significant difference between the present case and Jones is that Jones dealt with an inmate who had been sentenced to life imprisonment for first degree murder pursuant to former N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-2, while Petitioners were sentenced to life imprisonment under that statute for other offenses. Given that Jones addressed the same constitutional claims that have been raised in this case, with the only difference being the identity of the crimes for which the individual inmates were convicted, I believe that we are required to follow the analysis delineated in Jones in order to determine whether Petitioners are entitled to unconditional release from incarceration. In other words, I do not believe that the fact that this case and Jones involve individuals convicted of different offenses, without more, provides an adequate basis for affirming the trial court\u2019s order.\nA. Statutory Authority Concerning \u201cEarned Time Credits\u201d\nBefore addressing the petitioner\u2019s constitutional claims in Jones, the Supreme Court considered whether \u201cDOC\u2019s administration of good time, gain time, and merit time credits [was] within the statutory authority delegated [to] it by the General Assembly.\u201d 364 N.C. at 255, 698 S.E.2d at 54. In undertaking that analysis, the Supreme Court recognized that, \u201cimplicit in DOC\u2019s power to allow time for good behavior ... is [the] authority to determine the purposes for which time is allowed\u201d and the \u201c[discretion to determine [whether] the purposes for which time is awarded is consistent with such DOC goals as assuring that only those who can safely return to society are paroled or released and that they have been suitably prepared for outside life.\u201d Id. at 255, 698 S.E.2d at 55. Based on that logic, the Supreme Court concluded that the manner in which DOC applied its own regulations was \u201c \u2018strictly administrative\u2019 \u201d and consistent with the agency\u2019s statutory authority. Id.\nB. Due Process\nIn order to analyze the petitioner\u2019s substantive constitutional claims, the Supreme Court first considered whether the DOC\u2019s \u201cinterpretation and implementation of its regulations\u201d violated the petitioner\u2019s due process rights, with the Court\u2019s analysis focusing upon the petitioner\u2019s liberty interest in the earned time credits created by the DOC\u2019s regulations. Jones, 364 N.C. at 256, 698 S.E.2d at 55. At the beginning of its analysis, the Supreme Court discussed the parameters of the petitioner\u2019s liberty interest and stated that:\n[w]hen a liberty interest is created by a State, it follows that the State can, within reasonable and constitutional limits, control the contours of the liberty interest it creates. In other words, the liberty interest created by the State through its regulations may be limited to those particular aspects of an inmate\u2019s incarceration that fall within the purview of those regulations. DOC has interpreted its regulations as permitting the award of different types of time credits for certain purposes and has, in fact, awarded those credits to [the petitioner] for those purposes. On the record before this Court, \u2022 DOC has taken no action against [the petitioner] for punitive reasons. Because [the petitioner] has received the awards to which he is entitled for the purposes for which he is entitled, he has not been denied credits in which he has a constitutionally protected liberty interest.\nId. at 256-57, 698 S.E.2d at 55-56. The Supreme Court then addressed the petitioner\u2019s contention that his earned time credits should have been applied in calculating his unconditional release date by weighing his liberty interest, if any, in having his earned time credits utilized to calculate his unconditional release date against the State\u2019s interest in \u201ckeeping inmates incarcerated until they [could] be released with safety to themselves and to the public[,]\u201d concluding that, while the petitioner\u2019s liberty interest was de minimis, the State\u2019s interest was compelling. Id. at 257, 698 S.E.2d at 56. As part of this process, the Supreme Court noted that the petitioner was eligible for parole and had received annual parole reviews without having been released by the North Carolina Parole Commission. Id. Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that the petitioner had \u201creceived the process that [was] due him as an inmate eligible for parole, when the State\u2019s corresponding interest, [was] assuring that inmates [were] safely released under supervision.\u201d Id. Finally, the Supreme Court stated that:\n[assuming without deciding that DOC\u2019s procedures for determining parole adequately protect an inmate\u2019s due process rights to consideration for parole, those procedures [were] also adequate to preserve [the petitioner\u2019s] constitutional rights while still permitting the State to withhold application of [the petitioner\u2019s] good time, gain time, and merit time to the calculation of a date for his unconditional release. He ha[d] no State]]created right to have his time credits used to calculate his eligibility for unconditional release. [The petitioner\u2019s] due process rights [were] not. . . violated.\nId.\nAlthough my colleagues correctly noted that Petitioners in this case, unlike the petitioner in Jones, have been convicted of offenses other than first degree murder, I am unable to read Jones as establishing that first degree murder convictions represent the only occasions in which the State\u2019s interest in public safety is so compelling as to outweigh any liberty interest that an individual sentenced to life imprisonment pursuant to former N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-2 based upon a conviction for an offense other than first degree murder might have in being awarded earned time credits for the purpose of calculating an unconditional release date. Although the Supreme Court did recognize that the issue before the Court in Jones involved the treatment of individuals who had been sentenced to life imprisonment for first degree murder pursuant to former N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-2, nothing in\nJones suggests to me that the Supreme Court intended that the outcome would necessarily be different in a case involving individuals who had been sentenced to life imprisonment pursuant to former N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-2 based upon convictions for offenses other than first degree murder. On the contrary, it seems to me that we are required to conduct the same analysis utilized in Jones in light of any differences between the facts at issue in that case and those at issue here in order to determine whether a different outcome than that reached with respect to individuals convicted of first degree murder in Jones should be reached here.\nAfter conducting an analysis like that employed in Jones, I am unable to avoid reaching the conclusion that Petitioners \u201ch[ave] not been denied credits in which [they] have a constitutionally protected liberty interest.\u201d 364 N.C. at 257, 698 S.E.2d at 56. As I have previously noted, the Supreme Court has indicated that the State may create a liberty interest available to incarcerated individuals by adopting regulations such as those providing for earned time credits of the type at issue here. Jones, 364 N.C. at 256, 698 S.E.2d at 55. However, the Supreme Court expressly stated in Jones that this liberty interest has a limited scope given the State\u2019s ability, \u201cwithin reasonable and constitutional limits, [to] control the contours of the liberty interest it creates.\u201d Id. at 256, 698 S.E.2d at 56. Put another way, earned time credits created by DOC regulation \u201cmay be limited to those particular aspects of [Petitioners\u2019] incarceration that fall within the purview of those regulations.\u201d Id. at 257, 698 S.E.2d at 56. In the present case, as in Jones, while acknowledging that Petitioners had accumulated earned time credits, the DOC contends that the credits were not intended to be applied to reduce the time to be served on Petitioners\u2019 sentences. As the stipulations between the parties reflect (1), \u201c[b]ecause Petitioners were sentenced under pre-Fair Sentencing law, their sentences were shown in their combined inmate records as \u201cLIFE,\u201d and no credits were applied by DOC to calculate unconditional release dates for them[,]\u201d and (2):\nDOC has never applied either good time or gain and merit time to calculate an unconditional release date for inmates sentenced to or serving life sentences, regardless of whether the inmates were sentenced under pre-Fair Sentencing law or the Fair Sentencing Act or regardless of the crime of which the inmate was convicted. For such inmates, DOC applied good time credits only for the purpose of shortening the time required to be served to become eligible for parole consideration and the time required to be served to become eligible for promotion to minimum custody, the least restrictive DOC custody status. By contrast, DOC applied good time and gain or merit time in the event the Governor commuted a life sentence to a term of years\u2019 sentence.\nAs a result, given that the \u201cDOC has interpreted its regulations as permitting the award of different types of time for certain purposes and has, in fact, awarded those credits to [Petitioners] for those purposes . . . [Petitioners have] received the awards to which [they] are entitled for the purposes for which [they] are entitled,\u201d Id., and have not, under the logic set out in Jones, been deprived of a constitutionally protected liberty interest.\nIn addition, even if we were to address Petitioners\u2019 due process claims by weighing, as the Supreme Court did in a separate portion of its Jones opinion, their liberty interest, \u201cif any,... [against] the State\u2019s compelling interest in keeping inmates incarcerated until they can be released with safety to themselves and to the public[,]\u201d I would still feel compelled to conclude that no due process violation has occurred in this case. Id. at 257, 698 S.E.2d at 56.\nA careful reading of Jones indicates that the weighing analysis discussed by the Supreme Court rested upon determinations that (1) the liberty interest, if any, that had been created by the DOC\u2019s provisions providing for \u201cearned time credits\u201d was relatively minimal; (2) the State\u2019s interest in keeping inmates incarcerated until their release posed no danger to the public was compelling; and (3) the fact that the petitioners were eligible for parole, sufficed \u201cto preserve [his] constitutional rights while still permitting the State to withhold application of [his] good time, gain time, and merit time [from] the calculation of a date for [his] unconditional release.\u201d Id. Although the Supreme Court certainly emphasized the particularly heinous nature of the conduct needed to establish an individual\u2019s guilt of first degree murder in conducting the balancing test described in Jones, I do not see anything in the Supreme Court\u2019s opinion that suggests that the outcome would necessarily be different in the event that this same analysis were conducted in a case involving individuals convicted of something other than first degree murder. For that reason, even though the State\u2019s public safety interest may be less pronounced in this case than in a case involving an individual convicted of first degree murder, that fact does not necessarily mean that the incarcerated individual\u2019s limited interest in having earned time credits applied to his or her unconditional release date outweighs the State\u2019s public safety interest. As a result, we must replicate the Jones analysis based on the differing facts at issue here in order to determine whether to evaluate the validity of the trial court\u2019s due process decision.\nThe Supreme Court\u2019s determination that a prisoner\u2019s interest, if any, in the use of earned time credits to calculate a prisoner\u2019s unconditional release date is relatively minimal does not appear to me to hinge on the nature of the offense which led to his or her incarceration. For that reason, the liberty interest upon which Petitioners rely must, under Jones, be deemed minimal. In addition, although the offenses for which Petitioners are currently incarcerated are not as heinous as first degree murder, second degree burglary and second degree murder are very serious offenses that involve significant public safety implications. Finally, as was the case with respect to the convicted first degree murderers at issue in Jones, Petitioners were \u201celigible for parole ...[,] had received annual [or three year] parole reviews, [and] the Parole Commission [had] consistently . . . declined to parole [them].\u201d 364 N.C. at 257, 698 S.E.2d at 56. For that reason, as in Jones, the protections afforded to Petitioners were \u201cadequate to preserve [Petitioners\u2019] constitutional rights while still permitting the State to withhold application of [Petitioners\u2019] good time, gain time, and merit time to the calculation of a date for [their] unconditional release.\u201d Id. at 257, 698 S.E.2d at 56. As a result, given that the significant public safety concerns associated with the offenses for which Petitioners were convicted coupled with the adequacy of Petitioners\u2019 parole-related rights outweigh the minimal liberty interest that Petitioners possess in having their earned time credits utilized to calculate their unconditional release dates, I would hold that the trial court erred by concluding that Petitioners\u2019 liberty interests \u201c[were] anything but de minimis;\u201d that \u201cth[ose] significant liberty interests outweighfed] an important, but far less compelling, State interest in protecting the public from inmates who long ago committed crimes that, though horrific, f[e]ll far short of first-degree murder under any rational measure;\u201d and that Petitioners\u2019 due process rights were violated.\nC. Equal Protection\nThe trial court also concluded that the DOC\u2019s refusal to credit Petitioners\u2019 \u201cearned time credits\u201d for the purpose of calculating their unconditional release date constituted an equal protection violation. The trial court reached this conclusion on the grounds that (1) Jones made a sharp distinction between the public safety concerns that would be triggered by the release of individuals sentenced to life imprisonment pursuant to former N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-2 for first degree murder and the release of individuals sentenced to life imprisonment under that statute for other offenses and (2) the fact that Petitioners would not be subject to a life sentence for second degree murder and second degree burglary under current law. In affirming the trial court\u2019s decision with respect to this equal protection issue, my colleagues rely, once again, upon their determination that the difference between a life sentence under former N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-2 for first degree murder and a life sentence under that statute for some other offense is outcome-determinative. I do not find this reasoning persuasive.\nIn Jones, the Supreme Court rejected the petitioner\u2019s argument that those sentenced to life imprisonment for first degree murder under former N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-2 were \u201cserving determinate sentences differently [than] other inmates serving determinate sentences\u201d and that the \u201cDOC\u2019s denial of good time, gain time, and merit time for the purposes of calculating an unconditional release date violate[d] [the petitioner\u2019s] right to equal protection of the law.\u201d 364 N.C. at 259, 698 S.E.2d at 57. In analyzing the petitioner\u2019s equal protection claim, the Supreme Court began by noting that \u201c \u2018equal protection of the laws is not denied by a statute prescribing the punishment to be inflicted on a person convicted of crime unless it prescribes different punishment for the same acts committed under the same circumstances by persons in like situation[s].\u2019 \u201d Id. at 260, 698 S.E.2d at 57-58 (quoting State v. Benton, 276 N.C. 641, 660, 174 S.E.2d 793, 805 (1970)). After determining that the petitioner\u2019s claim should be subject to rational basis scrutiny, the Supreme Court stated that:\n[the petitioner] was convicted of a different crime than others serving determinate sentences under statutes other than [N.C. Gen. Stat.] \u00a7 14-2, even if the sentences of some of those others are for eighty years or even longer (perhaps due to the imposition of consecutive sentences). The fact that [the petitioner] is serving a sentence for first[] degree murder reasonably suggests that he presents a greater threat to society than prisoners convicted of other offenses.\nId. at 260, 698 S.E.2d at 58. As a result, the Supreme Court concluded that the \u201cDOC ha[d] a rational basis for denying [the] petitioner good time, gain time, and merit time for the purposes of unconditional release, even though these same credits ha[d] been awarded for that purpose to other prisoners with determinate sentences.\u201d Id.\nAt the time that their life sentences were imposed, individuals convicted of second degree murder and second degree burglary were subject to either an explicitly determinate sentence or a sentence of life imprisonment imposed pursuant to former N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-2. As a result of the Supreme Court\u2019s determination that claims such as the one at issue here are subject to rational basis review, Jones, 364 N.C. at 259-60, 698 S.E.2d at 57, we are required to uphold the DOC\u2019s refusal to utilize Petitioners\u2019 earned time credits for the purpose of calculating an unconditional release date as long as that decision \u201cbear[s] some rational relationship to a conceivable legitimate governmental interest.\u201d Texfi Industries v. City of Fayetteville, 301 N.C. 1, 11, 269 S.E.2d 142, 149 (1980). Although, the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Jones appears to rest upon the fact that an individual \u201cserving a sentence for first-degree murder . . . presents a greater threat to society than prisoners convicted of other offensesf,]\u201d 364 N.C. at 260, 698 S.E.2d at 58, the fact that Petitioners were convicted of offenses less heinous than first degree murder does not necessitate the conclusion that an equal protection violation has occurred in this instance. On the contrary, given that these individuals, who could have received an explicitly determinate sentence at trial, were sentenced to life imprisonment pursuant to former N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-2, I believe that, under the same basic logic adopted by the Supreme Court in Jones, we are compelled to conclude that there was a rational basis for believing that these individuals represented a greater threat to society than those sentenced to explicitly determinate sentences for the same offenses.\nIn addition, I do not believe that the fact that Petitioners would not be subject to sentences of life imprisonment under current law has any bearing on the equal protection analysis that should be employed in order to decide this case. As the General Assembly stated in repealing former N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-2:\n[t]his act becomes effective October 1, 1994, and applies only to offenses occurring on or after that date. Prosecutions for, or sentences based on, offenses occurring before the effective date of this act are not abated or affected by the repeal or amendment in this act of any statute, and the statutes that would be applicable to those prosecutions or sentences but for the provisions of this act remain applicable to those prosecutions or sentences.\nCh. 24, Sec. 14, 1993 N.C. Sess. Laws (Extra Sess. 1994) at 96. As the Supreme Court has recognized, the General Assembly has the authority to change the sentences applicable to particular criminal offenses on a prospective basis, with the judicial branch having the obligation to apply the revised sentencing legislation consistently with the effective date provisions enacted by the General Assembly. State v. Whitehead,_N.C.__,_, 722 S.E.2d 492, 495 (2012). As a result of the fact that the legislation repealing former N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-2 expressly left existing sentences undisturbed and the fact that such a change in the applicable sentencing statutes does not result in the imposition of differing sentences for the same conduct under the same circumstances, I am unable to see how the enactment of the existing sentencing statutes has any bearing on the constitutional analysis that we are required to undertake in this case. As a result, I would hold that the trial court erred by concluding that Petitioners have been deprived of their right to the equal protection of the laws by virtue of the DOC\u2019s refusal to utilize their earned credits in calculating their unconditional release dates.\nIII. Conclusion\nThus, although I agree with my colleagues that Jones controls the outcome in the present case, I believe that a proper understanding of Jones requires us to conduct an independent analysis of the specific facts underlying Petitioners\u2019 claims in order to. determine the validity of the trial court\u2019s order. After conducting such an analysis, I am compelled to conclude that Petitioners\u2019 constitutional rights to due process and equal protection have not been violated by the DOC\u2019s refusal to utilize their earned time credits in calculating their unconditional release dates. As a result, I believe that we should reverse the trial court\u2019s order and respectfully dissent from the Court\u2019s decision to the contrary.\n. In their brief, Petitioners contend that \u201cthe Supreme Court found that DOC could limit the purpose of [the petitioner\u2019s] sentence reduction credits due to the fact that [his] liberty interest in those credits was different than that of other inmates because he committed first-degree murder.\u201d I am unable, however, to read Jones as suggesting that the discussed determination in the text was limited to situations in which the petitioner had been sentenced to life imprisonment for first degree murder.\n. Because the trial court\u2019s decision to order Petitioners\u2019 unconditional release rested exclusively upon due process and equal protection considerations, I see no need to address the DOC\u2019s remaining challenges to the trial court\u2019s order.", "type": "dissent", "author": "ERVIN, Judge," } ], "attorneys": [ "Sarah Jessica Farber, Vemetta Alston, and Mary S. Pollard for petitioners-appellees.", "Roy A. Cooper, Attorney General, by Special Deputy Attorney General Thomas J. Pitman and Assistant Attorney General Elizabeth F. Parson, for respondents-appellants." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "CLYDE VERNON LOVETTE, Petitioner v. THE NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, ALVIN KELLER in his capacity as Secretary of Correction, and RUDY FOSTER in his capacity as Administrator of Dan River Prison Work Farm, Respondents CHARLES LYNCH, Petitioner v. THE NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, ALVIN KELLER in his capacity as Secretary of Correction, and TIM KERLEY in his capacity as Administrator of Catawba Correctional Center, Respondents\nNo. COA11-1081\n(Filed 21 August 2012)\n1. Sentencing \u2014 life imprisonment \u2014 prior statute\nIn an action involving the release date for inmates sentenced to life imprisonment under a prior statute, the trial court did not err by concluding that it was bound by Jones v. Keller, 364 N.C. 249, but then differentiating petitioners from the limited scope of the Jones decision. The Supreme Court went to great lengths to distinguish the Jones defendants (serving life sentences for first-degree murder) from other defendants serving life terms under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-2.\n2. Judges \u2014 change by subsequent judge \u2014 sentencing determination\nThe trial court did not change determinations by other superior courts when it held that petitioners, sentenced to life imprisonment under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-2, were serving sentences statutorily set at 80 years and had unconditional release dates to which credits should be applied.\n3. Constitutional Law \u2014 separation of powers \u2014 sentencing determination\nThe trial court did not violate the separation of powers doctrine by ordering the unconditional release of inmates imprisoned for life under a statute that defined \u201clife\u201d as 80 years where those prisoners had credits toward their release date.\nJudge ERVIN dissenting.\nAppeal by respondents from order entered 16 June 2011 by Judge Allen Baddour in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 25 January 2012.\nSarah Jessica Farber, Vemetta Alston, and Mary S. Pollard for petitioners-appellees.\nRoy A. Cooper, Attorney General, by Special Deputy Attorney General Thomas J. Pitman and Assistant Attorney General Elizabeth F. Parson, for respondents-appellants." }, "file_name": "0452-01", "first_page_order": 462, "last_page_order": 481 }