{ "id": 4033525, "name": "DIANE SOOD, Plaintiff v. AJIT BOBBY SOOD, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Sood v. Sood", "decision_date": "2012-09-18", "docket_number": "No. COA12-369", "first_page": "807", "last_page": "813", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "222 N.C. App. 807" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "630 S.E.2d 234", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635856 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "243" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/630/0234-01" ] }, { "cite": "643 S.E.2d 452", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12638084 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "456", "parenthetical": "quoting Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3, 2007 Ann. R. N.C. 446" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/643/0452-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 S.E. 407", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1934, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "410" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "205 N.C. 545", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8630094 ], "year": 1934, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "552" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/205/0545-01" ] }, { "cite": "488 S.E.2d 826", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "346 N.C. 557", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 139488, 139640, 139494 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/346/0557-03", "/nc/346/0557-01", "/nc/346/0557-02" ] }, { "cite": "480 S.E.2d 53", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "58" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "125 N.C. App. 174", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11866285 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "183" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/125/0174-01" ] }, { "cite": "676 S.E.2d 910", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "918", "parenthetical": "stating that \"[a]fter appeal, the trial court is without jurisdiction to grant relief under Rule 60.\" (citation omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "197 N.C. App. 261", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4167417 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "271", "parenthetical": "stating that \"[a]fter appeal, the trial court is without jurisdiction to grant relief under Rule 60.\" (citation omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/197/0261-01" ] }, { "cite": "677 S.E.2d 854", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "858", "parenthetical": "emphasis in original, quotation marks and citations removed" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "196 N.C. App. 615", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4167013 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "620", "parenthetical": "emphasis in original, quotation marks and citations removed" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/196/0615-01" ] }, { "cite": "685 S.E.2d 117", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "121" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "200 N.C. App. 476", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4172475 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "481" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/200/0476-01" ] }, { "cite": "705 S.E.2d 358", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2010, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "364 N.C. 616", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 2010, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "693 S.E.2d 235", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "240" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "204 N.C. App. 138", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4176902 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "144" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/204/0138-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 N.C. App. 614", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8301914 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "627-28" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/177/0614-01" ] }, { "cite": "182 N.C. App. 714", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8176080 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "719", "parenthetical": "quoting Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3, 2007 Ann. R. N.C. 446" }, { "page": "719" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/182/0714-01" ] }, { "cite": "706 S.E.2d 317", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "322", "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "572 S.E.2d 101", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "102", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted, emphasis in original" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 415", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511250 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "416", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0415-01" ] }, { "cite": "695 S.E.2d 807", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "810", "parenthetical": "quotation marks and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "205 N.C. App. 200", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 3734476 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "202", "parenthetical": "quotation marks and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/205/0200-01" ] }, { "cite": "509 S.E.2d 452", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "454", "parenthetical": "observing that \"[a] permanent custody order establishes a party's present right to custody of a child and that party's right to retain custody indefinitely.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 N.C. App. 851", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11206689 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "852", "parenthetical": "observing that \"[a] permanent custody order establishes a party's present right to custody of a child and that party's right to retain custody indefinitely.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/131/0851-01" ] }, { "cite": "587 S.E.2d 675", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "677", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "677", "parenthetical": "noting that an order is interlocutory if it \"does not determine all the issues.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "161 N.C. App. 78", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8955326 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "81", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "81" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/161/0078-01" ] }, { "cite": "533 S.E.2d 541", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "546", "parenthetical": "citations and ellipses omitted" }, { "page": "546" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "139 N.C. App. 222", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9496439 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "227", "parenthetical": "citations and ellipses omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/139/0222-01" ] }, { "cite": "582 S.E.2d 321", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "323", "parenthetical": "quotation marks and citations omitted" }, { "page": "323" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 N.C. App. 711", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9189139 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "713", "parenthetical": "quotation marks and citations omitted" }, { "page": "713" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/158/0711-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 S.E.2d 735", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "736" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 723", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5307026 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "725" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0723-01" ] }, { "cite": "711 S.E.2d 185", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "188", "parenthetical": "quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 54(a)" }, { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "189" }, { "page": "189" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 784, "char_count": 17364, "ocr_confidence": 0.74, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.692609448424287e-08, "percentile": 0.35792878272053696 }, "sha256": "dc68d241113f3a22375b9d8a2dbea37805a785b80aaf0aef4a325e2ad3529f4b", "simhash": "1:872ad62e6e3d646e", "word_count": 2888 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:23:21.020165+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge GEER concur." ], "parties": [ "DIANE SOOD, Plaintiff v. AJIT BOBBY SOOD, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "STROUD, Judge.\nAjit Bobby Sood (\u201cdefendant\u201d) appeals from the trial court\u2019s temporary custody order. For the following reasons, we deny defendant\u2019s petition for writ of certiorari and dismiss his interlocutory appeal.\nI. Background\nDiane Lynn Sood (\u201cplaintiff\u2019) and defendant were married to each other on 7 February 2003 and have one child, born 12 September 2003. The couple separated in July 2011. Plaintiff filed a complaint in Gaston County on 15 July 2011 requesting primary custody of the minor child, a temporary custody order, equitable distribution, child support, and a psychological evaluation of defendant. On 29 November 2011, the trial court held a hearing regarding temporary custody. Defendant was represented by counsel at this hearing. The trial court entered a written order on 20 January 2012 granting the parties joint legal custody, with primary physical custody awarded to plaintiff. Defendant timely filed written notice of appeal from the district court\u2019s temporary custody order on 14 February 2012.\nII. Appeal from temporary custody order\nOn appeal, defendant asserts fourteen distinct issues. Since we conclude that this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear defendant\u2019s appeal from an interlocutory order, we do not reach the merits of his claims and dismiss his appeal.\n\u201cAn order is either \u2018interlocutory or the final determination of the rights of the parties.\u2019 \u201d Hamilton v. Mortgage Information Services, Inc.,_N.C. App._,._, 711 S.E.2d 185, 188 (2011) (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 54(a)). \u201cAn interlocutory order . . . does not dispose of the case, but leaves it for further action by the trial court in order to settle and determine the entire controversy.\u201d Id. (citation omitted). There is, in general, \u201cno right of immediate appeal from interlocutory orders[.]\u201d Goldston v. American Motors Corp., 326 N.C. 723, 725, 392 S.E.2d 735, 736 (1990). Nevertheless, an interlocutory order\nis immediately appealable if (1) the order is final as to some claims or parties, and the trial court certifies pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 54(b) that there is no just reason to delay the appeal, or (2) the order deprives the appellant of a substantial right that would be lost unless immediately reviewed.\nCurrin & Currin Const., Inc. v. Lingerfelt, 158 N.C. App. 711, 713, 582 S.E.2d 321, 323 (2003) (quotation marks and citations omitted). The burden of showing that one of these exceptions applies rests on the appellant. Hamilton,_N.C. App. at_, 711 S.E.2d at 189. If the appellant fails to meet that burden, \u201cwe are required to dismiss that party\u2019s appeal on jurisdictional grounds.\u201d Id.\nA temporary child custody order is normally\ninterlocutory and does not affect any substantial right which cannot be protected by timely appeal from the trial court\u2019s ultimate disposition on the merits.\nBrewer v. Brewer, 139 N.C. App. 222, 227, 533 S.E.2d 541, 546 (2000) (citations and ellipses omitted). A trial court\u2019s label of a custody order as \u201ctemporary\u201d is not dispositive. Id. at 228, 533 S.E.2d at 546. A custody order is, in fact,\ntemporary if either (1) it is entered without prejudice to either party, (2) it states a clear and specific reconvening time in the order and the time interval between the two hearings was reasonably brief; or (3) the order does not determine all the issues.\nSenner v. Senner, 161 N.C. App. 78, 81, 587 S.E.2d 675, 677 (2003) (citations omitted).\nHere, the temporary custody order was not entered without prejudice to either party and did not include a \u201cclear and specific reconvening time.\u201d See id. However, the trial court did not determine all of the issues. In its order, the trial court specifically found that it lacked sufficient information to make vital findings of fact, particularly regarding the parties\u2019 mental conditions, as no psychological evaluation had yet been done, but there was evidence which indicated a need for this evaluation and the trial court ordered that such an evaluation be performed. In addition, the trial court explicitly left open the issue of defendant\u2019s child support arrearage and stated that child support would be recalculated \u201cwithout a showing of a substantial change in circumstances\u201d when \u201cPlaintiff becomes employed.\u201d The order did specify a custodial schedule for holidays in some detail for the subsequent months (2011 Christmas and 2012 Spring Break), but it did not resolve holidays for the indefinite future. See Regan v. Smith, 131 N.C. App. 851, 852, 509 S.E.2d 452, 454 (1998) (observing that \u201c[a] permanent custody order establishes a party\u2019s present right to custody of a child and that party\u2019s right to retain custody indefinitely.\u201d). Indeed, defendant concedes in his brief that the order \u201cis temporary as to the issue of child custody[.]\u201d Therefore, the order is interlocutory. See Senner, 161 N.C. App. at 81, 587 S.E.2d at 677 (noting that an order is interlocutory if it \u201cdoes not determine all the issues.\u201d).\nWe further note that the temporary custody order contains no Rule 54(b) certification. See Currin & Currin Const., Inc., 158 N.C. App. at 713, 582 S.E.2d at 323. However, defendant argues that even if the order is interlocutory, it does affect a substantial right because the trial court\u2019s order violated his First Amendment rights by granting custody of his child to plaintiff based solely on the fact that he is non-Christian and the trial judge, a Christian, was biased against him.\nWe first note that there is no indication in either brief that the trial judge\u2019s religious affiliation was ever mentioned prior or during the temporary custody hearing, although we do not have a transcript of the hearing. Based upon the record, it appears that defendant did not raise this issue until after entry of the temporary custody order, in his \u201cNotice and Motion To Vacate Court\u2019s Order entered January 20, 2012 and For Emergency Stay of Execution.\u201d Defendant attached to this motion various exhibits, including printouts of information from the trial judge\u2019s campaign Facebook page. The Facebook page notes Judge Lands\u2019s \u201cReligious views\u201d as \u201cChristian\u201d and identifies his church affiliation and the fact that he is a \u201cSunday School teacher.\u201d Under North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure 9(a)(l)(j) and 10(a)(1), it was improper for this information to be included in the record on appeal, as it was not ruled on or considered by the trial court in regard to any order which we are reviewing. In the same motion, defendant identifies himself as Hindu, although plaintiff asserts that defendant\u2019s religious affiliation was not in evidence at the temporary custody hearing. However, as neither party has objected, and both have argued based upon defendant\u2019s claims in his motion, we will assume, at least for purposes of argument, that Judge Lands is Christian and defendant is Hindu.\nDefendant is correct that this Court has found that orders \u201cimplicating a party\u2019s First Amendment rights affect[] a substantial right.\u201d Mathis v. Daly, 205 N.C. App. 200, 202, 695 S.E.2d 807, 810 (2010) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Generally, to preserve an issue for appeal, a party must raise the issue in the trial court. N.C.R. App. P. 10(a)(1). \u201cA constitutional issue not raised at trial will generally not be considered for the first time on appeal.\u201d Anderson v. Assimos, 356 N.C. 415, 416, 572 S.E.2d 101, 102 (2002) (citations omitted). This Court will consider constitutional questions not raised at trial \u201cin exceptional circumstances . . . only when the issue is squarely presented upon an adequate factual record and only when resolution of the issue is necessary.\u201d Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted, emphasis in original). In this instance, the issue has been neither \u201csquarely presented\u201d nor is there any factual record, much less an \u201cadequate factual record.\u201d Defendant failed to file a motion for the trial judge to recuse himself for any reason. In addition, defendant failed to include a transcript in the record, so we cannot determine if defendant properly preserved this issue for appeal by raising his First Amendment argument at trial or by mentioning any concern whatsoever regarding bias of the trial court. \u201c \u2018Appellate review is based solely upon the record on appeal,\u2019 N.C.R. App. P. 9(a); it is the duty of the appellants to see that the record is complete.\u201d CRLP Durham, LP v. Durham City/County Bd. of Adjustment, _N.C. App._,._, 706 S.E.2d 317, 322 (2011) (citations and quotation marks omitted)). Thus, defendant\u2019s First Amendment argument has not been properly preserved for appellate review by this Court. See N.C.R. App. P. 10(a)(1).\nDefendant states in a conclusory manner that the trial court\u2019s order violated his First Amendment rights because the trial court discriminated against him based on his religious beliefs and was biased against him because of those beliefs. Even though he states that he asked his trial counsel to reschedule his hearing so that he would have a different trial judge, there is, as noted above, no indication that he made a motion for recusal prior to entry of the temporary custody order. The North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct sets forth instances in which a party\u2019s motion for recusal of a judge should be granted. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3(C), 2010 Ann. R. N.C. 518-19. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3(C), 2010 Ann. R. N.C. 518, specifically states that\n(1) On motion of any party, a judge should disqualify himself/ herself in a proceeding in which the judge\u2019s impartiality may reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances where:\n(a) The judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party\nThe Code further\nnotes that \u201c[njothing in this Canon shall preclude a judge from disqualifying himself/herself from participating in any proceeding upon the judge\u2019s own initiative.\u201d Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3(D), 2010 Ann. R. N.C. 519. \u201cWhile this provision certainly encourages a judge to recuse himself or herself in cases where his or her \u2018impartiality may reasonably be questioned\u2019 upon their [sic] own motion, they [sic] are not required to do so in the absence of a motion by a party.\u201d In re Key, 182 N.C. App. 714, 719, 643 S.E.2d 452, 456 (2007) (quoting Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3, 2007 Ann. R. N.C. 446).\n\u201cIn order to preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must have presented to the trial court a timely request, objection, or motion[.]\u201d N.C. R. App. P. 10(a)(1) (2009). When a party does not move for a judge\u2019s recusal at trial, the issue is not preserved for our review. In re Key, 182 N.C. App. at 719, 643 S.E.2d at 456 (citing State v. Love, 177 N.C. App. 614, 627-28, 630 S.E.2d 234, 243 (2006)).\nIn re D.R.F., 204 N.C. App. 138, 144, 693 S.E.2d 235, 240 (footnote omitted), disc. rev. denied, 364 N.C. 616, 705 S.E.2d 358 (2010). This Court has held that an alleged failure to recuse is not considered an error automatically preserved under N.C.R. App. P. 10(a)(1). Id. Because defendant did not include a copy of the trial transcript in record, we cannot determine if defendant ever moved at trial to have the trial judge recuse himself. Where appellant failed to move that the trial judge recuse himself, he cannot later raise on appeal the judge\u2019s alleged bias based on an undesired outcome. Thus, neither of the First Amendment issues that defendant raises have been properly preserved for our review. Therefore, defendant cannot meet his burden to show that his interlocutory appeal affects a substantial right. Hamilton,_N.C. App. at_, 711 S.E.2d at 189. Accordingly, this Court has no jurisdiction to hear his appeal. See id.\nIII. Writ of Certiorari\nIn the alternative, defendant requests that this Court treat his appeal as a petition for writ of certiorari and exercise our discretion under N.C.R. App. P. 21(a)(1) and grant his petition. This Court has the discretion to treat an appeal as a petition for certiorari in appropriate circumstances. In re M.L.T.H., 200 N.C. App. 476, 481, 685 S.E.2d 117, 121 (2009). \u201cA writ of certiorari will only be issued upon a showing of appropriate circumstances in a civil case where the right of appeal has been lost by failure to take timely action or where no right to appeal from an interlocutory order exists.\u201d Harbin Yinhai Technology Development Co., Ltd. v. Greentree Financial Group, Inc., 196 N.C. App. 615, 620, 677 S.E.2d 854, 858 (2009) (emphasis in original, quotation marks and citations removed). Here, we have found that no right to appeal from an interlocutory order exists. In addition, defendant has failed to show appropriate circumstances for a writ of certiorari and we decline to exercise our discretion in granting the writ.\nIV. Conclusion\nSince we have concluded that this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear defendant\u2019s appeal from the interlocutory custody order and have declined to grant defendant a writ of certiorari, we must dismiss his appeal for want of jurisdiction.\nDISMISSED.\nChief Judge MARTIN and Judge GEER concur.\n. We note that on 19 December 2011, defendant filed a motion for \u201cA New Trial\u201d pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1 Rules 59 and 60. Following the entry of the temporary custody order, defendant filed a motion to vacate the trial court\u2019s order and stay its judgment on 30 January 2012 pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rules 60 and 62. There is no indication in the record of a ruling on these motions. See N.C.R. App. P. 10(a)(1). Although neither party has addressed the effect of these motions on defendant\u2019s appeal, we note that defendant\u2019s Rule 59 motion was untimely as it was filed on 19 December 2011, before the temporary custody order was entered. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 59(b); N.C.R. App. P. 3(c)(3). In fact, although defendant identified his motion as a motion for new trial under Rule 59, actually the motion states as its primary complaint the fact that an order had not yet been entered and continues on to address events which occurred between the parties after the hearing. It would probably be more appropriately treated as a motion in the cause regarding temporary custody based upon events occurring after the hearing. Defendant\u2019s Rule 60 and 62 motions would not prevent this Court from hearing defendant\u2019s appeal. See N. C. State Bar v. Sossomon, 197 N.C. App. 261, 271, 676 S.E.2d 910, 918 (2009) (stating that \u201c[a]fter appeal, the trial court is without jurisdiction to grant relief under Rule 60.\u201d (citation omitted)); Wilmington Star-News v. New Hanover Regional Medical Ctr., 125 N.C. App. 174, 183, 480 S.E.2d 53, 58 (stating that Rule 62(d) permits trial courts to stay orders pending appeal: \u201cWhen an appeal is taken, the appellant may obtain a stay of execution, subject to the exceptions contained in section (a), by proceeding in accordance with and subject to the conditions of [G.S. 1-289 through 1-295].\u201d (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 62(d)), appeal dismissed, 346 N.C. 557, 488 S.E.2d 826 (1997).\n. As noted above, there is no indication in our record that the trial court ever ruled upon this motion. See N.C.R. App. P. 10(a)(1).\n. Although plaintiff\u2019s counsel notified defendant of various objections to the record on appeal by letter and by filing a \u201cNotice of objection to Defendant\u2019s Proposed Record on Appeal,\u201d he failed to serve any proposed amendments or an alternative record, and neither party requested judicial settlement of the record on appeal. Thus, it appears that the contents of the record before us were determined entirely by defendant.\n. Defendant violates N.C.R. App. R 9(a) by including in his argument facts which are not contained in the record on appeal. Certainly his conversations with his own counsel are not in our record. If not for the fact that plaintiff\u2019s counsel responds in kind, by also stating facts in her brief which are not contained in the record, we would impose a sanction upon defendant. Yet both parties deserve the same sanction in this regard. We will at least admonish both plaintiff and defendant that, should they appear before this Court again, they must heed the requirements of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure, particularly as to settlement of the record on appeal, content of the record on appeal, and confining their arguments to the facts contained in the record on appeal. We further admonish plaintiff\u2019s counsel that it is entirely improper for him to state, in the first person, his personal recollection of events at trial or after as part of his argument in an appellate brief. We also encourage defendant to heed the wisdom of our Supreme Court that \u201cthe old adage is true: \u2018A man who is his own lawyer has a fool for a client.\u2019 \u201d State v. Goff, 205 N.C. 545, 552, 172 S.E. 407, 410 (1934).", "type": "majority", "author": "STROUD, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Timothy T. Leach, for plaintiff-appellee.", "Ajit Bobby Sood, pro se." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "DIANE SOOD, Plaintiff v. AJIT BOBBY SOOD, Defendant\nNo. COA12-369\n(Filed 18 September 2012)\nAppeal and Error \u2014 interlocutory order \u2014 writ of certiorari denied\nThe Court of Appeals denied defendant\u2019s petition for writ of certiorari and dismissed his appeal from an interlocutory order in a temporary child custody case. Neither of the First Amendment issues that defendant raised were properly preserved for review.\nAppeal by defendant from order entered on or about 17 January 2012 by Judge Michael K Lands in District Court, Gaston County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 27 August 2012.\nTimothy T. Leach, for plaintiff-appellee.\nAjit Bobby Sood, pro se." }, "file_name": "0807-01", "first_page_order": 817, "last_page_order": 823 }