{ "id": 4104301, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. KEITH ANTONIO BARNETT", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Barnett", "decision_date": "2012-10-02", "docket_number": "No. COA12-269", "first_page": "65", "last_page": "72", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "223 N.C. App. 65" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "533 S.E.2d 248", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "254", "parenthetical": "\"The purpose of an indictment is to give a defendant notice of the crime for which he is being charged.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "139 N.C. App. 18", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9495702 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "27", "parenthetical": "\"The purpose of an indictment is to give a defendant notice of the crime for which he is being charged.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/139/0018-01" ] }, { "cite": "724 S.E.2d 633", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "636", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "636" }, { "page": "639" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "354 S.E.2d 259", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "262" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "85 N.C. App. 123", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12169653 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "126" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/85/0123-01" ] }, { "cite": "459 S.E.2d 510", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "512" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "341 N.C. 173", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 793125 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "176" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/341/0173-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 S.E.2d 677", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "680" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "280 N.C. 273", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571097 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "276" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/280/0273-01" ] }, { "cite": "468 S.E.2d 221", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "224" }, { "page": "224" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "343 N.C. 61", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 798912 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "65" }, { "page": "65" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/343/0061-01" ] }, { "cite": "593 S.E.2d 453", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "455" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "163 N.C. App. 350", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8917729 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "352" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/163/0350-01" ] }, { "cite": "528 S.E.2d 326", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "341" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 481", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155877 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "503" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0481-01" ] }, { "cite": "432 S.E.2d 832", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "836", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 N.C. 169", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2531340 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "175", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/334/0169-01" ] }, { "cite": "451 S.E.2d 131", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "143", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "338 N.C. 315", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2518881 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "339", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/338/0315-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(4)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.9", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 10, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)", "parenthetical": "applying to all persons \"required to register\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 S.E.2d 695", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "709" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "60 N.C. App. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8519344 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "25" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/60/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 153-266.6", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 7, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "63" }, { "page": "65-66" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "170 S.E.2d 913", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "915" }, { "page": "914" }, { "page": "915" }, { "page": "916-17" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "276 N.C. 60", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560017 ], "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/276/0060-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.18", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "year": 2011, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "726 S.E.2d 863", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "864-67" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "132 S.E. 795", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1926, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "795" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "191 N.C. 700", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8631167 ], "year": 1926, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "702" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/191/0700-01" ] }, { "cite": "130 S.E.2d 638", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "639", "parenthetical": "in turn quoting State v. Ballangee, 191 N.C. 700, 702, 132 S.E. 795, 795 (1926)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "259 N.C. 374", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560657 ], "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "376", "parenthetical": "in turn quoting State v. Ballangee, 191 N.C. 700, 702, 132 S.E. 795, 795 (1926)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/259/0374-01" ] }, { "cite": "714 S.E.2d 201", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "207", "parenthetical": "alterations in original" }, { "page": "207" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "679 S.E.2d 857", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "861" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "198 N.C. App. 329", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4169390 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "334" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/198/0329-01" ] }, { "cite": "718 S.E.2d 737", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2011, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "677 S.E.2d 444", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "449" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 322", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4151610 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "328" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/363/0322-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 S.E.2d 917", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1953, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "920" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "238 N.C. 325", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8607564 ], "year": 1953, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "328" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/238/0325-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 743, "char_count": 16303, "ocr_confidence": 0.732, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.2345877655261833e-07, "percentile": 0.6064386379283117 }, "sha256": "e9efafc8f4ba00b63698976f4bd80f92ceba6ed2ad21af2bbf48e741dabe033f", "simhash": "1:836966615e6fedf0", "word_count": 2655 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:08:05.693184+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges MCGEE and BEASLEY concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. KEITH ANTONIO BARNETT" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "THIGPEN, Judge.\nKeith Antonio Barnett (\u201cDefendant\u201d) appeals from a jury verdict finding him guilty of failing to notify the sheriffs office of change of address as required for a registered sex offender under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.9. The indictment in this case failed to specify that Defendant was \u201ca person required to register,\u201d an essential element of the charged offense. This defect rendered the indictment insufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction upon the trial court, and we must therefore arrest the trial court\u2019s judgment and vacate Defendant\u2019s conviction.\nI. Factual & Procedural Background\nThe State\u2019s evidence at trial tended to show that Defendant was convicted of taking indecent liberties with a child in Gaston County in 1997. Said conviction is a \u201creportable offense\u201d under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(4) and required Defendant to register as a sex offender with the Gaston County Sheriff\u2019s Office. Defendant initially registered as a sex offender on 15 February 2010, at which time Defendant acknowledged his duty to notify the sheriff\u2019s office of any change in his personal address \u201cwithin three business days of establishing a residency in North Carolina\u201d and \u201cwithin three business days of being released from any jail[.]\u201d Defendant listed his address as \u201c554 South Boyd Street, Gastonia, North Carolina.\u201d\nDefendant notified the sheriff\u2019s office of a change of address several times subsequent to his initial sex offender registration: on 15 March 2010, Defendant listed his new address as 210 South Chester Street; on 17 March 2010, Defendant listed his new address as 1112 North Ransom Street; and on 13 April 2010, Defendant changed his address to 607 West Fourth Avenue, Gastonia. Quentin Brown, a friend of Defendant, testified that Defendant lived with him at his residence located at 607 West Fourth Avenue for approximately one week in April 2010. Mr. Brown further testified that Defendant left his residence when Defendant was arrested and jailed in April 2010 and that Defendant has not lived with him since that time.\nDefendant was arrested on 15 April 2010 (on charges unrelated to this appeal) and remained in the Gaston County Jail until his release at approximately 7:27 p.m. on 3 June 2010. Because the sheriff\u2019s office was not open at that time, Defendant was unable to register his new address until the following day. On 4 June 2010, a Friday, Defendant registered his new address as 607 West Fourth Avenue, the same address that Defendant had represented as his personal address prior to his arrest and imprisonment. Defendant also met with Officer Jamie Terry (\u201cofficer Terry\u201d), an officer of the State of North Carolina, that day and \u201creported that he was living at 607 West 4th Avenue, Gastonia, North Carolina.\u201d However, Officer Terry was unable to verify that Defendant lived at that address when she personally visited said address on five occasions \u2014 27 June 2010, 28 June 2010, twice on 29 June 2010, and 17 July 2010. On 19 July 2010, Officer Terry reported her inability to locate Defendant to Captain Darryl Griffin, the individual in charge of the Gaston County Sheriff\u2019s Department\u2019s Sex Offender Registration Program.\nDefendant was arrested on 21 July 2010 and subsequently indicted on 2 August 2010 on the charge of failing to notify the sheriff\u2019s office of his change in address as required for a registered sex offender. The matter came on for trial on 16 August 2011 in Gaston County Superior Court. On 17 August 2011, the jury returned a verdict finding Defendant guilty as charged. The trial court determined that Defendant was a prior record level V offender and sentenced Defendant within the presumptive range of 28 to 34 months imprisonment. Defendant appeals.\nII. Analysis\nDefendant contends the indictment in the instant case was insufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction upon the trial court, as it failed to allege all of the essential elements of the charged offense. Specifically, Defendant contends the indictment failed to allege that he was a \u201cperson required to register,\u201d a prerequisite for the offense as described in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.9. Defendant insists this defect in the indictment was fatal to the trial court\u2019s jurisdiction and requires that we arrest judgment and vacate his conviction. We agree.\n\u201cIt is well settled that \u2018a valid bill of indictment is essential to the jurisdiction of the trial court to try an accused for a felony.\u2019 \u201d State v. Abraham, 338 N.C. 315, 339, 451 S.E.2d 131, 143 (1994) (citation omitted). Lack of jurisdiction in the trial court due to a fatally defective indictment requires \u201c \u2018the appellate court... to arrest judgment or vacate any order entered without authority.\u2019 \u201d State v. Petersilie, 334 N.C. 169, 175, 432 S.E.2d 832, 836 (1993) (citation omitted). The issue of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, even for the first time on appeal. See State v. Wallace, 351 N.C. 481, 503, 528 S.E.2d 326, 341 (2000). The subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court is a question of law, which this Court reviews de novo on appeal. Ales v. T.A. Loving Co., 163 N.C. App. 350, 352, 593 S.E.2d 453, 455 (2004).\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-924(a)(5) requires that an indictment set forth:\nA plain and concise factual statement in each count which, without allegations of an evidentiary nature, asserts facts supporting every element of a criminal offense and the defendant\u2019s commission thereof with sufficient precision clearly to apprise the defendant or defendants of the conduct which is the subject of the accusation.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-924(a)(5) (2011).\nIn order to be valid and thus confer jurisdiction upon the trial court, \u201c[a]n indictment charging a statutory offense must allege all of the essential elements of the offense.\u201d State v. Snyder, 343 N.C. 61, 65, 468 S.E.2d 221, 224 (1996). The indictment \u201cis sufficient if it charges the offense in a plain, intelligible and explicit manner. ...\u201d State v. Taylor, 280 N.C. 273, 276, 185 S.E.2d 677, 680 (1972). \u201c[I]ndictments need only allege the ultimate facts constituting each element of the criminal offense,\u201d State v. Rambert, 341 N.C. 173, 176, 459 S.E.2d 510, 512 (1995), and \u201c[a]n indictment couched in the language of the statute is generally sufficient to charge the statutory offense,\u201d State v. Singleton, 85 N.C. App. 123, 126, 354 S.E.2d 259, 262 (1987). \u201c \u2018[Wjhile an indictment should give a defendant sufficient notice of the charges against him, it should not be subjected to hyper technical scrutiny with respect to form.\u2019 \u201d State v. Harris,_N.C. App._,_, 724 S.E.2d 633, 636 (2012) (citation omitted); see also State v. Bowen, 139 N.C. App. 18, 27, 533 S.E.2d 248, 254 (2000) (\u201cThe purpose of an indictment is to give a defendant notice of the crime for which he is being charged.\u201d). \u201c \u2018The general rule in this State and elsewhere is that an indictment for a statutory offense is sufficient, if the offense is charged in the words of the statute, either literally or substantially, or in equivalent words.\u201d Harris,_N.C. App. at_, 724 S.E.2d at 636 (quoting State v. Greer, 238 N.C. 325, 328, 77 S.E.2d 917, 920 (1953)).\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.9 provides, in pertinent part:\n(a) If a person required to register changes address, the person shall report in person and provide written notice of the new address not later than the third business day after the change to the sheriff of the county with whom the person had last registered.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.9(a) (2011). The three essential elements of the offense described in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.9 are: (1) the defendant is a person required to register; (2) the defendant changes his or her address; and (3) the defendant fails to notify the last registering sheriff of the change of address within three business days of the change. See State v. Abshire, 363 N.C. 322, 328, 677 S.E.2d 444, 449 (2009), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in State v. Moore, _N.C. App. _, 718 S.E.2d 737 (2011); State v. Worley, 198 N.C. App. 329, 334, 679 S.E.2d 857, 861 (2009).\nHere, the indictment charged Defendant with violating N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.9 and alleged as follows:\nThe jurors for the State upon their oath present that on or about [8 June 2010] and in [Gaston County] the defendant named above unlawfully, willfully and feloniously did fail to provide written notice or notify the Gaston County Sheriffs Department within three business days after a change of address as required by the North Carolina General Statute 14-208.9.\nWhile the indictment substantially tracks the statutory language set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.9(a) with respect to the second and third elements of the offense, it makes no reference to the first essential element of the offense, i.e., that Defendant be \u201ca person required to register.\u201d The indictment does not allege that Defendant is a registered sex offender, nor any facts indicating why it would be a crime for Defendant to \u201cfail to provide written notice or notify the Gaston County Sheriff\u2019s Department within three business days after a change of address.\u201d Moreover, the State\u2019s contention that the indictment language \u201cas required by the North Carolina General Statute 14-208.9\u201d was adequate to \u201cput Defendant on notice of the charge[] and [] inform[] him with reasonable certainty the nature of the crime charged\u201d is unavailing, as \u201cit is well established that \u201c\u2018[m]erely charging in general terms a breach of [a] statute and referring to it in the indictment is not sufficient\u2019\u201d to cure the failure to charge \u2018the essentials of the offense\u2019 in a plain, intelligible, and explicit manner.\u201d State v. Billinger,_N.C. App._,_, 714 S.E.2d 201, 207 (2011) (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Sossamon, 259 N.C. 374, 376, 130 S.E.2d 638, 639 (1963) (in turn quoting State v. Ballangee, 191 N.C. 700, 702, 132 S.E. 795, 795 (1926))).\nIn two recent decisions, State v. Harris,_N.C. App._, 724 S.E.2d 633, and State v. Herman,_N.C. App._, 726 S.E.2d 863 (2012), this Court vacated sex offender-related convictions where the indictment failed to adequately allege all of the essential elements of offenses described under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.18 (2011). In both cases, we held that the indictment was fatally defective because it failed to sufficiently allege that the defendant had been previously convicted of the specific category of sex offense \u2014 an offense enumerated in Article 7A of Chapter 14 of our General Statutes or an offense involving a victim who was under sixteen years of age at the time of the offense_that subjected him to a charge under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.18. Herman,_. N.C. App. at_, 726 S.E.2d at 864-67. We agree with the State\u2019s contention that the present case is distinguishable from Harris and Herman in that the address registration requirements set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.9 apply to all sex offenders, not just to a particular subclass of sex offenders. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.9(a) (applying to all persons \u201crequired to register\u201d). We cannot agree, however, with the State\u2019s assertion that the general application of a statute to registered sex offenders dispenses with the well-established requirement that an indictment set forth all of the essential elements of the charged offense.\nAlthough outside the context of our sex offender registration regime, we find instructive our Supreme Court\u2019s ruling in State v. J.N. McBane, 276 N.C. 60, 170 S.E.2d 913 (1969). There, the court addressed a purported violation of then-existing N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 153-266.6, which described a crime where\n[A] board of county commissioners adopt[ed] an ordinance regulating the subdivision of land as authorized [in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 153-266.6], [and] any person who, being the owner or agent of the owner of any land located within the platting jurisdiction granted to the county commissioners . . . transfers or sells such land by reference to a plat showing a subdivision of land before such plat [was] properly approved under such ordinance and recorded in the office of the appropriate register of deeds[.]\u201d\nId. at 63, 170 S.E.2d at 915. The warrant at issue alleged that the defendant had \u201ctransferred] or s[old] certain property ... by reference to a plat showing a sub-division of land before such plat had been properly approved ... and recorded\u201d and charged the defendant with \u201cthe committing of a misdemeanor in accordance with Section 153-266.6.\u201d Id. at 62, 170 S.E.2d at 914. However, the warrant failed to allege that the defendant was \u201cthe owner or agent of the owner of any land located within the platting jurisdiction granted to the county commissioners.\u201d Id. at 63, 170 S.E.2d at 915. Our Supreme Court stated the following in holding that the warrant was fatally defective because it failed to allege an essential element of the charged offense:\nThe general allegation that defendant\u2019s conduct constituted a misdemeanor in violation of [N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 153-266.6] is insufficient. The owner or agent of the owner of land within the \u2018platting jurisdiction\u2019 granted the county commissioners ... is the only person subject to criminal prosecution for violation of [N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 153-266.6]. ... In short, the warrant is fatally defective on account of its failure to allege one of the essential elements of the criminal offense created and defined in [N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 153-266.6], namely, that defendant was the owner or agent of the owner of land within the platting jurisdiction granted to the county commissioners. . . .\nId. at 65-66, 170 S.E.2d at 916-17.\nHere, the indictment describes an offense applicable only to registered sex offenders, but fails to allege facts indicating that Defendant is \u201ca person required to register.\u201d The general reference to Defendant\u2019s violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.9, which consists of multiple subsections and describes multiple offenses in addition to the offense for which Defendant was charged, is insufficient to cure this defect. We accordingly conclude that the indictment failed to \u201callege all of the essential elements of the offense.\u201d State v. Snyder, 343 N.C. 61, 65, 468 S.E.2d 221, 224 (1996), and that \u201cthe State\u2019s failure to allege an essential element of the crime . . . rendered] the indictment in this case facially defective and deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to adjudicate the charge[,]\u201d Billinger,_N.C. App. at _, 714 S.E.2d at 207.\nIII. Conclusion\nFor the foregoing reasons, we hold that the indictment was insufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction upon the trial court. The trial court\u2019s judgment is hereby arrested, and Defendant\u2019s conviction is \u201cvacated without prejudice to the State\u2019s right to attempt to prosecute Defendant based upon a valid indictment.\u201d Harris,_N.C. App. at_, 724 S.E.2d at 639.\nVACATED.\nJudges MCGEE and BEASLEY concur.\n. Defendant was also indicted for attaining habitual felon status, but that charge was dismissed by the trial court.\n. We also note that the indictment fails to specify subsection (a) of \u00a7 14-208.9 as the relevant statutory provision in the instant case, but that this omission in itself does not render the indictment invalid. See State v. Overton, 60 N.C. App. 1, 25, 298 S.E.2d 695, 709 (1982).", "type": "majority", "author": "THIGPEN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by J. Joy Strickland, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.", "Harrington, Gilleland, Winstead, Feindel & Lucas, LLP, by Anna S. Lucas, for the Defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. KEITH ANTONIO BARNETT\nNo. COA12-269\n(Filed 2 October 2012)\nSexual Offenders \u2014 failed to notify of change of address \u2014 subject matter jurisdiction \u2014 indictment insufficient \u2014 failed to specify all essential elements of charged offense\nThe trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction in a case involving defendant\u2019s failure to notify the sheriff\u2019s office of his change of address as required for a registered sex offender under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-208.9. The indictment failed to specify that defendant was \u201ca person required to register,\u201d an essential element of the charged offense. The trial court\u2019s judgment was arrested and defendant\u2019s conviction was vacated.\nAppeal by Defendant from judgment and commitment entered 17 August 2011 by Judge Mark E. Powell in Gaston County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 28 August 2012.\nRoy Cooper, Attorney General, by J. Joy Strickland, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.\nHarrington, Gilleland, Winstead, Feindel & Lucas, LLP, by Anna S. Lucas, for the Defendant." }, "file_name": "0065-01", "first_page_order": 75, "last_page_order": 82 }