{ "id": 4104644, "name": "KIRKLAND'S STORES, INC., Plaintiff v. CLEVELAND GASTONIA, LLC, CLEVELAND GASTONIA II, LLC, SANDWICK GASTONIA, LLC, and PANERA, LLC, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Kirkland's Stores, Inc. v. Cleveland Gastonia, LLC", "decision_date": "2012-10-16", "docket_number": "No. COA12-397", "first_page": "119", "last_page": "125", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "223 N.C. App. 119" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "265 S.E.2d 922", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "923", "parenthetical": "\"The thrust of plaintiffs' action is to have the court declare that they still hold a leasehold interest in the property, and such an action falls within G.S. 1-76.\" (emphasis added)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "46 N.C. App. 831", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8554196 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "832", "parenthetical": "\"The thrust of plaintiffs' action is to have the court declare that they still hold a leasehold interest in the property, and such an action falls within G.S. 1-76.\" (emphasis added)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/46/0831-01" ] }, { "cite": "336 S.E.2d 103", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "105" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "77 N.C. App. 796", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525460 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "799" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/77/0796-01" ] }, { "cite": "154 S.E.2d 320", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "323-24" }, { "page": "321" }, { "page": "324" }, { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "323", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "270 N.C. 201", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566561 ], "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "206" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/270/0201-01" ] }, { "cite": "368 S.E.2d 41", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "42" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "90 N.C. App. 210", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523424 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "212" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/90/0210-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 S.E.2d 767", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "769", "parenthetical": "alteration in original" }, { "page": "769" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 N.C. App. 317", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522579 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "320-21", "parenthetical": "alteration in original" }, { "page": "321" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/99/0317-01" ] }, { "cite": "209 S.E.2d 524", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "525", "parenthetical": "quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "23 N.C. App. 742", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8554288 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "743", "parenthetical": "quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "743" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/23/0742-01" ] }, { "cite": "158 S.E.2d 633", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "634-35" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "272 N.C. 503", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573745, 8573711 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "504-05" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/272/0503-02", "/nc/272/0503-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-82", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2011, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "268 S.E.2d 468", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "471", "parenthetical": "internal citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 715", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564683 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "719", "parenthetical": "internal citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0715-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 S.E.2d 735", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "736" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 723", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5307026 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "725" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0723-01" ] }, { "cite": "576 S.E.2d 316", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "319" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 642", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511442 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "647" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0642-01" ] }, { "cite": "669 S.E.2d 290", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "294", "parenthetical": "quoting In re Greens of Pine Glen Ltd., 356 N.C. 642, 647, 576 S.E.2d 316, 319 (2003)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 628", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4150837 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "632-33", "parenthetical": "quoting In re Greens of Pine Glen Ltd., 356 N.C. 642, 647, 576 S.E.2d 316, 319 (2003)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0628-01" ] }, { "cite": "689 S.E.2d 590", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "592" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "202 N.C. App. 509", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4175288 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "511" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/202/0509-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 1-76", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 657, "char_count": 13341, "ocr_confidence": 0.735, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.13138140486182784 }, "sha256": "c442df2a1a6cecd4360029948c6ad504e8c59363a21ddcb787544a4fbbe40cc0", "simhash": "1:0a39e472b4ab1636", "word_count": 2150 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:08:05.693184+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges ERVIN and MCCULLOUGH concur." ], "parties": [ "KIRKLAND\u2019S STORES, INC., Plaintiff v. CLEVELAND GASTONIA, LLC, CLEVELAND GASTONIA II, LLC, SANDWICK GASTONIA, LLC, and PANERA, LLC, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge.\nDefendants Cleveland Gastonia, LLC (\u201cCleveland Gastonia\u201d), Cleveland Gastonia II, LLC (\u201cCleveland Gastonia II\u201d), Sandwick Gastonia, LLC (\u201cSandwick Gastonia\u201d) and Panera, LLC (\u201cPanera\u201d) (collectively, \u201cDefendants\u201d) appeal the trial court\u2019s denial of their motions to change venue under Rule 12(b)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure as well as N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 1-76 and 1-83. Upon review, we affirm the decision of the trial court.\nI. Facts & Procedural History\nOn or about 27 May 2004, Kirkland\u2019s Stores, Inc. (\u201cPlaintiff\u2019) entered into a Standard Commercial Shopping Center Lease (the \u201cLease\u201d) with CK Cox-Franklin, LLC (\u201cCK Cox-Franklin\u201d). Under the terms of this agreement, Plaintiff leased for a five-year term approximately 5,254 square feet of commercial space in a shopping center (the \u201cShopping Center\u201d) then owned by CK Cox-Franklin in Gastonia. CK Cox-Franklin subsequently assigned its rights, title, and interest in the Lease and Shopping Center to Cleveland Gastonia, Cleveland Gastonia II, and Sandwick Gastonia (collectively, the \u201cLandlord\u201d) as tenants in common. The Lease was later extended until 31 January 2015.\nPlaintiff operates a home d\u00e9cor store in the Shopping Center. Because Plaintiff receives regular shipments of goods, Plaintiff negotiated for the Lease to provide that \u201c[e]xcept as required by law, Landlord will take no action which materially or adversely affects Tenant\u2019s visibility or access\u201d to the \u201cCommon Area,\u201d including \u201cloading areas.\u201d\nDefendant Panera operates a bakery-caf\u00e9 in the Shopping Center. In late 2010 or early 2011, Defendant Panera approached Landlord about constructing and operating a drive-through window immediately behind its storefront. Because the planned drive-through window was within several feet of Plaintiff\u2019s freight access doors and loading area, a representative of Landlord notified Plaintiff of the planned construction several days before its commencement. Plaintiff objected to the construction of the drive-through window before its commencement.\nLandlord and Panera completed construction of the drive-through window, and Plaintiff subsequently brought suit in Wake County Superior Court on 10 August 2011, claiming: (1) breach of contract; (2) declaratory judgment; (3) breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing; (4) breach of contract \u2014 third-party beneficiary; (5) tortious interference with contract; (6) private nuisance; and (7) injunctive relief. On 16 August 2011, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint, adding to its original prayer for relief, inter alia, that:\n[i]n the alternative to the injunctive relief requested herein, . . . the Court enter a judgment declaring that Plaintiff is entitled to a declaratory judgment that Landlord\u2019s material and incurable breaches of the Lease excuse any further performance from Plaintiff thereunder and relieving Plaintiff of any further liability under the Lease[.]\nPlaintiff further elaborated that the trial court should enter a judgment declaring that Landlord\u2019s breaches \u201centitl[e] Plaintiff to abandon its possession of the Premises[.]\u201d\nOn 9 September 2011, Panera timely filed a Motion to Change Venue. On 14 September 2011, Cleveland Gastonia, Cleveland Gastonia II, and Sandwick Gastonia timely filed a Motion to Transfer Venue. In a 21 December 2011 Order, the Wake County Superior Court denied Defendants\u2019 motions to change venue. Defendants filed timely notice of appeal from the trial court\u2019s order denying their motions to change venue.\nII. Jurisdiction & Standard of Review\nThis court has jurisdiction to hear the instant appeal pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-27(d) (2011). \u201cIssues of statutory construction are questions of law, reviewed de novo on appeal.\u201d McKoy v. McKoy, 202 N.C. App. 509, 511, 689 S.E.2d 590, 592 (2010). \u201c \u2018Under a de novo review, the court considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment\u2019 for that of the lower tribunal.\u201d State v. Williams, 362 N.C. 628, 632-33, 669 S.E.2d 290, 294 (2008) (quoting In re Greens of Pine Glen Ltd., 356 N.C. 642, 647, 576 S.E.2d 316, 319 (2003)).\nIII. Analysis\nOn appeal, Defendants argue the trial court erred by denying their motions to change venue. We disagree and affirm the trial court\u2019s ruling.\nPreliminarily, we note that although parties generally have \u201cno right of immediate appeal from interlocutory orders and judgments[,]\u201d Goldston v. Am. Motors Corp., 326 N.C. 723, 725, 392 S.E.2d 735, 736 (1990), Defendants have an appeal of right under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-27(d)(l) (2011) because they appeal from an \u201cinterlocutory order or judgment of a superior court or district court in a civil action or proceeding which . . . [ajffects a substantial right[.]\u201d As our Supreme Court has stated, \u201c[although the initial question of venue is a procedural one, there can be no doubt that a right to venue established by statute is a substantial right. Its grant or denial is immediately appealable.\u201d Gardner v. Gardner, 300 N.C. 715, 719, 268 S.E.2d 468, 471 (1980) (internal citation omitted).\nUnder N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-76 (2011), actions for \u201c[Recovery of real property, or of an estate or interest therein, or for the determination in any form of such right or interest, and for injuries to real property\u201d \u201cmust be tried in the county in which the subject of the action, or some part thereof, is situated[.]\u201d On the other hand, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-82 (2011) prescribes that \u201c[i]n all other cases the action must be tried in the county in which the plaintiffs or the defendants, or any of them, reside at its commencement, or if none of the defendants reside in the State, then in the county in which the plaintiffs, or any of them, resided\u201d\nTo determine which statute applies to a given set of facts, our Supreme Court has succinctly stated that\n[t]he test is this: If the judgment to which plaintiff would be entitled upon the allegations of the complaint will affect the title to land, the action is local and must be tried in the county where the land lies unless defendant waives the proper venue; otherwise, the action is transitory and must be tried in the county where one or more of the parties reside at the commencement of the action.\nThompson v. Horrell, 272 N.C. 503, 504-05, 158 S.E.2d 633, 634-35 (1968).\nFor purposes of venue, this Court has previously held that a party to a leasehold has \u201can estate or interest in real property.\u201d Sample v. Towe Motor Co., 23 N.C. App. 742, 743, 209 S.E.2d 524, 525 (1974) (quotation marks omitted). \u201cWhen a party brings an action that seeks to terminate [a vested estate or interest in real property] and will require the Court to determine the respective rights of the parties with respect to the leasehold interest, the action falls within the purview of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1-76.\u201d Snow v. Yates, 99 N.C. App. 317, 320-21, 392 S.E.2d 767, 769 (1990) (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quotation marks omitted). Thus, \u201c[a] suit to terminate a lease is subject to the local venue requirement.\u201d Id. at 321, 392 S.E.2d at 769. \u201c \u2018In determining whether the judgment sought by plaintiff would affect title to land, the court is limited to considering only the allegations of the complaint.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 320, 392 S.E.2d at 769 (quoting Pierce v. Associated Rest and Nursing Care, Inc., 90 N.C. App. 210, 212, 368 S.E.2d 41, 42 (1988)).\nConversely, a claim that merely seeks interpretation and enforcement of the terms of a lease, as opposed to termination of the lease, is transitory for venue purposes. See Rose\u2019s Stores, Inc. v. Tarrytown Center, Inc., 270 N.C. 201, 206, 154 S.E.2d 320, 323-24 (1967). For instance, in Rose\u2019s Stores, the plaintiff sought a permanent injunction to prevent the defendants from violating the terms of a lease agreement. Id. at 202, 154 S.E.2d at 321. In that case, our Supreme Court reasoned that the right at issue was \u201ca personal right and does not run with the land. Whatever the outcome of this action, the title to the land would not be affected.\u201d Id. at 206, 154 S.E.2d at 324. Because \u201c[t]he complaint sounds of breach of contract and not for recovery of real property, or of an estate or interest therein,\u201d the court in Rose\u2019s Stores found venue to be transitory. Id. (citation omitted) (quotation marks omitted).\nIn the present case, Plaintiff\u2019s initial 10 August 2011 Complaint did not seek termination of the Lease, but rather enforcement of the terms of the Lease. However, on 16 August 2011, Plaintiff filed its First Amended Complaint, which added as an alternative claim for relief that the trial court \u201cexcus[e] further performance from Plaintiff under the Lease, entitl[e] Plaintiff to abandon its possession of the Premises and relievfe] Plaintiff of any further liability under the Lease[.]\u201d\nWe now determine whether the addition of this alternative claim seeking termination of the Lease results in local venue for Plaintiffs entire suit. We conclude that because the principal object of Plaintiffs action involves interpretation and enforcement of the Lease, rather than termination of the Lease, the case is transitory for venue purposes.\nOur Supreme Court has clarified that\nan action is not necessarily local because it incidentally involves the title to land or a right or interest therein, or because the judgment that may be rendered may settle the rights of the parties by way of estoppel. It is the principal object involved in the action which determines the question, and if title is principally involved or if the judgment or decree operates directly and primarily on the estate or title, and not alone in personam against the parties, the action will be held to be local.\nId. at 206, 154 S.E.2d at 323 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quotation marks omitted); see also McCrary Stone Service, Inc. v. Lyalls, 77 N.C. App. 796, 799, 336 S.E.2d 103, 105 (1985) (\u201cHere the principal object of plaintiffs action, as formulated in its complaint, is a judicial declaration as to whether it is obligated to make rental payments for rock quarried from land adjacent to leased premises. Such a declaration would not directly affect title to the land.\u201d (emphasis added)); Gurganus v. Hedgepeth, 46 N.C. App. 831, 832, 265 S.E.2d 922, 923 (1980) (\u201cThe thrust of plaintiffs\u2019 action is to have the court declare that they still hold a leasehold interest in the property, and such an action falls within G.S. 1-76.\u201d (emphasis added)). Thus, in the present case, we look for the \u201cprincipal object\u201d of Plaintiff\u2019s action.\nDefendants rely on Snow and Sample to argue that when any of a plaintiff\u2019s claims involve title to or an interest in real property, venue is local. Nonetheless, although the courts in those cases found venue to be local, the primary goal of the claims in Snow and Sample was determination of the existence of a lease rather than interpretation of the terms of a lease. See Snow, 99 N.C. App. at 321, 392 S.E.2d at 769 (\u201c[T]he \u2018principal object\u2019 of plaintiff\u2019s cause of action is a determination of leasehold estate or interest in real property.\u201d); Sample, 23 N.C. App. at 743, 309 S.E.2d at 525 (\u201cPlaintiffs asked the Court to order the lease terminated and enter a money judgment for damages.\u201d). Consequently, both Snow and Sample comport with the \u201cprincipal object\u201d test outlined in Rose\u2019s Stores.\nHere, the principal object of Plaintiffs action is interpretation and enforcement of the Lease. Plaintiffs first Complaint did not even seek termination of the Lease, and its First Amended Complaint only sought termination of the Lease as an alternative to its original claims. Consequently, venue is transitory and the trial court did not err in denying Defendants\u2019 motions for change of venue.\nIV. Conclusion\nBecause the principal object of Plaintiff\u2019s claims did not involve title to or an interest in real property, we conclude venue is transitory and the trial court appropriately denied Defendants\u2019 motions to change venue. The trial court\u2019s decision is\nAffirmed.\nJudges ERVIN and MCCULLOUGH concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Bailey & Dixon, L.L.P., by Adam N. Oils, Michael L. Weisel, and David S. Wisz, for plaintiff-appellee.", "Templeton & Raynor, P.A., by Kenneth R. Raynor, for defendant-appellants Cleveland Gastonia, LLC, Cleveland Gastonia II, LLC, and Sandwick Gastonia, LLC.", "Horack, Talley, Pharr & Lowndes, P.A., by Keith B. Nichols and John W. Bowers, for defendant-appellant Panera, LLC." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "KIRKLAND\u2019S STORES, INC., Plaintiff v. CLEVELAND GASTONIA, LLC, CLEVELAND GASTONIA II, LLC, SANDWICK GASTONIA, LLC, and PANERA, LLC, Defendants\nNo. COA12-397\n(Filed 16 October 2012)\n1. Appeal and Error \u2014 interlocutory order and appeal \u2014 substantial right\nDefendants\u2019 appeal from the denial of their motion to change venue affected a substantial right and was immediately appealable.\n2. Venue \u2014 motion for change denied \u2014 interpretation and enforcement of lease \u2014 transitory\nThe trial court did not err by denying defendants\u2019 motions to change venue under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(3) and N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 1-76 and 1-83. Because the principal object of plaintiff\u2019s action involved interpretation and enforcement of the lease, rather than termination of the lease, the case was transitory for venue purposes.\nAppeal by defendants from order entered 21 December 2011 by Judge Lucy N. Inman in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 13 September 2012.\nBailey & Dixon, L.L.P., by Adam N. Oils, Michael L. Weisel, and David S. Wisz, for plaintiff-appellee.\nTempleton & Raynor, P.A., by Kenneth R. Raynor, for defendant-appellants Cleveland Gastonia, LLC, Cleveland Gastonia II, LLC, and Sandwick Gastonia, LLC.\nHorack, Talley, Pharr & Lowndes, P.A., by Keith B. Nichols and John W. Bowers, for defendant-appellant Panera, LLC." }, "file_name": "0119-01", "first_page_order": 129, "last_page_order": 135 }