{ "id": 4104211, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ROMIDS A. MILES", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Miles", "decision_date": "2012-10-16", "docket_number": "No. COA12-323", "first_page": "160", "last_page": "165", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "223 N.C. App. 160" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "656 S.E.2d 697", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640370 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "700", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Steen, 352 N.C. 227, 256, 536 S.E.2d 1, 18 (2000)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/656/0697-01" ] }, { "cite": "647 S.E.2d 679", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12638976 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "686" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/647/0679-01" ] }, { "cite": "651 S.E.2d 867", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639492 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "875" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/651/0867-01" ] }, { "cite": "650 S.E.2d 29", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639310 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "33" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/650/0029-01" ] }, { "cite": "536 S.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "18" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 N.C. 227", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 685065 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "256" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/352/0227-01" ] }, { "cite": "188 N.C. App. 832", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4155039 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "837", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Steen, 352 N.C. 227, 256, 536 S.E.2d 1, 18 (2000)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/188/0832-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14415.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(b)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "185 N.C. App. 227", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8209211 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "235" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/185/0227-01" ] }, { "cite": "426 S.E.2d 692", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "697" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 N.C. 431", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2546948 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "440" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/333/0431-01" ] }, { "cite": "676 F.2d 995", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 562145 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1002", "parenthetical": "footnotes omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/676/0995-01" ] }, { "cite": "300 S.E.2d 375", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378", "parenthetical": "quoting United States v. McCaskill, 676 F.2d 995, 1002 (4th Cir. 1982) (footnotes omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 655", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565416 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "660", "parenthetical": "quoting United States v. McCaskill, 676 F.2d 995, 1002 (4th Cir. 1982) (footnotes omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0655-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 610", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3739107 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "622" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0610-01" ] }, { "cite": "402 S.E.2d 809", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "814", "parenthetical": "\"In order to preserve a question for appellate review, a party must have presented the trial court with a timely request, objection or motion, stating the specific grounds for the ruling sought if the specific grounds are not apparent.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 409", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2541401 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "420", "parenthetical": "\"In order to preserve a question for appellate review, a party must have presented the trial court with a timely request, objection or motion, stating the specific grounds for the ruling sought if the specific grounds are not apparent.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0409-01" ] }, { "cite": "463 S.E.2d 176", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "181" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "342 N.C. 123", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 796093 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "131" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/342/0123-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 S.E.2d 359", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "362" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 464", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2572739 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "468" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0464-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-54", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "59" }, { "page": "(c)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "286 S.E.2d 804", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "806", "parenthetical": "quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary 292 (1968 ed." }, { "page": "806" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "56 N.C. App. 55", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8519440 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/56/0055-01" ] }, { "cite": "510 S.E.2d 410", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "412", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "132 N.C. App. 220", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11237395 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "222", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/132/0220-01" ] }, { "cite": "459 S.E.2d 510", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "512" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "341 N.C. 173", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 793125 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "175" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/341/0173-01" ] }, { "cite": "702 S.E.2d 330", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "333", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Rambert, 341 N.C. 173, 175, 459 S.E.2d 510, 512 (1995)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "208 N.C. App. 406", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4180858 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "409-10", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Rambert, 341 N.C. 173, 175, 459 S.E.2d 510, 512 (1995)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/208/0406-01" ] }, { "cite": "451 S.E.2d 211", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "223" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "339 N.C. 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2556681 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "192" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/339/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 S.E.2d 164", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "169" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 71", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559773 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "78-79" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0071-01" ] }, { "cite": "430 S.E.2d 914", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "918" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 N.C. 67", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2529175 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "75" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/334/0067-01" ] }, { "cite": "526 S.E.2d 451", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "455", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Barnes, 334 N.C. 67, 75, 430 S.E.2d 914, 918 (1993)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 373", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155599 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Barnes, 334 N.C. 67, 75, 430 S.E.2d 914, 918 (1993)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0373-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 N.C. App. 57", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8154614 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "62" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/186/0057-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-415.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-34.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 7, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)" }, { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 678, "char_count": 13746, "ocr_confidence": 0.749, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.400479698708787e-08, "percentile": 0.2761037419556121 }, "sha256": "9fd10b09ec3f4a4dd174f87343e92b9567a04141d0e4afffff290944fd899de5", "simhash": "1:6d2a6426f42e2ef0", "word_count": 2294 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:08:05.693184+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges HUNTER, JR. (Robert N.) and ERVIN concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ROMIDS A. MILES" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "McCullough, judge.\nRomids A. Miles (\u201cdefendant\u201d) appeals from his convictions for discharging a firearm into an occupied dwelling and possession of a firearm by a felon on the grounds that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charge of discharging a firearm into an occupied dwelling and admitting into evidence the substance of his stipulation concerning a prior felony conviction to support the charge of possession of a firearm by a felon. For the following reasons, we find no error.\nI. Background\nOn 16 July 2010, at approximately 4:30 p.m., Clara Durham (\u201cMs. Durham\u201d) was on her porch with her son, granddaughter, and great-grandson when gunshots were heard nearby and her grandson, Shawn Stamper (\u201cMr. Stamper\u201d), came running toward her house. Defendant followed Mr. Stamper in pursuit, firing at him.\nWhen Mr. Stamper reached Ms. Durham\u2019s house, he ran behind the house and reemerged on the other side, returning fire away from the house at defendant. At this point, defendant fired back towards Ms. Durham\u2019s house at Mr. Stamper three times. Ms. Durham testified that two of the bullets struck the house. As defendant fired towards the house at Mr. Stamper, Ms. Durham and the rest of her family on the porch attempted to escape the gunfire by entering the house through the front door. Once everyone on the porch was inside, the police were called. The police responded and detained defendant.\nOn 3 January 2011, a Vance County Grand Jury indicted defendant on one charge of discharging a weapon into occupied property in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-34.1(b). On 8 August 2011, a Vance County Grand Jury returned a second bill of indictment charging defendant with possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-415.1. The case came on for trial during the 12 September 2011 Criminal Session of Vance County Superior Court before the Honorable Robert H. Hobgood, Judge Presiding.\nOn 15 September 2011, the jury found defendant guilty of discharging a firearm into an occupied dwelling and possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony. The trial judge entered judgments sentencing defendant to two consecutive sentences totaling a minimum of 130 to a maximum of 165 months. Defendant appeals.\nII. Analysis\nOn appeal, defendant first contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the charge of discharging a weapon into occupied property. We disagree.\n\u201cThis court reviews the trial court\u2019s denial of a motion to dismiss de novo.\u201d State v. Smith, 186 N.C. App. 57, 62, 650 S.E.2d 29, 33 (2007). \u201c \u2018Upon defendant\u2019s motion for dismissal, the question for the Court is whether there is substantial evidence (1) of each essential element of the offense charged, or of a lesser offense included therein, and (2) of defendant\u2019s being the perpetrator of such offense.\u2019 \u201d State v. Fritsch, 351 N.C. 373, 378, 526 S.E.2d 451, 455 (2000) (quoting State v. Barnes, 334 N.C. 67, 75, 430 S.E.2d 914, 918 (1993)). \u201cSubstantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.\u201d State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 78-79, 265 S.E.2d 164, 169 (1980). \u201cIn making its determination, the trial court must consider all evidence admitted, whether competent or incompetent, in the light most favorable to the State, giving the State the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving any contradictions in its favor.\u201d State v. Rose, 339 N.C. 172, 192, 451 S.E.2d 211, 223 (1994)).\n\u201cThe elements of discharging a firearm into occupied property are \u2018(1) willfully and wantonly discharging (2) a firearm (3) into property (4) while it is occupied.\u2019 \u201d State v. Dubose, 208 N.C. App. 406, 409-10, 702 S.E.2d 330, 333 (2010) (quoting State v. Rambert, 341 N.C. 173, 175, 459 S.E.2d 510, 512 (1995)); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-34.1 (2011).\nThere is no requirement that the defendant have a specific intent to fire into the occupied building, only that he . . . (1) intentionally discharged the firearm at the occupied building with the bullet(s) entering the occupied building, or (2) intentionally discharged the firearm at a person with the bullet(s) entering an occupied building[.]\nState v. Byrd, 132 N.C. App. 220, 222, 510 S.E.2d 410, 412 (1999) (citations omitted). In this case, defendant specifically contends that there was no substantial evidence that the property was occupied when the firearm was discharged.\nThe evidence presented at trial tended to show that Ms. Durham and her family were on the front porch of her residence when defendant discharged the firearm toward the house at Mr. Stamper. When the firearm was discharged, Ms. Durham and her family tried to escape the gunfire by entering the house through the front door. However, at the time defendant discharged the firearm, there was no one inside the house.\nIn asserting there is no substantial evidence that the property was occupied, defendant contends that a porch is not a building for purposes of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-34.1. To support his argument, defendant cites State v. Gamble, 56 N.C. App. 55, 286 S.E.2d 804 (1982). In Gamble, we defined a building as \u201c \u2018a constructed edifice designed to stand more or less permanently, covering a space of land, usu. covered by a roof and more or less completely enclosed by walls, and serving as a dwelling ... or other useful structure \u2014 distinguished from structures not designed for occupancy[.]\u2019 \u201d Id. at 58, 286 S.E.2d at 806 (quoting Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary 292 (1968 ed.). In applying the definition of \u201cbuilding\u201d in that case, we dismissed the indictments against a defendant for breaking or entering on the grounds that the fenced-in area around a business was not a building within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-54. Id. at 59, 286 S.E.2d at 806.\nDefendant now urges the Court to narrowly construe the definition of \u201cbuilding\u201d based on Gamble and to apply this construction in the present case to conclude that Ms. Durham\u2019s porch is not a building because it is not fully enclosed by walls. We decline to accept defendant\u2019s argument.\nFirst, the porch fits the definition of a \u201cbuilding\u201d in all respects except that it is not fully enclosed by walls. In the case before us, the porch was attached to the dwelling and shared a common wall. Additionally, the porch was covered by the same roof as the house and was designed to stand permanently. Furthermore, the porch is used for many of the same activities for which the inside of a dwelling is used and is therefore distinguishable from a fenced-in area around a business in that the porch outside a dwelling is a useful structure designed for occupancy.\nSecond, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-34.1 is much broader then N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-54. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-54 applies only to breaking or entering into buildings, defined to include \u201cany dwelling, dwelling house, uninhabited house, building under construction, building within the curtilage of a dwelling house, and any other structure designed to house or secure within it any activity or property.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-54(c). On the other hand, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-34.1 applies to discharging a firearm into occupied property, including \u201cinto any building, structure, vehicle, aircraft, watercraft, or other conveyance, device, equipment, erection, or enclosure . . . .\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-34.1(a). Therefore, in addition to a building, a porch may be classified as a structure, erection, or enclosure within the meaning of the statute.\nThird, \u201c[t]he purpose of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-34.1 is to protect occupants of the building, vehicle or other property described in the statute.\u201d State v. Mancuso, 321 N.C. 464, 468, 364 S.E.2d 359, 362 (1988). In light of the purpose of the statute, we struggle to find any reason why the porch should not be considered part of the dwelling in this case. Thus, we conclude that the porch is a part of the dwelling for purposes of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-34.1 and the trial court did not err in denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the charge of discharging a firearm into an occupied dwelling where there is substantial evidence that the porch was occupied.\nOn appeal, defendant also contends that the trial court plainly erred by admitting into evidence the substance of his stipulation concerning a prior felony conviction in order to prove the charge of possession of a firearm by a felon. We disagree.\nGenerally, we review the trial court\u2019s admission of evidence under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 403, for an abuse of discretion. State v. McCray, 342 N.C. 123, 131, 463 S.E.2d 176, 181 (1995). However, defendant must preserve the issue for appeal by raising a timely objection at trial. See State v. Eason, 328 N.C. 409, 420, 402 S.E.2d 809, 814 (1991) (\u201cIn order to preserve a question for appellate review, a party must have presented the trial court with a timely request, objection or motion, stating the specific grounds for the ruling sought if the specific grounds are not apparent.\u201d); see also N.C.R. App. P 10(a)(1). As is the case here, where there is no objection to the admission of the evidence at trial, we are limited to a review for plain error. See N.C.R. App. P. 10(a)(4) (\u201cIn criminal cases, an issue that was not preserved by objection noted at trial and that is not deemed preserved by rule or law without any such action nevertheless may be made the basis of an issue presented on appeal when the judicial action questioned is specifically and distinctly contended to amount to plain error.\u201d); see also State v. Goss, 361 N.C. 610, 622, 651 S.E.2d 867, 875 (2007).\nPlain error arises when the error is \u201c \u2018so basic, so prejudicial, so lacking in its elements that justice cannot have been done[.]\u2019 \u201d State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 660, 300 S.E.2d 375, 378 (1983) (quoting United States v. McCaskill, 676 F.2d 995, 1002 (4th Cir. 1982) (footnotes omitted)). \u201cUnder the plain error rule, defendant must convince this Court not only that there was error, but that absent the error, the jury probably would have reached a different result.\u201d State v. Jordan, 333 N.C. 431, 440, 426 S.E.2d 692, 697 (1993).\nHere, the stipulation was admitted as evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt of possession of a firearm by a felon. In order to convict defendant of possession of a firearm by a felon, the State need only prove that \u201c(1) defendant was previously convicted of a felony; and (2) thereafter possessed a firearm.\u201d State v. Wood, 185 N.C. App. 227, 235, 647 S.E.2d 679, 686 (2007); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14415.1(a) (2011). In proving that defendant was previously convicted of a felony, \u201crecords of prior convictions . . . shall be admissible in evidence!;.]\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14415.1(b) (2011).\nIn this case, on 12 September 2011, defendant stipulated that he was convicted of felony possession of cocaine in Vance County on 28 September 2001 with an offense date of 12 January 2001.\nDespite authorization in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-415.1(b), defendant contends that the trial court erred in reading his stipulation to a prior felony conviction for possession of cocaine to the jury for purposes of proving defendant was previously convicted of a felony. Defendant specifically argues that reading the stipulation, as opposed to simply stipulating that defendant had been convicted of a prior felony, was an abuse of discretion under Rule 403.\nUnder Rule 403 the trial court has discretion to exclude evidence if the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 403 (2011). However, as stated supra, defendant failed to preserve the issue for appeal and \u201c[our] Supreme Court has specifically refused to apply the plain error standard of review \u2018to issues which fall within the realm of the trial court\u2019s discretion^]\u2019 \u201d State v. Cunningham, 188 N.C. App. 832, 837, 656 S.E.2d 697, 700 (2008) (quoting State v. Steen, 352 N.C. 227, 256, 536 S.E.2d 1, 18 (2000)). Therefore, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the nature of defendant\u2019s prior felony conviction where we are limited to a review for plain error.\nIII. Conclusion\nFor the reasons discussed above, the trial court did not err in denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the charge of discharging a firearm into an occupied dwelling and admitting into evidence the nature of defendant\u2019s prior felony conviction.\nNo error.\nJudges HUNTER, JR. (Robert N.) and ERVIN concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "McCullough, judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General David R Brenskelle, for the State.", "Robert W. Ewing for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ROMIDS A. MILES\nNo. COA12-323\n(Filed 16 October 2012)\n1. Firearms and Other Weapons \u2014 discharging firearm into occupied dwelling \u2014 motion to dismiss \u2014 sufficiency of evidence \u2014 porch as part of dwelling\nThe trial court did not err by denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the charge of discharging a firearm into an occupied dwelling. The porch is a part of the dwelling for purposes of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-34.1, and there was substantial evidence that the porch was occupied.\n2. Firearms and Other Weapons \u2014 possession of firearm by felon \u2014 stipulation to prior felony conviction \u2014 no abuse of discretion when limited to plain error review\nThe trial court did not err by admitting into evidence the substance of defendant\u2019s stipulation concerning a prior felony conviction to support the charge of possession of a firearm by a felon. It could not be concluded that the trial court abused its discretion when review was limited to plain error.\nAppeal by defendant from judgments entered 15 September 2011 by Judge Robert H. Hobgood in Vance County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 13 September 2012.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General David R Brenskelle, for the State.\nRobert W. Ewing for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0160-01", "first_page_order": 170, "last_page_order": 175 }