{ "id": 4102877, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CHIEGE OKWARA", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Okwara", "decision_date": "2012-10-16", "docket_number": "No. COA12-330", "first_page": "166", "last_page": "174", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "223 N.C. App. 166" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "657 S.E.2d 361", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640450 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "364-65" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/657/0361-01" ] }, { "cite": "615 S.E.2d 319", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633261 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "320" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/615/0319-01" ] }, { "cite": "668 S.E.2d 110", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12642153 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "112", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/668/0110-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 191", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4149183 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "197" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0191-01" ] }, { "cite": "171 N.C. App. 636", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8438878 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "638" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/171/0636-01" ] }, { "cite": "208 S.E.2d 506", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "508", "parenthetical": "\"Intent is a mental attitude seldom provable by direct evidence. It must ordinarily be proved by circumstances from which it may be inferred.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "285 N.C. 746", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569924 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "750", "parenthetical": "\"Intent is a mental attitude seldom provable by direct evidence. It must ordinarily be proved by circumstances from which it may be inferred.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/285/0746-01" ] }, { "cite": "300 S.E.2d 578", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "61 N.C. App. 238", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520296 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/61/0238-01" ] }, { "cite": "354 S.E.2d 289", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "291", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Boyd, 61 N.C. App. 238, 300 S.E.2d 578 (1983)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "85 N.C. App. 155", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12169693 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "158", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Boyd, 61 N.C. App. 238, 300 S.E.2d 578 (1983)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/85/0155-01" ] }, { "cite": "193 N.C. App. 591", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4161493 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "594", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/193/0591-01" ] }, { "cite": "150 S.E.2d 391", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "394" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "268 N.C. 254", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561177 ], "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "257" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/268/0254-01" ] }, { "cite": "393 S.E.2d 570", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "573", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 N.C. App. 380", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523187 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "385", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/99/0380-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 795, "char_count": 21665, "ocr_confidence": 0.747, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.1313215558127134 }, "sha256": "e60ed4794410b9d5172206065431ce9f5f43dd7c923aa0ca7237afde809eaf3b", "simhash": "1:938fd753ec2f145b", "word_count": 3571 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:08:05.693184+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges CALABRIA and ELMORE concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CHIEGE OKWARA" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "STEPHENS, Judge.\nProcedural History and Factual Background\nDefendant Chiege Okwara (\u201cMs. Okwara\u201d) appeals the order of the Honorable Robert C. Ervin, Superior Court Judge presiding, which found her in contempt of court for willfully disobeying a court order and the judgment subsequently entered by Judge Ervin, imposing censure for her contempt. Judge Ervin\u2019s decision followed an exchange during the 13 December 2010 criminal session of Mecklenburg County Superior Court, occurring between Ms. Okwara, who was serving as court-appointed defense counsel for Mr. Latron Marquay Hoover (\u201cMr. Hoover\u201d), and the prosecuting witness in that matter, Ms. Latasha Ward (\u201cMs. Ward\u201d).\nMr. Hoover had been charged with the rape of Ms. Ward and, in anticipation of his court appearance, Ms. Okwara filed a 17 March 2010 motion for a private, in camera hearing for the purpose of \u201cdetermining] the admissibility of evidence ... of the sexual behavior of [Ms. Ward].\u201d In support of that request, Ms. Okwara cited to the North Carolina General Statutes, sections 8C-1, Rule 412, and 15A-952(f). The hearing occurred on Monday, 13 December 2010, at which time Ms. Okwara questioned Ms. Ward about her sexual relationship with Mr. Hoover. At the end of the hearing, Judge Ervin informed Ms. Okwara that she was permitted \u201cto question [Ms. Ward] as to whether she [had] engaged in any sexual behaviour [sic] with the defendant during cross-examination of the State\u2019s case.\u201d Ms. Okwara responded with the statement: \u201cI guess as far as the \u2014 that\u2019s fine. That impeachment evidence will come in on cross-examination.\u201d\nTwo days later, 15 December 2010, during her cross-examination of Ms. Ward, Ms. Okwara asked: \u201cDo you remember telling [the prosecutor] you had been raped by your cousin when you were fifteen?\u201d The prosecutor objected to the question, the objection was sustained, Ms. Ward answered \u201cYes,\u201d and the court instructed the jury to disregard her answer. After the court took its morning recess, the prosecutor requested that Ms. Okwara be held in contempt of court for her question concerning a sexual encounter between Ms. Ward and her cousin, in violation of both Rule 412 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence (\u201cthe Rape Shield Statute\u201d or \u201cthe Statute\u201d) and Judge Ervin\u2019s order. Ms. Okwara denied intentionally violating the rule and stated that she intended the question solely for impeachment purposes. At that point, the court recessed and took the matter under advisement in order to clarity its understanding of the record.\nOn 8 February 2011, in response to the exchange between Ms. Okwara and Ms. Ward, Judge Ervin issued an order to show cause, mandating that Ms. Okwara appear before him to determine whether she should be held in criminal contempt. On 9 March 2011, Ms. Okwara responded to the show cause order with a motion to recuse Judge Ervin from conducting the proceedings. Five days later, on 14 March 2011, following a hearing, that motion was denied by the Honorable Forrest D. Bridges (\u201cJudge Bridges\u201d), who found that there was \u201cno indication whatsoever of lack of objectivity\u201d on the part of Judge Ervin. Ms. Okwara then appeared before Judge Ervin on 8 April 2011 for the mandated contempt hearing. On 6 May 2011, Judge Ervin issued an order finding that Ms. Okwara was guilty of contempt of court because of (1) her \u201cwillful disobedience of a court\u2019s lawful order or directive or its execution\u201d and (2) the \u201cwillful and grossly negligent failure of an officer of the court to perform her duties in an official transaction.\u201d\nJudge Ervin then scheduled an additional hearing for the purpose of determining punishment. After that hearing, in its 11 August 2011 judgment, the court determined that Ms. Okwara should be censured for (1) her \u201cwillful disobedience of a court\u2019s lawful order or directive or its execution\u201d and (2) the \u201cwillful and grossly negligent failure by an officer of the court to perform her duties in an official transaction.\u201d Ms. Okwara appeals both the order and final judgment.\nStandard of Review\nIn a contempt proceeding, we review the determination of a trial court by asking \u201cwhether there is competent evidence to support the [court\u2019s] findings of fact and whether the findings support the conclusions of law.\u201d Hartsell v. Hartsell, 99 N.C. App. 380, 385, 393 S.E.2d 570, 573 (1990) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). \u201cFindings of fact made by the judge in contempt proceedings are conclusive on appeal when supported by any competent evidence and are reviewable only for the purpose of passing upon their sufficiency to warrant the judgment.\u201d Id. (citing Mauney v. Mauney, 268 N.C. 254, 257, 150 S.E.2d 391, 394 (1966)).\nDiscussion\nMs. Okwara raises three issues in her brief on appeal. In the first, she contends that her question to Ms. Ward did not violate the Rape Shield Statute or, in the alternative, that Ms. Okwara should not be found in contempt of court because she did not violate the Statute willfully. Ms. Okwara also contends in this first issue that her question was proper because it sought evidence that was \u201cextremely relevant and pertinent, of high probative value, and . . . admissible no matter what the underlying charges were against Mr. Hoover.\u201d Thus, Ms. Okwara initially argues, \u201cthe trial court\u2019s findings and conclusions are unsupported by any evidence and its orders of contempt and censure must be overturned.\u201d We disagree.\nThe North Carolina Rape Shield Statute, Rule 412 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence, states that in trials resulting from charges of rape or a sex offense \u201cno reference to [sexual] behavior may be made in the presence of the jury and no evidence of this behavior may be introduced at any time during the trial\u201d unless the court determines in an in camera hearing that such a reference is relevant. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-412(d) (2011). If the proponent of sexual behavior evidence desires to produce that evidence, she or he must apply for an in camera hearing either prior to or during the trial. Id. In addition, the sexual behavior of the complainant (here, Ms. Ward) is considered irrelevant to the case unless that behavior:\n(1) Was between the complainant and the defendant; or\n(2) Is evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior offered for the purpose of showing that the act or acts charged were not committed by the defendant; or\n(3) Is evidence of a pattern of sexual behavior so distinctive and so closely resembling the defendant\u2019s version of the alleged encounter with the complainant as to tend to prove that such complainant consented to the act or acts charged or behaved in such a manner as to lead the defendant reasonably to believe that the complainant consented; or\n(4) Is evidence of sexual behavior offered as the basis of expert psychological or psychiatric opinion that the complainant fantasized or invented the act or acts charged.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-412(b).\nIn this case, Ms. Okwara did not petition the trial court for an in camera hearing on the admissibility of the question at issue. She now argues that her question was proper despite that failure because of the high probative value of the evidence sought by the question and because it may have referred to a false accusation, as opposed to a true memory, on the part of Ms. Ward. We need not address the merit of those arguments here. In either circumstance, Ms. Okwara\u2019s failure to initially address the question in an in camera hearing, before asking that question in front of the jury, violates the plain language of the Statute. When evidence refers to the sexual behavior of the complainant in a case resulting from a charge of rape or a sex offense, then an in camera hearing is required. In this case, Ms. Okwara asked Ms. Ward about a possible prior instance of rape between Ms. Ward \u2014the complainant \u2014 and her cousin, without first addressing the relevance and admissibility of that question during an in camera hearing. This constitutes competent evidence to support the trial court\u2019s finding that Ms. Okwara violated the Rape Shield Statute, and we affirm that decision.\nIn the alternative, Ms. Okwara argues that she did not intentionally violate the Rape Shield Statute and, thus, should not be found guilty of criminal contempt. We again disagree.\nIn order to be found guilty of criminal contempt, an individual must act willfully or with gross negligence. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 5A-11(a) (2011). In the context of contempt proceedings, this Court has previously defined a willful act as one \u201cdone deliberately and purposefully in violation of law, and without authority, justification, or excuse.\u201d State v. Phair, 193 N.C. App. 591, 594, 668 S.E.2d 110, 112 (2008) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Gross negligence has been interpreted in contempt proceedings to imply \u201crecklessness or carelessness that shows a thoughtless disregard of consequences or a heedless indifference to the rights of others.\u201d State v. Chriscoe, 85 N.C. App. 155, 158, 354 S.E.2d 289, 291 (1987) (citing State v. Boyd, 61 N.C. App. 238, 300 S.E.2d 578 (1983)).\nIn its 6 May 2011 order, determining that Ms. Okwara\u2019s actions were willful or grossly negligent, the trial court made a number of findings that we find persuasive and supported by competent evidence in this matter. First, the court highlighted the exchange between Ms. Okwara and Judge Ervin at the conclusion of the 13 December 2010 voir dire hearing. During that hearing, requested by Ms. Okwara pursuant to the terms of the Rape Shield Statute, the court informed her that it \u201cwould be inclined having heard the evidence to permit the defense to question [Ms. Ward] as to whether she has engaged in any sexual behaviour [sic] with the defendant during cross-examination of the State\u2019s case.\u201d When the court asked Ms. Okwara if she sought any evidence beyond this, she responded \u201cI guess as far as the \u2014 that\u2019s fine.\u201d\nSecond, despite the above exchange, the trial court noted in its 6 May 2011 order that Ms. Okwara never \u201csought to explain her failure to comply with [Rule 412]\u201d or even address her violation of the Rule, even though she asked Ms. Ward about a possible sexual relationship with her cousin in front of the jury and in violation of the Statute. Rather, Ms. Okwara maintained the position that \u201cthe question she asked sought to elicit admissible evidence.\u201d\nThird, the trial court determined that the 13 December 2010 exchange between Judge Ervin and Ms. Okwara, which occurred at the conclusion of the voir dire hearing, constituted a \u201cdirective or instruction of the court to the defendant,\u201d which the defendant had disobeyed by asking a clearly impermissible question under the Statute. Thus, the trial court determined that Ms. Okwara had \u201cfailed to comply with the requirements of [the Rape Shield Statute] in that she made reference to sexual behavior in the presence of the jury prior to obtaining a determination of the relevance of that evidence\u201d and, because of that, failed as an officer of the court to perform her duties. That failure, the court noted, would be sufficient to constitute criminal contempt if it were found to be willful or grossly negligent.\nFourth, on the subject of willfulness or gross negligence, the court acknowledged the North Carolina Pattern Jury Instructions on intent, which state that:\nIntent is a mental attitude seldom provable by direct evidence. It must ordinarily be proved by circumstances from which it may be inferred. You arrive at the intent of a person by such just and reasonable deductions from the circumstances proven as a reasonably prudent person would ordinarily draw therefrom.\nN.C. Pattern Jury Instructions, Crim. \u00a7 120.10 (2012); see also State v. Bell, 285 N.C. 746, 750, 208 S.E.2d 506, 508 (1974) (\u201cIntent is a mental attitude seldom provable by direct evidence. It must ordinarily be proved by circumstances from which it may be inferred.\u201d). In support of its inference that Ms. Okwara \u201cwas certainly aware of the provision of [the Rape Shield Statute],\u201d the trial court specified that \u201c[Ms. Okwara] had filed a motion pursuant to [the Rape Shield Statute] earlier in the proceedings . . . and had participated in a voir dire hearing that resulted from her earlier motion.\u201d\nFifth, the court found as a substantive point that Ms. Okwara \u201ccertainly had knowledge of the requirements of [the Rape Shield Statute],\u201d noting that she had \u201cyet to recognize her obligation to comply with the provisions of [the Rape Shield Statute] or her failure to do so\u201d and concluding that, together, these findings were sufficient evidence for the court to determine that Ms. Okwara \u201chas manifested that she acted knowingly and of a stubborn purpose. . . . [and her] conduct was willfully contemptuous.\u201d As a result, the court determined Ms. Okwara had \u201cdemonstrated carelessness reflecting a thoughtless disregard for the consequences and a heedless indifference to Ms. Ward\u2019s rights in this instance\u201d and, thus, \u201c[Ms. Okwara] is guilty of criminal contempt for the grossly negligent failure to perform her duties as an officer of the court in an official transaction.\u201d'\nThe record before this Court establishes that these findings are supported by competent evidence and, when taken together, are sufficient to justify the trial court\u2019s conclusion. Therefore, we affirm the trial court\u2019s determination that Ms. Okwara\u2019s violation- of the Statute was willful and grossly negligent and, thus, that she is guilty of criminal contempt of court.\nIn the second issue Ms. Okwara raises in her brief, she makes three additional sub-arguments. Ms. Okwara argues that the trial court abused its discretion and committed plain and reversible error: (1) in failing to recuse itself from the contempt proceedings; (2)(a) in finding that there was no evidence of lack of objectivity on the part of Judge Ervin, (b) by determining that the show cause order should not be returned before a judge other than Judge Ervin, and (c) by denying Ms. Okwara\u2019s motion to recuse Judge Ervin; and (3) in finding that Ms. Okwara proved her willful intent to disobey the court by defending herself.\nBecause neither Ms. Okwara nor her trial counsel (\u201cMr. Osho\u201d) challenged the decision of Judge Bridges either at the end of the 10 March 2011 recusal hearing or in her notice of appeal, we lack jurisdiction to review these arguments. \u201cA person found in criminal contempt may appeal in the manner provided for appeals in criminal actions[.]\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 5A-17 (2011). In criminal cases, the appellant must either (1) \u201cgive[] oral notice of appeal at trial, or (2) fil[e] notice of appeal with the clerk of superior court[.]\u201d N.C.R. App. P. 4(a). In the latter circumstance, the appellant\u2019s notice of appeal must \u201cdesignate the judgment or order from which appeal is taken[.]\u201d N.C.R. App. P. 4(b).\nIn this case, we find no evidence that Ms. Okwara sought to appeal the 10 March 2011 order of Judge Bridges denying her motion for recusal of Judge Ervin. Nowhere in the transcript of that hearing did Mr. Osho give oral notice of his intent to appeal the decision of Judge Bridges. In addition, when asked by Judge Bridges about whether he would prefer to have Judge Ervin or another judge decide the case, Mr. Osho commented, \u201cIt doesn\u2019t matter to me. Whatever the Court\u2019s ruling is, we comply with that ruling.\u201d Lastly, Ms. Okwara did not request that this Court review the trial court\u2019s 10 March 2011 decision in her written notice of appeal. Instead, Ms. Okwara only requested that this Court review \u201cthe Contempt Order entered by the Honorable Judge Robert C. Ervin . . . entered ... on May 6, 2011, as well as the Final Judgment which censured and /or recommended that the defendant be censured as a result of the aforementioned criminal contempt conviction[.]\u201d\n\u201c[W]hen a defendant has not properly given notice of appeal, this Court is without jurisdiction to hear the appeal.\u201d State v. McCoy, 171 N.C. App. 636, 638, 615 S.E.2d 319, 320 (2005); see also Dogwood Dev. & Mgmt. Co. v. White Oak Transp. Co., 362 N.C. 191, 197, 657 S.E.2d 361, 364-65 (2008) (\u201cIt is axiomatic that courts of law must have their power properly invoked by an interested party. . . . The appellant\u2019s compliance with the jurisdictional rules governing the taking of an appeal is the linchpin that connects the appellate division with the trial division and confers upon the appellate court the authority ito act in a particular case.\u201d). Thus, we dismiss Ms. Okwara\u2019s arguments concerning the results of the recusal hearing on 10 March 2011 for lack of jurisdiction.\nIn the third issue Ms. Okwara raises in her brief, she argues that \u201cthis Court must reverse the [trial court\u2019s] Show Cause Order entered February 8, 2011,\u201d because that order was entered by Judge Ervin \u201cwhile he was neither residing in nor assigned to Mecklenburg County, without Defendant\u2019s agreement,\u201d and, thus, the \u201corder is \u2018null and void and of no legal effect.\u2019 \u201d In this circumstance, again, we do not have jurisdiction to address Ms. Okwara\u2019s argument. There is no evidence in any of the transcripts that either Ms. Okwara or Mr. Osho orally sought to appeal the validity of Judge Ervin\u2019s show cause order. In addition, the show cause order is not mentioned in Ms. Okwara\u2019s 15 August 2011 notice of appeal. Thus, pursuant to North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure 4(a)-(b), this issue is likewise dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.\nLastly, it should be noted that the issue of censure is not directly addressed in the contents of Ms. Okwara\u2019s brief, despite the fact that she requested review of that order in her notice of appeal. Though censure is broadly referenced on a number of occasions in the brief, which asserts that the 11 August 2011 censure judgment should be overturned, it discusses neither the merits of Judge Ervin\u2019s judgment nor whether a different punishment would have been more appropriate. Thus, pursuant to Rule 28(a) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure, this issue is deemed abandoned, and we will not address it here. N.C.R. App. P. 28(a).\nAccordingly, the trial court\u2019s 6 May 2011 order and 11 August 2011 judgment are affirmed.\nAFFIRMED in part; DISMISSED in part.\nJudges CALABRIA and ELMORE concur.\n. In addition to these three issues, Ms. Okwara lists in her brief numerous \u201cAssignments of Error.\u201d Assignments of Error are no longer recognized by the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. Thus, pursuant to Rule 28(a) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure, we will only address those arguments that are specifically discussed in Ms. Okwara\u2019s brief. N.C.R. App. P. 28(a)(\u201cIssues not presented and discussed in a party\u2019s brief are deemed abandoned.\u201d).\n. The trial court also observed that:\nThe defendant\u2019s conduct and subsequent arguments in this litigation ignore the Court\u2019s role in safeguarding [the victim\u2019s interests under the Statute] and instead demonstrate an attitude that the defendant herself as counsel for Mr. Hoover was entitled to determine whether the question at issue should be asked without necessity for an in camera hearing.\n. Though Defendant-Appellant refers to a fourth point in the heading of her argument for the second issue \u2014 that the trial court erred in determining that it had given Ms. Okwara sufficient notice of her peril \u2014 she does not discuss that point in the contents of her brief. Thus, pursuant to Rule 28(a) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure, that argument is deemed abandoned, and we will not address it here. N.C.R. App. P. 28(a)(\u201cIssues not presented and discussed in a party\u2019s brief are deemed abandoned.\u201d).\n. As is discussed in the Standard of Review section, supra, the standard of review in contempt proceedings is not abuse of discretion or plain error. Rather, we ask whether a trial court\u2019s findings of fact were based on competent evidence sufficient to support the court\u2019s conclusions of law.", "type": "majority", "author": "STEPHENS, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Laura E. Parker, for,the State.", "Turrentine Law Firm, PLLC, by Karlene S. Turrentine, for Defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CHIEGE OKWARA\nNo. COA12-330\n(Filed 16 October 2012)\n1. Contempt \u2014 criminal contempt \u2014 willful violation of Rape Shield Statute\nThe trial court did not err in a criminal contempt case by finding defendant, the defense attorney in a rape case, guilty of criminal contempt. Defendant\u2019s question of the prosecuting witness about a possible prior instance of rape between the witness and her cousin, without first addressing the relevance and admissibility of that question during an in camera hearing, constituted competent evidence to support the trial court\u2019s finding that defendant violated the Rape Shield Statute. Further, the trial court\u2019s conclusion that defendant was willfully and grossly negligent was supported by the findings, which were supported by competent evidence.\n2. Appeal and Error \u2014 preservation of issues \u2014 failure to file notice of appeal\nDefendant failed to preserve for appellate review her challenge to the decision of Judge Bridges to deny her motion to recuse Judge Ervin where defendant failed to file a notice of appeal from that order. Defendant\u2019s argument was dismissed.\n3. Appeal and Error \u2014 preservation of issues \u2014 failure to file notice of appeal\nDefendant failed to preserve for appellate review her challenge to a show cause order where defendant failed to file a notice of appeal from that order. Defendant\u2019s argument was dismissed.\nAppeal by Defendant from order entered 6 May 2011 and judgment entered 11 August 2011 by Judge Robert C. Ervin in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals on 26 September 2012.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Laura E. Parker, for,the State.\nTurrentine Law Firm, PLLC, by Karlene S. Turrentine, for Defendant." }, "file_name": "0166-01", "first_page_order": 176, "last_page_order": 184 }