{ "id": 4104246, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DONUATTE MARQUISE WILKERSON", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Wilkerson", "decision_date": "2012-10-16", "docket_number": "No. COA12-175", "first_page": "195", "last_page": "201", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "223 N.C. App. 195" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "632 S.E.2d 218", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636290 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "230-31" }, { "page": "230-31" }, { "page": "230" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/632/0218-01" ] }, { "cite": "516 S.E.2d 388", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "397", "parenthetical": "\"The trial court may either reduce Defendant's probation to the statutory period or may enter a finding that the longer period is necessary.\" (emphasis added)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 N.C. App. 496", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11220395 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "509", "parenthetical": "\"The trial court may either reduce Defendant's probation to the statutory period or may enter a finding that the longer period is necessary.\" (emphasis added)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/133/0496-01" ] }, { "cite": "594 S.E.2d 411", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "418", "parenthetical": "\"[W]e must remand this case for re-sentencing in order for the trial court to either impose a probation term consistent with the statute or to make the appropriate finding of fact that a longer probationary period is necessary.\" (emphasis added and citation omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "163 N.C. App. 615", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8920112 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "625", "parenthetical": "\"[W]e must remand this case for re-sentencing in order for the trial court to either impose a probation term consistent with the statute or to make the appropriate finding of fact that a longer probationary period is necessary.\" (emphasis added and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/163/0615-01" ] }, { "cite": "708 S.E.2d 719", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "721", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "372 S.E.2d 523", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "527", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 279", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2562603 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "285", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0279-01" ] }, { "cite": "178 N.C. App. 395", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8378055 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "412-15" }, { "page": "412-15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/178/0395-01" ] }, { "cite": "459 S.E.2d 739", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "745" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "340 N.C. 735", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 790153 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "746-47" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/340/0735-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 S.E.2d 223", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "225" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 180", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560030 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "182" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0180-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 710, "char_count": 13966, "ocr_confidence": 0.754, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.13137291015808258 }, "sha256": "1457ebfee3ef7138fb9b799e97ba565fcaeb261d0bea25825f3237795b3f80b0", "simhash": "1:2e5a536b34ad0d70", "word_count": 2297 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:08:05.693184+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges MCGEE and THIGPEN concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DONUATTE MARQUISE WILKERSON" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BEASLEY, Judge.\nDonuatte Marquise Wilkerson (Defendant) appeals from judgment entered on his convictions for felonious larceny after breaking and entering and felonious possession of stolen goods. For the following reasons, we find no error.\nOn 28 August 2009, the victim, John Dintelmann reported a break-in at his home in Hoke County to police. He reported that a 52-inch flat screen Samsung television, some laptop computers, a desktop computer, a keyboard, speakers, a Wii game, several DVDs, a laundry basket, jewelry, and some change had been stolen from his home.\nEarlier that same day, Phyllis Bethea, Mr. Dintelmann\u2019s neighbor who lived three houses down, observed a light-colored, \u201colder model,\u201d large-sized car driving slowly up and down the street. She watched the car pass her house three times within five to ten minutes. Ms. Bethea testified that, initially, the driver was alone in the car and was on his cell phone. However, when the car passed her house again coming from the direction of Mr. Dintelmann\u2019s home, she observed more than one person in the car. She found the car suspicious and called police to report it. Ms. Bethea provided the police with two possible license plate numbers to the car. One of the plate numbers was registered to Defendant\u2019s car, a white, 1996 Lincoln Town Car.\nThe next day, Detective Sergeant Donald Schwab of the Hoke County Sheriff\u2019s Office went to Defendant\u2019s home and spoke with Defendant. Defendant\u2019s white 1996 Lincoln Town Car was parked at the residence, and Sergeant Schwab asked Defendant for his consent to search the car. Defendant consented, unlocked the car and opened the trunk. The trunk contained a laundry basket filled with several \u201ccomputer items\u201d that matched the description of the stolen property. Sergeant Schwab seized this property and two cell phones from Defendant\u2019s pocket. One of the cell phones, a Nokia, was Defendant\u2019s and was serviced by T-Mobile.\nAt trial, the State presented testimony from Antoinette Moore, a T-Mobile Wireless records custodian. Ms. Moore provided \u201ccall details records\u201d for Defendant\u2019s Nokia phone. She testified that a number of calls were made from or received by Defendant\u2019s phone on the day of the crime, starting at 10:56 a.m. and concluding at 1:24 p.m. Ms. Moore explained the process involved in transmitting cellular signals: calls made or received in a given area will be transmitted through the closest cell tower that is not busy. She provided the times, length, and tower locations of each call. Sergeant Schwab then testified that lie visited each cell tower and plotted their locations on a map according to the time the call was received by the tower. The calls began and ended in Cumberland County, where Defendant resides, following a path to and from Hoke County with the calls hitting towers 1.5 and 1.7 miles from the victim\u2019s home in Hoke County.\nMs. Moore also testified that a text message was sent from Defendant\u2019s phone at 10:45 a.m. Pacific Daylight Time, based on T-Mobile records housed in Seattle, Washington. Sergeant Schwab testified that he searched the phone after seizing it and found a text message in the \u201csent\u201d folder to a number labeled \u201cwork.\u201d On the phone itself, the message was time stamped at 2:45 p.m. on 28 August 2009, the day of the crime. It read, \u201cI got a 64 inch flat Samsung.\u201d\nDuring trial, in anticipation of the text message evidence and outside the presence of the jury, Defense counsel objected to its admission on the grounds that it could not be properly authenticated. The court heard from both parties and, before ruling, noted that the objection by Defense counsel was a motion in limine. Before ruling the message was admissible, the court required that the State first present evidence showing that the phone was in Defendant\u2019s possession, Defendant claimed the phone was his, Defendant\u2019s car was seen on the victim\u2019s street around the time of the crime, the phone records tend to establish a path of travel to the victim\u2019s residence and back to Defendant\u2019s residence, and a large Samsung flat screen television was stolen.\nThe jury found Defendant guilty of felonious larceny after breaking and/or entering, guilty of possession of stolen goods, and not guilty of felonious breaking and/or entering. The trial court arrested judgment on the larceny conviction and sentenced Defendant to imprisonment for a period of six to eight months on the possession conviction, with sixty days active and the remainder suspended. The trial court also ordered five years of probation \u201cin light of evicence [sic] in this case appears to be much more serious than a normal break/enter because of phone calls & text messages during the time of the crime.\u201d\nDefendant first argues that the trial court erred by admitting the text message from Defendant\u2019s cell phone as it was not properly authenticated under Rule 901 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence with respect to who sent the message or at what time it was sent. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 901(a) (2011). After careful review of all of the evidence on the record, we find no error.\nA motion in limine \u201ccan be made in order to prevent the jury from ever hearing the potentially prejudicial evidence thus obviating the necessity for an instruction during trial to disregard that evidence if it comes in and is prejudicial.\u201d State v. Tate, 300 N.C. 180, 182, 265 S.E.2d 223, 225 (1980). \u201cThe decision of whether to grant... a motion [in limine] rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge.\u201d State v. Hightower, 340 N.C. 735, 746-47, 459 S.E.2d 739, 745 (1995). This Court has previously applied this standard of review to an appeal from a denied motion in limine based on admissibility of text messages under Rule 901 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence. State v. Taylor, 178 N.C. App. 395, 412-15, 632 S.E.2d 218, 230-31 (2006). As the trial court here made clear that it was considering Defendant\u2019s objection as a motion in limine, we review Defendant\u2019s appeal for an abuse of discretion. \u201cAbuse of discretion results where the court\u2019s ruling is manifestly unsupported by reason or is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.\u201d State v. Hennis, 323 N.C. 279, 285, 372 S.E.2d 523, 527 (1988) (citation omitted).\nUnder Rule 901 \u201c[t]he requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 901(a). The rule also provides a nonexclusive list of methods of acceptable authentication, including testimony from a knowledgeable witness \u201cthat a matter is what it is claimed to be[;]\u201d \u201c[a]ppearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics, taken in conjunction with circumstances[;]\u201d and \u201c[e]vidence describing a process or system used to produce a result and showing that the process or system produces an accurate result.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 901(b)(1), (4), (9).\nDefendant cites Taylor, in support of his assertion that because he was not specifically named as the sender in any of the texts, the authentication was not proper. However, Defendant misunderstands our ruling in Taylor. In Taylor, we affirmed the trial court\u2019s denial of the defendant\u2019s motion in limine to exclude text messages where expert witnesses testified as to the process employed in sending and receiving text messages and where circumstances indicated that the victim was the sender by identifying the victim twice by his first name and identifying the vehicle he would be driving. Taylor, 178 N.C. App. at 412-15, 632 S.E.2d at 230-31. Here, Defendant attempts to rely on the fact that the exact same identifying circumstances, largely his name, were not present in this case. Yet, this is not what Taylor requires. Relying on the language of Rule 901, we found \u201c[t]he text messages contained] sufficient circumstantial evidence that tends to show the victim was the person who sent and received them.\u201d Id. at 414, 632 S.E.2d at 230. Thus, the fact that the defendant was identified by name was merely a circumstance that satisfied the statute, not a specific requirement in and of itself.\nHere, the State presented substantial circumstantial evidence tending to show that Defendant was the sender of the text message at issue. Defendant\u2019s car was seen driving up and down the victim\u2019s street on the day of the crime in a manner such that an eyewitness found the car suspicious and called police. The eyewitness provided a license plate number and a description of the car that both matched Defendant\u2019s car, and she testified that the driver appeared to be using a cell phone. The morning after the crime, the car was found parked in front of Defendant\u2019s home and some of the stolen property was found in the trunk. The phone was found on Defendant\u2019s person the following morning. Around the time of the crime, multiple calls were made from and received by Defendant\u2019s cell phone. The message itself referenced an item that was stolen: a large, flat-screen Samsung television. Further, similar to Taylor, by referencing the cell towers used to transmit the calls, expert witnesses established the time of the calls placed, the process employed, and a path of transit tracking the phone from the area of Defendant\u2019s home to the area of the victim\u2019s home and back.\nDefendant argues that inconsistencies in the timing of the message resulting from the difference in time zones between where the messages were sent and where the records were stored and time stamped negates the authenticity of the message. However, such issues in witness credibility are for the trial court to weigh in making its determination of authenticity and we see nothing in these facts to indicate this was done abusively. From the circumstances and testimony provided above, which the trial court carefully weighed, it is reasonable to find that Defendant was the sender of the text message. Consequently, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant\u2019s motion in limine to exclude the text message.\nDefendant next argues that the trial court erred by placing Defendant on probation for sixty months without making findings adequate to support the decision. We disagree.\n\u201cAlleged statutory errors are questions of law, and as such, are reviewed de novo.\" State v. Mackey,_N.C. App._,_, 708 S.E.2d 719, 721 (2011) (citations omitted). By statute, the maximum length of probation that the trial court may impose is thirty-six months \u201c[u]nless the court makes specific findings that longer or shorter periods of probation are necessary.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1343.2(d) (2011). If such findings are made, the probation may extend up to five years (sixty months). Id. Yet the statute merely requires a finding that a longer term is needed; it does not require detailed rationale. See State v. Mucci, 163 N.C. App. 615, 625, 594 S.E.2d 411, 418 (2004)(\u201c[W]e must remand this case for re-sentencing in order for the trial court to either impose a probation term consistent with the statute or to make the appropriate finding of fact that a longer probationary period is necessary.\u201d (emphasis added and citation omitted)); State v. Cardwell, 133 N.C. App. 496, 509, 516 S.E.2d 388, 397 (1999)(\u201cThe trial court may either reduce Defendant's probation to the statutory period or may enter a finding that the longer period is necessary.\" (emphasis added)).\nHere, the trial court went beyond the statutory requirement. It supported its rationale with the evidence of the phone calls and text message which it found raised the seriousness of the offense: \u201cProb length 60 mths in light of evicence [sic] in this case appears to be much more serious than a normal break/enter because of phone calls & text messages during the time of the crime.\u201d As such, we find no error.\nUnder this same argument, Defendant also contends that the extended probation was inappropriately imposed as a form of punishment rather than for reformation. However, this claim is without merit. As the State correctly points out, the North Carolina General Statutes provide several purposes behind criminal sentencing, including \u201cpunishment commensurate with the injury . . . caused\u201d among them. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1340.12 (2011). Thus, even if Defendant is correct that the trial court sought to impose punishment, this is not contrary to our laws or to the purpose of our criminal justice system.\nNo Error.\nJudges MCGEE and THIGPEN concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "BEASLEY, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Benjamin J. Kull, for the State.", "William B. Gibson, for Defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DONUATTE MARQUISE WILKERSON\nNo. COA12-175\n(Filed 16 October 2012)\n1. Evidence \u2014 authentication\u2014text message \u2014 substantial circumstantial evidence \u2014 defendant was sender\nThe trial court did not err in a felonious larceny after breaking and entering and felonious possession of stolen goods case by admitting the text message from defendant\u2019s cell phone. The State presented substantial circumstantial evidence tending to show that defendant was the sender of the text message at issue.\n2. Probation and Parole \u2014 extended sentence \u2014 supported by the findings \u2014 imposition of punishment allowed\nThe trial court did not err in a felonious larceny after breaking and entering and felonious possession of stolen goods case by placing defendant on probation for sixty months. The trial court supported its rationale with evidence of phone calls and a text message which it found raised the seriousness of the offense. Further, even if the trial court sought to impose punishment with the extended probation period, it was not contrary to our laws or to the purpose of our criminal justice system.\nAppeal by Defendant from judgment entered 26 October 2011 by Judge Michael E. Beale in Hoke County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 28 August 2012.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Benjamin J. Kull, for the State.\nWilliam B. Gibson, for Defendant." }, "file_name": "0195-01", "first_page_order": 205, "last_page_order": 211 }