{ "id": 4104376, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. STEVEN FRANKLIN RYAN", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Ryan", "decision_date": "2012-11-06", "docket_number": "No. COA12-228", "first_page": "325", "last_page": "341", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "223 N.C. App. 325" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "635 S.E.2d 906", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636951 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "913", "parenthetical": "photographs of two other children admissible because they were relevant to child victim's motives for coming forward with allegations of sexual abuse against the defendant" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/635/0906-01" ] }, { "cite": "632 S.E.2d 498", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636318 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "503" }, { "page": "507" }, { "page": "507" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/632/0498-01" ] }, { "cite": "651 S.E.2d 867", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639492 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "875" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/651/0867-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(5)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-27", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-202.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-27.4", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "179 N.C. App. 657", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8238958 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "668", "parenthetical": "photographs of two other children admissible because they were relevant to child victim's motives for coming forward with allegations of sexual abuse against the defendant" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/179/0657-01" ] }, { "cite": "432 S.E.2d 705", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "710" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "111 N.C. App. 359", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522034 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "366" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/111/0359-01" ] }, { "cite": "564 S.E.2d 296", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "297" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "150 N.C. App. 710", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9083069 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "712" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/150/0710-01" ] }, { "cite": "595 S.E.2d 715", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "718-19" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "164 N.C. App. 254", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8896816 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "259-60" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/164/0254-01" ] }, { "cite": "359 S.E.2d 463", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "466" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "320 N.C. 610", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4724664 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "615" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/320/0610-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 S.E.2d 838", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "116 N.C. App. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521887 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/116/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "178 N.C. App. 78", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8376280 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/178/0078-01" ] }, { "cite": "608 S.E.2d 774", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "782" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "168 N.C. App. 263", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8469249 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "274" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/168/0263-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 S.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "3" }, { "page": "3" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 N.C. 748", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2535590 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "752" }, { "page": "752" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/336/0748-01" ] }, { "cite": "341 S.E.2d 565", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "568" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 337", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4700970 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "341-42" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0337-01" ] }, { "cite": "350 S.E.2d 347", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 614", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4735495 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0614-01" ] }, { "cite": "350 S.E.2d 76", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 590", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4732149 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0590-01" ] }, { "cite": "370 S.E.2d 676", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "678", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Aguallo, 318 N.C. 590, 350 S.E.2d 76 (1986); State v. Kim, 318 N.C. 614, 350 S.E.2d 347 (1986); State v. Heath, 316 N.C. 337, 341 S.E.2d 565 (1986)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 818", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2515424 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "822", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Aguallo, 318 N.C. 590, 350 S.E.2d 76 (1986); State v. Kim, 318 N.C. 614, 350 S.E.2d 347 (1986); State v. Heath, 316 N.C. 337, 341 S.E.2d 565 (1986)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0818-01" ] }, { "cite": "365 S.E.2d 651", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "655" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "89 N.C. App. 212", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521188 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "219" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/89/0212-01" ] }, { "cite": "485 S.E.2d 88", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "89", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Bailey, 89 N.C. App. 212, 219, 365 S.E.2d 651, 655 (1988)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "126 N.C. App. 312", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11710305 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "315", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Bailey, 89 N.C. App. 212, 219, 365 S.E.2d 651, 655 (1988)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/126/0312-01" ] }, { "cite": "538 S.E.2d 597", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "601" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "140 N.C. App. 743", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12134907 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "748" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/140/0743-01" ] }, { "cite": "553 S.E.2d 679", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "354 N.C. 354", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 138480 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/354/0354-01" ] }, { "cite": "543 S.E.2d 179", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "183" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "142 N.C. App. 411", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9441531 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "419" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/142/0411-01" ] }, { "cite": "357 S.E.2d 359", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "366-67" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "320 N.C. 20", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4729914 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "31-32" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/320/0020-01" ] }, { "cite": "559 S.E.2d 788", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "789" }, { "page": "789" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "355 N.C. 266", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 219976 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "267" }, { "page": "266-67" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/355/0266-01" ] }, { "cite": "571 S.E.2d 584", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 428", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511280 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0428-01" ] }, { "cite": "563 S.E.2d 594", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "598" }, { "page": "599" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "150 N.C. App. 46", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9079747 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "52" }, { "page": "53" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/150/0046-01" ] }, { "cite": "723 S.E.2d 326", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "333", "parenthetical": "quoting Odom, 307 N.C. at 660, 300 S.E.2d at 378" }, { "page": "335" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "426 S.E.2d 692", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "697" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 N.C. 431", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2546948 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "440" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/333/0431-01" ] }, { "cite": "676 F.2d 995", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 562145 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1002" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/676/0995-01" ] }, { "cite": "300 S.E.2d 375", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378", "parenthetical": "quoting United States v. McCaskill, 676 F.2d 995, 1002 (4th Cir. 1982)" }, { "page": "378" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 655", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565416 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "660", "parenthetical": "quoting United States v. McCaskill, 676 F.2d 995, 1002 (4th Cir. 1982)" }, { "page": "660" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0655-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 610", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3739107 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "622" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0610-01" ] }, { "cite": "554 S.E.2d 650", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "354 N.C. 223", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 138432, 138537, 138405, 138477 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/354/0223-04", "/nc/354/0223-02", "/nc/354/0223-01", "/nc/354/0223-03" ] }, { "cite": "549 S.E.2d 889", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "893" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "145 N.C. App. 302", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11437253 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "307" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/145/0302-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1261, "char_count": 39690, "ocr_confidence": 0.747, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.627316783393982e-08, "percentile": 0.35178189925358583 }, "sha256": "1b88edbd5103f26d410fdef7b14eb22492f83ffeb2148421460b0775cd3e165e", "simhash": "1:156a3060544388e6", "word_count": 6445 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:08:05.693184+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges HUNTER, JR., (Robert N.) and ERVIN concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. STEVEN FRANKLIN RYAN" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "McCullough, judge.\nOn 31 May 2011, Steven Franklin Ryan (\u201cdefendant\u201d) was convicted of one count of first-degree sex offense and two counts of taking indecent liberties with a child. On appeal, defendant contends he is entitled to a new trial for the following reasons: (1) the trial court\u2019s failure to reinstruct the deadlocked jury unconstitutionally coerced guilty verdicts; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant\u2019s motion for a mistrial based upon the existence of a deadlocked jury; (3) the testimony of a State\u2019s witness vouching for the credibility of the minor child constituted plain error; (4) the State\u2019s closing argument was so improper as to necessitate ex mero mo tu intervention; and (5) the admission of the State\u2019s evidence regarding defendant\u2019s living arrangements with his granddaughter constituted plain error. Defendant also contends the trial court erred in ordering him to register as a sex offender and enroll in lifetime satellite-based monitoring (\u201cSBM\u201d). We hold the testimony of the State\u2019s expert witness vouching for the credibility of the minor child constituted plain error in this case, and therefore we order a new trial for defendant.\nI. Background\nThe child victim in the present case (\u201cthe child\u201d) testified that she was 13 years old and was completing the eighth grade at the time of trial. She lived with her grandmother, Donna Allen (\u201cAllen\u201d) from the time she was two until she was age ten. In 2007, the child and Allen were living with defendant in his three-bedroom trailer home.\nThe child testified she was left alone with defendant while Allen worked at night. She testified that at the end of her fourth grade year, when she was approximately ten years old, defendant began rubbing her back while wearing only his robe, and she could see his penis under his opened robe. She testified that defendant also kissed her. The child told Allen about the back rubs, but not about seeing defendant\u2019s penis or that he had kissed her. Allen confronted defendant about the back rubs, but the child testified the back rubs continued.\nBy the beginning of her fifth grade year, the child testified defendant put his mouth on her breasts and her vagina and put his penis in her vagina and butt. She testified that when she went to the bathroom to urinate afterward, \u201c[i]t was burning and hurting.\u201d The child testified defendant also put his fingers in her vagina. She testified that defendant told her that if she said anything about the encounters, he would break up with her grandmother. The child testified that during the encounters, she asked defendant to stop, and on one occasion she hit defendant. On one occasion, around her tenth birthday in August 2007, the child testified defendant held her arms down, kissed her, and then kissed her breasts and licked her vagina. The child testified defendant also took her hand and put it on his penis.\nSometime in late 2007 or early 2008, Allen\u2019s relationship with defendant deteriorated and the two broke up. Criminal charges were filed by both Allen and defendant against the other but were subsequently dropped. Evidence was introduced that at the time of the breakup, defendant had been drinking and threw Allen\u2019s belongings into the yard, at which point Allen left the residence. Evidence was also introduced indicating that Allen had threatened defendant, saying that he would not live in his house without her. Further evidence was introduced that following the breakup, defendant and Allen were civil to each other and performed favors for each other, such as providing transportation, haircuts, and machine maintenance.\nThe child went to live with her mother, Cailey, after her grandmother and defendant broke up. In September 2009, approximately two years after the alleged sexual abuse, the child told her mother defendant had raped her without providing any details. The child testified that she waited two years'to tell anyone because she was scared and thought the sexual contact was her fault. The child also testified she came forward with the allegations because defendant was living with his seven-year-old granddaughter and she was afraid defendant would abuse her as well.\nAfter the child told Cailey that defendant had raped her, Cailey informed Allen of what the child had said, and the two immediately took the child to speak with a relative who was a detective with the Johnston County Sheriff\u2019s Office, Kevin Massengill (\u201cDetective Massengill\u201d). The child initially remained in the vehicle while Allen informed Detective Massengill of the child\u2019s sexual assault accusations against defendant. Detective Massengill then spoke with the child about the accusations and advised Allen to seek a child medical evaluation. Detective Massengill testified that the child did not provide any details of the alleged incidents, but that she only stated she had been touched inappropriately. On the following day, Allen and Cailey took the child to WakeMed Hospital and were referred to a specialist.\nAlso on the following day, Detective Massengill referred the case to his supervisor at the Sheriff\u2019s Office. Detective Toni Lee (\u201cDetective Lee\u201d) was assigned to the case. Detective Lee was an acquaintance of the child\u2019s family. Detective Lee interviewed the child about the allegations for approximately thirty minutes. Allen was present in the room while Detective Lee interviewed the child. During the interview, the child informed Detective Lee that once when she was home alone with defendant, he had kissed her. She also stated that defendant had rubbed her back twice and she had told him to stop. She further stated that one night, defendant held her down, kissed her on the mouth and on her breasts, stuck his fingers and tongue in her private area, and put his penis in her vagina.\nFollowing her interview with the child, Detective Lee attempted to contact defendant at his residence and left her business card asking him to contact her. Defendant contacted her 23 minutes later and informed her he would be glad to speak with her and that she was welcome to come by. Detective Lee returned to defendant\u2019s residence and spoke with him about the child\u2019s allegations. The conversation lasted approximately six minutes, during which defendant denied the allegations and suggested to Detective Lee that Allen had influenced the child to fabricate the allegations against him. Following her interview with defendant, Detective Lee concluded that the child\u2019s accusations against defendant were not fabricated and did not conduct any further investigation.\nOn referral from WakeMed, the child was seen by Dr. Laura Gutman (\u201cDr. Gutman\u201d), a pediatrician specializing in child maltreatment and child sexual abuse. Dr. Gutman was qualified as an expert witness in the field at trial. Dr. Gutman interviewed Cailey about the child\u2019s medical history and then talked at length with the child about the sexual abuse allegations. The child informed Dr. Gutman about the back rubs and defendant\u2019s exposing himself to her. Dr. Gutman then used anatomically correct dolls and proceeded to lead the child to various body parts, asking her if anything had happened there. During the body inventory, the child informed Dr. Gutman that defendant had placed his tongue in her mouth and had put his penis in her private area. The child also informed Dr. Gutman that defendant had felt her breasts and private area with his fingers. When Dr. Gutman asked the child if anything happened in the anal area, the child responded defendant had put his penis in her butt. The child also stated defendant had put his penis in her mouth. Dr. Gutman testified about the child\u2019s ability to describe \u201csensory detail[s]\u201d about these alleged incidents, such as the taste of defendant\u2019s tongue and the warmth of his penis. Dr. Gutman further testified that the child reported mental health symptoms that are common in sexually abused children, including nightmares, embarrassment, dissociation, and anger. The child told Dr. Gutman that no one else had touched her sexually.\nFollowing her lengthy interview with the child, Dr. Gutman performed a physical exam on the child. She observed a deep notch in the child\u2019s hymen, which she testified was highly suggestive of vaginal penetration. Dr. Gutman also examined the child\u2019s anus and found it to be normal, although she testified that physical findings of anal abuse are uncommon. Finally, Dr. Gutman tested the child for sexually transmitted diseases. The tests were negative, except that the child was diagnosed with the presence of bacterial vaginosis. Dr. Gutman testified that the presence of bacterial vaginosis can be indicative of a vaginal injury, although it is the most common genital infection in women and can have many causes. Cailey had indicated the child had symptoms of vaginosis as early as 2006, which predated the alleged abuse. Based on the presence of the hymenal notch and bacterial vaginosis, and the child\u2019s history as taken from both Cailey and the child, Dr. Gutman testified as to her conclusion that the child had been sexually abused, that she had no indication the child\u2019s story was fictitious or that the child had been coached, and that defendant was the perpetrator.\nThe child also met with licensed clinical social worker Stacey Drake (\u201cDrake\u201d). Drake testified she provided therapy for the child\u2019s mental health issues and encouraged the child to keep a private journal about the alleged abuse as a coping method. Drake testified that when she first met with the child, the child was shy, made no eye contact, had a difficult time talking, and was acting very angry at home. Drake also testified the child was doing poorly in school and had gained weight. Drake testified the child had made progress with her mental health issues as of June 2010.\nDefendant testified at trial in his own defense. He admitted to rubbing the child\u2019s back twice but stated he had stopped when Allen asked him to. Defendant repeatedly denied the allegations of sexual abuse and maintained that he and the child had always had a good relationship. Defendant testified there were other men, some with known criminal records, who had visited with Allen in the presence of the child following their breakup. Defendant testified concerning his belief that Allen had compelled the child to fabricate the allegations against him. Defendant\u2019s ex-wife also testified on defendant\u2019s behalf, stating that some time in 2007, after defendant\u2019s breakup with Allen, she was giving defendant a ride when they saw the child in her yard. She testified the child ran towards the truck waving and calling defendant\u2019s name and appeared happy to see him.\nOn 5 April 2010, defendant was indicted on two counts of first-degree rape, two counts of first-degree sex offense, and two counts of taking indecent liberties with a child. The State dismissed one count of first-degree rape prior to trial. Defendant was tried on the remaining five charges before a jury beginning 23 May 2011. Following three indications of deadlock by the jury, defendant moved for a mistrial, which was denied by the trial court. After approximately four hours of deliberations over two days, the jury returned unanimous verdicts on all five counts. The jury found defendant not guilty of first-degree rape and one count of first-degree sex offense. The jury found defendant guilty of the remaining charges \u2014 one count of first-degree sex offense and two counts of taking indecent liberties with a child. The trial court entered judgment on the verdicts, sentencing defendant to consecutive terms of 288-355 and 19-23 months\u2019 imprisonment. The trial court also ordered defendant to register as a sex offender and enroll in lifetime SBM. Defendant gave oral notice of appeal in open court following his convictions and has filed a petition for writ of certiorari with this Court seeking review of the trial court\u2019s sex offender registration and SBM orders.\nII. Improper Expert Opinion Testimony Vouching For Credibility of Minor Child\nWe first address defendant\u2019s argument that the trial court both erred and committed plain error in allowing the State\u2019s expert witness, Dr. Gutman, to improperly vouch for the credibility of the minor child. Defendant objected to some portions of Dr. Gutman\u2019s testimony, but not to others. Accordingly, this Court reviews those portions to which defendant objected for prejudicial error and those portions to which defendant did not object for plain error.\nGenerally, an alleged error is prejudicial if \u201cthere is a reasonable possibility that, had the error in question not been committed, a different result would have been reached at the trial[.]\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1443(a) (2011). Nonetheless, \u201c[e]videntiary errors are harmless unless a defendant proves that absent the error a different result would have been reached at trial.\u201d State v. Ferguson, 145 N.C. App. 302, 307, 549 S.E.2d 889, 893, disc. review denied, 354 N.C. 223, 554 S.E.2d 650 (2001).\n\u201cIn criminal cases, an issue that was not preserved by objection noted at trial and that is not deemed preserved by rule or law without any such action nevertheless may be made the basis of an issue presented on appeal when the judicial action questioned is specifically and distinctly contended to amount to plain error.\u201d N.C.R. App. P. 10(a)(4) (2012); see also State v. Goss, 361 N.C. 610, 622, 651 S.E.2d 867, 875 (2007). Plain error arises when the error is \u201c \u2018so basic, so prejudicial, so lacking in its elements that justice cannot have been done[.]\u2019 \u201d State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 660, 300 S.E.2d 375, 378 (1983) (quoting United States v. McCaskill, 676 F.2d 995, 1002 (4th Cir. 1982)). \u201cUnder the plain error rule, defendant must convince this Court not only that there was error, but that absent the error, the jury probably would have reached a different result.\u201d State v. Jordan, 333 N.C. 431, 440, 426 S.E.2d 692, 697 (1993). In its recent opinion in State v. Towe,_N.C._,_S.E.2d_, No. 121PA11 (June 14, 2012), our Supreme Court reiterated the plain error standard, stating that \u201cto establish plain error [a] defendant must show that a fundamental error occurred at his trial and that the error \u201c\u2018had a probable impact on the jury\u2019s finding that the defendant was guilty.\u201d \u2019 \u201d Id. at_,_ S.E.2d at_, No. 121PA11, slip. op. at 11 (quoting State v. Lawrence, _N.C._,_, 723 S.E.2d 326, 333 (2012) (quoting Odom, 307 N.C. at 660, 300 S.E.2d at 378)).\nHere, those portions of Dr. Gutman\u2019s testimony challenged by defendant on appeal can be classified into three categories: (1) expert opinion testimony concluding that the child had been sexually abused, (2) expert opinion testimony that the child\u2019s story was not fictitious, and (3) expert opinion testimony that the child had not been coached. Defendant also challenges Dr. Gutman\u2019s testimony as to her conclusion that defendant was the perpetrator of the sexual abuse on the child.\nA. Conclusion of Sexual Abuse\nIt is well-settled law that \u201c[e]xpert opinion testimony is not admissible to establish the credibility of the victim as a witness.\u201d State v. Dixon, 150 N.C. App. 46, 52, 563 S.E.2d 594, 598, aff\u2019d, 356 N.C. 428, 571 S.E.2d 584 (2002). Nonetheless, \u201c[w]ith respect to expert testimony in child sexual abuse prosecutions, our Supreme Court has approved, upon a proper foundation, the admission of expert testimony with respect to the characteristics of sexually abused children and whether the particular complainant has symptoms consistent with those characteristics.\u201d Id. (citing State v. Stancil, 355 N.C. 266, 267, 559 S.E.2d 788, 789 (2002); State v. Kennedy, 320 N.C. 20, 31-32, 357 S.E.2d 359, 366-67 (1987)).\nIn addition, \u201can expert medical witness may render an opinion pursuant to Rule 702 that sexual abuse has in fact occurred if the State establishes a proper foundation, i.e. physical evidence consistent with sexual abuse.\u201d Id. \u201cHowever, in the absence of physical evidence to support a diagnosis of sexual abuse, expert testimony that sexual abuse has in fact occurred is not admissible because it is an impermissible opinion regarding the victim\u2019s credibility.\u201d Id.; see also Stancil, 355 N.C. at 266-67, 559 S.E.2d at 789 (\u201cIn a sexual offense prosecution involving a child victim, the trial court should not admit expert opinion that sexual abuse has in fact occurred because, absent physical evidence supporting a diagnosis of sexual abuse, such testimony is an impermissible opinion regarding the victim\u2019s credibility.\u201d). Thus, \u201c[testimony that a child has been \u2018sexually abused\u2019 based solely on interviews with the child [is] improper.\u201d State v. Grover, 142 N.C. App. 411, 419, 543 S.E.2d 179, 183, aff\u2019d, 354 N.C. 354, 553 S.E.2d 679 (2001); see also State v. Bates, 140 N.C. App. 743, 748, 538 S.E.2d 597, 601 (2000) (acknowledging that where an expert witness conducted an interview and a physical examination of a child who claimed she had been sexually abused, and where the child\u2019s physical examination revealed no evidence that the child had been sexually abused, expert testimony \u201cdiagnosing]\u201d the child as a victim of sexual abuse based solely on the child\u2019s statement that she had been abused lacked a proper foundation and should not have been admitted). Our Supreme Court reaffirmed these legal principles in its recent opinion in Towe, _ N.C. at _, _ S.E.2d at _, No. 121PA11, slip. op. at 9-10.\nIn the present case, Dr. Gutman testified that based upon her training, education, and experience, as well as her examination of the child, she concluded that the history given by the child and her physical findings \u201cwere consistent with sexual abuse[.]\u201d Similarly, in Dr. Gutman\u2019s written report, she concluded that the child had been \u201csexually assaulted\u201d based upon her medical evaluation of the child. We hold Dr. Gutman\u2019s conclusions in this regard were properly admitted, given the physical evidence of the child\u2019s unusual hymenal notch and bacterial vaginosis.\nWe note that in both her testimony and in her written report, Dr. Gutman did not state which acts of alleged sexual abuse she concluded had occurred, although she noted the various types of sexual acts alleged by the child in both her testimony and her written report. Had Dr. Gutman testified as to her specific conclusion that the child had been the victim of both vaginal and anal sexual abuse, we would hold the admission of such testimony to be error, as the State presented no physical evidence of anal sexual abuse, and Dr. Gutman admitted on cross-examination that such a conclusion would be based solely on her interview with the child.\nHowever, Dr. Gutman did not give an opinion as to which specific assault she concluded had occurred. Rather, Dr. Gutman stated only her conclusions that the child\u2019s history and physical findings were \u201cconsistent with sexual abuse\u201d and that based on her medical evaluation of the child, the child had been \u201csexually assaulted.\u201d Because the State introduced a proper foundation of physical evidence \u2014 the unusual deep hymenal notch and the presence of the child\u2019s vaginosis \u2014 prior to Dr. Gutman\u2019s stating her conclusion of sexual abuse, we cannot conclude it was error for Dr. Gutman to testify as to her general conclusions. Cf. Towe,_N.C. at_,_S.E.2d at_, No. 121PA11, slip. op. at 10 (expert witness testified \u201cthat she observed no injuries during her physical examination of the victim, that the victim\u2019s hymen appeared normal and smooth, and that the victim displayed no physical symptoms diagnostic of sexual abuse\u201d).\nB. Truthfulness of Child and Coaching\n\u201c \u2018[0]ur appellate courts have consistently held that the testimony of an expert to the effect that a prosecuting witness is believable, credible, or telling the truth is inadmissible evidence.\u2019 \u201d State v. Dick, 126 N.C. App. 312, 315, 485 S.E.2d 88, 89 (1997) (quoting State v. Bailey, 89 N.C. App. 212, 219, 365 S.E.2d 651, 655 (1988)). Accordingly, our Supreme Court \u201chas found reversible error when experts have testified that the victim was believable, had no record of lying, and had never been untruthful.\u201d State v. Aguallo, 322 N.C. 818, 822, 370 S.E.2d 676, 678 (1988) (citing State v. Aguallo, 318 N.C. 590, 350 S.E.2d 76 (1986); State v. Kim, 318 N.C. 614, 350 S.E.2d 347 (1986); State v. Heath, 316 N.C. 337, 341 S.E.2d 565 (1986)). However, our Supreme Court has agreed that \u201ca statement that a child was not coached is not a statement on the child's truthfulness.\u201d State v. Baymon, 336 N.C. 748, 752, 446 S.E.2d 1, 3 (1994).\nIn the present case, the following exchange occurred on redirect examination of Dr. Gutman:\nQ. [H]ave you ever diagnosed or made a finding that [a] child is not being truthful?\nA. I have done that on several occasions.\nQ. Can you explain to the jurors what you look for, the clues that you look for, and do you do that in every case?\nA. I do it in every case.\nQ. Was there anything about your examination of [the child] that gave you any concerns in this regard?\nA. That gave me concerns that she was giving a fictitious story? Q. Yes.\nA. Nothing. There was nothing about the evaluation which led me to have those concerns. And again, as I was getting into her history and considering this as a possibility, nothing came out.\nWe conclude Dr. Gutman\u2019s testimony that she was not concerned that the child was \u201cgiving a fictitious story\u201d is tantamount to her opinion that the child was not lying about the sexual abuse. See, e.g., Heath, 316 N.C. at 341-42, 341 S.E.2d at 568 (prosecutor\u2019s question to expert whether child victim was suffering from a mental condition which could have caused her to make up a story about sexual assault was designed to elicit expert\u2019s opinion as to whether child victim might have lied about the alleged assault and constituted inadmissible opinion testimony as to child\u2019s credibility). Our Supreme Court and this Court have repeatedly held that such testimony is inadmissible, and we hold the trial court erred in allowing Dr. Gutman to so testify.\nThe State argues that defendant opened the door to this particular testimony by contending that the child was coached into bringing the sexual abuse allegations against defendant. The State maintains that because defendant revealed this theory in his opening arguments to the jury and in his cross-examination of the child and her grandmother, he opened the door to Dr. Gutman\u2019s opinion testimony that the child had not been coached. We are not persuaded by the State\u2019s argument.\nDr. Gutman testified separately regarding indications that a child has been \u201ccoached\u201d and that, based upon her examination of the child, she concluded there were no indications that the child \u201chad been coached in any way[.]\u201d This testimony was elicited on direct examination, prior to Dr. Gutman\u2019s testimony that she had no concerns that the child was giving a fictitious story. Dr. Gutman testified again on redirect examination that she had no concerns that the child \u201chad been coached in any way[.]\u201d Given our Supreme Court\u2019s holding in Baymon, as denoted above, such opinion testimony that the child had not been \u201ccoached\u201d was admissible. Baymon, 336 N.C. at 752, 446 S.E.2d at 3. The State, therefore, addressed defendant\u2019s \u201ccoaching\u201d argument through separate, admissible testimony. However, opinion testimony that a child has not been \u201ccoached\u201d is distinguishable from opinion testimony that a child is not lying or is not giving a fictitious story \u2014 testimony that is clearly inadmissible under our case law.\nOur Supreme Court has noted, as the State contends, that \u201c[u]nder certain circumstances, . . . otherwise inadmissible evidence may be admissible if the door has been opened by the opposing party\u2019s cross-examination of the witness.\u201d Id. Thus, \u201c[t]his evidence is allowed only if defendant \u2018opened the door\u2019 by addressing the victims\u2019 credibility on cross-examination\u201d of the witness presently testifying. State v. Thaggard, 168 N.C. App. 263, 274, 608 S.E.2d 774, 782 (2005). Despite the State\u2019s argument to the contrary, defendant\u2019s theory of the case, his opening arguments, and his cross-examination of other witnesses do not \u201copen the door\u201d to otherwise inadmissible testimony by a different witness. Otherwise, defendant\u2019s ability to put on a defense would be severely impaired. As to defendant\u2019s cross-examination of Dr. Gutman, the only questions relevant to the child\u2019s credibility consisted of questions concerning whether \u201c[s]ome people make up stories of abuse\u201d and whether some children \u201cmake false accusations\u201d or \u201cfalse representations[.]\u201d We cannot say such generalized questions on cross-examination opened the door for Dr. Gutman to testify as to her opinion that the child in this case was not giving a fictitious story.\nC. Defendant as Perpetrator\nIn addition to this testimony, Dr. Gutman further concluded that \u201cthere was no evidence that there was a different perpetrator\u201d other than defendant. Dr. Gutman based her conclusion on her interview with the child. In State v. Brigman, 178 N.C. App. 78, 632 S.E.2d 498 (2006), a pediatrician specializing in the diagnosis of sexual assault injuries in children testified as an expert concerning her conclusion that the child victims had \u201csuffered sexual abuse by [defendant].\u201d Id. at 85-86, 632 S.E.2d at 503. On appeal in Brigman, the defendant argued the doctor\u2019s testimony \u201cconstituted expert testimony on the guilt of the defendant.\u201d Id. at 91, 632 S.E.2d at 507. This Court agreed with the defendant\u2019s contention, holding that such testimony was \u201cimproper opinion testimony concerning the victims\u2019 credibility.\u201d Id. at 91-92, 632 S.E.2d at 507. Similarly, in State v. Figured, 116 N.C. App. 1, 446 S.E.2d 838 (1994), this Court held that testimony by an expert stating that \u201cin his opinion the children were sexually abused by this defendant\u201d constituted an expression of opinion as to the defendant\u2019s guilt and was thus improper. Id. at 8-9, 446 S.E.2d at 842-43. This Court reasoned that the doctor\u2019s \u201copinion that the children were sexually abused by defendant did not relate to a diagnosis derived from his expert examination of the prosecuting witnesses in the course of treatment. It thus constituted improper opinion testimony as to the credibility of the victims\u2019 testimony.\u201d Id. at 9, 446 S.E.2d at 843.\nHere, we find no discernible difference between Dr. Gutman\u2019s testimony that \u201cthere was no evidence that there was a different perpetrator\u201d other than defendant and the testimony by the doctors in Brigman and Figured that the child had been sexually abused by the defendant. Thus, the admission of such testimony constituted improper opinion testimony as to the credibility of the child\u2019s testimony and was also error.\nD. Prejudicial Error\nBecause we hold Dr. Gutman\u2019s testimony that she had no concerns the child was giving a fictitious story and that there was no evidence that there was a different perpetrator other than defendant was inadmissible, we must address whether the error was prejudicial to defendant in this case. Defendant did not object to these particular lines of questioning, therefore we review for plain error.\nUnder our plain error review, \u201cwe must consider whether the erroneous admission of expert testimony that impermissibly bolstered the victim\u2019s credibility had the \u2018prejudicial effect necessary to establish that the error was a fundamental error.\u2019 \u201d Towe,_N.C. at _,_S.E.2d at_, No. 121PA11, slip. op. at 11 (quoting Lawrence, _N.C. at_, 723 S.E.2d at 335). \u201cThis Court has held that it is fundamental to a fair trial that a witness\u2019s credibility be determined by a jury, that expert opinion on the credibility of a witness is inadmissible, and that the admission of such testimony is prejudicial when the State\u2019s case depends largely on the testimony of the prosecuting witness.\u201d Dixon, 150 N.C. App. at 53, 563 S.E.2d at 599.\nNotably, a review of relevant case law reveals that where the evidence is fairly evenly divided, or where the evidence consists largely of the child victim\u2019s testimony and testimony by corroborating witnesses with minimal physical evidence, especially where the defendant has put on rebuttal evidence, the error is generally found to be prejudicial, even on plain error review, since the expert\u2019s opinion on the victim\u2019s credibility likely swayed the jury\u2019s decision in favor of finding the defendant guilty of a sexual assault charge. See Aguaillo, 318 N.C. at 599-600, 350 S.E.2d at 82; State v. Trent, 320 N.C. 610, 615, 359 S.E.2d 463, 466 (1987); State v. Bush, 164 N.C. App. 254, 259-60, 595 S.E.2d 715, 718-19 (2004); State v. O\u2019Connor, 150 N.C. App. 710, 712, 564 S.E.2d 296, 297 (2002); State v. Parker, 111 N.C. App. 359, 366, 432 S.E.2d 705, 710 (1993).\nIn the present case, the State's evidence consisted of testimony from the child, her family members, her therapist, the lead detective on the case who was an acquaintance of the family, and an expert witness. All of the State\u2019s evidence relied in whole or in part on the child\u2019s statements concerning the alleged sexual abuse. The only physical evidence presented that bolstered the State\u2019s case that the child had been sexually abused was a deep hymenal notch in the child\u2019s vagina and the presence of bacterial vaginosis. However, Cailey testified that the child\u2019s symptoms of bacterial vaginosis predated the alleged sexual assaults by defendant. In addition, more than two years had elapsed since the alleged sexual contact and the child\u2019s medical examination. Further, there was no physical evidence that bolstered the State\u2019s case that the child was anally assaulted or that defendant was the perpetrator of any such abuse. There was no testimony presented by the State that did not have as its origin the accusations of the child. For this reason, the credibility of the child was central to the State\u2019s case.\nIn addition, the State presented Dr. Gutman as a specialist in child maltreatment and child sexual abuse. Dr. Gutman described her training and experience, specifically focusing on child infectious diseases, including sexually transmitted infections, and child sexual abuse. Dr. Gutman testified that she helped found a hospital clinic for child maltreatment, that she had authored numerous publications on child sexual abuse, that she had seen approximately 1300-1400 cases of child maltreatment or child sexual abuse, that she had testified as an expert in the field 28 times in the five years prior to the trial of the present case, and that she had helped to train or teach other pediatricians in this field. Upon review of the record, it is clear that Dr. Gutman\u2019s testimony was central to the State\u2019s case, as her testimony comprises approximately 161 pages of the trial transcript, which is roughly equivalent to the testimony of the child, Cailey, Allen, Detective Massengill, and Detective Lee combined.\nDefendant\u2019s evidence consisted of his testimony that he did not sexually abuse the child. Defendant\u2019s ex-wife also testified that she was with defendant on one occasion following the alleged sexual abuse and the child seemed happy to see defendant drive by and was shouting and waving at him. Evidence was also introduced that other men, some with known criminal records, had been in the presence of the child following defendant\u2019s split with Allen and prior to the child\u2019s sexual assault allegations, although the lead detective failed to investigate these other men. The child\u2019s account of what happened evolved over time, and new allegations of what happened to her, particularly the anal assault, came out during her evaluation by Dr. Gutman.\nExcept for Dr. Gutman\u2019s testimony, the evidence presented at trial amounted to conflicting accounts from the child, defendant, and their families. Because Dr. Gutman was an expert in treating sexually abused children, her opinion likely held significant weight with the jury. Considering Dr. Gutman\u2019s testimony in light of the other evidence, we must conclude the testimony in question had a probable impact on the jury\u2019s finding defendant guilty by enhancing the credibility of the child in the jurors\u2019 minds. Thus, we hold Dr. Gutman\u2019s improper expert opinion testimony vouching for the credibility of the child constituted plain error in this case. We must, therefore, vacate the judgments and order a new trial for defendant.\nIII. Remaining Issues\nHaving ordered a new trial for defendant on this issue, we shall comment only briefly upon those remaining issues raised by defendant that are likely to recur on retrial. We will not address defendant\u2019s first two arguments regarding the trial court\u2019s failure to reinstruct the deadlocked jury or his request for a mistrial, nor will we address his fourth argument regarding his objection to the prosecutor\u2019s closing argument, as these issues are not likely to recur.\nIn his fifth argument on appeal, defendant argues the trial court committed plain error in allowing testimony by Dr. Gutman regarding her concern that defendant was living with his seven-year-old granddaughter at the time of the child\u2019s allegations. Defendant argues this testimony was irrelevant, and therefore inadmissible, as it made it no more probable that he had sexually abused the child.\nIn the present case, the entirety of the testimony concerning defendant\u2019s living with his granddaughter consisted of the following. On direct examination of the child, the following exchange took place:\nQ. What made you wait two years and tell your mom in 2009?\nA. I was scared because I thought it was my fault.\nQ. Did you think about the defendant who lived with the defendant (sic)?\nA. Uh-huh.\nQ. Did you think about who was living with [defendant] at that time?\nA. Yeah.\nQ. Who was living with him?\nA. His granddaughter.\nQ. How old was she?\nA. I\u2019m not sure.\nQ. Younger or older than you?\nA. She\u2019s younger than me.\nQ. And the fact that he was living with his granddaughter, how did that make you feel?\nA. It made me feel bad.\nQ. Why? What were you thinking?\nA. That he might do it to her.\nQ. So because of that, what did you tell your mom?\nA. I told her what he had done.\nSuch evidence is relevant to the child\u2019s motives for reporting the alleged sexual abuse. See State v. Whitman, 179 N.C. App. 657, 668, 635 S.E.2d 906, 913 (2006) (photographs of two other children admissible because they were relevant to child victim\u2019s motives for coming forward with allegations of sexual abuse against the defendant).\nSubsequently, during the direct examination of Dr. Gutman, Dr. Gutman testified that she had learned from the child\u2019s mother that defendant had a granddaughter \u201cwho is seven, who lived with him at that time currently\u201d and that in her written report, she \u201cnoted with concern that [defendant] is reported to be living with a granddaughter who is age seven.\u201d Defendant did not object to any of the foregoing testimony. Although we believe the admission of such evidence did not rise to the level of plain error in this case, defendant is correct that Dr. Gutman\u2019s testimony as to this fact was not relevant to a determination of his guilt or innocence and was therefore inadmissible. Accordingly, if Dr. Gutman\u2019s written report is introduced into evidence on retrial, such notation should be redacted from the report.\nFinally, because we vacate defendant\u2019s judgments in the present case, we need not address his arguments concerning the trial court\u2019s sex offender registration and SBM orders. However, we note that the trial court\u2019s findings that defendant had been convicted of a reportable conviction, specifically \u201can offense against a minor under G.S. 14-208.6(1m),\u201d as well as \u201crape of a child, G.S. 14-27.2A, or sexual offense with a child, G.S. 14-27.4A\u201d were erroneous. Defendant\u2019s convictions for first-degree sex offense, a violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-27.4, and taking indecent liberties with a child, a violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-202.1, do not fall within the statutory definition of an \u201coffense against a minor\u201d or a \u201csexual offense with a child\u201d pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-27.4A. However, both of defendant\u2019s convictions for first-degree sex offense and taking indecent liberties with a child are encompassed in the definition of \u201ca sexually violent offense\u201d under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(5), and therefore they are both reportable convictions under the statute.\nIV. Conclusion\nWe hold Dr. Gutman\u2019s testimony that she had no concerns the child victim was giving a fictitious story was tantamount to expert opinion testimony that the child was not lying about the sexual abuse allegations, and therefore such testimony was inadmissible. Similarly, Dr. Gutman\u2019s testimony that there was no evidence of any other perpetrators of sexual abuse on the child other than defendant likewise constituted improper expert opinion testimony concerning both the guilt of defendant and the credibility of the child.\nGiven that Dr. Gutman\u2019s testimony was central to the State\u2019s case, and in light of the minimal physical evidence and other conflicting testimony presented at trial, we hold Dr. Gutman\u2019s improper opinion testimony vouching for the credibility of the child had a probable impact on the jury\u2019s finding defendant guilty, and therefore, the admission of such testimony constituted plain error, necessitating a new trial for defendant.\nNew trial.\nJudges HUNTER, JR., (Robert N.) and ERVIN concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "McCullough, judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Jane Rankin Thompson, for the State.", "Robert H. Hale, Jr. & Associates, Attorneys at Law, RC., by Daniel M. Blau, for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. STEVEN FRANKLIN RYAN\nNo. COA12-228\n(Filed 6 November 2012)\n1. Evidence \u2014 expert opinion testimony \u2014 improper vouching for credibility of child sex abuse victim\nThe trial court committed plain error in a first-degree sex offense and taking indecent liberties with a child case by allowing the State\u2019s expert witness to improperly vouch for the credibility of a minor child victim when the expert stated that she had no concerns the child was giving a fictitious story and that there was no evidence that there was a different perpetrator other than defendant. Considering the testimony in light of the other evidence, the testimony had a probable impact on the jury\u2019s finding defendant guilty by enhancing the credibility of the child in the jurors\u2019 minds.\n2. Evidence \u2014 expert testimony \u2014 inadmissible\u2014not relevant to determination of guilt or innocence\nAlthough the trial court did not commit plain error in a first-degree sex offense and taking indecent liberties with a child case by allowing testimony by the State\u2019s expert witness regarding her concern that defendant was living with his seven-year-old granddaughter at the time of the child\u2019s allegations, the testimony was not relevant to a determination of defendant\u2019s guilt or innocence and was therefore inadmissible. Accordingly, if the expert\u2019s written report is introduced into evidence on retrial, such notation should be redacted from the report.\n3. Satellite-Based Monitoring \u2014 sexually violent offense\u2014 first-degree sex offense \u2014 indecent liberties with child\nBecause defendant\u2019s judgments were vacated, his arguments concerning the trial court\u2019s sex offender registration and satellite-based monitoring orders were not addressed. However, both of defendant\u2019s convictions for first-degree sex offense and taking indecent liberties with a child were encompassed in the definition of \u201ca sexually violent offense\u201d under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-208.6(5), and therefore they were both reportable convictions under the statute.\nAppeal by defendant from judgments entered 31 May 2011 by Judge Ola M. Lewis in Johnston County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 30 August 2012.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Jane Rankin Thompson, for the State.\nRobert H. Hale, Jr. & Associates, Attorneys at Law, RC., by Daniel M. Blau, for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0325-01", "first_page_order": 335, "last_page_order": 351 }