{ "id": 4104270, "name": "FRIENDS OF JOE SAM QUEEN, Plaintiff v. RALPH HISE FOR N.C. SENATE and N.C. REPUBLICAN EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Friends of Queen v. Hise", "decision_date": "2012-11-20", "docket_number": "No. COA12-455", "first_page": "395", "last_page": "408", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "223 N.C. App. 395" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "2012 WL 1940543", "category": "reporters:specialty_west", "reporter": "WL", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "47 U.S.C. \u00a7 227", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(d)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 664:14", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 75-16", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "providing cause of action, including treble damages, for those injured by the breakup of a monopoly" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-2-161", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "providing cause of action, including treble damages, for false statements regarding insurance claims" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Cal. Elec. Code \u00a7 20010", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Cal. Code", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "providing candidates a civil action against those who maliciously misappropriate their image in political advertising" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 664:21", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.", "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "establishing civil and criminal penalties to be pursued by the State for violations of election law" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Del. Code Ann. tit. 15, \u00a7 8043", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Del. Code Ann.", "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "providing for criminal penalties for election law violations" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Cal. Gov't Code \u00a7 91000", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Cal. Code", "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "establishing criminal penalties for election law violations" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "S.C. Code Ann. \u00a7 8-13-1520", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "S.C. Code Ann.", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "making violations misdemeanors" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Tenn. Code Ann. \u00a7 2-19-120", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Tenn. Code Ann.", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "requiring disclosures for political advertisements and making violations criminal" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Fla. Stat. \u00a7 106.1439", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Fla. Stat.", "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "making election law violations misdemeanors" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Va. Code Ann. \u00a7 24.2-955.3", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Va. Code Ann.", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "establishing civil and criminal penalties, enforceable by the State Board of Elections, to be paid to the state" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law \u00a7\u00a7 13-602", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Md. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Va. Code Ann. \u00a7 24.2-957.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Va. Code Ann.", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "requiring on-air disclosures for political television advertisements" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law \u00a7 13-401", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Md. Code Ann.", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "requiring an authority line on campaign material" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 S.E.2d 668", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "669" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 N.C. 495", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4725706 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "497" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/313/0495-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 163-278.17", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "67 Ind. L. J. 663", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Ind. L.J.", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "677-78", "parenthetical": "discussing the purpose of political advertising disclosure laws" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "709 F.2d 922", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 11335937 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "933", "parenthetical": "noting that similar Federal Election Commission rules \"are designed to reveal whether a commercial is authorized by a candidate.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/709/0922-01" ] }, { "cite": "441 F.3d 776", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "793" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "285 S.E.2d 833", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 N.C. 392", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568516, 8568556, 8568657, 8568690, 8568603 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/304/0392-01", "/nc/304/0392-02", "/nc/304/0392-04", "/nc/304/0392-05", "/nc/304/0392-03" ] }, { "cite": "280 S.E.2d 780", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "782" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "53 N.C. App. 290", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520807 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "292" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/53/0290-01" ] }, { "cite": "725 S.E.2d 439", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "442", "parenthetical": "quotation marks, citation, brackets, and ellipses omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "725 S.E.2d 393", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "396", "parenthetical": "quotation marks and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "684 S.E.2d 890", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quotation marks and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 654", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quotation marks and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "678 S.E.2d 357", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "360", "parenthetical": "quotation marks and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "197 N.C. App. 386", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4167964 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "389-90", "parenthetical": "quotation marks and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/197/0386-01" ] }, { "cite": "424 S.E.2d 915", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 N.C. 170", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2548224, 2548489, 2545554, 2545101 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/333/0170-02", "/nc/333/0170-04", "/nc/333/0170-01", "/nc/333/0170-03" ] }, { "cite": "421 S.E.2d 374", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "376" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "107 N.C. App. 559", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527791 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "562" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/107/0559-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 163-278.6", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 6, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(4)" }, { "page": "(9)" }, { "page": "(9)", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "727 S.E.2d 343", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "346-47", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "669 S.E.2d 572", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "576", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 569", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4150896 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "573", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0569-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 163-278", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 39, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1137, "char_count": 35472, "ocr_confidence": 0.739, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.309311792351655e-08, "percentile": 0.2714932414978634 }, "sha256": "988fb6d1f9f955362141713bca3b81078fe45b637a4b9451979eb26a52b7d211", "simhash": "1:2a8b16465dd12ef1", "word_count": 5498 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:08:05.693184+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges ELMORE and BEASLEY concur." ], "parties": [ "FRIENDS OF JOE SAM QUEEN, Plaintiff v. RALPH HISE FOR N.C. SENATE and N.C. REPUBLICAN EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "STROUD, Judge.\nI. Introduction\nThis case arises from alleged violations of the \u201cStand by Your Ad\u201d disclaimers required for political advertisements under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 163-278.39A (2009) which occurred during the 2010 campaign between Senator Ralph Hise and Senator Joe Sam Queen in North Carolina\u2019s 47th senatorial district. As both plaintiff and defendants failed to provide proper disclosures of the joint sponsorship of television advertisements by both the candidate committee and the political party, plaintiff\u2019s claim is barred by the statutory tu quoque defense. Since no prior case has interpreted N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 163-278.39A and given the ambiguity inherent in the statute, as discussed below, it is not surprising that plaintiff and defendants would in good faith come to slightly different understandings of the requirements of the statute, and we do not mean to imply that either plaintiff or defendants intentionally violated N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 163-278.39A. We affirm the trial court\u2019s order dismissing plaintiff\u2019s claim for the reasons below.\nII. Background\nFriends of Joe Sam Queen (\u201cplaintiff\u2019 or \u201cQueen Committee\u201d), a political committee formed in North Carolina, filed a complaint on 28 January 2011 in Haywood County seeking damages under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 163-278.39A(f) from Ralph Hise for N.C. Senate (\u201cHise Committee\u201d) and the North Carolina Republican Executive Committee, now known as the North Carolina Republican Party (\u201cNCGOP\u201d), also political committees (jointly, \u201cdefendants\u201d). Plaintiff alleged that defendants violated disclosure requirements for advertising paid for by NCGOP during the 2010 race for North Carolina Senate.\nIn 2010, Joe Sam Queen was the Democratic candidate, and incumbent, for North Carolina Senate from the 47th North Carolina Senatorial District. His opponent was now-Senator Ralph Hise, a Republican. Both campaigns received substantial financial support for their media campaigns from their respective party committees, spending several hundred thousand dollars on television advertising over the course of the 2010 election season. Each political party paid for the production of video messages to be used in its candidate\u2019s advertising. NCGOP transferred funds to American Media and Advocacy Group (\u201cAmerican Media\u201d) for the specific purpose of media buys for the Hise campaign, and American Media held these funds in a separate account designated for Senator Hise until he authorized a media purchase with the funds. The North Carolina Democratic Party (\u201cNCDP\u201d), by contrast, donated money to the Queen campaign to be used to purchase air time through its media company, Envision, and Envision\u2019s subcontractor, Buying Time, Inc. Each contribution by the NCDP to the Queen Committee was transferred to the committee\u2019s account for a brief period of time, and held there normally no longer than several hours \u2014 once only eleven minutes \u2014 before being transferred to Buying Time. Both Senators Hise and Queen authorized all expenditures to purchase the air time. Substantively, the only difference in the actions of the plaintiff and the defendants is that the Democratic Party ran the contributed funds briefly though the candidate\u2019s campaign account before they were used for a media buy, while the Republican Party sent the funds directly to the media company to be held \u201cin escrow\u201d for the candidate to be disbursed for a media buy only at the candidate\u2019s direction. Both candidates listed the candidate or campaign committee as the \u201csponsor\u201d of the advertising in the required on-air disclosure statements and neither listed a political party as a \u201csponsor.\u201d Neither candidate committee had sufficient funds, but for the contributions of the respective political parties, to pay for their television advertising campaigns.\nPlaintiff filed its complaint on 28 January 2011, alleging that defendants violated the disclosure rules for political television advertising under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 163-278.39A. Specifically, plaintiff alleged that because the NCGOP paid American Media directly, as opposed to through the Hise campaign, it should have been disclosed as the sole \u201csponsor\u201d of the Hise advertisements. Plaintiff further alleged that Ralph Hise for N.C. Senate was complicit in these violations and, therefore, also liable under \u00a7 163-278.39A(f). Plaintiff also claimed that its campaign advertising had complied fully with N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 163-278.39A, as it must in order to bring this claim.\nAfter defendants answered the complaint, denying that the alleged acts constituted violations and raising various defenses, the parties submitted affidavits, took depositions, and filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Defendants also asserted a statutory tu quoque (\u201cyou too\u201d) defense under \u00a7 163-278.39A(f) analogous to the equitable defense of unclean hands, claiming that plaintiff engaged in equivalent conduct, so that if defendant\u2019s actions were in violation of the statute, the plaintiff\u2019s actions were also in violation, as they were substantively the same. Defendants further claimed that even if they were liable under the statute, \u00a7 163-278.39A violates their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well the parallel provisions of the North Carolina Constitution.\nThe trial court granted defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment and denied plaintiff\u2019s motion for summary judgment by an order entered 14 December 2011, thus dismissing the plaintiff\u2019s claims. Plaintiff timely filed notice of appeal from both rulings in that order on 22 December 2011.\nIII. Standard of Review\nPlaintiff timely appeals from the trial court\u2019s final order denying its motion for summary judgment and granting defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment.\n\u201cOur standard of review of an appeal from summary judgment is de novo; such judgment is appropriate only when the record shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\u201d\nIn re Will of Jones, 362 N.C. 569, 573, 669 S.E.2d 572, 576 (2008) (citation and quotation marks omitted). In our review of the trial court\u2019s judgment, \u201cwe view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.\u201d Beeson v. Palombo, _N.C. App._,_, 727 S.E.2d 343, 346-47 (2012) (citation and quotation marks omitted).\nIV. Cause of Action Under \u00a7 163-278.39A(f)\nThis case, which turns on the interpretation of the \u201cStand by Your Ad\u201d law enacted in 1999, is one of first impression in this Court. N.C. Session Laws 1999-453. Although neither party raises this issue, we must address the preliminary matter of whether the proper plaintiff has brought this action. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 163-278.39A(f) provides that \u201ca candidate for an elective office who complied with the television and radio disclosure requirements throughout that candidate\u2019s entire campaign shall have a monetary remedy in a civil action against\u201d an opponent-candidate, candidate committee, political party organization, or other sponsor of political advertisements who violates the disclosure provisions of \u00a7 163-278.39A. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 163-278.39A(f) (emphasis added). The statute further provides that \u201c[t]he plaintiff candidate may bring the civil action personally or authorize his or her candidate campaign committee to bring the civil action.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 163-278.39A(f)(2)\nSome explanation of the structure of Article 22A may be helpful in our discussion of the issues raised by this case. The statutory definitions of several words are important in this case. Article 22A, entitled \u201cRegulating Contributions and Expenditures in Political Campaigns,\u201d includes in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 163-278.6 (2009) a set of general definitions for terms used for most of Article 22A, while N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 163-278.38Z (2009) includes additional definitions which are applicable only to Part 1A, entitled \u201cDisclosure Requirements for Media Advertisements.\u201d Plaintiffs claim is brought under a provision of Part 1A, specifically N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 163-278.39A(f). The terms \u201ccandidate,\u201d \u201ccandidate campaign committee,\u201d and \u201cpolitical action committee\u201d have definitions which are applicable only to Part 1A and are different from the definitions of the same words in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 163-278.6. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 163-278.6(4),(14); N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 163-278.38Z(2), (3), (5). We will use the definitions which are specific to Part 1A for these terms and will use the general definitions set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 163-278.6 for the other relevant defined terms.\nFor purposes of Part 1A, a \u201ccandidate\u201d is an individual who has filed the requisite notice of candidacy or has otherwise been certified as such. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 163-278.38Z(2). A \u201ccandidate campaign committee\u201d is \u201cany political committee organized by or under the direction of a candidate.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 163-278.38Z(3). As noted above, these two terms are defined separately in Part 1A of Article 22A and are used as separate terms in subsection (f). N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 163-278.38Z, 163-278.39A(f) (stating that the plaintiff-candidate has a cause of action against \u201can opposing candidate or candidate committee\u201d (emphasis added)). The statute identifies the candidate as the injured party by vesting the individual candidate with the right to bring a cause of action. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 163-278.39A(f) (stating that \u201ca candidate for an elective office . . . shall have a monetary remedy in a civil action) (emphasis added)). Thus, the statute clearly provides the right to bring such an action only to an individual candidate or to that candidate\u2019s candidate campaign committee where the candidate has specifically authorized the committee to bring the action. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 163-278.39A(f)(2).\nHere, although there is no allegation of explicit and direct authorization of this lawsuit in the complaint and no written authorization in the record on appeal, defendants conceded at oral argument that the present suit was properly authorized by Senator Queen. While in another case this absence could be fatal to the plaintiffs claim, as the parties agree that Senator Queen authorized his committee to pursue this action, we will consider the parties\u2019 substantive arguments.\nV. Interpretation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 163-278.38Z, et seq.\nThis statute, known as the \u201cStand by Your Ad\u201d law, was enacted in 1999. N.C. Session Laws 1999-453; N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 163-278.38Z, et seq. (2009). N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 163-278.39A(f) gives \u201ca candidate for an elective office\u201d a cause of action against \u201can opposing candidate or candidate committee\u201d or \u201cany political party organization, political action committee, individual, or other sponsor\u201d whose advertisement for \u201cthat elective office\u201d violates the \u00a7 163-278.39A disclosure requirements for television and radio advertising. Plaintiff\u2019s only claim against defendants arises from this provision of the statute. In order to recover damages under this statute, plaintiff must prove that (1) his opponent or his opponent\u2019s candidate committee violated the disclosure requirements of \u00a7 163-278.39A, and (2) he violated none of those disclosure requirements. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 163-278.39A(f).\nA. Statutory Ambiguity in \u00a7 163-278.39A\nPlaintiff contends that the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment, and granting defendant\u2019s, because it presented undisputed evidence which indicates that defendant NCGOP paid for television advertisements that did not bear the appropriate disclosures required under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 163-278.39A and that therefore it is entitled to recover damages under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 163-278.39A(f) in the amount of three times the money spent on the improper advertising. In its complaint, plaintiff alleged that defendants violated the disclosure requirements of \u00a7 163-278.39A because they aired television ads indicating that they were sponsored by Ralph Hise for NC Senate when the NCGOP had provided the funds to pay for the air time directly to the media buyer, rather than first providing the funds to the Hise Committee so that the Hise Committee could pay for the air time. Plaintiff contends that the NCGOP should have been identified as the \u201csponsor\u201d of the advertisements or at least as a joint sponsor of the advertisements, along with the Hise Committee. Under the facts presented in this case, Plaintiff\u2019s claim depends on what it means to be a \u201csponsor\u201d of an \u201cadvertisement.\u201d Therefore, our review must begin with an interpretation of that statute. See State ex rel. Thornburg v. Lot and Bldgs, at 800 Waughtown St., 107 N.C. App. 559, 562, 421 S.E.2d 374, 376, disc. review denied, 333 N.C. 170, 424 S.E.2d 915 (1992).\nThe \u201cStand by Your Ad\u201d statute requires the following disclosures:\n(1) Candidate advertisements on television \u2014 Television advertisements purchased by a candidate or candidate campaign committee supporting or opposing the nomination or election of one or more clearly identified candidates shall include a disclosure statement spoken by the candidate and containing at least the following words: T am (or \u2018This is_\u2019) [name of candidate], candidate for [name of office], and I (or \u2018my campaign\u2019) sponsored this ad.\u2019\n(2) Political party advertisements on television \u2014 Television advertisements purchased by a political party organization supporting or opposing the nomination or election of one or more clearly identified candidates shall include a disclosure statement spoken by the chair, executive director, or treasurer of the political party organization and containing at least the following words: \u201cThe [name of political party organization] sponsored this ad opposing/supporting [name of candidate] for [name of office].\u201d The disclosed name of the political party organization shall include the name of the political party as it appears on the ballot.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 163-278.39A(b) (emphasis added). Similar provisions apply to political action committees, \u00a7 163-278.39A(b)(3), private individuals, \u00a7 163-278.39A(b)(4), and any other \u201csponsor\u201d, \u00a7 163-278.39A(b)(5). Thus, whoever \u201cpurchased\u201d the advertisement, i.e. the \u201csponsor\u201d, must include a disclosure statement so indicating. The statute does not define what it means to purchase an advertisement and only defines \u201csponsor\u201d as an entity or individual \u201cthat purchases an advertisement.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 163-278.38Z(10). An advertisement is defined as \u201cany message appearing in the print media, on television, or on radio that constitutes a contribution or expenditure under this Article.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 163-278.38Z(1) (emphasis added).\nPlaintiff claims that the \u201cpurchaser\u201d or \u201csponsor\u201d of an advertisement is anyone who furnishes money directly to a media buyer for air time, while payment for the production of the message which is aired is \u201cnot relevant.\u201d Plaintiff argues that NCGOP \u201cpurchased\u201d both the production of the Hise Committee message and the air time for its broadcast, so it was the sole \u201csponsor,\u201d or at least a joint sponsor, by its participation in the air time purchase. Defendants first counter that the purchaser or \u201csponsor\u201d of an advertisement should be defined as the individual or entity which has ultimate editorial control over the advertisement \u2014 the message itself. Defendants next contend that Senator Hise did actually \u201cpurchase\u201d the air time for the advertisements, as he had control over the funds in the American Media escrow account and he authorized and directed each expenditure of these funds for air time. Defendants also argue that\n[e]ven assuming that the NCGOP \u201cpurchased\u201d TV airtime by sending funds directly to American Media as Plaintiff contends, nothing in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 163-278.39A or Chapter 163 defines the \u201cpurchaser\u201d of an advertisement as the person or entity who purchases only the air time for the ad. Unlike the term \u201cpurchase,\u201d the statute defines \u201cadvertisement\u201d as \u201cany message appearing in the print media, on television, or on radio that constitutes a contribution or expenditure under this Article.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 163-278.38Z(10). Thus, a television \u201cadvertisement\u201d requires at least two things: (1) a message and (2) air time on which to broadcast that message.\nAlthough defendants\u2019 brief does not concede that they committed any violation of the disclosure requirements, they argue that if they did violate the statute, plaintiff did also, as the air time for plaintiff\u2019s advertisements was purchased with funds contributed by the NCDP which were deposited into Senator Queen\u2019s campaign account before being almost immediately disbursed for each purchase of air time.\n\u201cThe cardinal principle of statutory interpretation is to ensure that legislative intent is accomplished. To determine legislative intent, we first look to the language of the statute.\u201d Insulation Systems, Inc. v. Fisher, 197 N.C. App. 386, 389-90, 678 S.E.2d 357, 360 (2009) (quotation marks and citations omitted), disc. rev. denied, 363 N.C. 654, 684 S.E.2d 890. \u201cWhen the language of a statute is clear and without ambiguity, it is the duty of this Court to give effect to the plain meaning of the statute, and\u201d we need not look further. In re Hamilton,_ N.C. App. _, _, 725 S.E.2d 393, 396 (2012) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Indeed, \u201cwhen confronted with a clear and unambiguous statute, courts are without power to interpolate, or superimpose, provisions and limitations not contained therein.\u201d Id. If, however, \u201cthe language is ambiguous or unclear, the reviewing court must construe the statute in an attempt not to defeat or impair the object of the statute if that can reasonably be done without doing violence to the legislative language.\u201d Dayton v. Dayton,_N.C. App. _,_, 725 S.E.2d 439, 442 (2012) (quotation marks, citation, brackets, and ellipses omitted).\nAs noted above, a \u201csponsor\u201d of an \u201cadvertisement\u201d is the entity or individual \u201cthat purchases an advertisement.\u201d Although the statute does not define \u201cpurchase, the normal dictionary definition is clear. See Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1354 (9th ed. 2009) (defining purchase as \u201c[t]he act or an instance of buying.\u201d). But the phrase \u201cpurchase,\u201d an advertisement\u201d is ambiguous, given the definition of \u201cadvertisement.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 163-278.38Z(1) defines an \u201cadvertisement\u201d as: \u201cany message appearing in the print media, on television, or on radio that constitutes a contribution or expenditure under this Article.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 163-278.38Z(1). Thus, a television advertisement consists of two parts \u2014 the message and its appearance on television, or the \u201cair time\u201d. Looking at the definition of \u201cadvertisement\u201d grammatically, the term \u201cmessage\u201d is modified by two phrases: \u201cthat constitutes a contribution or an expenditure under this Article\u201d and \u201cappearing in print media, on television or on radio.\u201d\nWhere the same person or entity \u201cpurchases\u201d both the production of the message and the air time to broadcast the message, there is no ambiguity in the identity of the \u201csponsor\u201d of the advertisement. Here, the problem is that the political parties \u2014 both NCDP and NCGOP\u2014 paid for the production of the messages and then contributed funds to pay for the air time in slightly different ways; both of the political parties and the candidate committees jointly participated in the purchases of the advertisements.\nThe issue is then whether a \u201csponsor\u201d is the one who purchases the message (i.e., production of the actual recording, video, etc.), the air time, or both. Given three possible interpretations, we must conclude that this provision of the statute is ambiguous, especially considering the uniquely powerful remedy against those who violate these provisions.\nB. Defining \u201csponsor\u201d\n\u201c[W]hen the meaning of a statute is in doubt, reference may be made to the title and context of an act to determine the legislative purpose.\u201d Preston v. Thompson, 53 N.C. App. 290, 292, 280 S.E.2d 780, 782 (1981), disc. rev. denied, 304 N.C. 392, 285 S.E.2d 833. This act is entitled \u201cStand by your Ad.\u201d N.C. Session Laws 1999-453. As the title makes clear, the primary purpose of this act is to let the public know who is responsible for the content of the advertisement and to further the State\u2019s interest in \u201cinforming voters who or what entity is trying to persuade them to vote in a certain way.\u201d Alaska Right to Life Committee v. Miles, 441 F.3d 776, 793 (9th Cir. 2006); see KVUE, Inc. v. Moore, 709 F.2d 922, 933 (5th Cir. 1983) (noting that similar Federal Election Commission rules \u201care designed to reveal whether a commercial is authorized by a candidate.\u201d); Timothy Moran, Format Restrictions On Televised Political Advertising: Elevating Political Debate Without Suppressing Free Speech, 67 Ind. L. J. 663, 677-78 (1992) (discussing the purpose of political advertising disclosure laws).\nAs noted above, an advertisement has two parts: the message and its appearance on television. As the production of the message must occur prior to its broadcast, we will first address the \u201cmessage.\u201d\nPlaintiff argues that the purchase of the \u201cmessage,\u201d or payment of production costs, is \u201cnot relevant\u201d to the determination of \u201cwho purchased or sponsored the advertisement.\u201d Plaintiff recognizes that an advertisement has two parts, the message and its broadcast but argues that only \u201cthe purchase and use of airtime on television . . . under the statute, turns a video into an advertisement.\u201d This statement is true, but an advertisement also cannot exist without a message and the message must exist before the \u201cuse of airtime\u201d can occur. We believe that ignoring the fact that the \u201cmessage\u201d is an essential part of the \u201cadvertisement\u201d would fail to give effect to the statutory language and would undermine the purpose of the statute, which is to inform the public of who is trying to influence them. Air time without a message is white noise; the message is the only portion of an \u201cadvertisement\u201d with any substantive content. Failure to identify the entity which paid for the message\u2019s production would be contrary to the primary purpose of the \u201cStand by Your Ad\u201d law.\nIn further support of its argument that payment for production costs for the message is irrelevant, Plaintiff notes that the statute does not mention \u201cproduction costs or the other tangential costs affiliated with the making of political advertisements.\u201d Yet the definition of \u201cadvertisement\u201d itself specifically defines an advertisement in part as \u201cany message . . . that constitutes a contribution or expenditure.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 163-278.38Z(1). For a message to constitute a contribution or expenditure, some transfer of money or thing of value is needed. Art. 22A broadly defines \u201cexpenditures,\u201d \u201ccontributions,\u201d and \u201cindependent expenditures\u201d, all of which include some form of transfer of \u201cmoney or anything of value\u201d to \u201csupport or oppose the nomination [or] election\u201d of a \u201cclearly identified candidate.\u201d The payments of expenses for the production of videos which supported or opposed the elections of both Senators Hise and Queen were reported as \u201cin kind contributions\u201d and \u201ccoordinated expenditures\u201d under Article 22A by Senators Hise and Queen as well as the NCDP and NCGOP.\nPlaintiff also contends that payment for the message production is irrelevant because the statutory damages are calculated based on \u201cthe total dollar amount of television and radio advertising time that was aired and that the plaintiff candidate correctly identifies as being in violation of the disclosure requirements of this section.\u201d See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 163-278.39A(f)(2). But the fact that the General Assembly chose to base the damages just upon \u201ctime that was aired\u201d and not upon production costs as well makes sense, as no one is misled by a message or the disclaimer on a message that has not been aired yet\u2014 no violation can occur until a message is actually disseminated by airing it.\nWe hold that payment of production costs for the \u201cmessage,\u201d here the videos, constitutes part of the sponsorship of an \u201cadvertisement\u201d under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 163-278.39A(b). Thus, for the \u201csponsors\u201d to be properly identified, all of the purchasers of both parts of the advertisement must be identified in the disclaimer.\nThis interpretation best advances the purpose of the statute while avoiding violence to its language. Indeed, it is clear that the legislature contemplated the possibility that an advertisement could have multiple sponsors. In \u00a7 163-278.39A(el), the statute provides fairly detailed instructions on how to properly disclose joint sponsors:\nIf an advertisement described in this section is jointly sponsored, the disclosure statement shall name all the sponsors and the disclosing individual shall be one of those sponsors. If a candidate is one of the sponsors, that candidate shall be the disclosing individual, and if more than one candidate is the sponsor, at least one of the candidates shall be the disclosing individual.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 163-278.39A(e1). Thus, where different entities or individuals jointly purchase the message, the air time, portions of either, or both, they must disclose joint sponsorship under this section.\nThe facts regarding payment of production costs for both the Hise and Queen Committees television advertisements are undisputed, and were summarized by Plaintiff as follows:\nThe NCDP paid Envision Communications directly for the cost of producing these TV ads. Production costs paid by the NCDP were reported by the NCDP on its campaign finance reports as a \u201ccoordinated party expenditure.\u201d The Queen Committee reported these payments by the NCDP as \u201cin-kind\u201d contributions.\nThe [Hise Committee] ads were produced by a media company called Innovative Advertising. The NCGOP paid Innovative Advertising directly for the costs of producing these ads. The NCGOP\u2019s payments to Innovative Advertising were disclosed on the campaign finance reports of both the NCGOP and the Hise Committee as \u201cin-kind\u201d contributions to the Hise Committee for \u201cmedia production.\u201d\nIt is undisputed that the NCDP paid for the production of the message, or video, for the Queen Committee advertisements, and that the NCGOP paid for the production of the video of the Hise Committee advertisements. It is also undisputed that the Queen Committee advertisements identified only the Queen Committee as the \u201csponsor\u201d of the advertisements; NCDP was not identified as a joint sponsor under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 163-278.39A(e1). Thus, Senator Queen is not a \u201ccandidate for an elective office who complied with the television and radio disclosure requirements throughout that candidate\u2019s entire campaign,\u201d and he cannot recover under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 163-278.39A(f) even if defendants also violated the disclosure requirements because of the maimer of the transfer of funds to American Media for the air time.\nAs we have determined that plaintiff is barred from recovery for failure to disclose the joint sponsorship of the Queen advertisements, we need not examine the second portion of the definition of \u201csponsorship\u201d of an advertisement, the method of payment for the air time. Whether we were to determine that Senator Hise purchased the airtime for his advertisements because he paid for the airtime with funds which were held by American Media, or that NCGOP actually purchased the airtime because the funds were transferred directly to American Media instead of to the Hise Committee campaign account, the result would be the same, since neither NCDP or NCGOP was identified as a \u201csponsor\u201d of the advertisements based upon their payment of production costs. It is therefore unnecessary for us to address the parties\u2019 various arguments regarding the method by which NCGOP and the Hise Committee actually paid for the airtime for the Hise Committee advertisements.\nVI. Conclusion\nPlaintiff\u2019s only claim against defendants depended on showing that the NCGOP was the \u201csponsor\u201d of advertisements run in Senator Hise\u2019s name and that plaintiff\u2019s advertisements included a disclaimer identifying all sponsors in compliance with N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 163-278.39A. Because we have determined that neither plaintiff nor defendants fully complied with N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 163-278.39A, plaintiffs claim is barred by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 163-278.39A(f). Therefore, we need not reach defendants\u2019 other statutory or constitutional arguments. As there were no genuine issues of material fact and defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the trial court did not err in granting defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment or in denying plaintiff\u2019s motion for summary judgment.\nAFFIRMED.\nJudges ELMORE and BEASLEY concur.\n. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 163-278.17 (2009) provides in part that \u201ceach media shall require written authority for each expenditure from each candidate, treasurer or individual making or authorizing an expenditure.\u201d There is no dispute that both Senators Hise and Queen properly authorized the media expenditures at issue in this case.\n. The NCDP contributions paid for approximately 91% of the Queen Committee advertising, and the NCGOP contributions paid for approximately 84% of the Hise Committee advertising.\n. It is worth noting that our Supreme Court has observed, in a different context, that a candidate committee \u201cis the creature of the candidate .. . [and] is, in effect, the alter ego of the candidate.\u201d In re Wright, 313 N.C. 495, 497, 329 S.E.2d 668, 669 (1985). But this particular statute consistently differentiates between the candidate and the candidate committee. Perhaps N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 163-278.39A(f) could be considered the \"Stand by your Lawsuit\u201d provision of the \u201cStand by your Ad\u201d law.\n. The plaintiff must also file the necessary notices under \u00a7 163-278.39A(f) to preserve the right to bring the action. There is no dispute that Senator Queen did so here.\n. A plaintiff-candidate under this statute is entitled to treble damages if after notifying the opponent that his advertisement is improper, the opponent continues to run the advertisement. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 163-278.39A(f)(2). Plaintiff here sent such a notice.\n. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 163-278.6(9) defines the term \u201cexpend\u201d or \u201cexpenditure\u201d as \u201cany purchase, advance, conveyance, deposit, distribution, transfer of funds, loan, payment, gift, pledge or subscription of money or anything of value whatsoever, whether or not made in an election year, and any contract, agreement, or other obligation to make an expenditure, to support or oppose the nomination, election, or passage of one or more clearly identified candidates, or ballot measure.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 163-278.6(9) (emphasis added).\n. The enforcement mechanism chosen by our legislature is unique in the world of election law. Many other jurisdictions have analogous disclosure laws. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. \u00a7 441d (2006) (setting out federal disclosure requirements for political advertisements), Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law \u00a7 13-401 (West 2010) (requiring an authority line on campaign material), Va. Code Ann. \u00a7 24.2-957.1 (2011) (requiring on-air disclosures for political television advertisements). However, after diligent searching, it appears that North Carolina has the only statute that provides candidates with a private cause of action against their opponents for advertising disclosure violations, rather than enforcement through government-enforced criminal or civil penalties. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. \u00a7 437g(6) (2006) (authorizing the Federal Election Commission to institute civil enforcement actions), Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law \u00a7\u00a7 13-602, 13-603, 13-604 (West 2010) (making knowing election law violations, including violation of Maryland\u2019s disclosure and disclaimer requirements for campaign materials, misdemeanors prosecutable by the State), Va. Code Ann. \u00a7 24.2-955.3 (2011) (establishing civil and criminal penalties, enforceable by the State Board of Elections, to be paid to the state), Fla. Stat. \u00a7 106.1439 (2008) (making election law violations misdemeanors), 10 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/9-23 (2010) (establishing civil penalties for election law violations, enforced by the Attorney General), Tenn. Code Ann. \u00a7 2-19-120 (West 2003) (requiring disclosures for political advertisements and making violations criminal), S.C. Code Ann. \u00a7 8-13-1520 (2011) (making violations misdemeanors), Cal. Gov\u2019t Code \u00a7 91000 (West 2012) (establishing criminal penalties for election law violations), Minn. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 211B.16, 211B.19 (2010) (providing for criminal penalties enforced by county attorneys), Iowa Code \u00a7 68A.701 (2012) (making violation of campaign finance and disclosure laws a \u201cserious misdemeanor\u201d), Del. Code Ann. tit. 15, \u00a7 8043 (2006) (providing for criminal penalties for election law violations), N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 664:21 (2012) (establishing civil and criminal penalties to be pursued by the State for violations of election law), but see Cal. Elec. Code \u00a7 20010 (West 2003) (providing candidates a civil action against those who maliciously misappropriate their image in political advertising). Indeed, the most analogous statutes appear to be those punishing non-criminal fraud of various sorts, or for violation of telemarketing disclosure rules. See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-2-161 (2011) (providing cause of action, including treble damages, for false statements regarding insurance claims), N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 75-16 (2011) (providing cause of action, including treble damages, for those injured by the breakup of a monopoly), N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 664:14-a (establishing a civil action for those injured by political \u201crobocalls\u201d, including treble damages for willful violations); see also 47 U.S.C. \u00a7 227(d), (g) (2006) (requiring disclosure statement at the beginning of \u201crobo-calls\u201d and authorizing civil enforcement action against violators, including treble damages), and Maryland v. Universal Electronics,_F.Supp.2d_,_, 2012 WL 1940543 (discussing civil enforcement action by Maryland against company who made robo-calls without the required disclosure).", "type": "majority", "author": "STROUD, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Wallace & Nordan, L.L.P. by John R. Wallace and Joseph A. Newsome, for plaintiff-appellant and Frank G. Queen, P.L.L. C. by Frank G. Queen, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P. C. by Thomas A. Farr and Michael D. McKnight, for defendants-appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "FRIENDS OF JOE SAM QUEEN, Plaintiff v. RALPH HISE FOR N.C. SENATE and N.C. REPUBLICAN EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, Defendants\nNo. COA12-455\n(Filed 20 November 2012)\n1. Parties \u2014 proper party to bring action \u2014 conceded at oral argument\nIn an action involving the attribution of political advertising, the parties\u2019 substantive arguments were heard even though there was a question as to whether the proper party had brought the action where defendants conceded at oral argument that the present suit was properly authorized.\n2. Elections \u2014 Stand by Your Ad \u2014 requirements for action\nThe trial court did not err by granting defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment, or by denying plaintiff\u2019s motion for summary judgment, in an action under the Stand by Your Ad law where neither plaintiff nor defendants fully complied with the statute. In order to recover damages under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 163-278.39A, plaintiff must prove that he violated none of the statutory disclosure requirements. Different entities or individuals that jointly purchase a message, air time, portions of either, or both, must disclose joint sponsorship under the statute.\nAppeal by plaintiff from order and final judgment entered 14 December 2011 by Judge Gary E. Trawick in Superior Court, Haywood County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 10 October 2012.\nWallace & Nordan, L.L.P. by John R. Wallace and Joseph A. Newsome, for plaintiff-appellant and Frank G. Queen, P.L.L. C. by Frank G. Queen, for plaintiff-appellant.\nOgletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P. C. by Thomas A. Farr and Michael D. McKnight, for defendants-appellees." }, "file_name": "0395-01", "first_page_order": 405, "last_page_order": 418 }