{ "id": 4115151, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MARY COLEMAN GRIER", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Grier", "decision_date": "2012-12-04", "docket_number": "No. COA12-448", "first_page": "150", "last_page": "155", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "224 N.C. App. 150" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "9 S.E. 410", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "weight": 2, "year": 1889, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "410" }, { "page": "410" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 N.C. 344", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8650045 ], "year": 1889, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "346" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/103/0344-01" ] }, { "cite": "103 N.C. 268", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "269-70" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "677 S.E.2d 444", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "449", "parenthetical": "citations and quotations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 322", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4151610 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "327-28", "parenthetical": "citations and quotations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/363/0322-01" ] }, { "cite": "718 S.E.2d 623", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "626", "parenthetical": "citations and quotations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "365 N.C. 306", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4153563 ], "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "312", "parenthetical": "citations and quotations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/365/0306-01" ] }, { "cite": "678 S.E.2d 592", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "594", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 96", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4150522 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "98", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/363/0096-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-75", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2011, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 S.E.2d 375", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378", "parenthetical": "alterations in original" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 655", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565416 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "660", "parenthetical": "alterations in original" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0655-01" ] }, { "cite": "723 S.E.2d 326", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "333", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 660, 300 S.E.2d 375, 378 (1983) (alterations in original)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 587, "char_count": 11950, "ocr_confidence": 0.756, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.13173432119015432 }, "sha256": "d134f4af13cc88ff881f75b1e4af49d28251faebedf91446293ffa959a208887", "simhash": "1:aeab4c6c444e9c6c", "word_count": 2013 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:14:41.206072+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges MCGEE and THIGPEN concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MARY COLEMAN GRIER" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BRYANT, Judge.\nBecause the trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury that the crime of forgery, uttering, and larceny of a chose in action were mutually exclusive crimes, we affirm the trial court. Because defendant did not feloniously steal, take and carry away, or take by robbery a chose in action, we reverse the judgment entered against defendant on the charge of larceny of a chose in action.\nThe evidence presented at trial tended to show that, on 18 October 2010, Thera Wright \u2014 78 years old at the time of trial \u2014 was eating breakfast at a Chick-fil-A restaurant when she was approached by a woman whom she did not know. Defendant introduced herself as Barbara Mason. Defendant offered her services to provide in-home care to handicap persons three or five days a week; Medicare would cover all expenses. Ms. Wright declined the offer but indicated that her sister, who suffered from Alzheimer\u2019s disease, may be able to use defendant\u2019s services. Defendant was provided with the name and telephone number of Ms. Wright\u2019s sister. In turn, defendant wrote a note referencing Medicare and Medicaid and a telephone number on a restaurant napkin.\nLater that day, Ms. Wright was surprised by defendant\u2019s appearance at her residence. Ms. Wright did not recall giving defendant her address. Defendant stated that she had been to the residence of Ms. Wright\u2019s sister-in-law. Ms. Wright invited defendant into her home. The two spoke for ten minutes. After defendant left, Ms. Wright could not find her pocketbook. She called the phone number defendant provided her with on the napkin at the Chick-fil-A restaurant and heard an automated message providing the time of day. Ms. Wright called her bank and cancelled her credit cards. Then she called the police to report the crime and the name Barbara Mason. The next day Ms. Wright went to SunTrust Bank to explain what had happened regarding the loss of her pocketbook including her checkbook. A bank representative informed her that a check for $465.00 had been cashed made payable to Mary Grier.\nIn an interview with Charlotte Mecklenburg Police detectives, defendant acknowledged that she stole and cashed Ms. Wright\u2019s check.\nDefendant was charged with forgery, uttering forged paper, larceny of a chose in action, and attaining habitual felon status. A jury trial commenced on 12 September 2011 in Mecklenburg County Superior Court before the Honorable W. Robert Bell. The jury returned verdicts of guilty on all charges. The trial court entered a consolidated judgment in accordance with the jury verdicts. Defendant appeals.\nOn appeal, defendant argues that (I) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that defendant couldn\u2019t be convicted of mutually exclusive crimes and (II) there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction for larceny of a chose in action.\nI\nDefendant argues that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that the crimes of forgery, uttering a forged check, and larceny of a chose in action are mutually exclusive. Defendant contends that a single instrument cannot be both a forgery and a valid chose in action. We disagree.\nAs the State notes in its brief, defendant failed to raise this objection before the trial court, but defendant argues that the trial court\u2019s failure to instruct the jury on mutually exclusive offenses amounts to plain error.\nIn criminal cases, an issue that was not preserved by objection noted at trial and that is not deemed preserved by rule or law without any such action nevertheless may be made the basis of an issue presented on appeal when the judicial action questioned is specifically and distinctly contended to amount to plain error.\nN.C. R. App. P. 10(a)(4) (2012).\n[T]he plain error rule ... is always to be applied cautiously and only in the exceptional case where, after reviewing the entire record, it can be said the claimed error is a fundamental error, something so basic, so prejudicial, so lacking in its elements that justice cannot have been done, or where [the error] is grave error which amounts to a denial of a fundamental right of the accused, or the error has resulted in a miscarriage of justice or in the denial to appellant of a fair trial or where the error is such as to seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings or where it can be fairly said the instructional mistake had a probable impact on the jury\u2019s finding that the defendant was guilty.\nState v. Lawrence,_N.C._,_, 723 S.E.2d 326, 333 (2012) (quoting State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 660, 300 S.E.2d 375, 378 (1983) (alterations in original)) (quotations and brackets omitted).\nInitially, we note that defendant\u2019s argument relies upon the contention that the crime of forgery and uttering a forged check require a counterfeit instrument while the evidence of larceny of a chose in action requires a showing that the defendant \u201cstole a valid instrument.\u201d (Emphasis in the original).\nPursuant to section 14-75, \u201cLarceny of chose in action\u201d occurs when \u201cany person shall feloniously steal, take and carry away, or take by robbery, any bank note, check or other order for the payment of money issued by or drawn on any bank ... being the property of any other person . . . N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-75 (2011). But, contrary to defendant\u2019s argument, section 14-75 does not require that the \u201cbank note, check or other order for payment\u201d be valid.\nThus, defendant cannot maintain the argument that the State is required to make a showing that a financial instrument such as a bank note or check in order to be a chose in action must be valid. Further, defendant points us to no authority, and we find none, indicating that the crimes of larceny of a chose in action and forgery and uttering a forged paper or instrument are mutually exclusive. Therefore, the trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury that larceny of a chose in action required a valid instrument or that the crimes charged were mutually exclusive. Accordingly, defendant\u2019s argument is overruled.\nII\nDefendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict her of larceny of a chose in action. Defendant contends that the evidence presented during trial was that she took and carried away Ms. Wright\u2019s blank check. Defendant further contends that the theft of a blank check does not support a claim for larceny of a chose in action. We agree.\n\u201cWhen ruling on a motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence, the trial court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, drawing all reasonable inferences in the State\u2019s favor.\u201d State v. Miller, 363 N.C. 96, 98, 678 S.E.2d 592, 594 (2009) (citation omitted). \u201c[T]he trial court must determine whether substantial evidence has been presented in support of each element of the charged offense.\u201d State v. Nabors, 365 N.C. 306, 312, 718 S.E.2d 623, 626 (2011) (citations and quotations omitted). On appeal, \u201cthis Court determines whether the State presented substantial evidence\u2019 in support of each element of the charged offense. \u2018Substantial evidence\u2019 is relevant evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate, or would consider necessary to support a particular conclusion.\u201d State v. Abshire, 363 N.C. 322, 327-28, 677 S.E.2d 444, 449 (2009) (citations and quotations omitted).\nA \u201cchose in action\u201d is pertinently defined as \u201c[a] proprietary right in personam, such as a debt owed by another person . . . .\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 234 (7th ed. 1999). Again, \u201cLarceny of chose in action\u201d occurs when \u201cany person shall feloniously steal, take and carry away, or take by robbery, any bank note, check or other order for the payment of money issued by or drawn on any bank ... being the property of any other person ....\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-75 (2011). See generally, State v. Campbell, 103 N.C. 268, 269-70 (103 N.C. 344, 346), 9 S.E. 410, 410 (1889) (\u201cWhen, . . . the indictment charges the larceny of one of the several species of choses in action specified in the statute, and there is no count for larceny at common law, as suggested, the State must prove the larceny of the chose in action as charged, else the prosecution must fail, because the charge is, not for the larceny merely of a piece of paper on which the note or other thing is written, but of the valuable written evidence of the chose in action as charged and as designated in the statute. It is the latter embodied and evidenced by the writing that is charged to have been stolen. It would not comport with just and settled criminal procedure to indict a person for the larceny of a promissory note, and allow him to be convicted upon such charge of stealing a piece of paper. Stealing the latter, if an offense at all, is a common law offense, and essentially different from the statutory offense of stealing a promissory note. The former is not necessarily a part of, or embraced by, the latter. The note might be written on parchment, linen, silk or cotton cloth, or the like. Neither principle nor statutory provision requires promissory notes and like things to be written on paper, though ordinarily, for the greater convenience, they are so written.\u201d).\nHere, Ms. Wright testified that she invited defendant into her home, and after defendant left, Ms. Wright could not find her pocketbook. The pocketbook contained Ms. Wright\u2019s checkbook. The next day, a bank representative informed Ms. Wright that a check had been cashed against her account for $465.00.\nQ And any of the writing on this check, any of the handwriting on this check, is any of that your writing?\nA No.\nQ So you didn't fill in any of this information?\nA No.\nQ And that is not your signature on the check?\nA No.\nQ Did you authorize anybody to fill out this check to [defendant] Mary Grier?\nA No.\nQ Do you know a [defendant] Mary Grier?\nA No.\nQ You wouldn't have written a check to her?\nA No.\nDuring the investigation of the theft report, defendant was interviewed by a detective in the financial crimes unit of the Charlotte Mecklenburg Police Department. The detective testified that during her interview, defendant admitted that she stole and cashed Ms. Wright\u2019s check.\nDespite the record evidence that defendant took a check from Ms. Wright\u2019s checkbook and cashed a check made payable to herself for $465.00, there is no evidence that the check evidenced any debt or obligation prior to the taking. Therefore, there is no evidence that defendant committed larceny of a chose in action. See Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 234 (7th ed. 1999); see also, generally, Campbell, 103 N.C. at 269-70 (103 N.C. at 346), 9 S.E. at 410. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court as to this charge and remand for further proceedings.\nAffirmed in part; reversed in part.\nJudges MCGEE and THIGPEN concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "BRYANT, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Perry J. Pelaez, for the State.", "Michael E. Casterline for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MARY COLEMAN GRIER\nNo. COA12-448\nFiled 4 December 2012\n1. Larceny \u2014 chose in action \u2014 forgery\u2014not mutually exclusive offenses \u2014 valid instrument not required\nThere was no plain error in a prosecution for larceny of a chose in action, forgery, and uttering a forged paper or instrument where the trial court failed to instruct the jury that larceny of a chose in action required a valid instrument or that the crimes were mutually exclusive.\n2. Larceny \u2014 chose in action \u2014 blank check \u2014 evidence not sufficient\nThe theft of a blank check does not support a claim for larceny of a chose in action and there was no evidence that defendant committed larceny of a chose in action when she took a check from the victim\u2019s checkbook and cashed it for $465.00. There was no evidence that the check evidenced any debt or obligation prior to the taking.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 14 September 2011 by Judge W. Robert Bell in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 9 October 2012.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Perry J. Pelaez, for the State.\nMichael E. Casterline for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0150-01", "first_page_order": 160, "last_page_order": 165 }