{ "id": 4114697, "name": "In the Matter of Posha Whatley", "name_abbreviation": "In re Whatley", "decision_date": "2012-12-18", "docket_number": "No. COA12-716", "first_page": "267", "last_page": "274", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "224 N.C. App. 267" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "667 S.E.2d 302", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12642037 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "304", "parenthetical": "describing \"[a] trial court's duty to record the facts that support its findings [as] 'mandatory' \"" }, { "page": "304", "parenthetical": "holding that the trial court had incorporated by reference \"the last physician's report\" into its order" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/667/0302-01" ] }, { "cite": "270 S.E.2d 537", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "541", "parenthetical": "affirming an involuntary commitment order on the basis of dangerousness to others even though the evidence was insufficient to establish dangerousness to self" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "49 N.C. App. 23", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8519271 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "31-32", "parenthetical": "affirming an involuntary commitment order on the basis of dangerousness to others even though the evidence was insufficient to establish dangerousness to self" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/49/0023-01" ] }, { "cite": "598 S.E.2d 696", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "700" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "165 N.C. App. 462", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8998193 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "469" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/165/0462-01" ] }, { "cite": "193 N.C. App. 433", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4161798 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "436", "parenthetical": "describing \"[a] trial court's duty to record the facts that support its findings [as] 'mandatory' \"" }, { "page": "437" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/193/0433-01" ] }, { "cite": "271 S.E.2d 72", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "74", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "49 N.C. App. 243", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520575 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "246", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/49/0243-01" ] }, { "cite": "689 S.E.2d 468", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "472-73", "parenthetical": "providing that \"[w]hen the challenged order may form the basis for future commitment or may cause other collateral legal consequences for the respondent, an appeal of that order is not moot\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "201 N.C. App. 212", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4172984 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "217", "parenthetical": "providing that \"[w]hen the challenged order may form the basis for future commitment or may cause other collateral legal consequences for the respondent, an appeal of that order is not moot\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/201/0212-01" ] }, { "cite": "244 S.E.2d 450", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "451", "parenthetical": "explaining that \"a prior discharge will not render questions challenging the involuntary commitment proceeding moot\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "36 N.C. App. 638", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8555151 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "639", "parenthetical": "explaining that \"a prior discharge will not render questions challenging the involuntary commitment proceeding moot\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/36/0638-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 647, "char_count": 16747, "ocr_confidence": 0.748, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.5952755832819613e-07, "percentile": 0.6828560275135732 }, "sha256": "c47f9bac15cd88d093a3c1a4ecf5f88dd625730ee046a9e5a8ccc4f94f175ead", "simhash": "1:03cbba6ede36bf73", "word_count": 2589 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:14:41.206072+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges McGEE and BRYANT concur." ], "parties": [ "In the Matter of Posha Whatley" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "THIGPEN, Judge.\nPosha Whatley (\u201cRespondent\u201d) appeals from the trial court\u2019s involuntary commitment order, contending, inter alia, that the findings of fact in the order were insufficient to support her commitment. For the following reasons, we agree with Respondent\u2019s contention, and we reverse and remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nI. Factual & Procedural Background\nOn 5 January 2012, Respondent was involuntarily committed to a mental health facility (\u201cPresbyterian Hospital\u201d) pursuant to an affidavit and petition for involuntary commitment filed that day by her physician, Dr. Amishi Shah. The affidavit and petition requesting Respondent\u2019s commitment alleged that Respondent had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder, that she had been admitted with psychosis while taking care of her two-month-old child, that she remained disorganized and paranoid, that she was refusing to take her medications, and that she clearly represented a danger to herself or others if not treated. Based upon his 5 January 2012 examination of Respondent, Dr. Shah concluded that Respondent was \u201cmentally ill\u201d and \u201cdangerous to self\u2019 and recommended that Respondent be committed as an inpatient at Presbyterian Hospital for 30 days. A court order was entered that day by Magistrate A. Williams finding that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the facts alleged in the petition were true and ordering that Respondent be temporarily committed for examination and treatment at Presbyterian Hospital pending a hearing in district court.\nRespondent was evaluated three times following her commitment and prior to her district court hearing. On 6 January 2012, Dr. Noel Ibanez examined Respondent and found that Respondent continued to exhibit bizarre, psychotic behavior, an inability to care for herself, poor insight, poor impulse control, and a tendency to place herself directly at risk of harm. From these findings, Dr. Ibanez concluded that Respondent was \u201cmentally ill\u201d and \u201cdangerous to self\u2019 and recommended inpatient commitment for a period of 30 days. On 12 January 2012, Dr. Shah evaluated Respondent a second time, and, in his report based upon this evaluation, indicated that Respondent remained paranoid and disorganized with poor insight and judgment, that Respondent initially presented as manic and psychotic while caring for her two-month-old child, that she needed continued impatient stay for medication stabilization, and that she was \u201cclearly at risk to self if discharged too soon.\u201d Dr. Shah again opined that Respondent was \u201cmentally ill\u201d and \u201cdangerous to self\u2019 and recommended inpatient commitment for a period of 30 days. A court order filed 13 January 2012 indicates that following Dr. Shah\u2019s second evaluation, Respondent requested a continuance of her district court hearing in order \u201cto discuss voluntary [commitment] with her doctor.\u201d On 18 January 2012, Dr. Shah again evaluated Respondent and made findings similar to those included in his previous reports, noting that Respondent had been admitted with psychosis while taking care of her two-month-old son, that she had a history of bipolar disorder, that she remained paranoid and disorganized with poor judgment, and that she needed continued stabilization. Dr. Shah also noted Respondent\u2019s statement to him that she did not plan to follow-up with treatment as an outpatient. Dr. Shah again recommended that Respondent be committed as an inpatient based on his opinion that she was mentally ill. and a danger to herself; however, this time Dr. Shah recommended that Respondent be admitted as an impatient for 15 days, rather than 30 days, as he had recommended in his previous reports.\nThe matter of Respondent\u2019s involuntary commitment came on for hearing at a special proceedings court session in Mecklenburg County District Court on 18 January 2012. At the hearing, Dr. Shah indicated his recommendation \u2014 to which Respondent objected \u2014 that Respondent \u201ccontinue to receive treatment at Presbyterian Hospital up to an additional 15 days for inpatient treatment, for the balance of 90 days of outpatient treatment[.]\u201d By order entered 18 January 2012, the trial court concluded that Respondent was mentally ill and dangerous to herself and others. The court ordered that Respondent be involuntarily committed at Presbyterian Hospital for a period not to exceed 15 days and thereafter committed to an outpatient facility for a period not to exceed 90 days.\nOn 30 January 2012, Respondent\u2019s treating physician at Presbyterian Hospital requested a hearing to extend Respondent\u2019s involuntary commitment. This request was rendered moot, however, when Respondent subsequently consented to inpatient treatment beyond the timeframe set forth in the 18 January 2012 order. Consequently, the trial court ordered that \u201cno action be taken on Petitioner\u2019s Request for Re-hearing\u201d and that Respondent remain under the outpatient terms of the 18 January 2012 commitment order. Respondent timely filed notice of appeal from the trial court\u2019s 18 January 2012 commitment order with this Court on 25 January 2012.\nII. Analysis\nRespondent contends that the trial court erred in failing to record sufficient findings of fact in its order for involuntary commitment to support its conclusions that Respondent was dangerous to herself and others. We agree.\nPreliminarily, we note that Respondent\u2019s appeal is properly before us, notwithstanding the fact that the period of her involuntary commitment has ended. In re Mackie, 36 N.C. App. 638, 639, 244 S.E.2d 450, 451 (1978) (explaining that \u201ca prior discharge will not render questions challenging the involuntary commitment proceeding moot\u201d); see also In re Webber, 201 N.C. App. 212, 217, 689 S.E.2d 468, 472-73 (2009) (providing that \u201c[w]hen the challenged order may form the basis for future commitment or may cause other collateral legal consequences for the respondent, an appeal of that order is not moot\u201d). We accordingly undertake our review of the trial court\u2019s commitment order as follows:\nOn appeal of a commitment order our function is to determine whether there was any competent evidence to support the \u201cfacts\u201d recorded in the commitment order and whether the trial court\u2019s ultimate findings of mental illness and dangerous to self or others were supported by the \u201cfacts\u201d recorded in the order. We do not consider whether the evidence of respondent\u2019s mental illness and dangerousness was clear, cogent and convincing. It is for the trier of fact to determine whether the competent evidence offered in a particular case met the burden of proof.\nIn re Collins, 49 N.C. App. 243, 246, 271 S.E.2d 72, 74 (1980) (citations omitted).\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 122C-268Q) sets forth the criteria for involuntary commitment and provides that the trial court must \u201cfind by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that the respondent is mentally ill and dangerous to self... or dangerous to others .. . .\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 122C-268(j) (2011). The trial court must also record the facts that support its \u201cultimate findings,\u201d i.e., conclusions of law, that the respondent is mentally ill and dangerous to himself or others. Id.; In re Booker, 193 N.C. App. 433, 436, 667 S.E.2d 302, 304 (2008) (describing \u201c[a] trial court\u2019s duty to record the facts that support its findings [as] \u2018mandatory\u2019 \u201d).\nThe trial court here found the following facts \u201cby clear, cogent and convincing evidence\u201d:\nRespondent was exhibiting psychotic behavior that endangered her and her newborn child. She is bipolar and was experiencing a manic stage. She was initially noncompliant in taking her medications but has been compliant over the past 7 days. Respondent continues to exhibit disorganized thinking that causes her not to be able to properly care for herself. She continues to need medication monitoring. Respondent has been previously involuntarily committed.\nRespondent does not challenge any of the trial court\u2019s findings of fact, and these findings, therefore, are binding on appeal. See In re Zollicoffer, 165 N.C. App. 462, 469, 598 S.E.2d 696, 700 (2004). The trial court also checked a box in its order indicating its intention to find \u201cas facts all matters set out in the physician\u2019s/eligible psychologist\u2019s report, specified below[.]\u201d Although the court did not specify which report it sought to incorporate, this Court has previously indicated that the most recent report be incorporated under these circumstances. Booker, 193 N.C. App. at 437, 667 S.E.2d at 304 (holding that the trial court had incorporated by reference \u201cthe last physician\u2019s report\u201d into its order). The most recent physician\u2019s report presented to the trial court here was Dr. Shah\u2019s 18 January 2012 report. We deduce from the fact that this report was completed on the day of the hearing and from the fact that Dr. Shah was the only physician to testify at the hearing that the 18 January 2012 report was likely the report that the trial court intended to incorporate into its order. This report set forth the following findings:\nPatient admitted [with] psychosis while taking care of her two month old son. She has a [history of] Bipolar [disorder]. She remains paranoid, disorganized, intrusive. She tells me that she does not plan to follow up as an outpatient. She has very poor insight [and] judgment and needs continued stabilization.\nAs detailed below, we hold that even assuming that the trial court successfully incorporated the contents of Dr. Shah\u2019s 18 January 2012 report into its order, the order was still insufficient to support Respondent\u2019s involuntary commitment.\nA. Dangerous to Self\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 122C-3 defines \u201cdangerous to self\u2019 to mean that, within the relevant past, the individual\u2019s conduct has demonstrated the following:\nI. That he would be unable, without care, supervision, and the continued assistance of others not otherwise available, to exercise self-control, judgment, and discretion in the conduct of his daily responsibilities and social relations, or to satisfy his need for nourishment, personal or medical care, shelter, or self-protection and safety; and\nII. That there is a reasonable probability of his suffering serious physical debilitation within the near future unless adequate treatment is given pursuant to this Chapter. A showing of behavior that is grossly irrational, of actions that the individual is unable to control, of behavior that is grossly inappropriate to the situation, or of other evidence of severely impaired insight and judgment shall create a prima facie inference that the individual is unable to care for himself].]\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 122C-3(11)(a)(l) (2011) (emphasis added).\nOur review of the trial court\u2019s findings, which we assume arguendo included the findings set out in Dr. Shah\u2019s report, indicates that the second prong of the \u201cdangerous to self\u2019 inquiry is not satisfied. In short, none of the court\u2019s findings demonstrate that there was \u201ca reasonable probability of [Respondent] suffering serious physical debilitation within the near future\u201d absent her commitment. Each of the trial court\u2019s findings pertain to either Respondent\u2019s history of mental illness or her behavior prior to and leading up to the commitment hearing, but they do not indicate that these circumstances rendered Respondent a danger to herself in the future. For instance, the court\u2019s findings concerning Respondent\u2019s psychotic behavior, history of bipolar disorder, and \u201cmanic stage\u201d reflect only the court\u2019s ultimate finding of mental illness, which Respondent does not contest. Similarly, the findings that Respondent \u201cremain[ed] paranoid,\u201d \u201cexhibitfed] disorganized thinking,\u201d and demonstrated \u201cvery poor insight [and] judgment\u201d describe Respondent\u2019s condition at the time of the hearing, but do not in themselves indicate that Respondent presented a threat of \u201cserious physical debilitation\u201d to herself within the near future. The trial court also found that Respondent needed medication monitoring and that she did not plan to follow up as an outpatient, but, again, there is no finding that connects these concerns with the court\u2019s ultimate finding of \u201cdangerous to self\u2019 as defined in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 122C-3(ll)(a)(l). Simply put, the trial court\u2019s findings reflect Respondent\u2019s mental illness, but they do not indicate that Respondent\u2019s illness or any of her aforementioned symptoms will persist and endanger her within the near future. Accordingly, we cannot uphold the trial court\u2019s commitment order on the basis that Respondent was dangerpus to herself.\nB. Dangerous to Others\nAs an alternative basis for upholding the trial court\u2019s commitment order, we next address whether the court\u2019s findings of fact were sufficient to support its conclusion that Respondent was dangerous to others. See In re Monroe, 49 N.C. App. 23, 31-32, 270 S.E.2d 537, 541 (1980) (affirming an involuntary commitment order on the basis of dangerousness to others even though the evidence was insufficient to establish dangerousness to self). An individual is \u201cdangerous to others\u201d if\nwithin the relevant past, the individual has inflicted or attempted to inflict or threatened to inflict serious bodily harm on another, or has acted in such a way as to create a substantial risk of serious bodily harm to another, or has engaged in extreme destruction of property; and that there is a reasonable probability that this conduct will be repeated. Previous episodes of dangerousness to others, when applicable, may be considered when determining reasonable probability of future dangerous conduct. Clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that an individual has committed a homicide in the relevant past is prima facie evidence of dangerousness to others.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 122C-3(ll)(b) (2011) (emphasis added).\nThe only findings relevant to the trial court\u2019s conclusion that Respondent was dangerous to others are the court\u2019s findings that \u201cRespondent was exhibiting psychotic behavior that endangered . . . her newborn child\u201d and \u2014 as incorporated from Dr. Shah\u2019s report\u2014 that Respondent had been \u201cadmitted [with] psychosis while taking care of her two month old son.\u201d These findings are clearly inadequate to demonstrate \u201ca reasonable probability that this conduct will be repeated,\u201d see id., as the findings pertain only to Respondent\u2019s past conduct and draw no nexus between that conduct and future danger to others. Thus, the trial court\u2019s findings are insufficient to support its conclusion that Respondent was dangerous to others, and the commitment order cannot be upheld on this basis.\nIII. Conclusion\nIn sum, we hold that the trial court\u2019s findings of fact are insufficient to support its conclusions that Respondent presented a danger to herself and others. We believe that the appropriate remedy is to remand to the trial court for entry of additional findings \u2014 if any can be made- \u2014 to support its conclusions. Absent additional findings, however, the commitment order cannot be upheld. We accordingly reverse the trial court\u2019s 18 January 2012 order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nREVERSED and REMANDED.\nJudges McGEE and BRYANT concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "THIGPEN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Charlene Richardson, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.", "Staples S. Hughes, Appellate Defender, by John F. Carella, Assistant Appellate Defender, for Respondent." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In the Matter of Posha Whatley\nNo. COA12-716\nFiled 18 December 2012\n1. Appeal and Error \u2014 mootness\u2014collateral consequences\nRespondent\u2019s appeal from an involuntary commitment was properly before the Court of Appeals, notwithstanding the fact that the period of commitment had ended, because of collateral legal consequences.\n2. Mental Illness \u2014 involuntary commitment \u2014 dangerous to herself \u2014 findings not sufficient\nRespondent\u2019s involuntary commitment on the basis that respondent was dangerous to herself was not upheld where the trial court\u2019s findings reflected respondent\u2019s mental illness, but did not indicate that respondent\u2019s illness or any of her symptoms would persist and endanger her within the near future.\n3. Mental Illness \u2014 involuntary commitment \u2014 dangerous to others \u2014 findings not sufficient\nRespondent\u2019s involuntary commitment on the basis that she was dangerous to others was not upheld where the findings pertained only to respondent\u2019s past conduct and drew no nexus between that conduct and future danger to others.\n4. Mental Illness \u2014 involuntary commitment \u2014 insufficient findings \u2014 remedy\nAn involuntary commitment order that lacked sufficient findings was remanded for further findings, if any could be made.\nAppeal by Respondent from order entered 18 January 2012 by Judge Regan A. Miller in Mecklenburg County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 23 October 2012.\nRoy Cooper, Attorney General, by Charlene Richardson, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.\nStaples S. Hughes, Appellate Defender, by John F. Carella, Assistant Appellate Defender, for Respondent." }, "file_name": "0267-01", "first_page_order": 277, "last_page_order": 284 }