{ "id": 4115526, "name": "AUSTIN MAINTENANCE & CONSTRUCTION, INC., Plaintiff v. CROWDER CONSTRUCTION COMPANY and STEVE LANIER, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Austin Maintenance & Construction, Inc. v. Crowder Construction Co.", "decision_date": "2012-12-18", "docket_number": "No. COA12-201", "first_page": "401", "last_page": "423", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "224 N.C. App. 401" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. 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App. 49", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8350396 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "51, 60" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/174/0049-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 75-1.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "343 S.E.2d 174", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "179" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 461", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4694338 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "469" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0461-01" ] }, { "cite": "618 F. Supp. 782", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3799369 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "785-86" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/618/0782-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 L. 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Abeles, 240 N.C. 667, 674 84 S.E. 2d 176, 182-83 (1954)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 643", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2518481 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "661", "parenthetical": "citing Childress v. Abeles, 240 N.C. 667, 674 84 S.E. 2d 176, 182-83 (1954)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0643-01" ] }, { "cite": "370 S.E.2d 227", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 486", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2519568, 2518281, 2516346, 2514601 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0486-03", "/nc/322/0486-02", "/nc/322/0486-01", "/nc/322/0486-04" ] }, { "cite": "367 S.E.2d 647", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "651", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 216", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2515946 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "222-23", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0216-01" ] }, { "cite": "415 S.E.2d 200", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "412 S.E.2d 97", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "99" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 N.C. App. 652", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523555 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "655" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/104/0652-01" ] }, { "cite": "713 S.E.2d 132", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "135", "parenthetical": "quoting Salt v. Applied Analytical, Inc., 104 N.C. App. 652, 655, 412 S.E.2d 97, 99 (1991), cert. denied, 331 N.C. 119, 415 S.E.2d 200 (1992)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "541 S.E.2d 716", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 191", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155746, 1155907, 1155630 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0191-01", "/nc/351/0191-03", "/nc/351/0191-02" ] }, { "cite": "519 S.E.2d 308", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "309" }, { "page": "310" }, { "page": "312" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 27", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155931 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0027-01" ] }, { "cite": "72 S.E. 801", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1911, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "808", "parenthetical": "other citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "157 N.C. 44", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8656346 ], "year": 1911, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "62-63", "parenthetical": "other citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/157/0044-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 S.E.2d 735", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "738", "parenthetical": "other citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "239 N.C. 121", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8626052 ], "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "124-25", "parenthetical": "other citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/239/0121-01" ] }, { "cite": "403 S.E.2d 483", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "489", "parenthetical": "citing Casey v. Grantham, 239 N.C. 121, 124-25, 79 S.E.2d 735, 738 (1954) (other citation omitted" }, { "page": "492" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 578", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2538399 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "588", "parenthetical": "citing Casey v. Grantham, 239 N.C. 121, 124-25, 79 S.E.2d 735, 738 (1954) (other citation omitted" }, { "page": "593" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0578-01" ] }, { "cite": "189 N.C. App. 601", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4157030 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "613", "parenthetical": "internal citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/189/0601-01" ] }, { "cite": "700 S.E.2d 102", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "108", "parenthetical": "quoting S.N.R. Mgmt. Corp. v. Danube Partners 141, LLC, 189 N.C. App. 601, 613, 659 S.E.2d 442, 451 (2008) (internal citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "207 N.C. App 401", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4179326 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "408", "parenthetical": "quoting S.N.R. Mgmt. Corp. v. Danube Partners 141, LLC, 189 N.C. App. 601, 613, 659 S.E.2d 442, 451 (2008) (internal citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/207/0401-01" ] }, { "cite": "160 S.E. 896", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "weight": 2, "year": 1931, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "906" }, { "page": "906" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "201 N.C. 577", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8626992 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1931, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "598" }, { "page": "598" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/201/0577-01" ] }, { "cite": "316 S.E.2d 272", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "275" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "311 N.C. 259", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4683498 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "264" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/311/0259-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 S.E.2d 457", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 715", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4779554, 4776469 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0715-01", "/nc/317/0715-02" ] }, { "cite": "343 S.E.2d 188", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "191" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "80 N.C. App. 383", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523953 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "385" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/80/0383-01" ] }, { "cite": "692 S.E.2d 605", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "611" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "364 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4152793 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "7" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/364/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "504 S.E.2d 574", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "577" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "130 N.C. App. 729", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11470258 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "733" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/130/0729-01" ] }, { "cite": "548 S.E.2d 704", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "707" }, { "page": "708" }, { "page": "708" }, { "page": "712" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 647", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135724 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "651" }, { "page": "651" }, { "page": "651" }, { "page": "655-56" }, { "page": "658" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0647-01" ] }, { "cite": "669 S.E.2d 572", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "576", "parenthetical": "quoting Dalton v. Camp, 353 N.C. 647, 651, 548 S.E.2d 704, 707 (2001)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 569", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4150896 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "573", "parenthetical": "quoting Dalton v. Camp, 353 N.C. 647, 651, 548 S.E.2d 704, 707 (2001)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0569-01" ] }, { "cite": "230 S.E.2d 159", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "161-62", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "31 N.C. App. 463", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8550131 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "466", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/31/0463-01" ] }, { "cite": "180 S.E.2d 823", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "830", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "278 N.C. 523", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561041 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "534", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/278/0523-01" ] }, { "cite": "711 S.E.2d 114", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "116", "parenthetical": "quoting Kessing v. Mortgage Corp., 278 N.C. 523, 534, 180 S.E.2d 823, 830 (1971) (citation and quotation marks omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "365 N.C. 179", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "182", "parenthetical": "quoting Kessing v. Mortgage Corp., 278 N.C. 523, 534, 180 S.E.2d 823, 830 (1971) (citation and quotation marks omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "151 L. Ed. 2d 261", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 S. Ct. 345", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "547 S.E.2d 810", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 371", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135616, 135649, 135948, 135763, 135735 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0371-05", "/nc/353/0371-03", "/nc/353/0371-01", "/nc/353/0371-02", "/nc/353/0371-04" ] }, { "cite": "546 S.E.2d 401", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 262", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135914, 135661, 135986, 135704, 135806 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0262-04", "/nc/353/0262-02", "/nc/353/0262-05", "/nc/353/0262-03", "/nc/353/0262-01" ] }, { "cite": "534 S.E.2d 660", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "664" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "139 N.C. App. 778", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9497849 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "784-85" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/139/0778-01" ] }, { "cite": "565 S.E.2d 140", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "146" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "355 N.C. 672", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 220147 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "681" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/355/0672-01" ] }, { "cite": "573 S.E.2d 118", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "124", "parenthetical": "citing DeWitt v. Eveready Battery Co., 355 N.C. 672, 681, 565 S.E.2d 140, 146 (2002)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 571", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511376 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "579", "parenthetical": "citing DeWitt v. Eveready Battery Co., 355 N.C. 672, 681, 565 S.E.2d 140, 146 (2002)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0571-01" ] }, { "cite": "289 S.E.2d 363", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "366", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 N.C. 366", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569908 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "369", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/305/0366-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1861, "char_count": 56442, "ocr_confidence": 0.74, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.682153601785378e-07, "percentile": 0.6977339219390783 }, "sha256": "f19351beb7807a9be3494b77e1c276f063362b25cfe4653b4538658df1a6ede2", "simhash": "1:8300462265052656", "word_count": 8824 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:14:41.206072+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges McGEE and STEELMAN concur." ], "parties": [ "AUSTIN MAINTENANCE & CONSTRUCTION, INC., Plaintiff v. CROWDER CONSTRUCTION COMPANY and STEVE LANIER, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ERVIN, Judge.\nPlaintiff Austin Maintenance & Construction, Inc., appeals from orders granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants Steve Lanier and Crowder Construction Company with respect to Plaintiffs breach of fiduciary duty claim, which had been asserted solely against Mr. Lanier; Plaintiffs claims for tortious interference with contract, unfair or deceptive trade practices, and civil conspiracy, which had been asserted against both Defendants; and Plaintiffs request for injunctive relief. On appeal, Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants on the grounds that the record reveals the existence of genuine issues of material fact concerning whether Mr. Lanier breached a fiduciary duty that he owed Plaintiff and whether Defendants tortiously interfered with a contract between Plaintiff and The Timken Company, engaged in unfair or deceptive trade practices, and participated in a civil conspiracy, and on the grounds that Plaintiff was entitled to injunctive relief. After careful consideration of Plaintiffs challenges to the trial court\u2019s orders in light of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that the trial court\u2019s orders should be affirmed.\nI. Background\nA. Substantive Facts\nTimken operates a \u201ctapered roller bearing\u201d manufacturing plant in Randleman, a town near Asheboro. Timken personnel refer to this facility as the Asheboro plant. Between 2006 and 2010, Sanders Brothers Inc. provided construction-related maintenance services at Timken\u2019s Asheboro plant and several other Timken plants pursuant to a Master Service Agreement (MSA). The MSA set out the general terms and conditions which would apply to specific contracts into which Timken and Sanders might enter in the future. The MSA did not provide for the provision of specific services or obligate either party to enter into specific contracts; instead, the MSA provided that Timken would execute Purchase Orders memorializing any future contracts between the parties.\nIn 2010, Sanders experienced serious financial difficulties. At that point, Rick Flickinger, the manager of Timken\u2019s Asheboro plant, investigated the possibility of procuring construction-related maintenance services from a different company. In the course of that process, Crowder, which competes with Plaintiff in the construction maintenance business, made Mr. Flickinger\u2019s \u201cshort list.\u201d However, after Sanders Brothers assigned its rights under the MSA to Plaintiff effective on 9 June 2010, Plaintiff assumed responsibility for providing construction-related maintenance services at Timken\u2019s Asheboro plant instead.\nAt the time that Plaintiff began providing construction maintenance services at the Asheboro plant, Mr. Lanier had been employed at that facility for twelve years, with the last six years of that period having been spent as a Sanders Brothers employee. Mr. Lanier supervised a crew consisting of three other men who had also worked at the plant for at least five years \u2014 James Moore, Willard McDaniel, and Earl Turner. The crew performed various tasks at the direction of Mr. Flickinger, including welding, metal fabrication, wiring, repairing the water pipes and coolant system, pipe fitting, and performing other machine repairs. In addition, Timken had a \u201ctendency to rearrange machines\u201d in the Asheboro plant, so Mr. Lanier\u2019s crew was involved in implementing these \u201cmachine moves\u201d as well. The machines were very large; moving them required a complex series of procedures including the performance of some construction-related work.\nAfter Plaintiff purchased Sanders Brothers\u2019 rights under the MSA, it hired Mr. Lanier and the other members of the crew as hourly, at-will employees. Mr. Lanier continued to serve as crew foreman after coming into Plaintiff\u2019s employment; his immediate supervisor was Jack Richardson, one of Plaintiff\u2019s General Managers. As crew superintendent and Plaintiff\u2019s highest ranking employee at the Asheboro plant, Plaintiff had additional responsibilities over and above those assigned to the other crew members. Among other things, Mr. Lanier supervised the crew, coordinated their work on specific projects, and had the right to select crew members and request pay raises. Mr. Lanier also had certain record-keeping responsibilities, including documenting compliance with safety regulations, overseeing weekly employee time sheets, and preparing documents that Plaintiff used to generate invoices and prepare other reports. Finally, Mr. Lanier functioned as the primary source of communication between his crew and the individuals directly responsible for operating Timken\u2019s Asheboro plant and Plaintiff. Mr. Lanier did not work from an office; instead, he performed his supervisory tasks while working with the rest of the crew on construction-related maintenance projects. Neither Mr. Lanier nor any other member of the crew was asked to sign a non-competition agreement, a non-solicitation agreement, or a confidentiality agreement.\nWithin a month after becoming employed by Plaintiff, the members of the crew became dissatisfied with the manner in which Plaintiff handled certain administrative issues, the amount of paperwork that Plaintiff required, and the manner in which Plaintiff responded to their concerns. As a result, all four crew members began looking for other employment during the summer of 2010.-\nOn 14 July 2010, James Moore called Brian Gossett, a Crowder employee with whom James Moore had worked when both were employed by Sanders Brothers at the Asheboro plant. At that time, James Moore, who wanted to \u201cget away from [Plaintiff],\u201d asked Mr. Gossett if he might obtain employment at Crowder. After Mr. Gossett indicated that Crowder was always looking for good workers, James Moore gave him Mr. Lanier\u2019s phone number. Mr. Gossett, in turn, agreed to provide Mr. Lanier\u2019s phone number to Tracy Moore, who held a management position with Crowder.\nOn the following day, Tracy Moore called Mr. Lanier. At that time, Mr. Lanier and Tracy Moore discussed the possibility that Mr. Lanier\u2019s entire crew would begin working for Crowder. During that conversation, Mr. Lanier asked Tracy Moore to send him information concerning the salary and benefit package that Crowder would be in a position to offer to members of the crew.\nMr. Lanier also talked to Mr. Flickinger about the possible change. Among other things, Mr. Lanier told Mr. Flickinger that he did not want to continue working for Plaintiff and that the crew complained about Plaintiff \u201cseveral times a week.\u201d After speaking with his supervisors, Mr. Flickinger informed Mr. Lanier that, instead of being contractually obligated to work with Plaintiff, Timken was free to procure specific construction-related maintenance services from Crowder rather than Plaintiff. In addition, Mr. Flickinger told Mr. Lanier that he would like the crew to stay at the Asheboro plant regardless of whether they were employed by Plaintiff, Crowder, or some other company. After receiving this information, Crowder provided salary and benefits information to Mr. Lanier, submitted a proposal under which Crowder would perform work at Timken\u2019s Asheboro plant to Mr. Flickinger, and completed the documentation required for Crowder to become qualified to provide construction-related maintenance services at the Asheboro plant.\nBetween July and October of 2010, the crew had frequent discussions concerning their dissatisfaction with Plaintiff and the possibility that they might begin working for Crowder instead. On 23 August 2010, Mr. Richardson received an email from Caleb Rice, one of Plaintiff\u2019s safety managers, in which Mr. Rice stated that:\nI just wanted to send you guys a note reflecting on my visit with Steve Lanier at Timken Asheboro last week. ... I would regret not letting you know the concerns that Steve has voiced to me, and knowing Steve as a very honest and straightforward person, these are not idle threats. . . . Steve is looking at other contactors to work for in the Timken Asheboro plant, and right now the only thing stalling the change is which company will offer the best pay and benefits. First of all, Steve says that he does not want to change companies, he feels that they have been through enough without having to go through another change, but the crew up there will not continue working with all of these issues. The following are some of the issues that he has had over the last two months.....\nOn the following day, Mr. Richardson traveled to the Asheboro plant and met with Mr. Lanier, Mr. Flickinger, and the other members of the crew for the purpose of discussing issues that were of concern to the crew. However, the crew continued to be dissatisfied with their status as employees of Plaintiff.\nOn 27 September 2010, the members of the crew met with Tracy Moore to discuss working for Crowder. Although the benefits offered by Crowder were not as favorable as those already provided by Plaintiff, the entire crew decided to quit working for Plaintiff and to go to work for Crowder. As a result, on 7 October 2010, the crew traveled to Crowder\u2019s Spartanburg, South Carolina, office, where they completed job applications and were hired to work for Crowder beginning on 18 October 2010.\nThe crew was involved in moving a very large and complex machine during the following week. On 14 October 2010, which was a Thursday, they worked three hours overtime in order to make sure that the machine move had been sufficiently completed that a regular Timken employee or contractor could finish the job without a loss of production capability if something prevented the crew from returning on Monday as Crowder employees. After finishing work on 14 October 2010, Mr. Lanier called Mr. Richardson and informed him that he, Mr. McDaniel, Mr. Turner, and Mr. Moore were resigning. On the following Monday, 18 October 2010, Mr. Lanier and the other crew members returned to work at the Asheboro plant as Crowder employees.\nB. Procedural History\nOn 3 November 2010, Plaintiff filed a complaint in which it sought damages from both Defendants based on claims sounding in tortious interference with contractual relations, unfair or deceptive trade practices, and civil conspiracy and an additional claim against Mr. Lanier for breach of fiduciary duty. In addition, Plaintiff sought the issuance of a permanent injunction barring Crowder from providing construction-related maintenance services at the Asheboro plant. On 3 January 2011, Defendants filed separate answers in which they denied the material allegations of Plaintiff\u2019s complaint; asserted various affirmative defenses; sought dismissal of Plaintiff\u2019s complaint pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6); and requested an award of attorneys\u2019 fees. On 20 April 2011, Judge Richard D. Boner entered an order denying Defendants\u2019 dismissal motions and allowing Plaintiff\u2019s request to amend its complaint.\nOn 26 April 2011, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint in which it asserted the same claims that had been asserted in its original complaint. In essence, Plaintiff alleged that Defendants had \u201cknowingly conspired\u201d to \u201cimplement a predatory scheme\u201d by which the crew would resign \u201cen masse\u201d in \u201cthe middle of a critical machine move\u201d on 14 October 2010 and that, given that set of circumstances, Mr. Flickinger \u201chad no choice\u201d but to use Mr. Lanier\u2019s crew, in their capacity as Crowder employees, for needed construction-related maintenance services. On 1 June 2011, Defendants filed answers in which they denied the material allegations of the amended complaint, asserted various affirmative defenses, sought dismissal of Plaintiffs claims for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted, and requested an award of attorneys\u2019 fees.\nOn 2 September 2011, Defendants filed motions seeking the entry of summary judgment in their favor with respect to all of Plaintiff\u2019s claims. The trial court conducted a hearing for the purpose of addressing the issues raised by Defendants\u2019 summary judgment motions on 14 September 2011. On 2 November 2011, the trial court entered summary judgment orders in favor of Defendants with respect to all of the claims that had been asserted in the amended complaint. Plaintiff noted a timely appeal to this Court from the trial court\u2019s orders.\nII. Legal Analysis\nA. Standard of Review\nAn award of summary judgment is appropriate \u201cif the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that any party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 56(c). \u201cA party moving for summary judgment may prevail if it meets the burden (1) of proving an essential element of the opposing party\u2019s claim is nonexistent, or (2) of showing through discovery that the opposing party cannot produce evidence to support an essential element of his or her claim.\u201d Lowe v. Bradford, 305 N.C. 366, 369, 289 S.E.2d 363, 366 (1982) (citations omitted). \u201cThe party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.\u201d Liberty Mat. Ins. Co. v. Pennington, 356 N.C. 571, 579, 573 S.E.2d 118, 124 (2002) (citing DeWitt v. Eveready Battery Co., 355 N.C. 672, 681, 565 S.E.2d 140, 146 (2002)). However, \u201c[o]nce the party seeking summary judgment makes the required showing, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to produce a forecast of evidence demonstrating specific facts, as opposed to allegations, showing that he can at least establish a prima facie case at trial.\u201d Gaunt v. Pittaway, 139 N.C. App. 778, 784-85, 534 S.E.2d 660, 664, disc, review denied, 353 N.C. 262, 546 S.E.2d 401 (2000), cert, denied, 353 N.C. 371, 547 S.E.2d 810, cert, denied, 534 U.S. 950, 122 S. Ct. 345, 151 L. Ed. 2d 261 (2001).\n\u201cA genuine issue of material fact arises when \u2018the facts alleged . . . are of such nature as to affect the result of the action.\u2019 \u201d N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sadler, 365 N.C. 179, 182, 711 S.E.2d 114, 116 (2011) (quoting Kessing v. Mortgage Corp., 278 N.C. 523, 534, 180 S.E.2d 823, 830 (1971) (citation and quotation marks omitted)). \u201cOn a motion for summary judgment the court may consider evidence consisting of affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, documentary materials, facts which are subject to judicial notice, and any other materials which would be admissible in evidence at trial.\u201d Huss v. Huss, 31 N.C. App. 463, 466, 230 S.E.2d 159, 161-62 (1976) (citations omitted). \u201c \u2018When considering a motion for summary judgment, the trial judge must view the presented evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party.\u2019 \u201d In re Will of Jones, 362 N.C. 569, 573, 669 S.E.2d 572, 576 (2008) (quoting Dalton v. Camp, 353 N.C. 647, 651, 548 S.E.2d 704, 707 (2001)).\nThe \u201cstandard of review on appeal from summary judgment is whether there is any genuine issue of material fact and whether the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\u201d BruceTerminix Co. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 130 N.C. App. 729, 733, 504 S.E.2d 574, 577 (1998), mod. on other grounds, Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co. v. Buzz Off Insect Shield, L.L.C., 364 N.C. 1, 7, 692 S.E.2d 605, 611 (2010). A trial court\u2019s decision to grant a summary judgment motion is reviewed on a de novo basis. Va. Elec. & Power Co. v. Tillett, 80 N.C. App. 383, 385, 343 S.E.2d 188, 191, cert. denied, 317 N.C. 715, 347 S.E.2d 457 (1986). We will now utilize this standard of review for the purpose of analyzing the appropriateness of the trial court\u2019s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Defendants..\nB. Breach of Fiduciary Duty\nIn its first challenge to the trial court\u2019s order, Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of Mr. Lanier with respect to Plaintiff\u2019s breach of fiduciary duty claim. In support of this argument, Plaintiff asserts that the record discloses the existence of genuine issues of material fact regarding the extent to which Mr. Lanier owed a fiduciary duty to Plaintiff and whether he breached that duty. Plaintiff\u2019s argument lacks merit.\n\u201cFor a breach of fiduciary duty to exist, there must first be a fiduciary relationship between the parties. Such a relationship has been broadly defined by this Court as one in which \u2018there has been a special confidence reposed in one who in equity and good conscience is bound to act in good faith and with due regard to the interests of the one reposing confidence ... and in which there is confidence reposed on one side, and resulting domination and influence on the other.\u2019 \u201d Dalton, 353 N.C. at 651, 548 S.E.2d at 707-08 (citing Curl v. Key, 311 N.C. 259, 264, 316 S.E.2d 272, 275 (1984), and quoting Abbitt v. Gregory, 201 N.C. 577, 598, 160 S.E. 896, 906 (1931)). \u201c \u2018[I]n North Carolina . . . there are two types of fiduciary relationships: (1) those that arise from legal relations such as attorney and client, broker and client. . . partners, principal and agent, trustee and cestui que trust, and (2) those that exist as a fact, in which there is confidence reposed on one side, and the resulting superiority and influence on the other.\u2019 \u201d Ellison v. Alexander, 207 N.C. App 401, 408, 700 S.E.2d 102, 108 (2010) (quoting S.N.R. Mgmt. Corp. v. Danube Partners 141, LLC, 189 N.C. App. 601, 613, 659 S.E.2d 442, 451 (2008) (internal citation omitted).\nBusiness partners, for example, are each other\u2019s fiduciaries as a matter of law. In less clearly defined situations the question whether a fiduciary relationship exists is more open and depends ultimately on the circumstances. Courts have historically declined to offer a rigid definition of a fiduciary relationship in order to allow imposition of fiduciary duties where justified. Thus, the relationship can arise in a variety of circumstances . . . and may stem from varied and unpredictable factors.\nHajmm Co. v. House of Raeford Farms, 328 N.C. 578, 588, 403 S.E.2d 483, 489 (1991) (citing Casey v. Grantham, 239 N.C. 121, 124-25, 79 S.E.2d 735, 738 (1954) (other citation omitted).\nThe undisputed evidence tends to show that Mr. Lanier was the foreman of a crew that consisted of four men, including himself; that his job duties were confined to performing various tasks related to the provision of construction-related maintenance services; and that his employment was terminable at will by Plaintiff. Under that set of circumstances, we have no difficulty in concluding that Mr. Lanier did not occupy the type of fiduciary relationship with Plaintiff that'arises by operation of law, such as that inherent in an attorney-client relationship. As a result, the only way in which a fiduciary relationship between Plaintiff and Mr. Lanier could have existed would be if Plaintiff reposed trust and confidence in Mr. Lanier, resulting in a situation in which Mr. Lanier exercised \u201csuperiority and influence\u201d over Plaintiff.\nAlthough our appellate jurisprudence does not precisely define when a fiduciary relationship of this second type does or does not exist, \u201cthe broad parameters accorded the term have been specifically limited in the context of employment situations. Under the general rule, \u2018the relation of employer and employee is not one of those regarded as confidential.\u2019 \u201d Dalton, 353 N.C. at 651, 548 S.E.2d at 708 (quoting King v. R.R., 157 N.C. 44, 62-63, 72 S.E. 801, 808 (1911) (other citation omitted). As a result, in the absence of some unusual set of facts that would suffice to differentiate the relationship between Plaintiff and Mr. Lanier from other employer-employee relationships, Mr. Lanier did not have a fiduciary relationship with Plaintiff.\nAccording to the record, Plaintiff\u2019s corporate parent has over 7,000 employees and an annual income of approximately $300,000,000.00 to $500,000,000.00, of which Plaintiff\u2019s work at Timken\u2019s Asheboro plant generated approximately $2,000,000.00, or .04 percent to .06 percent. Of these 7,000 or so employees, only five were working at the Asheboro plant, which Plaintiff characterizes as a \u201cremote\u201d company site. As we have already noted, Mr. Lanier was an hourly, at-will employee charged with supervising a four-person crew. The record contains no evidence tending to show that Mr. Lanier played any role within Plaintiff\u2019s organization except for that of a foreman overseeing a crew performing construction-related maintenance services. In light of that set of facts, we conclude that any confidence that Plaintiff reposed in Mr. Lanier consisted of nothing more than relying on him to competently perform his assigned duties. Simply put, given that the record demonstrates that Mr. Lanier was a relatively small cog in a very large operation, we have no hesitation about concluding that Mr. Lanier exercised little or no control over Plaintiff\u2019s overall operations and that Mr. Lanier did not owe any fiduciary duties to Plaintiff.\nIn attempting to persuade us to reach a contrary conclusion, Plaintiff stresses the degree of responsibility and authority assigned to a foreman such as Mr. Lanier and argues that he had considerable responsibility for, and authority over, the other crew members. However, the fact that Mr. Lanier had responsibility for ensuring the proper performance of construction-related maintenance tasks assigned to his crew by Mr. Flickinger simply does not make him Plaintiff\u2019s fiduciary. As the Supreme Court observed in Dalton:\n. .. [T]he managerial duties of Camp were such that a certain level of confidence was reposed in him by Dalton; and (2) as a confidant of his employer, Camp was therefore bound to act in good faith and with due regard to the interests of Dalton. In our view, such circumstances, as shown here, merely serve to define the nature of virtually all employer-employee relationships; without more, they are inadequate to establish Camp\u2019s obligations as fiduciary in nature. No evidence suggests that his position in the workplace resulted in \u201cdomination and influence on the other [Dalton],\u201d an essential component of any fiduciary relationship. Camp was hired as an at-will employee to manage the production of a publication. . . . [H]is responsibilities were not unlike those of employees in other businesses and can hardly be construed as uniquely positioning him to exercise dominion over Dalton.\nDalton at 651-52, 548 S.E.2d at 708 (quoting Abbitt, 201 N.C. at 598, 160 S.E. at 906). Thus, for essentially the same reasons that underlie the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Dalton, we conclude that Mr. Lanier\u2019s status as the foreman of a four-person crew did not \u201cuniquely position\u201d him to exercise dominion over Plaintiff.\nWe have carefully considered Plaintiff\u2019s remaining arguments in support of its claim that Mr. Lanier breached his fiduciary duty owed to Plaintiff, and conclude that they lack merit as well. For example, Plaintiff contends that there are disputed issues of fact regarding the scope of Mr. Lanier\u2019s responsibilities and authority given Plaintiff\u2019s contention that Mr. Lanier \u201cparticipated in any discussions [with] plaintiff\u2019s officers concerning management level decisions or operations .of the company concerning cash flow, lines of credit, issuance of stock or debt and the like.\u201d However, the only evidentiary support that Plaintiff has offered for this argument is the fact that Mr. Lanier had supervisory responsibility for a four-person crew and that he reported to Mr. Richardson, one of Plaintiff\u2019s managers. The undisputed record evidence shows that Mr. Lanier only interacted with Mr. Richardson concerning matters affecting his four-person crew; nothing in the record suggests that Mr. Lanier was ever involved in making any \u201cmanagement level decisions\u201d as that term is ordinarily understood. Similarly, Plaintiff asserts that issues of fact regarding the extent to which Mr. Lanier owed a fiduciary duty to Plaintiff arise from language in the MSA spelling out Plaintiff\u2019s obligation to employ on-site supervisory personnel. However, the relevant language from the MSA, which has no binding effect unless Timken actually con-traded with Plaintiff to perform spedfic work at the Asheboro plant, provides no additional basis for conduding that Mr. Lanier had a fidudary relationship with Plaintiff. Moreover, Plaintiff argues that the fact that Mr. Lanier was an hourly at-will employee and had not been asked to sign a non-competition agreement or similar documents is \u201cimmaterial to whether [Plaintiff] reposed trust and confidence in [Mr.] Lanier resulting in [his] domination and influence on [Plaintiff] at the Timken Asheboro plant site.\u201d In view of the fact that the presence or absence of such agreements did shed light on the nature of the relationship between Plaintiff and Mr. Lanier, we believe that the trial court properly considered these factors in determining whether to grant summary judgment in favor of Mr. Lanier. As a result, none of Plaintiffs attempts to persuade us that there were genuine issues of material fact concerning the extent, if any, to which Mr. Lanier owed a fiduciary duty to Plaintiff have any merit.\nSimilarly, we are unable to agree with Plaintiffs contention that the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Sara Lee Corp. v. Carter, 351 N.C. 27, 519 S.E.2d 308, rehearing denied, 351 N.C. 191, 541 S.E.2d 716 (1999), supports its contention that Mr. Lanier breached a fiduciary-duty that he owed Plaintiff. In Sara Lee, the defendant\u2019s job description required him to provide the plaintiff \u201c \u2018with the best possible pricing, availability, and support of hardware and services.\u2019 \u201d In violation of this obligation, the defendant started his own company and \u201cengaged in self-dealing by supplying Sara Lee with computer parts and services at allegedly excessive cost while concealing his interest in these businesses.\u201d Sara Lee, 351 N.C. at 29, 519 S.E.2d at 309. On these facts, we upheld the trial court\u2019s conclusion \u201cthat defendant owed a fiduciary- duty to Sara Lee with respect to his role in recommending the purchase and ordering of computer parts and related services for Sara Lee and that defendant breached that fiduciary duty].]\u201d Sara Lee at 30, 519 S.E.2d at 310. However, the alleged breach of fiduciary duty at issue in Sara Lee is very different from the alleged breach of fiduciary duty at issue here. According to Plaintiff:\nThe record evidence establishing that the self-dealing [Mr.] Lanier was a fiduciary of [Plaintiff] is even stronger than that of the employee in Sara Lee. [Plaintiff] entrusted and authorized its Site Manager [Mr.] Lanier to interact with its valued customer Timken and to manage and supervise the other [Plaintiff] employees at the site. [Mr.] Lanier maintained and repaired unique machinery for [Plaintiff\u2019s] customer Timken. For [Plaintiffs] benefit he was supposed to maintain a strong relationship with [Mr.] Flickinger and provide other support as needed. . . . Instead, [Mr.] Lanier acted to benefit himself to the strong detriment of his employer, [Plaintiff].\nHowever, the record contains no evidence that Mr. Lanier failed to \u201cmanage and supervise the other [Plaintiff] employees at the site,\u201d to \u201cmaintain a strong relationship with [Mr.] Flickinger,\u201d to perform any other duty arising from his job description, or to refrain from engaging in self-dealing. On the contrary, the sole basis for Plaintiffs claim that Mr. Lanier engaged in \u201cself-dealing\u201d and acted \u201cto benefit himself to the strong detriment of his employer\u201d is the fact that Mr. Lanier resigned from his employment with Plaintiff in order to work for Crowder because he \u201cwas clearly not happy working for [Plaintiff]\u201d and saw a \u201cswitch to Crowder as being in his long-term best interests from a job satisfaction perspective.\u201d However, the fact that an at-will employee stops working for one employer, as the result of personal dissatisfaction with his existing position, and goes to work for another, who then takes over work that had previously been performed by the employee\u2019s original employer, is not consistent with any recognized definition of \u201cself-dealing,\u201d see Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1390 (8th ed. 2004) (defining self-dealing as \u201c[participation in a transaction that benefits oneself instead of another who is owed a fiduciary duty\u201d), and does not bear any significant resemblance to the . facts at issue in Sara Lee.\nIn addition, Plaintiff points out that the Supreme Court stated in Dalton that the defendant, although not a fiduciary, was \u201cbound to act in good faith and with due regard to the interests of\u2019 his employer. Similarly, Plaintiff argues that it \u201cplaced its trust and confidence in [Mr.] Lanier and that [he] used that trust, confidence and resulting power to dominate [Plaintiff] and [Plaintiff\u2019s] other employees and, surreptitiously, from the inside, stole away the very business he was supposed to service and safeguard for [Plaintiff].\u201d However, the record contains no evidence tending to show that Mr. Lanier had any responsibility, beyond the adequate performance of his job duties, for safeguarding Timken\u2019s decision to contract with Plaintiff, instead of some other entity, for the provision of construction-related maintenance services at the Asheboro plant. As a result, we do not believe that Plaintiff\u2019s argument in reliance upon Dalton has any merit.\nWe have carefully examined Plaintiff\u2019s factual contentions regarding the circumstances surrounding the resignation of Mr. Lanier and his co-workers from their employment with Plaintiff and Timken\u2019s decision to transfer construction maintenance service work from Plaintiff to Crowder and have concluded that these contentions lack adequate record support. For example, Plaintiff contends that Mr. Lanier \u201cleveraged the trust and confidence reposed in him by [Plaintiff] to pressure both [Plaintiff\u2019s] other employees and [Mr.] Flickinger into submitting to a conspiracy with Crowder to replace [Plaintiff] with Crowder at the Timken Asheboro plant site.\u201d In addition, Plaintiff repeatedly asserts that Mr. Lanier \u201cpressured\u201d his coworkers and Mr. Flickinger to work with Crowder instead of Plaintiff and contends that, in order to \u201cachieve his self-dealing goal, [Mr.] Lanier directed the crew to ... resign en masse from [Plaintiff] in the middle of a critical machine move.\u201d Finally, Plaintiff contends that Mr. Lanier \u201cfiltered and provided the information that he thought would best advance his self-dealing conspiracy with Crowder to steal the Timken business.\u201d\nAfter thoroughly reviewing the evidentiary materials that were submitted for the trial court\u2019s consideration, we find no evidence that Mr. Lanier \u201cpressured\u201d his crew to resign their employment with Plaintiff or to begin working for Crowder or that Plaintiff \u201cfiltered\u201d the information that they received prior to deciding to change employers. As we have already noted, each crew member testified that, even before learning of a possible position at Crowder, they were planning to leave Plaintiff\u2019s employment. None of the crew members testified that Mr. Lanier \u201cpressured\u201d them into resigning their employment with Plaintiff; in fact, the record is completely devoid of any evidence that Mr. Lanier suggested that the members of the crew should work for Crowder rather than Plaintiff. Similarly, there is no evidence that Mr. Lanier concealed or \u201cfiltered\u201d information in order to \u201cpressure\u201d his crew into leaving Plaintiff\u2019s employment. Although the record does reflect that Tracy Moore sent copies of Crowder\u2019s benefits package to Mr. Lanier for delivery to the members of the crew and subsequently met with the crew to answer any questions they might have, nothing in the record reflects that Mr. Lanier did anything to put pressure on his fellow crew members to leave their employment with Plaintiff and to begin working with Crowder.\nSimilarly, we find no indication that Mr. Lanier \u201cpressured\u201d Mr. Flickinger into using Crowder rather than Plaintiff for the purpose of providing construction-related maintenance services at the Asheboro plant. Mr. Flickinger testified that he had worked with Mr. Lanier for over ten years, that \u201c[Mr. Lanier\u2019s] work is always top-notch,\u201d and that, \u201c[p]ersonally[,] I think he\u2019s [] very honest[.]\u201d During the four months that Mr. Lanier worked for Plaintiff at Timken\u2019s Asheboro plant, he and his crew did a good job and were \u201cvery conscientious\u201d about safety .regulations. After the crew began to have problems with Plaintiff, Mr. Flickinger consulted with Timken\u2019s management about changing construction-related maintenance providers and learned that he had no contractual obligation to continue using Plaintiffs services. When Mr. Lanier spoke with Mr. Flickinger about the possibility that Crowder would assume responsibility for performing construction-related maintenance work at the Asheboro plant, Mr. Flickinger indicated that he was open to a proposal from Crowder. In fact, Mr. Flickinger testified that he intended to continue working with Mr. Lanier\u2019s crew regardless of whether they were employed by Plaintiff, Crowder, or some other company. Simply put, nothing in the present record in any way tends to show that Mr. Flickinger\u2019s preference for working with Mr. Lanier\u2019s crew had any source other than his satisfaction with the quality of their work.\nIn addition, although Plaintiff argues that the crew timed its resignation from Plaintiff\u2019s employment in such a way as to force Mr. Flickinger\u2019s hand \u201cby scheduling the . . . crew\u2019s en masse resignation in the middle of a planned critical machine move,\u201d the record simply does not support this assertion. Instead, the undisputed evidence in the record indicates that Mr. Lanier\u2019s crew worked several hours overtime on 14 October 2010 for the sole purpose of preventing any production delays in the event that the crew was unable to return to the Asheboro plant on the following Monday as employees of Crowder. In essence, Mr. Flickinger testified that, when Mr. Lanier left on 14 October 2010, the work being done on the machine had reached \u201ca point it would be operational so if no one was there Monday . . . we could continue operations;\u201d that the crew \u201cfinished the work that the mechanical contractor would have needed to that day, so if no one showed up Monday, we could have continued to work with our associates and made product;\u201d and that, when the members of the crew resigned from Plaintiffs employment, their part in the machine move was essentially \u201ccomplete.\u201d Similarly, Mr. Lanier testified that the crew worked on 14 October 2010 in order to \u201cget that machine back where somebody could finish it if something happened.\u201d As a result, we conclude that there is no record support for Plaintiff\u2019s contention that Mr. Flickinger was forced to stop using Plaintiff for the provision of construction maintenance services based upon pressure from Mr. Lanier, the timing of the crew\u2019s resignation, or any other similar factor.\nPlaintiff also asserts that Mr. Lanier acted \u201csecretly\u201d and that he \u201csecretly recruited the entire work force and betrayed [Plaintiff] in persuading [Mr.] Flickinger to switch to the company that best suited him, to the detriment of [Plaintiff].\u201d A careful examination of the record reveals no indication that Mr. Lanier or his crew made any effort to hide their dissatisfaction with Plaintiff. Mr. Lanier discussed the crew\u2019s complaints with Mr. Flickinger, who testified that, every time Mr. Richardson visited the plant, \u201c[he] would tell him, the guys aren\u2019t happy, you need to try to help[.]\u201d In addition, the record reflects that Mr. Rice met with Mr. Lanier in mid-August 2010 and, at Mr. Lanier\u2019s request, informed Plaintiff of the crew\u2019s dissatisfaction. On 23 August 2010, Mr. Rice sent Mr. Richardson an email that specifically informed him that Mr. Lanier was \u201clooking at other contactors, to work for in the Timken Asheboro plant, and right now the only thing stalling the change is which company will offer the best pay and benefits.\u201d The fact that Mr. Richardson claims not to have noticed this portion of the email does not in any way detract from the fact that it was sent. As a result, the record contains no indication that Mr. Lanier acted secretly.\nIn addition, such an allegation, even if proven, would not necessarily constitute evidence of wrongdoing. Plaintiff has not cited any authority tending to suggest that Mr. Lanier had an obligation to keep Plaintiff apprised of his desire to quit, his discussions with co-workers about changing jobs, or his negotiations with Crowder. \u201cIn North Carolina, \u2018in the absence of an employment contract for a definite period, both employer and employee are generally free to terminate their association at any time and without any reason.\u2019 \u201d Elliott v. Enka-Candler Fire and Rescue, _ N.C. App _, _, 713 S.E.2d 132, 135 (2011) (quoting Salt v. Applied Analytical, Inc., 104 N.C. App. 652, 655, 412 S.E.2d 97, 99 (1991), cert. denied, 331 N.C. 119, 415 S.E.2d 200 (1992)) (other citations omitted). As the Supreme Court has recognized, \u201c[t]o restrict an employer\u2019s right to entice employees, bound only by terminable at will contracts, from their positions with a competitor or to restrict where those employees may be put to work once they accept new employment savors strongly of oppression.\u201d Peoples Security Life Ins. Co. v. Hooks, 322 N.C. 216, 222-23, 367 S.E.2d 647, 651, rehearing denied, 322 N.C. 486, 370 S.E.2d 227 (1988) (citation omitted). As a result, for all of these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of Mr. Lanier with respect to Plaintiffs breach of fiduciary duty claim.\nC. Tortious Interference with Contract\nSecondly, Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants with respect to Plaintiff\u2019s tortious interference with contract claim. In support of this contention, Plaintiff contends that the record reflects the existence of a genuine issue of fact concerning the extent to which \u201cDefendants conspired to pressure [Mr.] Flickinger not to perform the MSA with Austin and to hire Crowder instead\u201d and to which \u201cDefendants acted without justification.\u201d Once again, we conclude that Plaintiff\u2019s arguments lack merit.\n\u201cThe tort of interference with contract has five elements: (1) a valid contract between the plaintiff and a third person which confers upon the plaintiff a contractual right against a third person; (2) the defendant knows of the contract; (3) the defendant intentionally induces the third person not to perform the contract; (4) and in doing so acts without justification; (5) resulting in actual damage to the plaintiff.\u201d United Laboratories, Inc. v. Kuykendall, 322 N.C. 643, 661, 370 S.E.2d 375, 387 (1988) (citing Childress v. Abeles, 240 N.C. 667, 674 84 S.E. 2d 176, 182-83 (1954)). A careful study of the record compels the conclusion that Plaintiff has failed to forecast evidence tending to show the existence of the first element required to establish a tortious interference with contract claim.\nAs we have already noted, the MSA sets out the terms and conditions under which Plaintiff and Timken agreed to do business. \u201cIt is common practice for companies and contractors to enter into master service agreements, the specific terms of which govern future work performed by the contractor pursuant to individual work orders or authorizations.\u201d John E. Graham & Sons v. Brewer (In re John E. Graham & Sons), 210 F.3d 333, 341, rehearing denied, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 15071 (5th Cir. La. May 22, 2000). \u201cTypically, they first sign a \u2018blanket contract\u2019 that may remain in place for an extended period of time. Later, they issue work orders for the performance of specific work, which usually incorporate[] the terms of the blanket contract.\u201d Grand Isle Shipyard Inc. v. Seacor Marine, LLC, 589 F.3d 778, 787 n.6 (5th Cir. La. 2009), cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 130 S. Ct. 3386, 177 L. Ed. 2d 302 (2010). \u201cA master service agreement contemplates as yet unspecified and wholly contingent performance in the future. The agreement standing alone obligates neither party to perform any services. The issuance of a specific work order triggers the obligation to perform.\" Burnham v. Sun Oil Co., 618 F. Supp. 782, 785-86 (W.D. La. 1985).\nConsistently with the pattern outlined above, the MSA defines Timken as the \u201cBuyer\u201d and Plaintiff (standing in Sanders Brothers\u2019 shoes) as the \u201cContractor,\u201d provides for a seven year term, and defines a \u201cPurchase Order\u201d as the \u201cdocument or electronic notification through which Service(s) and/or Merchandise shall be requested by Buyer.\u201d The MSA \u201cshall be incorporated into and made a part of each Buyer\u2019s Purchase Order issued to Contractor, whether or not expressly incorporated by reference in the Purchase Order,\u201d and, \u201ctogether with ... Purchase Order(s) ... and other documents specifically incorporated by reference ...[,] comprise the entire agreement between the parties.\u201d The MSA does not include an agreement by Timken or Plaintiff to enter into any particular number of contracts for the provision of construction-related maintenance services; instead, the MSA expressly states that \u201cContractor acknowledges that this Agreement is not a commitment by Buyer to purchase any Service(s) and/or Merchandise from Contractor on an exclusive basis or otherwise.\u201d As a result, we conclude that the MSA does not obligate Timken to enter into any Purchase Orders with Plaintiff, a fact which requires a finding that Timken\u2019s decision to award specific construction-related maintenance service contracts to Crowder did not breach the MSA.\nIn seeking to persuade us that the record did, in fact, reflect the existence of a genuine issue of material fact with respect to this issue, Plaintiff relies solely on Mr. Richardson\u2019s testimony concerning the existence of \u201cverbal agreements\u201d that were allegedly entered into outside the scope of the MSA. The. principal problem with this argument is that the MSA contains a merger clause which clearly provides that the MSA, taken in conjunction with other pertinent written documents, constitutes the entire agreement between the parties. In addition, Plaintiff directs our attention to Mr. Richardson\u2019s belief that the provision to the effect that the MSA \u201cis not a commitment by Buyer to purchase any Service(s) and/or Merchandise from Contractor on an exclusive basis or otherwise\u201d should be understood to mean that Timken was obligated to contract with Plaintiff for the provision of construction-related maintenance services while retaining the ability to employ specialty contractors as necessary. This \u201cinterpretation\u201d is, however, contrary to the literal language of the relevant MSA provision, so we decline to adopt it.\nIn addition, Plaintiff disputes Defendants\u2019 contention that the MSA does not require Timken to obtain construction-related maintenance services exclusively from Plaintiff. This aspect of Plaintiff\u2019s argument rests upon Article 36 of the MSA, which states that \u201c[t]he Contractor agrees to supply the listed Services and/or Merchandise to all Buyers, and Buyer\u2019s subsidiaries\u2019 facilities, including but not limited to\u201d Timken bearing and alloy steel plants located in certain specified states. This provision, which simply specifies the geographical scope of the agreement, does not operate to override the remainder of the agreement, which clearly requires separate Purchase Orders in the event that Timken wished Plaintiff to perform any specific service. Moreover, although Article 36 obligates Plaintiff to supply construction-related maintenance services to a list of locations, it does not obligate Timken to contract for these services at any of those locations. Thus, this aspect of Plaintiff\u2019s argument fails as well.\nAs a result, in light of our review of the MSA, we conclude that (1) the MSA does not require Timken to contract with Plaintiff for provision of construction maintenance services, either at its Asheboro plant or elsewhere; (2) the MSA does not confer any specific contractual rights upon Plaintiff until Timken and Plaintiff executed a Purchase Order which required Plaintiff to provide specific construction maintenance services; and (3), as Mr. Richardson conceded during his deposition, Timken did not breach the MSA by beginning to use Crowder, rather than Plaintiff, to perform construction maintenance services at Timken\u2019s Asheboro plant. As a result, given that the MSA conferred no contractual rights on Plaintiff until the execution of a specific Purchase Order and given that Plaintiff failed to adduce any evidence that Timken failed to perform any of its obligations under the MSA, we conclude that Plaintiff failed to produce evidence that the MSA \u201cconfers upon the plaintiff a contractual right against a third person.\u201d United, Laboratories, 322 N.C. at 661, 370 S.E.2d at 387. Thus, the .trial court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants with respect to Plaintiff\u2019s tortious interference with contract claim.\nD. Unfair or Deceptive Trade Practices\nThirdly, Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants with respect to its unfair or deceptive trade practices claim. In support of this contention, Plaintiff argues that Defendants \u201cinterrupted the commercial relationship between Austin and Timken,\u201d that \u201ctheir actions of hiring away the entire work force and inducing non-performance of the Austin/Timken MSA by Timken\u201d constituted unfair and deceptive trade practices, and that Mr. Lanier \u201csurreptitiously raided the entire Austin workforce to his and Crowder\u2019s benefit and to the clear detriment of Austin.\u201d We do not find Plaintiff\u2019s arguments persuasive.\n\u201cThe extent of trade practices deemed as unfair and deceptive is summarized in [N.C. Gen. Stat.] \u00a7 75-1.1(a) (\u2018the Act\u2019), which . . . was intended to benefit consumersf.] . . . [T]he Act does not normally extend to run-of-the-mill employment disputes [, unless] ... an employee\u2019s conduct: (1) involved egregious activities outside the scope of his assigned employment duties, and (2) otherwise qualified as unfair or deceptive practices that were in or affecting commerce.\u201d Dalton, 353 N.C. at 655-56, 548 S.E.2d at 710-11 (citing Pearce v. American Defender Life Ins. Co., 316 N.C. 461, 469, 343 S.E.2d 174, 179 (1986), HAJMM Co., 328 N.C. at 593, 403 S.E.2d at 492, and Sara Lee, 351 N.C. at 34, 519 S.E.2d at 312). For example, in Dalton, 353 N.C. at 658, 548 S.E.2d at 712, in which the defendant formed a company for the purpose of competing with his employer before resigning and then obtaining the contract previously held by his employer, the Supreme Court held:\nThat [the defendant] failed to inform his employer of the ongoing negotiations and resigned after signing the KFI deal may be an unfortunate circumstance; however, in our view, such business-related conduct, without more, is neither unlawful in itself. . . . nor aggravating or egregious enough to overcome the longstanding presumption against unfair and deceptive practices claims as between employers and employees.\nSimilarly, in this case, the undisputed evidence showed that (1) by July or August, 2010, before they were provided with information concerning Crowder, Mr. Lanier and the crew working with him had each made the independent decision to look for a new employer; (2) Mr. Lanier discussed the crew\u2019s complaints with Mr. Flickinger and Mr. Richardson; (3) at Mr. Lanier\u2019s request, Mr. Rice informed Mr. Richardson that the crew was looking for a company to replace Plaintiff at Timken\u2019s Asheboro plant; and (4) the crew decided to work for Crowder despite a reduction in the level of their employer-provided benefits. As a result, we conclude that the record fails to support Plaintiff\u2019s assertion that Defendants \u201csurreptitiously raided\u201d Plaintiff\u2019s workforce and that neither the decision by Mr. Lanier and his crew members to become Crowder employees nor the manner in which Crowder obtained the right to perform construction-related maintenance work previously performed by Plaintiff supported a finding of liability under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 75-1.1.\nIn urging us to reach a contrary result, Plaintiff cites Sunbelt Rentals, Inc. v. Head, & Engquist Equip., L.L.C., 174 N.C. App. 49, 620 S.E.2d 222 (2005), disc, review dismissed, 360 N.C. 296, 629 S.E.2d 289 (2006). According to Plaintiff, Sunbelt \u201cexpressly prohibits as an unfair trade practice the surreptitious and intentional use of employees to solicit other employees while both the soliciting and solicited employees are still employed by the same company.\u201d Aside from the fact that we do not read Sunbelt as enunciating a per se rule of the nature described by Plaintiff and the fact that Sunbelt is readily distinguishable from this case on a factual basis, the record does not contain any evidence tending to show that Defendants engaged in \u201cthe surreptitious and intentional use of employees to solicit other employees.\u201d\nIn Sunbelt, the president and other key executives of a corporation resigned in order to work for a competitor. Subsequently, they secretly recruited more than seventy key managerial employees at various locations to join them. The result of this series of activities was that the plaintiff\u2019s \u201cbranches were severely impacted, or \u2018crippled,\u2019 to the point [that the plaintiff\u2019s] opportunity and ability to compete for key employees on a level playing field was completely eliminated.\u201d Sunbelt, 174 N.C. App at 51, 60, 620 S.E.2d at 225, 230. In addition, the defendants misappropriated trade secrets by sharing certain confidential information with this competitor. On the other hand, in this case a four-man work crew, all of whom were at-will employees responsible for performing construction-related maintenance services, became dissatisfied with Plaintiff and left to work for a different company. Aside from the fact that the resignation of these four men from an organization employing over 7,000 employees differs dramatically from the situation at issue in Sunbelt, the record does not establish that the events in question involved the disclosure of confidential information, had significant impact on Plaintiffs financial situation, or caused damage to Plaintiffs competitive position. Thus, we do not believe that Sunbelt has any significant bearing on the proper resolution of this case.\nIn addition, Plaintiff cites Songwooyarn Trading Co. v. Sox Eleven, _ N.C. App _, 714 S.E.2d 162, disc. review denied, 365 N.C. 360, 718 S.E.2d 396 (2011), in support of its attempt to establish the validity of its unfair or deceptive trade practices claim. In Songwooyam, the defendant misappropriated funds belonging to his employer and secretly diverted monies that were supposed to be paid to one of his employer\u2019s corporate affiliates for his own use. On appeal, we upheld the trial court\u2019s decision to direct a verdict in favor of the plaintiff with respect to its unfair and deceptive trade practices claim. Songwooyam is easily distinguished from the facts of the present case and does not control its outcome.\nAlthough Plaintiff\u2019s unfair and deceptive trade practices claim rests on allegations that Defendants \u201csecretly pressured\u201d Plaintiff\u2019s employees to change jobs, thereby \u201cinduc[ing]\u201d Timken to breach the MSA, the record does not, as we have already demonstrated, support these assertions. As a result, none of the arguments upon which Plaintiff relies in challenging the trial court\u2019s decision to grant summary judgment in Defendants\u2019 favor with respect to Plaintiff\u2019s unfair and deceptive trade practices claim have merit.\nE. Civil Conspiracy and Injunctive Relief\nFinally, Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants with respect to its civil conspiracy claim and its request for injunctive relief. Plaintiff has not, however, advanced any specific arguments directed in opposition to the trial court\u2019s rulings with respect to these claims. Instead, Plaintiff simply asserts that, \u201c[f]or the reasons discussed\u201d in addressing its other challenges to the trial court\u2019s rulings, the trial court erred by granting summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff\u2019s civil conspiracy claim and by denying Plaintiff\u2019s request for the issuance of a permanent injunction. Having already considered and rejected these arguments, we necessarily conclude that the trial court did not err by granting summary judgment in Defendants\u2019 favor with respect to Plaintiff\u2019s civil conspiracy claim and rejecting its request for injunctive relief.\nTIT. Conclusion\nThus, for the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the trial court did not err by entering orders granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants and denying Plaintiffs request for the issuance of a permanent injunction. As a result, the trial court\u2019s orders should be, and hereby are, affirmed.\nAFFIRMED.\nJudges McGEE and STEELMAN concur.\n. Mr. Lanier\u2019s crew originally included a janitor named Juan Estrada. However, Crowder did not hire Mr. Estrada because of questions about his immigration status. As a result, all references to Mr. Lanier\u2019s crew throughout the remainder of this opinion should be understood as encompassing only the four individuals named in the text.\n. Although Plaintiff makes much of allegedly unsupported \u201cfindings\u201d of undisputed fact in the trial court\u2019s order, we need not address its specific complaints about these \u201cfindings\u201d given that we have been able, based on our own review of the record, to determine what the undisputed record evidence tends to show.\n. Mr. Richardson testified that he had no personal knowledge of the status of the machine move as of 14 October 2010.\n. Plaintiff does not assert that Timken violated any specific Purchase Order as a result of Defendants\u2019 conduct. Instead, Plaintiff\u2019s tortious interference claim relies solely on alleged violations of the MSA.", "type": "majority", "author": "ERVIN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Moye, O\u2019Brien, O\u2019Rourke, Pickert & Dillon, LLP, by J. Andrew Williams, Stephen W. Pickert, and Peter C. Anderson, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Erwin, Bishop, Capitano & Moss, P.A., by Joseph W. Moss, Jr., for defendant-appellee Steve Lanier.", "Johnston, Allison & Hord, P.A., by Michael L. Wilson and Kerry L. Traynum, for defendant-appellee Crowder Construction Company." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "AUSTIN MAINTENANCE & CONSTRUCTION, INC., Plaintiff v. CROWDER CONSTRUCTION COMPANY and STEVE LANIER, Defendants\nNo. COA12-201\nFiled 18 December 2012\n1. Fiduciary Relationship \u2014 breach of fiduciary duty\u2014 employer-employee relationship \u2014 no exercise of dominion\nThe trial court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of defendant Lanier with respect to plaintiffs breach of fiduciary duty claim. There was no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether defendant Lanier owed a fiduciary duty to plaintiff as a result of their employer-employee relationship as defendant Lanier\u2019s status as the foreman of a four-person crew did not \u201cuniquely position\u201d him to exercise dominion over plaintiff.\n2. Contracts \u2014 tortious interference with contract \u2014 existence of valid contract\nThe trial court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of defendants with respect to plaintiff\u2019s tortious interference with contract claim. Plaintiff failed to forecast evidence tending to show the existence of a valid contract between plaintiff and a third person which conferred upon plaintiff a contractual right against a third person, the first element required to establish a tortious interference with contract claim.\n3. Unfair Trade Practices \u2014 workforce not surreptitiously raided \u2014 arguments meritless\nThe trial court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of defendants with respect to its unfair or deceptive trade practices claim. The record failed to support plaintiff\u2019s assertion that defendants \u201csurreptitiously raided\u201d plaintiff\u2019s workforce and plaintiff\u2019s remaining arguments were meritless.\n4. Conspiracy \u2014 civil conspiracy \u2014 injunctive relief\nThe trial court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of defendants with respect to its civil conspiracy claim and its request for injunctive relief. Having already considered and rejected the arguments upon which plaintiff based these claims, plaintiff\u2019s argument was meritless.\nAppeal by plaintiff from judgments entered 2 November 2011 by Judge Calvin E. Murphy in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 14 August 2012.\nMoye, O\u2019Brien, O\u2019Rourke, Pickert & Dillon, LLP, by J. Andrew Williams, Stephen W. Pickert, and Peter C. Anderson, for plaintiff-appellant.\nErwin, Bishop, Capitano & Moss, P.A., by Joseph W. Moss, Jr., for defendant-appellee Steve Lanier.\nJohnston, Allison & Hord, P.A., by Michael L. Wilson and Kerry L. Traynum, for defendant-appellee Crowder Construction Company." }, "file_name": "0401-01", "first_page_order": 411, "last_page_order": 433 }