{ "id": 4115308, "name": "GROVER FRANKLIN MINOR and CAROLEEN W. MINOR, Plaintiffs v. SANDRA ANN MINOR, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Minor v. Minor", "decision_date": "2012-12-18", "docket_number": "No. COA12-693", "first_page": "471", "last_page": "478", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "224 N.C. App. 471" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "660 S.E.2d 550", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640919 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "559", "parenthetical": "quoting Liborio v. King, 150 N.C. App. 531, 534, 564 S.E.2d 272, 274 (2002)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/660/0550-01" ] }, { "cite": "538 N.Y.S.2d 380", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "381" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "816 N.Y.S.2d 453", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.2d", "case_ids": [ 3649609 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "454", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ad3d/30/0197-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-40", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2011, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "150 S.E. 13", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1929, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "14" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "197 N.C. 574", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8630426 ], "year": 1929, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "576" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/197/0574-01" ] }, { "cite": "314 S.E.2d 129", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "131", "parenthetical": "\"Mere use, standing alone, is presumed to be permissive, particularly use by members of a family living as neighbors as in this case.\" (internal citation omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "68 N.C. App. 46", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526644 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "50", "parenthetical": "\"Mere use, standing alone, is presumed to be permissive, particularly use by members of a family living as neighbors as in this case.\" (internal citation omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/68/0046-01" ] }, { "cite": "145 S.E.2d 873", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "875" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "266 N.C. 257", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560153 ], "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "261" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/266/0257-01" ] }, { "cite": "548 S.E.2d 171", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "176" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "143 N.C. App. 656", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11436756 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "663" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/143/0656-01" ] }, { "cite": "713 S.E.2d 566", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "571", "parenthetical": "quoting Merrick v. Peterson, 143 N.C. App. 656, 663, 548 S.E.2d 171, 176 (2001)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "560 S.E.2d 841", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "847" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 N.C. App. 152", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9125989 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "160" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/149/0152-01" ] }, { "cite": "564 S.E.2d 272", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "274" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "150 N.C. App. 531", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9081951 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "534" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/150/0531-01" ] }, { "cite": "190 N.C. App. 233", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4158036 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "243", "parenthetical": "quoting Liborio v. King, 150 N.C. App. 531, 534, 564 S.E.2d 272, 274 (2002)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/190/0233-01" ] }, { "cite": "650 S.E.2d 819", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639480 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "821", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/650/0819-01" ] }, { "cite": "140 S.E.2d 738", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "740" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "264 N.C. 58", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570521 ], "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "61" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/264/0058-01" ] }, { "cite": "74 S.E. 347", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1912, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "348", "parenthetical": "\"The possession must ... be shown by known and visible boundaries.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "159 N.C. 236", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8657880 ], "year": 1912, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "238", "parenthetical": "\"The possession must ... be shown by known and visible boundaries.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/159/0236-01" ] }, { "cite": "61 S.E.2d 82", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "83", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "232 N.C. 371", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8601750 ], "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "373", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/232/0371-01" ] }, { "cite": "677 S.E.2d 452", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 364", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4151783 ], "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/363/0364-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 N.C. App. 167", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8155241 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "169", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/186/0167-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 844, "char_count": 18338, "ocr_confidence": 0.753, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.13174300895534835 }, "sha256": "d3f462a12dfe6fcd0f1737c791296cbec1e25c0308ba7bd625fef918300a8c63", "simhash": "1:874c44123f0eb6dc", "word_count": 3039 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:14:41.206072+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge STROUD concurs in result only.", "Judge ELMORE dissents." ], "parties": [ "GROVER FRANKLIN MINOR and CAROLEEN W. MINOR, Plaintiffs v. SANDRA ANN MINOR, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BEASLEY, Judge.\nSandra Ann Minor (Defendant) appeals from judgment entered pursuant to a jury verdict declaring Grover and Caroleen Minor (collectively, Plaintiffs) to be the lawful owners of the property located at 7949 Valley Falls Road (the property). Defendant also appeals from an order denying her motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a new trial. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.\nDefendant is Plaintiffs\u2019 ex-daughter-in-law. Grover Minor (Grover) and his father bought the property as part of a larger tract of land in 1971. They subdivided the land in 1972, making Plaintiffs the record owners of the disputed property. Grover and his son, Tyson Minor (Tyson), built a log cabin on the land in mid-1970s. Tyson and Defendant married in 1980. iy and Defendant began living in the cabin between 1984 and 1986. Defendant testified that she thought the cabin was her husband\u2019s property. Defendant believed she owned the land based on what Grover had said to her about inheriting the property if Tyson died. She did not ask permission to live there or make improvements. Around Christmas of 1985, she testified to telling the family that the property was hers and Tyson\u2019s property. On cross-examination when she was asked whether she lived at the cabin with her husband\u2019s permission, she answered that they lived together and she let him live there too. She claimed to be the owner of the property, having assumed her name was on the deed.\nGrover testified that he gave Tyson permission to live in the cabin. Grover stated that Defendant had permission to live there since she was Tyson\u2019s wife. Grover pledged the property as collateral on a deed of trust for a loan so that Tyson and Defendant could make improvements to the property. Tyson and Defendant made the payments on the loan, but Grover signed the promissory note.\nTyson paid a leasehold tax in exchange for living on the property, and Plaintiffs paid the real estate taxes, according to Grover\u2019s and Tyson\u2019s testimonies. Plaintiffs\u2019 exhibit shows that leasehold taxes, rather than real property taxes, were paid on the property from 1985 to 2006. The exhibit also includes a 1988 check for the amount due signed by Defendant. Defendant admitted that she wrote the check. She thought she was paying the taxes she and Tyson owed on the property.\nThere was never a doubt in Tyson\u2019s mind that his father owned the property. Tyson never heard Defendant say she owned the property. Tyson testified that Defendant did not like Caroleen Minor making statements in public that Defendant and Tyson lived on her and Grover\u2019s property because it made it seem like they did not own it. Tyson told Grover about several of the improvements they were going to make on the property. He did not explicitly ask for permission, but he would let Grover know their plans and Grover did not stop them. He took it as permission to make the improvements. If Grover had said no, he would not have been able to make those improvements.\nDefendant and Tyson lived together on the property continuously from 1984 until they separated around 2001. At that time, Tyson moved off of the property. After the separation, Grover testified that he allowed Defendant to continue living there since she was still legally their daughter-in-law and asked her to leave in 2008 when she and Tyson began the divorce process.\nPlaintiffs filed a complaint in Guilford County District Court on 27 January 2010. Plaintiffs obtained a judgment for summary ejectment in small claims court on 16 March 2010. Defendant appealed to district court on 25 March 2010 and filed a counterclaim to quiet title by way of adverse possession on 23 April 2010. The issue of adverse possession came on for jury trial on 18 July 2011. Defendant took the posture of the plaintiff during trial.\nDefendant requested an instruction that Defendant could acquire title to less than the entire tract of land. The trial court denied the request.\nOn 20 July 2011, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiffs, finding that Defendant\u2019s possession of the property was not actual, open and notorious under known and visible boundaries, and uninterrupted for twenty years. The jury found that Defendant\u2019s possession of the property was exclusive and hostile to Plaintiffs, but the verdict sheet does not indicate when this exclusive and hostile possession began. Defendant filed motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a new trial on 29 July 2011, both of which were denied 23 September 2011. Defendant now appeals.\nDefendant argues that the trial court erred in denying her request for an instruction on acquiring title to less than the entire tract. We disagree. Defendant has failed to show that the jury was misled or that the verdict was affected by the trial court\u2019s failure to give the instruction. Any error in failing to so instruct the jury is harmless in light of the insufficiency of the evidence as to the hostility and duration of Defendant\u2019s possession.\nA specific jury instruction should be given when \u201c(1) the requested instruction was a correct statement of law and (2) was supported by the evidence, and that (3) the instruction given, considered in its entirety, failed to encompass the substance of the law requested and (4) such failure likely misled the jury.\u201d\nOutlaw v. Johnson, 190 N.C. App. 233, 243, 660 S.E.2d 550, 559 (2008) (quoting Liborio v. King, 150 N.C. App. 531, 534, 564 S.E.2d 272, 274 (2002)). \u201cThe party asserting error bears the burden of showing that the jury was misled or that the verdict was affected by an omitted instruction.\u201d Bass v. Johnson, 149 N.C. App. 152, 160, 560 S.E.2d 841, 847 (2002).\n\u201cIn North Carolina, to acquire title to land by adverse possession, the claimant must \u2018show actual, open, hostile, exclusive, and continuous possession of the land claimed for the prescriptive period ... under known and visible lines and boundaries.\u2019 \u201d Rushing v. Aldridge, _ N.C. App. _, _, 713 S.E.2d 566, 571 (2011)(quoting Merrick v. Peterson, 143 N.C. App. 656, 663, 548 S.E.2d 171, 176 (2001)). The evidence in this case demonstrates that Plaintiff\u2019s possession was permissive and failed to satisfy the prescriptive period.\n\u201cA \u2018hostile\u2019 use is simply a use of such nature and exercised under such circumstances as to manifest and give notice that the use is being made under claim of right.\u201d Dulin v. Faires, 266 N.C. 257, 261, 145 S.E.2d 873, 875 (1966). North Carolina presumes permissive use, and the presumption is stronger when the parties are related. Amos\nv. Bateman, 68 N.C. App. 46, 50, 314 S.E.2d 129, 131 (1984)(\u201cMere use, standing alone, is presumed to be permissive, particularly use by members of a family living as neighbors as in this case.\u201d (internal citation omitted)). In cases of adverse possession by a tenant as against the landlord, the lease must end before the use becomes adverse to the landlord. See Pitman v. Hunt, 197 N.C. 574, 576, 150 S.E. 13, 14 (1929). The statutory period to acquire title by adverse possession without color of title is twenty years. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-40 (2011).\nA New York case speaks to the unique facts presented here. The New York Appellate Division, in considering whether the occupant of a co-operative apartment was likely to prevail on the merits of her adverse possession claim such that the court should issue an injunction, held as follows:\nWhile plaintiff and Malone, whose spouses were siblings, may not be related to each other in any conventional sense, any presumption of hostility to which plaintiff is entitled by reason of the fact that her occupancy was open, continuous and uninterrupted for at least 10 years is rebutted by the fact that she was the prior owner\u2019s daughter-in-law, and that her occupancy of the apartment from 1984 to 1995 [the time period corresponding to her marriage] was apparently with his permission. Moreover, even if such an in-law relationship is not by itself sufficient to rebut the presumption of hostility, taking possession of property by reason of cohabiting with a spouse is not a taking under a claim of right, also a necessary element of adverse possession. It does not avail plaintiff that she may have believed that her husband owned the apartment.\nSugarman v. Malone, 816 N.Y.S.2d 453, 454 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (internal citations omitted).\nHere, Defendant\u2019s possession is presumed permissive, and she failed to rebut that presumption and demonstrate that her possession was hostile, for twenty years. Defendant lived on the property with Plaintiffs\u2019 permission and merely paid a leasehold interest on the property. Defendant\u2019s lease on the property and permissive use ended only in 2008 when Plaintiffs sued for summary ejectment; thus, any hostile use of the property began only in 2008, well short of the statutory period of twenty years. Further, Tyson gave unequivocal testimony that he never thought he owned the property. \u201cCohabiting with a spouse is not a taking under a claim of right,\u201d as noted by the Sugarman court. Id. Her right to be on the property was derivative of Tyson\u2019s; she could have no more right to the cabin by adverse possession than he did. If Defendant and Tyson had not divorced, Defendant could not sue to quiet title as against Plaintiffs where Tyson did not have the state of mind to claim the property as his own. Defendant has failed to demonstrate to this Court that the verdict was affected or that the jury was misled when the evidence tends to show that she did not possess the property under a claim of right for twenty years.\nIn Defendant\u2019s \u201cIssues Presented,\u201d she lists the issue of whether the trial court erred in denying her motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Given our decision above, we need not consider it.\nFor the reasons stated above, we affirm the trial court\u2019s decisions and the jury\u2019s verdict.\nAffirmed. .\nJudge STROUD concurs in result only.\nJudge ELMORE dissents.\n. The exhibit is denominated \u201cTrial Exhibit \u2018D-T \u201d since Plaintiffs took the posture of the defendants in the case below.\n. The dissent argues that our review exceeds the issues presented since the jury found that Defendant\u2019s possession was hostile. As noted above, we cannot tell during what time period the jury found her possession to be hostile. Her possession was certainly hostile after 2008 when Grover asked her to leave. Regardless of whether the jury found Defendant\u2019s possession to be hostile earlier than 2008, the jury nevertheless found against Defendant on the statutory period, supporting our ultimate conclusion that Defendant has failed to show that the jury was misled or that the verdict was affected. It is unnecessary to reverse and remand the case for a new trial when the evidence shows that the verdict in the first trial should nonetheless be upheld.\nIn further response to the dissent, the other improvements built in the 1980s and shown on \u201cExhibit E\u201d fail to create visible boundaries that satisfy the twenty-year period. The dog fence that would enclose the portion Defendant claims was not constructed until 1994, meaning the statute of limitations would not run until 2014. The barbed wire fence that was installed in 1984 merely traces along the property line and fails to separate the portion that Defendant claims from the remainder of the tract. As such, Defendant\u2019s requested jury instruction would not have affected the verdict since she failed to show visible boundaries as to a lesser portion of the property for a twenty-year period.\n. New York law differs from North Carolina law in that New York presumes hostile use if all other elements of adverse possession have been met. Sinicropi v. Town of Indian Lake, 538 N.Y.S.2d 380, 381 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989).\n. We would also deem the issue abandoned per N.C. R. App. P. 28(a) since Defendant presented no argument on this issue, instead choosing to argue for a new trial throughout her brief.", "type": "majority", "author": "BEASLEY, Judge." }, { "text": "ELMORE, Judge\ndissenting.\nI respectfully disagree with the decision of the majority to affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment entered in Guilford County District Court on 30 August 2011, declaring that defendant had no lawful interest in the property subject to this dispute and dismissing her appeal of summary ejectment. I agree with defendant that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that they could divide the property at issue in the event that they determined defendant adversely possessed some lesser portion of the property. As a result, I would we reverse and remand for a new trial.\nI believe that the majority\u2019s analysis stretches far beyond what we have been asked to review on appeal. On appeal, defendant contends only that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that they could divide the property 1) in its initial instruction to the jury and 2) after the jury sent a written question to the trial court, inquiring if it could divide the property. Defendant submitted a written request for specific instructions \u201cfor the purpose of allowing the jury to determine if she possessed something less than the entire 23-acre parcel in the event that that portion of the property was actually possessed.\u201d The trial court denied the request. Thus, our review is strictly limited to whether the evidence supported such an instruction.\nWhen reviewing the refusal of a trial court to give certain instructions requested by a party to the jury, this Court must decide whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support a reasonable inference by the jury of the elements of the claim. If the instruction is supported by such evidence, the trial court\u2019s failure to give the instruction is reversible error.\nEllison v. Gambill Oil Co., 186 N.C. App. 167, 169, 650 S.E.2d 819, 821 (2007) (citations omitted), aff\u2019d per curiam and disc, review improvidently allowed, 363 N.C. 364, 677 S.E.2d 452 (2009).\nI conclude that defendant\u2019s request was supported by the evidence presented at trial. Our Supreme Court has established that\n[o]ne may assert title to land embraced within the bounds of another\u2019s deed by showing adverse possession of the portion claimed for twenty years under known and visible lines and boundaries, but his claim is limited to the area actually possessed, and the burden is upon the claimant to establish his title to the land in that manner.\nWallin v. Rice, 232 N.C. 371, 373, 61 S.E.2d 82, 83 (1950) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).\nHere, at trial, defendant offered \u201cExhibit E,\u201d a diagram of the property, into evidence. From this exhibit she testified to her use of the property. She explained that she made the following improvements, all of which were without plaintiffs\u2019 permission: 1) a \u201cmedia dog fence\u201d installed \u201caround 1994\u201d which was visible and marked by flags, 2) a barbed wire fence installed in 1984, which \u201ctraces along the property line\u201d 3) two \u201cwrought-iron gates\u201d installed \u201caround the early part\u201d of her possession of the property, which were installed \u201cto protect the drive to the house\u201d 4) a barn, and the foundations for two other bams, built in the early 90s, 5) a \u201cstone bridge\u201d built in the early 90s, and 6) an arbor built in the late 80s to \u201cpark a car, or either, you know, to entertain, if you want\u201d Defendant also testified that when she moved into the cabin on the property, she installed indoor plumbing, heat, water, and electricity, all without plaintiffs\u2019 assistance or permission.\nI conclude that this evidence is sufficient to allow a reasonable inference by the jury that defendant actually possessed at least some portion of the property, smaller than the entire 23-acre parcel; and further, that those portions actually possessed were marked by visible boundaries. See Locklear v. Savage, 159 N.C. 236, 238, 74 S.E. 347, 348 (1912) (\u201cThe possession must ... be shown by known and visible boundaries.\u201d).\nAs such, I conclude that the trial court erred in denying defendant\u2019s request for specific instructions regarding portions of the property that were actually possessed. Further, I disagree with the majority that defendant was not prejudiced by this error.\nThe majority reasons that any error in failing to so instruct the jury was harmless in light of the insufficiency of the evidence as to hostility. Yet, it appears that the majority has ignored the fact that the issue of hostility was decided by the jury in defendant\u2019s favor. On the verdict sheet, the jury was asked: \u201cWas this actual possession exclusive and hostile to the Defendants, Grover & Caroleen Minor?\u201d To which the jury answered, \u201cYes.\u201d As such, I believe the majority\u2019s lengthy analysis, regarding hostility and labeling defendant\u2019s possession permissive, is inappropriate and beyond the scope of our review on appeal.\nWhile I agree with the majority that the evidence presented at trial would tend to suggest that defendant has failed to satisfy the element of hostility, the jury obviously disagreed. \u201cWeighing evidence is not a task assigned to the Court \u2014 either trial or appellate.\u201d Southern R. Co. v. Woltz, 264 N.C. 58, 61, 140 S.E.2d 738, 740 (1965). Determining the weight of the evidence is \u201ca jury function.\u201d Id. Likewise, on remand for a new trial, a new jury very well might determine, as the majority suggests, that defendant\u2019s possession was permissive. But again, I must stress the importance of keeping that determination squarely within the hands of the jury.", "type": "dissent", "author": "ELMORE, Judge" } ], "attorneys": [ "Forman Rossabi Black, P.A., by T Keith Black and Gavin J. Reardon, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.", "Tuggle Duggins & Meschan, P.A., by Denis E. Jacobson and Jeffrey S. Southerland, for Defendant-Appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "GROVER FRANKLIN MINOR and CAROLEEN W. MINOR, Plaintiffs v. SANDRA ANN MINOR, Defendant\nNo. COA12-693\nFiled 18 December 2012\nAdverse Possession \u2014 jury instruction \u2014 harmless error \u2014 insufficient evidence as to hostility and duration\nThe trial court did not err in a real property case by denying defendant\u2019s request for an instruction on acquiring title to less than the entire tract. Any error in failing to so instruct the jury was harmless in light of the insufficiency of the evidence as to the hostility and duration of defendant\u2019s possession.\nJudge Elmore dissenting.\nAppeal by Defendant from judgment entered 30 August 2011 and order entered 23 September 2011 by Judge Jan H. Samet in Guilford County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 14 November 2012.\nForman Rossabi Black, P.A., by T Keith Black and Gavin J. Reardon, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.\nTuggle Duggins & Meschan, P.A., by Denis E. Jacobson and Jeffrey S. Southerland, for Defendant-Appellant." }, "file_name": "0471-01", "first_page_order": 481, "last_page_order": 488 }