{ "id": 4115544, "name": "SHEILA GREGORY, Administratrix of the Estate of TRAVIS BRYAN KIDD v. BARRY BLAINE PEARSON, in his individual capacity; SHEILA GREGORY, Administratrix of the Estate of TRAVIS BRYAN KIDD v. CLEVELAND COUNTY, Self-McNeilly Solid Waste Management Facility", "name_abbreviation": "Gregory v. Pearson", "decision_date": "2012-12-31", "docket_number": "No. COA12-742; No. COA12-813", "first_page": "580", "last_page": "588", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "224 N.C. App. 580" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "643 S.E.2d 566", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12638095 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "570" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/643/0566-01" ] }, { "cite": "407 S.E.2d 222", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "227", "parenthetical": "alteration in original" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 N.C. 330", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2553288 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "338", "parenthetical": "alteration in original" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/329/0330-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 S.E.2d 433", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "437", "parenthetical": "\"An independent contractor is not a person included within the terms of the Workers' Compensation Act.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 380", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2571983 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "383", "parenthetical": "\"An independent contractor is not a person included within the terms of the Workers' Compensation Act.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0380-01" ] }, { "cite": "124 S.E.2d 905", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "908" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "256 N.C. 709", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574810 ], "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "713" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/256/0709-01" ] }, { "cite": "677 S.E.2d 485", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "489" }, { "page": "490" }, { "page": "491" }, { "page": "492" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "197 N.C. App. 404", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4167431 ], "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/197/0404-01" ] }, { "cite": "512 S.E.2d 760", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "761" }, { "page": "763" }, { "page": "764" }, { "page": "763" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "132 N.C. App. 472", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11238636 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "477" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/132/0472-01" ] }, { "cite": "525 S.E.2d 471", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "473", "parenthetical": "applying the Collins test" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "136 N.C. App. 603", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11241126 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "607", "parenthetical": "applying the Collins test" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/136/0603-01" ] }, { "cite": "204 S.E.2d 873", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "876", "parenthetical": "quotation marks and citation omitted" }, { "page": "876" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "21 N.C. App. 455", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8556526 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "459", "parenthetical": "quotation marks and citation omitted" }, { "page": "459" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/21/0455-01" ] }, { "cite": "319 S.E.2d 690", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "693" }, { "page": "691" }, { "page": "691" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "70 N.C. App. 408", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522566 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "413" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/70/0408-01" ] }, { "cite": "460 S.E.2d 356", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "360", "parenthetical": "quoting Henderson v. Manpower of Guilford Cnty., Inc., 70 N.C. App. 408, 413, 319 S.E.2d 690, 693 (1984)" }, { "page": "358" }, { "page": "358" }, { "page": "360" }, { "page": "360-61" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "119 N.C. App. 753", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11917546 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "759", "parenthetical": "quoting Henderson v. Manpower of Guilford Cnty., Inc., 70 N.C. App. 408, 413, 319 S.E.2d 690, 693 (1984)" }, { "page": "754-55" }, { "page": "760" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/119/0753-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(2)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "148 S.E.2d 21", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "24" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "267 N.C. 158", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558751 ], "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "161" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/267/0158-01" ] }, { "cite": "239 S.E.2d 243", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "244", "parenthetical": "\"[A]n employee subject to the Act whose injuries arise out of and in the course of his employment may not maintain a common law action against a negligent co-employee.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "293 N.C. 731", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567203 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "733", "parenthetical": "\"[A]n employee subject to the Act whose injuries arise out of and in the course of his employment may not maintain a common law action against a negligent co-employee.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/293/0731-01" ] }, { "cite": "325 S.E.2d 244", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "247", "parenthetical": "\"We also have interpreted the Act as foreclosing a worker who is injured in the course of his employment from suing a co-employee whose negligence caused the injury.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 710", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4749409 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "713", "parenthetical": "\"We also have interpreted the Act as foreclosing a worker who is injured in the course of his employment from suing a co-employee whose negligence caused the injury.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0710-01" ] }, { "cite": "531 S.E.2d 881", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "883", "parenthetical": "barring a negligence claim against an employer when the employee already recovered under the Workers' Compensation Act" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 N.C. App. 703", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11081450 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "706", "parenthetical": "barring a negligence claim against an employer when the employee already recovered under the Workers' Compensation Act" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/138/0703-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-10.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "year": 2011, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-6", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 4, "year": 2011, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-3", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2011, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "576 S.E.2d 316", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "319" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 642", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511442 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "647" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0642-01" ] }, { "cite": "669 S.E.2d 290", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "294", "parenthetical": "quoting In re Greens of Pine Glen Ltd., 356 N.C. 642, 647, 576 S.E.2d 316, 319 (2003)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 628", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4150837 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "632-33", "parenthetical": "quoting In re Greens of Pine Glen Ltd., 356 N.C. 642, 647, 576 S.E.2d 316, 319 (2003)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0628-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 265", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3738344 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "271" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0265-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 838, "char_count": 17084, "ocr_confidence": 0.756, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.7492960360752035e-08, "percentile": 0.2983255008303573 }, "sha256": "5e0f6411695152c392a67b92810d975225607622dbb8ca0fb196c0c5ac5e3ce5", "simhash": "1:0089557ad4ff861e", "word_count": 2681 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:14:41.206072+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges STROUD and BEASLEY concur.", "Judge BEASLEY concurred prior to 17 December 2012." ], "parties": [ "SHEILA GREGORY, Administratrix of the Estate of TRAVIS BRYAN KIDD v. BARRY BLAINE PEARSON, in his individual capacity SHEILA GREGORY, Administratrix of the Estate of TRAVIS BRYAN KIDD v. CLEVELAND COUNTY, Self-McNeilly Solid Waste Management Facility" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge.\nSheila Gregory, in her capacity as administratrix of the estate of Travis Bryan Kidd, appeals from a 23 March 2012 order dismissing her cases against Barry Blaine Pearson and Cleveland County (collectively, \u201cDefendants\u201d). Her appeals have been consolidated for review by this Court. Upon review, we reverse the trial court\u2019s order.\nI. Facts & Procedural History\nTravis Bryan Kidd (\u201cKidd\u201d) was twenty-four years old and lived with his mother, Sheila Gregory (\u201cPlaintiff\u2019). Kidd was employed by WorkForce Staffing, Inc. (\u201cWorkForce\u201d), a temporary employment agency. WorkForce contracted with Cleveland County (the \u201cCounty\u201d) to send temporary workers to the County\u2019s Self-McNeilly Solid Waste Management Facility (the \u201cLandfill\u201d).\nWorkForce and the County entered into a Staffing Vendor Agreement (the \u201cStaffing Vendor Agreement\u201d or the \u201cAgreement\u201d). Under the terms of the Agreement, the County regularly paid WorkForce, and WorkForce in turn paid its temporary workers. The Agreement stated WorkForce was responsible for workers\u2019 compensation insurance. According to the Agreement, the County could terminate the workers from the Landfill at any time. The Agreement expressly stated the temporary employees were not employees of the County.\nWorkForce subsequently assigned Kidd to work at the Landfill as a \u201cspotter,\u201d helping dump trucks and other vehicles navigate the terrain. The Landfill provided Kidd with protective equipment, including gloves and a reflective orange vest. While Kidd worked at the Landfill, he did not take any other assignments from WorkForce.\nOn or about 22 February 2010, Kidd was working as a spotter at the Landfill. Barry Blaine Pearson (\u201cPearson\u201d), a full-time County employee, was driving a mobile trash compactor near Kidd, despite Landfill policies requiring a 20-foot buffer between trash compactors and spotters. Also, the trash compactor\u2019s \u201cbackup camera\u201d did not provide adequate visibility. This defect had resulted in previous collisions with other equipment. On that day, Pearson accidentally ran over Kidd with the trash compactor, driving him into a pile of trash. A few minutes later, another truck driver noticed Kidd lying in the trash pile. That driver approached, saw Kidd was severely injured but still alive, and called EMS. Although EMS extracted Kidd and took him to a hospital, he died that same day as a result of the injuries he received.\nAfter Kidd\u2019s death, Plaintiff filed a workers\u2019 compensation claim with the North Carolina Industrial Commission against WorkForce. She collected from WorkForce all her entitled benefits under the North Carolina Workers\u2019 Compensation Act (the \u201cWorkers\u2019 Compensation Act\u201d).\nOn 19 August 2011, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Pearson in Cleveland County Superior Court alleging (i) negligence; and (ii) wrongful death. On 21 February 2012, Plaintiff also filed a companion complaint against Cleveland County for (i) negligence; (ii) negligence per se (due to alleged statutory health and safety violations at the Landfill); and (iii) wrongful death.\nOn 6 March 2012, the County filed a motion to dismiss under North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). After a hearing, the trial court dismissed both Plaintiff\u2019s complaints on 23 March 2012 because Plaintiff\u2019s allegations were exclusively covered by the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act. Plaintiff filed timely notice of appeal on 10 April 2012.\nII. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review\nThis Court has jurisdiction to hear the instant appeal pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-27(b) (2011). \u201cWe review Rule 12(b)(1) motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo and may consider matters outside the pleadings.\u201d Harris v. Matthews, 361 N.C. 265, 271, 643 S.E.2d 566, 570 (2007). \u201c \u2018Under a de novo review, the court considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment\u2019 for that of the lower tribunal.\u201d State v. Williams, 362 N.C. 628, 632-33, 669 S.E.2d 290, 294 (2008) (quoting In re Greens of Pine Glen Ltd., 356 N.C. 642, 647, 576 S.E.2d 316, 319 (2003)).\nIII. Analysis\nPlaintiff contends her claims are not barred by the exclusive remedy of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act because Kidd was not a County employee. Specifically, she argues: (i) the express contract between WorkForce and the County stated Kidd was not a County employee; (ii) the County did not exercise control over Kidd\u2019s work; and (iii) the \u201cspecial employment\u201d doctrine has a decreased burden of proof. Upon review, we reverse the trial court\u2019s order.\nUnder the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, employers generally must \u201cpay .. . compensation [to employees] for personal injury or death by accident arising out of and in the course of [employees\u2019] employment.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-3 (2011). \u201cNo contract or agreement, written or implied, no rule, regulation, or other device shall in any manner operate to relieve an employer in whole or in part, of any obligation created by this Article, except as herein otherwise expressly provided.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-6 (2011).\nThe Workers\u2019 Compensation Act provides an exclusive remedy for unintentional work-related injuries. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-10.1 (2011) (\u201cIf the employee and the employer are subject to and have complied with the provisions of this Article, then the rights and remedies herein granted to the employee . . . exclude all other rights and remedies of the employee ... as against the employer at common law or otherwise on account of such injury or death.\u201d). Thus, the remedial provisions of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act bar other claims against an employer, such as negligence. See, e.g., Reece v. Forga, 138 N.C. App. 703, 706, 531 S.E.2d 881, 883 (2000) (barring a negligence claim against an employer when the employee already recovered under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act).\nSimilarly, an employee who recovers under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act cannot raise a negligence claim against a co-employee acting in the scope of employment. See Pleasant v. Johnson, 312 N.C. 710, 713, 325 S.E.2d 244, 247 (1985) (\u201cWe also have interpreted the Act as foreclosing a worker who is injured in the course of his employment from suing a co-employee whose negligence caused the injury.\u201d); Strickland v. King, 293 N.C. 731, 733, 239 S.E.2d 243, 244 (1977) (\u201c[A]n employee subject to the Act whose injuries arise out of and in the course of his employment may not maintain a common law action against a negligent co-employee.\u201d); Altman v. Sanders, 267 N.C. 158, 161, 148 S.E.2d 21, 24 (1966).\nAccording to the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, \u201c[t]he term \u2018employee\u2019 means every person engaged in an employment under any appointment or contract of hire or apprenticeship, express or implied, oral or written.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2(2) (2011). Furthermore, under the \u201cspecial employment\u201d doctrine:\n\u201ca general employee of one [employer] can also be the special employee of another while doing the latter\u2019s work and under his control [citation omitted] [a]nd it goes without saying that if a loaned servant is the borrower\u2019s servant also when doing the borrower\u2019s work and under his control, a servant especially hired for that very purpose is likewise.\u201d\nBrown v. Friday Services, Inc., 119 N.C. App. 753, 759, 460 S.E.2d 356, 360 (1995) (quoting Henderson v. Manpower of Guilford Cnty., Inc., 70 N.C. App. 408, 413, 319 S.E.2d 690, 693 (1984)) (second and third alterations in original). Thus, if N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-10.1 bars an employee\u2019s suit against a general employer, it also bars suit against a \u201cspecial employer.\u201d\nIn Collins v. James Paul Edwards, Inc., this Court established a three-part test to determine when the \u201cspecial employment\u201d doctrine applies:\nWhen a general employer lends an employee to a special employer, the special employer becomes liable for workmen\u2019s compensation only if\n(a) the employee has made a contract of hire, express or implied, with the special employer;\n(b) the work being done is essentially that of the special employer; and\n(c) the special employer has the right to control the details of the work.\nWhen all three of the above conditions are satisfied\u2019 in relation to both employers, both employers are liable for workmen\u2019s compensation.\n21 N.C. App. 455, 459, 204 S.E.2d 873, 876 (1974) (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Anderson v. Demolition Dynamics, Inc., 136 N.C. App. 603, 607, 525 S.E.2d 471, 473 (2000) (applying the Collins test).\nAs Defendants describe, this Court has previously applied the Collins test to determine employees of temporary employment agencies may also become \u201cspecial employees\u201d of the businesses where they are assigned, barring non-workers\u2019 compensation claims against their \u201cspecial employers.\u201d For instance, in Brown, a temporary worker fell through a skylight and died while working for a roofing contractor. Brown, 119 N.C. App. at 754-55, 460 S.E.2d at 358. The worker\u2019s estate brought a wrongful death claim against the roofing contractor. Id. at 755, 460 S.E.2d at 358. There, this Court affirmed dismissal of the case because the circumstances satisfied all three parts of the Collins test. Id. at 759, 460 S.E.2d at 360.\nIn Poe v. Atlas-Soundelier/American Trading and Production Corp., 132 N.C. App. 472, 512 S.E.2d 760 (1999), a temporary worker\u2019s hand was crushed by a machine while working for Atlas. Id. at 473, 512 S.E.2d at 761. The plaintiff recovered workers\u2019 compensation from his temporary employment agency, but also brought a negligence claim against Atlas. Id. at 476, 512 S.E.2d at 763. In that case, this Court again applied the \u201cspecial employment\u201d doctrine to determine the exclusivity provisions of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act barred Poe\u2019s negligence claim. Id. at 478, 512 S.E.2d at 764.\nIn Henderson, 70 N.C. App. 408, 319 S.E.2d 690, a temporary worker was injured by a falling tree while working for a construction company. Id. at 409, 319 S.E.2d at 691. There, we held both the temporary employment agency and the construction company were liable for workers\u2019 compensation because they were both Henderson\u2019s employers under the \u201cspecial employment\u201d doctrine. Id. at 410, 319 S.E.2d at 691.\nIn the present case, Plaintiff contends the exclusivity provisions of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act do not bar her cases because Kidd was not a County employee. Plaintiff argues the circumstances do not satisfy the first prong of the Collins test because the Agreement stated Kidd was not a County employee. We agree.\nUnder the first portion of the Collins test, we consider whether \u201cthe employee has made a contract of hire, express or implied, with the special employer.\u201d Collins, 21 N.C. App. at 459, 204 S.E.2d at 876. In this analysis, we may examine the contract between a temporary employment agency and the business hiring temporary workers. See Brown, 119 N.C. App. at 760, 460 S.E.2d at 360-61; Poe, 132 N.C. App. at 477, 512 S.E.2d at 763.\nHere, the Staffing Vendor Agreement expressly stated temporary employees are not employees of the County. Significantly, none of the cases cited by Defendants contain a similar contractual provision. In fact, we have discovered no North Carolina workers\u2019 compensation case involving a temporary employment agency with this type of contractual language. Therefore, we distinguish the instant case from Brown, Poe, and Henderson based on this contractual provision.\nWe are further guided by Shelton v. Steelcase, Inc., 197 N.C. App. 404, 677 S.E.2d 485 (2009). In Shelton, the plaintiff was an employee of Drew, LLC (\u201cDrew\u201d), a cleaning company. Id. at 407, 677 S.E.2d at 489. Steelcase, Inc. (\u201cSteelcase\u201d), contracted for Drew to clean its maintenance area. Id. The plaintiff was injured by a falling fire door at Steelcase and sued Steelcase for negligence. Id. at 408, 677 S.E.2d at 490. In Shelton, this Court applied the Collins test to determine the plaintiff was not barred from bringing suit. Id. at 410-11, 677 S.E.2d at 491. Under the first prong of the Collins test, we concluded Shelton was not a \u201cspecial employee\u201d of Steelcase because the contract between Drew and Steelcase expressly stated Drew staff \u201cwill be employees of [Drew],\u201d not Steelcase. Id. at 412, 677 S.E.2d at 492.\nSimilarly, because the Staffing Vendor Agreement expressly states the temporary workers are not County employees, we conclude the circumstances do not satisfy the first prong of the Collins test. \u201cIt is a well established principle that an express contract precludes an implied contract with reference to the same matter.\u201d Veteo Concrete Co. v. Troy Lumber Co., 256 N.C. 709, 713, 124 S.E.2d 905, 908 (1962). Therefore, given the Agreement\u2019s express language, we decline to consider any implied contract between Kidd and the County.\nThe Agreement\u2019s language indicates the County intended to avoid workers\u2019 compensation liability by forming an independent contracting relationship with the temporary workers rather than an employment relationship. See Youngblood v. North State Ford Truck Sales, 321 N.C. 380, 383, 364 S.E.2d 433, 437 (1988) (\u201cAn independent contractor is not a person included within the terms of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act.\u201d). For instance, the Agreement (i) expressly disavows an employment relationship, and (ii) requires WorkForce, rather than the County, to obtain workers\u2019 compensation insurance.\nBecause the County chose not to establish an employment relationship with Kidd, it eschews both the liabilities and protections of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act. In this regard, we note the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act:\nseeks to balance competing interests and implement trade-offs between the rights of employees and their employers. It provides for an injured employee\u2019s certain and sure recovery without having to prove employer negligence or face affirmative defenses such as contributory negligence and the fellow servant rule. In return the Act limits the amount of recovery available for work-related injuries and removes the employee\u2019s right to pursue potentially larger damages awards in civil actions. [W]hile the employer assumes a new liability without fault he is relieved of the prospect of large damage verdicts.\nWoodson v. Rowland, 329 N.C. 330, 338, 407 S.E.2d 222, 227 (1991) (alteration in original) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Having made a contract which allocated the risk of workers\u2019 compensation liability to WorkForce, the County may not now use the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act as a shield against the risk of \u201clarge damage verdicts\u201d for civil tort liability. Id.\nSince we determine the County did not form an employment relationship with Kidd, we reject Defendants\u2019 argument regarding the applicability of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-6. This statute states \u201c[n]o contract ... shall in any manner operate to relieve an employer... of any obligation created by this Article . . . .\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-6 (2011). The County argues this statute invalidates its contractual provision stating Kidd was not an employee. However, we hold N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-6 does not apply here because the County was not Kidd\u2019s \u201cemployer.\u201d\nBecause the circumstances here do not satisfy the first prong of the Collins test, we conclude Kidd was not a \u201cspecial employee\u201d of the County. Consequently, the exclusivity provisions of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act do not bar Plaintiff\u2019s suit and we reverse the trial court\u2019s order. Since we reverse the entire order based on Plaintiff\u2019s first argument, we decline to address her other arguments.\nIV. Conclusion\nWe conclude Plaintiff\u2019s claims are not barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act because Kidd was not a County employee under the \u201cspecial employment\u201d doctrine. Consequently, the trial court\u2019s order dismissing Plaintiff\u2019s case is\nReversed.\nJudges STROUD and BEASLEY concur.\nJudge BEASLEY concurred prior to 17 December 2012.", "type": "majority", "author": "HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "James M. Roane III for plaintiff-appellant.", "Teague Campbell Dennis & Gorham, L.L.P., by William A. Bulfer and Rebecca Rausch, and Womble Carlyle Sandridge and Rice, by Sean F. Perrin and Jackson Price, for defendantappellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "SHEILA GREGORY, Administratrix of the Estate of TRAVIS BRYAN KIDD v. BARRY BLAINE PEARSON, in his individual capacity SHEILA GREGORY, Administratrix of the Estate of TRAVIS BRYAN KIDD v. CLEVELAND COUNTY, Self-McNeilly Solid Waste Management Facility\nNo. COA12-742\nNo. COA12-813\nFiled 31 December 2012\nWorkers\u2019 Compensation \u2014 exclusivity\u2014temporary staffing\u2014 expressly not an employee \u2014 no implied contract\nPlaintiff\u2019s negligence claims were not barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act where plaintiff\u2019s decedent, who worked for a temporary employment agency, was not a County employee under the express language of the agreement between the agency and the County. Because the County chose not to establish an employment relationship with decedent, it eschewed both the liabilities and protections of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act.\nAppeals by Sheila Gregory from order entered on 23 March 2012 by Judge Richard Doughton in Cleveland County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 29 November 2012.\nJames M. Roane III for plaintiff-appellant.\nTeague Campbell Dennis & Gorham, L.L.P., by William A. Bulfer and Rebecca Rausch, and Womble Carlyle Sandridge and Rice, by Sean F. Perrin and Jackson Price, for defendantappellees." }, "file_name": "0580-01", "first_page_order": 590, "last_page_order": 598 }