{ "id": 4131614, "name": "DENNIS RAY SPIVEY, Plaintiff v. WRIGHT'S ROOFING, Employer/Subcontractor, NONINSURED; RANDY WRIGHT, Individually; AMS STAFF LEASING, Employer; DALLAS NATIONAL INSURANCE, Carrier for Wright's Roofing and AMS Staff Leasing; CRAWFORD & COMPANY, Administrator/Servicing Agent for Dallas National Insurance; BOYET BUILDERS, General Contractor; and AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE, Carrier [for Boyet Builders], Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Spivey v. Wright's Roofing", "decision_date": "2013-01-15", "docket_number": "No. COA12-270", "first_page": "106", "last_page": "120", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "225 N.C. App. 106" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "672 S.E.2d 717", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12642781 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "721" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/672/0717-01" ] }, { "cite": "634 S.E.2d 887", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636688, 12636689, 12636687 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/634/0887-02", "/se2d/634/0887-03", "/se2d/634/0887-01" ] }, { "cite": "620 S.E.2d 288", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12634111 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "293", "parenthetical": "citing Sims v. Charmes/Arby's Roast Beef, 142 N.C. App. 154, 159, 542 S.E.2d 277, 281, disc. review denied, 353 N.C. 729, 550 S.E.2d 782 (2001), and Calhoun v. Wayne Dennis Heating & Air Cond., 129 N.C. App. 794, 798, 501 S.E.2d 346, 349 (1998" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/620/0288-01" ] }, { "cite": "673 S.E.2d 149", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12642853 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "156", "parenthetical": "quoting Johnson v. Herbie's Place, 157 N.C. App. 168, 180, 579 S.E.2d 110, 118, disc. review denied, 357 N.C. 460, 585 S.E.2d 760 (2003)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/673/0149-01" ] }, { "cite": "195 N.C. App. 430", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4164914 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "436" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/195/0430-01" ] }, { "cite": "458 S.E.2d 190", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "340 N.C. 360", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 790218, 790157, 790191, 790066, 790233 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/340/0360-02", "/nc/340/0360-03", "/nc/340/0360-01", "/nc/340/0360-04", "/nc/340/0360-05" ] }, { "cite": "791 F. Supp. 595", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 7409985 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "599" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/791/0595-01" ] }, { "cite": "454 S.E.2d 666", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "667", "parenthetical": "citing Zocco v. U.S. Dept. of Army, 791 F. Supp. 595, 599 (E.D.N.C. 1992)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 N.C. App. 156", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11917121 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "159", "parenthetical": "citing Zocco v. U.S. Dept. of Army, 791 F. Supp. 595, 599 (E.D.N.C. 1992)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/118/0156-01" ] }, { "cite": "584 S.E.2d 871", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "876", "parenthetical": "quoting from Commission's order" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "160 N.C. App. 137", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8954674 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "145", "parenthetical": "quoting from Commission's order" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/160/0137-01" ] }, { "cite": "606 S.E.2d 119", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "123" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "167 N.C. App. 449", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8411620 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "453" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/167/0449-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-18", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)" }, { "page": "(d)" }, { "page": "(d)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "725 S.E.2d 923", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "2012 N.C. App. LEXIS 670" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "130 S.E. 40", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1925, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "43" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "190 N.C. 397", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8605013 ], "year": 1925, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "402" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/190/0397-01" ] }, { "cite": "130 S.E.2d 541", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "543-44", "parenthetical": "quoting Furst v. Merritt, 190 N.C. 397, 402, 130 S.E. 40, 43 (1925)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "259 N.C. 359", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560578 ], "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "362", "parenthetical": "quoting Furst v. Merritt, 190 N.C. 397, 402, 130 S.E. 40, 43 (1925)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/259/0359-01" ] }, { "cite": "400 S.E.2d 450", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that a unilateral mistake by an unrepresented claimant would not support a decision to set aside a settlement agreement that the plaintiff had signed" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 270", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2545596, 2540340, 2540374, 2537916, 2545535 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that a unilateral mistake by an unrepresented claimant would not support a decision to set aside a settlement agreement that the plaintiff had signed" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0270-02", "/nc/328/0270-01", "/nc/328/0270-05", "/nc/328/0270-04", "/nc/328/0270-03" ] }, { "cite": "398 S.E.2d 604", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "100 N.C. App. 754", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527620 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/100/0754-01" ] }, { "cite": "586 S.E.2d 99", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 461", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491489, 491617, 491528, 491820, 491822, 491408, 491795, 491576, 491450 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0461-09", "/nc/357/0461-05", "/nc/357/0461-07", "/nc/357/0461-03", "/nc/357/0461-01", "/nc/357/0461-08", "/nc/357/0461-06", "/nc/357/0461-04", "/nc/357/0461-02" ] }, { "cite": "580 S.E.2d 743", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "748" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 N.C. App. 244", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9186909 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "249" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/158/0244-01" ] }, { "cite": "495 S.E.2d 907", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "911-12" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 N.C. 520", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 551066 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "527" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/347/0520-01" ] }, { "cite": "489 S.E.2d 375", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "379" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 N.C. 126", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 551278 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "132" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/347/0126-01" ] }, { "cite": "515 S.E.2d 17", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "20" }, { "page": "21-22", "parenthetical": "emphasis in original" }, { "page": "21-22" }, { "page": "19, 20" }, { "page": "21-22" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "132 N.C. App. 720", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11240082 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "7225" }, { "page": "726-27" }, { "page": "722, 724" }, { "page": "726-27" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/132/0720-01" ] }, { "cite": "532 S.E.2d 198", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 N.C. App. 663", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11081184 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/138/0663-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 587", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3788297 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0587-01" ] }, { "cite": "532 S.E.2d 524", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "350 N.C. 92", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 131960, 132306, 131970, 132311 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/350/0092-04", "/nc/350/0092-02", "/nc/350/0092-01", "/nc/350/0092-03" ] }, { "cite": "501 S.E.2d 346", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "349" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "129 N.C. App. 794", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11653108 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "798" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/129/0794-01" ] }, { "cite": "550 S.E.2d 782", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 729", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135619, 135982, 135568, 135706, 135866 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0729-01", "/nc/353/0729-05", "/nc/353/0729-04", "/nc/353/0729-02", "/nc/353/0729-03" ] }, { "cite": "542 S.E.2d 277", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "281" }, { "page": "281" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "142 N.C. App. 154", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9439949 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "159" }, { "page": "159" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/142/0154-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 N.C. App. 128", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8350684 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "135-36", "parenthetical": "citing Sims v. Charmes/Arby's Roast Beef, 142 N.C. App. 154, 159, 542 S.E.2d 277, 281, disc. review denied, 353 N.C. 729, 550 S.E.2d 782 (2001), and Calhoun v. Wayne Dennis Heating & Air Cond., 129 N.C. App. 794, 798, 501 S.E.2d 346, 349 (1998" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/174/0128-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-82", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "597 S.E.2d 695", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "701", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 488", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2986640 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "496", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/358/0488-01" ] }, { "cite": "585 S.E.2d 760", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 460", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491744, 491866, 491659, 491910 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0460-04", "/nc/357/0460-01", "/nc/357/0460-02", "/nc/357/0460-03" ] }, { "cite": "579 S.E.2d 110", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "118" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "157 N.C. App. 168", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9185540 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "180" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/157/0168-01" ] }, { "cite": "195 N.C. App. 463", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4165354 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "470", "parenthetical": "quoting Johnson v. Herbie's Place, 157 N.C. App. 168, 180, 579 S.E.2d 110, 118, disc. review denied, 357 N.C. 460, 585 S.E.2d 760 (2003)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/195/0463-01" ] }, { "cite": "509 S.E.2d 411", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "414", "parenthetical": "internal citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 676", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571666 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "681", "parenthetical": "internal citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0676-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 S.E.2d 549", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "552" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 N.C. 109", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 684964 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "115" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/352/0109-01" ] }, { "cite": "669 S.E.2d 582", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "584", "parenthetical": "quoting Deese v. Champion Int'l Corp., 352 N.C. 109, 115, 530 S.E.2d 549, 552 (2000), and Adams v. AVX Corp., 349 N.C. 676, 681, 509 S.E.2d 411, 414 (1998) (internal citation omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 657", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4149368 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "660", "parenthetical": "quoting Deese v. Champion Int'l Corp., 352 N.C. 109, 115, 530 S.E.2d 549, 552 (2000), and Adams v. AVX Corp., 349 N.C. 676, 681, 509 S.E.2d 411, 414 (1998) (internal citation omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0657-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-19", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1215, "char_count": 34665, "ocr_confidence": 0.756, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.041502013137158e-08, "percentile": 0.3741274105169838 }, "sha256": "117b53b85336517f3a23d6f208c850bdf729cfe236c15df08fac8874b91cad18", "simhash": "1:9c4346a63d350646", "word_count": 5465 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:12:03.865649+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges ROBERT N. HUNTER, JR., and McCULLOUGH concur." ], "parties": [ "DENNIS RAY SPIVEY, Plaintiff v. WRIGHT\u2019S ROOFING, Employer/Subcontractor, NONINSURED; RANDY WRIGHT, Individually; AMS STAFF LEASING, Employer; DALLAS NATIONAL INSURANCE, Carrier for Wright\u2019s Roofing and AMS Staff Leasing; CRAWFORD & COMPANY, Administrator/Servicing Agent for Dallas National Insurance; BOYET BUILDERS, General Contractor; and AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE, Carrier [for Boyet Builders], Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ERVIN, Judge.\nDefendants AMS Staff Leasing, Dallas National Insurance Co., and Crawford & Company appeal from a Commission order awarding Plaintiff Dennis Ray Spivey medical and disability benefits. On appeal, Defendants argue that the Commission erred by determining that they were bound by the Industrial Commission Form 60 which they had previously filed and by failing to determine that Defendant Boyet Builders was liable for payment of any workers\u2019 compensation benefits to which Plaintiff was entitled. After careful consideration of Defendants\u2019 challenges to the Commission\u2019s order in light of the record and the applicable law, we conclude the Commission\u2019s order should be affirmed.\nI. Factual Background\nA. Substantive Facts\nPlaintiff was employed by Wright\u2019s Roofing, which was a sole proprietorship owned by Randy Wright, between 2005 and 2008. During that time, Plaintiff worked either part-time or full-time, depending on availability of work, and was paid, for most of that period, by Wright\u2019s Roofing.\nAt some point during Plaintiff\u2019s initial period of employment, Mr. Wright contracted with AMS Staffing, a company that provides administrative services such as handling payroll, tax, and workers\u2019 compensation insurance-related issues. According to the arrangement between Wright\u2019s Roofing and AMS Staffing, after Mr. Wright designated an employee as being \u201cemployed by\u201d AMS Staffing, the employee would fill out an AMS Staffing form, Wright\u2019s Roofing would pay AMS Staffing for the work performed by the employee, and AMS Staffing would issue a paycheck to the employee. AMS Staffing also assumed responsibility for procuring workers\u2019 compensation coverage for the Wright\u2019s Roofing employees whose employment had been reported to AMS Staffing.\nIn October 2008, Plaintiff was asked to complete the forms required by AMS Staffing. After that time, Plaintiff\u2019s paychecks were issued by AMS Staffing, which withheld taxes and took care of other required deductions. In September, 2009, Plaintiff stopped working for Wright\u2019s Roofing due to a lack of available work. After Plaintiff stopped working for Wright\u2019s Roofing, Mr. Wright submitted a termination form to AMS Staffing in which Wright\u2019s Roofing informed AMS Staffing that Plaintiff was no longer employed by that business.\nAfter a six or seven month gap, Plaintiff returned to work for Wright\u2019s Roofing in 2010. Upon returning to work at Wright\u2019s Roofing, Plaintiff performed the same essential tasks that he had performed during his earlier period of employment. Plaintiff did not, however, complete any AMS Staffing forms when he came back to work at Wright\u2019s Roofing. Instead, Plaintiff was paid with checks drawn on a Wright\u2019s Roofing account. At that time, only one of Wright\u2019s Roofing\u2019s employees was registered with AMS Staffing; Wright\u2019s Roofing paid for workers\u2019 compensation coverage for this single employee, but failed to provide workers\u2019 compensation insurance for its other employees.\nOn 28 June 2010, Plaintiff was working on a residential roof at a job for which Defendant Boyet Builders, the general contractor, had hired Wright\u2019s Roofing as a subcontractor. As of that date, Wright\u2019s Roofing had not provided Boyet Builders with a certificate attesting that it was in compliance with applicable workers\u2019 compensation insurance requirements. On that date, Plaintiff fell from a ladder and suffered an admittedly compensable leg fracture for which Plaintiff was hospitalized and underwent surgery. As of the date of the hearing in this matter, Plaintiff had not yet returned to full time work.\nB. Procedural History\nOn 19 July 2010, Plaintiff filed a Form 18 in which he formally reported the accident in which he had been involved and asserted a claim for workers\u2019 compensation benefits. Plaintiff filed an amended Form 18 on 22 July 2010. On 31 August 2010, Defendants filed a Form 60 in which they admitted that Plaintiff was entitled to receive workers\u2019 compensation benefits. On the same date, Defendant Crawford sent Plaintiff\u2019s counsel an email stating that:\nOur client, Dallas National Ins., has agreed to accept this claim on a Form 60. We have requested TTD [(temporary, total disability)] from 6-30 thru 8-31, 10 weeks, be issued and sent to Mr. Spivey. Additional TTD will be paid weekly. Related medical expenses will be paid in accordance with the fee schedule. Please acknowledge receipt and advise that you will waive the interrogatory responses.\nIn addition, Defendants sent a letter to Plaintiff\u2019s counsel in which a copy of the filed Form 60 was enclosed and by means of which Defendants advised Plaintiff\u2019s counsel that a disability check \u201cshould be coming to your client[.]\u201d Pursuant to the filed Form 60, Defendants began paying weekly disability benefits at the rate of $342.18 covering the period from 30 June 2010 through 7 September 2010, resulting in total benefit payments of $3,763.00.\nOn 15 September 2010, Defendants filed a Form 63 and a Form 61 by means of which they denied liability and ceased making indemnity payments as of that date. Defendants informed the Commission that, after they filed the Form 60, they had \u201cdetermined that they have no workers [\u2019] compensation coverage\u201d applicable to Plaintiff and were \u201cwithdrawing\u201d their Form 60. In response, Plaintiff filed a motion requesting that Defendant be ordered to continue making temporary total disability payments. Defendants replied to Plaintiff\u2019s motion by asserting that, after filing the Form 60, they had \u201cdiscovered evidence\u201d that entitled them to withdraw the Form 60 and to deny Plaintiff\u2019s claim. On 22 October 2010, the Commission issued an administrative order denying Plaintiff\u2019s motion and directing Plaintiff to \u201cfile a Form 33 to request an evidentiary hearing\u201d at which the relevant issues would be addressed. As a result, on 27 October 2010, Plaintiff filed a Form 33 requesting that the extent to which Defendants were entitled to withdraw the Form 60 and contest their liability for Plaintiff\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation benefits be set for hearing.\nOn the same date, Plaintiff filed a second amended Form 18 in which he named Wright\u2019s Roofing as Plaintiff\u2019s employer, Dallas National as Wright\u2019s carrier, and Boyet Builders as the general contractor at the construction project at which Plaintiff was working when he was injured. Boyet Builders filed a response to Plaintiffs request for a hearing in which it stated that Plaintiff was not its employee, that it was not liable as a statutory employer pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-19, and that \u201c[Dallas National] has already accepted the compensability of this claim via a Form 60 dated August 31, 2010 and has therefore incurred liabilily for benefits.\u201d On 5 January 2011, Boyet Builders denied Plaintiffs claim for workers\u2019 compensation benefits. On 17 January 2011, Plaintiff filed another Form 33 in which he contended that, after Dallas National filed a Form 60, it had \u201cunilaterally, without Commission approval, stopped paying benefits.\u201d\nA hearing was conducted before Deputy Commissioner Adrian Phillips on 9 February 2011. During this hearing, Plaintiff moved that Defendants be directed to reinstate temporary total disability benefits pending a final decision regarding liability. Deputy Commissioner Phillips allowed Plaintiff\u2019s motion on 21 February 2011. On 19 May 2011, Deputy Commissioner Phillips entered an order holding Boyet Builders and Auto-Owners Insurance liable for Plaintiff\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation benefits and ordering them to pay medical and temporary total disability benefits. On 24 May 2011, Boyet Builders and Auto Owners Insurance appealed to the Commission from Deputy Commissioner Phillips\u2019 order.\nThe Commission heard this case on 6 October 2011. On 2 December 2011, the Commission, by means of an order issued by Commissioner Danny Lee McDonald with the concurrence of Commission Chair Pamela T. Young and Commissioner Christopher Scott, determined that Defendants had no legal basis to withdraw the Form 60 which they had initially filed, and ordered Defendants to pay temporary total disability and medical benefits to Plaintiff. The Commission also concluded that Wright\u2019s Roofing did not have workers\u2019 compensation insurance applicable to Plaintiff on the date of his injury and imposed a fine upon Mr. Wright for failing to comply with the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act. Defendants noted an appeal to this Court from the Commission\u2019s order.\nII. Legal Analysis\nA. Standard of Review\n\u201cThe standard of review in workers\u2019 compensation cases has been firmly established by the General Assembly and by numerous decisions of this Court. . . . Under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, \u2018[t]he Commission is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony.\u2019 Therefore, on appeal from an award of the Industrial Commission, review is limited to consideration of whether competent evidence supports the Commission\u2019s findings of fact and whether the findings support the Commission\u2019s conclusions of law. This \u2018court\u2019s duty goes no further than to determine whether the record contains any evidence tending to support the finding.\u2019 \u2019\u2019Richardson v. Maxim Healthcare/Allegis Grp., 362 N.C. 657, 660, 669 S.E.2d 582, 584 (2008) (quoting Deese v. Champion Int\u2019l Corp., 352 N.C. 109, 115, 530 S.E.2d 549, 552 (2000), and Adams v. AVX Corp., 349 N.C. 676, 681, 509 S.E.2d 411, 414 (1998) (internal citation omitted)). \u201c[Findings of fact which are left unchallenged by the parties on appeal are \u2018presumed to be supported by competent evidence\u2019 and are, thus \u2018conclusively established on appeal.\u2019 \u201d Chaisson v. Simpson, 195 N.C. App. 463, 470, 673 S.E.2d 149, 156 (2009) (quoting Johnson v. Herbie\u2019s Place, 157 N.C. App. 168, 180, 579 S.E.2d 110, 118, disc. review denied, 357 N.C. 460, 585 S.E.2d 760 (2003)). The \u201cCommission\u2019s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.\u201d McRae v. Toastmaster, Inc., 358 N.C. 488, 496, 597 S.E.2d 695, 701 (2004) (citation omitted). We will now utilize this standard of review in order to evaluate Defendants\u2019 challenges to the Commission\u2019s order.\nB. Effect of Filing a Form 60\n1. Applicable Legal Principles\nAccording to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-82(b):\nPayment pursuant to [N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7] 97-18(b) or payment pursuant to [N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7] 97-18(d) when compensability and liability are not contested prior to expiration of the period for payment without prejudice, shall constitute an award of the Commission on the question of compensability of and the insurer\u2019s liability for the injury for which payment was made. Compensation paid in these circumstances shall constitute payment of compensation pursuant to an award under this Article.\nIn other words, \u201c[t]he employer\u2019s filing of a Form 60 is an admission of compensability. Thereafter, the employer\u2019s payment of compensation pursuant to the Form 60 is an award of the Commission on the issue of compensability of the injury.\u201d Perez v. American Airlines/AMR Corp., 174 N.C. App. 128, 135-36, 620 S.E.2d 288, 293 (2005) (citing Sims v. Charmes/Arby\u2019s Roast Beef, 142 N.C. App. 154, 159, 542 S.E.2d 277, 281, disc. review denied, 353 N.C. 729, 550 S.E.2d 782 (2001), and Calhoun v. Wayne Dennis Heating & Air Cond., 129 N.C. App. 794, 798, 501 S.E.2d 346, 349 (1998), disc. review dismissed, 350 N.C. 92, 532 S.E.2d 524 (1999)), disc. review improvidently allowed, 360 N.C. 587, 634 S.E.2d 887 (2006). Thus, an employer who files a Form 60 waives the right to contest a claim that it is liable for a claimant\u2019s injury:\nIn Olivares-Juarez v. Showell Farms, 138 N.C. App. 663, 532 S.E.2d 198 (2000), the employer made direct payments to the injured employee pursuant to [N.C. Gen. Stat.] \u00a7 97-18(d), using the Industrial Commission Form 63 . . . beyond the 90-day statutory period[.] . . . [T]he employer had waived its right to contest the compensability of or its liability for the employee\u2019s injury. The status of the employer who pays compensation without prejudice beyond the statutory period is therefore the same as the employer who files Form 60 pursuant to [N.C. Gen. Stat.] \u00a7 97-18(b). That is, in both circumstances the employers will be deemed to have admitted liability and compensability.\nSims v. Charmes, 142 N.C. App. at 159, 542 S.E.2d at 281.\nAs a general rule, once a party has filed a Form 60, that filing will not be set aside on the basis of the party\u2019s unilateral mistake or failure to investigate the claim prior to admitting liability. For example, in Higgins v. Michael Powell Builders, 132 N.C. App. 720, 515 S.E.2d 17 (1999), the carrier admitted liability for the claimant\u2019s injury by filing a Form 63 and failing to contest the claim within 90 days. Subsequently, the carrier unsuccessfully sought relief from the binding effect of the Form 63 on the grounds of excusable neglect, mutual mistake, or newly discovered evidence, based on the defendant\u2019s contention that the claimant was a subcontractor rather than an employee. On appeal, we affirmed the Commission\u2019s determination that the \u201cplaintiffs employment status was \u2018at all times reasonably discoverable\u2019 by both the employer and the carrier\u201d and held that:\nHaving failed to reasonably investigate the claim, [Defendant] cannot now assert that the information was not reasonably available. Pursuant to the provisions of [N.C. Gen. Stat.] \u00a7 97-18(d), defendants have waived their right to contest the compensability of plaintiff\u2019s injuries, and the award of compensation has become final as provided by [N.C. Gen. Stat.] \u00a7 97-82(b).\nHiggins, 132 N.C. App at 7225, 515 S.E.2d at 20. In addition, we also held that an award resulting from a filed Form 60 could not be set aside on the grounds of \u201cmutual mistake:\u201d\nBecause the doctrines of mutual mistake, misrepresentation, and fraud generally apply to agreements between parties, these doctrines will not provide grounds to set aside an award not based upon such an agreement.... The Commission\u2019s award does not adopt an agreement between the parties; rather, the award derives from defendant\u2019s unilateral initiation of payment of compensation and subsequent failure to contest the claim under [N.C. Gen. Stat.] \u00a7 97-18(d). Therefore, the doctrines of mutual mistake, misrepresentation, and fraud do not operate to afford [Defendant] relief from the award.\nHiggins at 726-27, 515 S.E.2d at 21-22 (emphasis in original) (citing McAninch v. Buncombe County Schools, 347 N.C. 126, 132, 489 S.E.2d 375, 379 (1997), and Creech v. Melnik, 347 N.C. 520, 527, 495 S.E.2d 907, 911-12 (1998)) (other citations omitted). As a result, well-established North Carolina law clearly places the burden on the employer or carrier to determine whether a particular claim is compensable and whether the employer or carrier is liable before filing a Form 60.\nThe principle that an employer or carrier is not entitled to relief from a Form 60 on unilateral mistake grounds is consistent with other decisions holding that a workers\u2019 compensation award will not be set aside based upon a party\u2019s unilateral mistake. For example, in Smith v. First Choice Servs., 158 N.C. App. 244, 249, 580 S.E.2d 743, 748, disc. review denied, 357 N.C. 461, 586 S.E.2d 99 (2003), the claimant was an officer of the employer. On appeal, we affirmed the Commission\u2019s decision that, because the workers\u2019 compensation policy included coverage for company officers, the carrier was liable for the plaintiffs compensable injury even though the extension of coverage to officers in the relevant policy provisions may have resulted from a unilateral mistake on the part of the carrier. See also Brookover v. Borden, Inc., 100 N.C. App. 754, 398 S.E.2d 604 (1990), disc. review denied, 328 N.C. 270, 400 S.E.2d 450 (1991) (holding that a unilateral mistake by an unrepresented claimant would not support a decision to set aside a settlement agreement that the plaintiff had signed). Similarly, this rule is consistent with the basic principle that \u201c \u2018[t]he duty to read an instrument or to have it read before signing it, is a positive one, and the failure to do so, in the absence of any mistake, fraud or oppression, is a circumstance against which no relief may be had, either at law or in equity.\u2019 \u201d Mills v. Lynch, 259 N.C. 359, 362, 130 S.E.2d 541, 543-44 (1963) (quoting Furst v. Merritt, 190 N.C. 397, 402, 130 S.E. 40, 43 (1925)).\nIn recognition of the fact that a Form 60 may not be set aside based upon a unilateral mistake by the employer or carrier, we recently upheld the imposition of sanctions against defendants who persisted in challenging a previously-filed Form 60 on such a basis. In Kennedy v. Minuteman Powerboss,_N.C. App __, 725 S.E.2d 923 (2012) (2012 N.C. App. LEXIS 670) (unpublished), the carrier filed a Form 60 which it later tried to withdraw on the grounds that, at the time it filed the Form 60, it had not known that the claimant had suffered an earlier back injury for which he was taking pain medication. The Commission sanctioned Defendants for stubborn, unfounded litigiousness based on their decision to continue to prosecute a motion to set aside the Form 60 on this basis. On appeal, we upheld the Commission\u2019s decision to impose sanctions, stating that:\nFirst, the Full Commission properly concluded, as a matter of law, that a Form 60 cannot be set aside based upon mutual mistake. Second, \u201can employer who files a Form 60 pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-18(b),\u201d . . . \u201cwill be deemed to have admitted liability and compensability.\u201d... Had defendants wished to investigate either the incident or [claimant\u2019s] medical history, they could have filed a Form 63, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-18(d), which would have allowed them to investigate the compensability of [his] accident.. . . [Defendants, after admitting compensability via a Form 60, continued to challenge that admitted compensability based upon (1) a legally impossible basis and (2) their own lack of due diligence.\nKennedy, 2012 N.C. LEXIS 670, *14 (citing Higgins, 132 N.C. App. at 726-27, 515 S.E.2d at 21-22, and quoting Barbour v. Regis Corp., 167 N.C. App. 449, 453, 606 S.E.2d 119, 123 (2004)) (footnote omitted). As a result, this Court has made it crystal clear that an employer or carrier is not entitled to relief from a Form 60 based solely upon the fact that the party making the filing failed to adequately investigate all relevant issues before conceding compensability or liability.\n2. Discussion\nOn 31 August 2010, Defendants filed a Form 60, \u201cEmployer\u2019s Admission of Employee\u2019s Right to Compensation ([N.C. Gen. Stat.] \u00a7 97-18(b),\u201d which listed Wright\u2019s Roofing as Plaintiff\u2019s employer and Dallas National c/o Crawford & Co. as the responsible insurance carrier. By filing this Form 60, Defendants admitted the compensability of Plaintiff\u2019s claim and their liability for making the necessary benefit payments. As a result, given that the basis upon which they seek relief from the Form 60 rests upon a claim of unilateral mistake, Defendants have forfeited the ability to challenge their responsibility for paying workers\u2019 compensation benefits to Plaintiff.\nIn seeking to persuade us to reach a contrary conclusion, Defendants initially argue that a Form 60 \u201cdoes not bind a non-employer.\u201d In other words, Defendants contend that, because Plaintiff\u2019s return to Wright\u2019s Roofing\u2019s employment had not been reported to AMS Staffing at the time of his injury, he was not a co-employee of AMS Staffing and Wright\u2019s Roofing, a fact which, in their view, means that Defendants are not bound by the Form 60. We do not find this argument persuasive.\nThis Court rejected an argument similar to Defendants\u2019 that their filing of a Form 60 does \u201cnot bind a non-employer\u201d in Higgins, In that case, the defendants sought to have a Form 63 set aside on the grounds that, rather than being \u201can employee of [the employer,]\u201d the plaintiff \u201cwas, instead, a subcontractor.\u201d In upholding the Commission\u2019s decision to reject the defendants\u2019 position, we noted that \u201c[the claimant\u2019s] employment status was \u2018at all times reasonably discoverable\u2019 by both the employer and the carrier.\u201d Higgins, 132 N.C. App. at 722, 724, 515 S.E.2d at 19, 20. Defendants have not argued that Plaintiff\u2019s employment status was not \u201creasonably discoverable\u201d or made any other attempt to distinguish Higgins from the present case. As a result, we conclude that Defendants\u2019 contention that questions about Plaintiff\u2019s employment status provides support for a decision to revisit the Form 60 lacks adequate legal support.\nSecondly, Defendants argue that they are nothing more than \u201can innocent third party who simply made a mistake\u201d and argue that, unless the Commission\u2019s decision is reversed:\n[A]ny employer, no matter how far removed from the plaintiff, who accidentally files a Form 60, would be forever prohibited from fixing his mistake and denying liability, even when, as in this case, another carrier is on the risk. Under that rationale, if Grocery Store tries to file a Form 60 for its employee Bob Smith but accidentally misspells the name and files one for Bob Smyth, a mechanic injured while working for Auto Body Shop, then Grocery Store would be held liable for paying the claim of Bob Smyth, even if Grocery Store quickly discovers and tries to retract the Form.\n(emphasis in original). In addition, Defendants assert that, if the Commission\u2019s order is upheld, \u201cone mistake by a well-meaning servicing agent, even one who is completely unrelated to the injured employee, is forever irreparable.\u201d We are not persuaded that this set of policy-based concerns justifies a decision to reverse the Commission\u2019s order.\nAs an initial matter, the facts at issue here bear no resemblance to the hypothetical scenario outlined by Defendants, given that Defendants are not strangers lacking any connection to Plaintiff. The undisputed evidence contained in the present record shows that (1) Wright\u2019s Roofing was subject to the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act and, therefore, legally required to obtain workers\u2019 compensation insurance for its employees, including Plaintiff; (2) Mr. Wright contracted with AMS Staffing for the purpose of, among other things, obtaining workers\u2019 compensation insurance for designated employees, with Dallas National being the carrier responsible for covering Wrights\u2019 Roofing\u2019s employees under this arrangement; and (3) Plaintiff had previously been one of the designated employees for whom AMS Staffing had provided workers\u2019 compensation insurance coverage and, when Plaintiff returned to work for Wright\u2019s Roofing, the company should have required him to complete the relevant AMS Staffing forms, but did not do so. As a result, Defendants were not \u201ccompletely unrelated\u201d to Plaintiff\u2019s employment; on the contrary, they were the parties with whom Wright\u2019s Roofing had previously contracted for the purpose of obtaining workers\u2019 compensation coverage applicable to Plaintiff and with whom Plaintiff should have been covered at the time of his injury.\nIn addition, we are unable to agree with Defendants\u2019 contention that a decision to uphold the Commission\u2019s order would make it possible for an \u201cinnocent third party\u201d to accidentally incur liability for the workers\u2019 compensation benefits owed to a claimant with whom it had no relationship. A properly completed Form 60 must indicate (1) the claimant\u2019s name, address, phone number, and date of birth; (2) the claimant\u2019s employer and the employer\u2019s insurance carrier; and (3) the date of the claimant\u2019s injury and the nature of the injury. As should be obvious, the inclusion of this information will correctly identify the specific claimant and distinguish him or her from some other person with a similarly spelled name. Thus, we do not believe that a decision to uphold the Commission\u2019s order will result in the imposition of liability upon entities with utterly no relationship to a claimant, as Defendants suggest.\nFinally, we reject Defendants\u2019 remaining justifications for setting aside the Form 60. For example, Defendants argue that the Form 60 should be set aside due to \u201cmutual mistake.\u201d However, as discussed above, we have previously held that the doctrine of mutual mistake is not applicable to a workers\u2019 compensation award made pursuant to a Form 60. Higgins, 132 N.C. App. at 726-27, 515 S.E.2d at 21-22. In addition, Defendants contend that, since a Form 60 is treated as a Commission decision, it should be subject to revision or modification pursuant to the Commission\u2019s inherent authority to vacate an award that \u201cit admits is contrary to law.\u201d However, we have concluded that the Commission\u2019s decision is not \u201ccontrary to law,\u201d a fact which precludes application of the authority upon which Defendants rely. Although Defendants argue that they should not be estopped from denying liability, the Commission expressly determined that the Form 60 \u201ccannot be set aside, rendering the issue of estoppel moot.\u201d For that reason, we need not reach the'estoppel issue. Finally, Defendants cite no authority for their contention that the Form 60 that they filed may be set aside because they did not determine, prior to filing, that Plaintiff was no longer a designated co-employee covered by their workers\u2019 compensation policy, and we know of none. As a result, for all of these reasons, we conclude that the Commission properly determined that Defendants were not entitled to have the Form 60 in which they admitted liability to Plaintiff set aside.\nC. Liability of Bovet Builders\nSecondly, Defendants argue that the Commission erred by failing to hold Boyet Builders responsible for paying Plaintiff\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation benefits pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-19. We are unable to agree with Defendants\u2019 contention.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-19 provides, in pertinent part, that:\nAny principal contractor . . . who shall sublet any contract for the performance of any work without requiring from such subcontractor ... a certificate of compliance . . . stating that such subcontractor has complied with [N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7] 97-93 hereof, shall be liable ... to the same extent as such subcontractor would be if he were subject to the provisions of this Article for the payment of compensation and other benefits. . . .\nAs this Court has previously noted, \u201cthe \u2018chain of liability [for making workers\u2019 compensation payments] extends from the immediate employer of the injured employee up the chain to the first responsible contractor who has the ability to pay.\u2019 \u201d Robertson v. Hagood Homes, Inc., 160 N.C. App. 137, 145, 584 S.E.2d 871, 876 (2003) (quoting from Commission\u2019s order). As a result, \u201c[N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7] 97-19 applies only when two conditions are met. First, the injured employee must be working for a subcontractor doing work which has been contracted to it by a principal contractor. Second, the subcontractor does not have workers\u2019 compensation insurance coverage covering the injured employee.\u201d Rich v. R.L. Casey, Inc., 118 N.C. App. 156, 159, 454 S.E.2d 666, 667 (1995) (citing Zocco v. U.S. Dept. of Army, 791 F. Supp. 595, 599 (E.D.N.C. 1992)), disc. rev. denied, 340 N.C. 360, 458 S.E.2d 190 (1995). As a result, Boyet Builders is not liable for Plaintiff\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation benefits in the absence of a determination that no coverage is available through Plaintiff\u2019s immediate employer, Wright\u2019s Roofing.\nIn view of Defendants\u2019 apparent recognition of this limitation on Boyet Builder\u2019s liability, they claim that Boyet Builders should be held liable for Plaintiff\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation benefits \u201cin the absence of any other workers\u2019 compensation insurance coverage as more fully explained\u201d earlier in their brief. However, we have already upheld the Commission\u2019s decision that the carrier for Plaintiff\u2019s immediate employer is liable for Plaintiff\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation benefits. Given that this aspect of Defendant\u2019s challenge to the Commission\u2019s order rests on an inadequate factual basis and given Defendants\u2019 failure to cite any authority for the proposition that a general contractor should be held liable when the immediate employer\u2019s carrier has admitted its liability, we conclude that the Commission did not err by failing to hold Boyet Builders liable for Plaintiffs workers\u2019 compensation benefits.\nD. Motion for Sanctions\nFinally, N.C.R. App. P. 34(a) provides that an appellate court \u201cmay, on its own initiative or motion of a party, impose a sanction against a party or attorney or both when the court determines that an appeal . . . was frivolous because of one or more of the following: (1) the appeal was not well grounded in fact and was not warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.\u201d On 22 June 2012, Boyet Builders and Auto-Owners Insurance filed a motion seeking the imposition of sanctions on Defendants on the grounds that their appeal \u201cis frivolous, not supported by any factual evidence in the record, not warranted by existing and well-established law, and sets forth no good argument for modifying the same.\u201d In support of their motion, these parties note that the law is settled as to an employer\u2019s or carrier\u2019s liability upon filing a Form 60, that Defendants failed to distinguish Higgins, and cite Kennedy, in which we upheld the imposition of sanctions by the Commission under circumstances similar to this case. On 2 July 2012, Defendants filed a response to the motion for sanctions in which they argued that the Commission erroneously \u201callowed the general contractor to walk away with no penalty or any obligation to pay anything to plaintiff\u2019 \u201csolely on the basis that [Defendants] had accidentally admitted compensability shortly after the accident, based on the mistaken belief that plaintiff was employed through AMS.\u201d In addition, Defendants contend that, because they \u201cprevailed at the Deputy Commissioner level of the Industrial Commission on all pending issues\u201d it was \u201centirely reasonable for AMS/Dallas/Crawford to appeal the Full Commission\u2019s reversal.\u201d\nAs we have already demonstrated, the Commission correctly ruled that Defendants were bound by their admission of compensability. Although we agree with Boyet Builders and Auto-Owners Insurance that Defendants\u2019 position was not a strong one and interpret the underlying theme of Defendants\u2019 challenge to the Commission\u2019s order to be more equitable than legal in nature, we conclude, \u201c[i]n our discretion,\u201d that sanctions should not be imposed upon counsel pursuant to Rule 34. State v. Hudgins, 195 N.C. App. 430, 436, 672 S.E.2d 717, 721 (2009). As a result, the motion for sanctions is denied.\nIII. Conclusion\nThus, for the reasons discussed above, we conclude that none of Defendants\u2019 challenges to the Commission\u2019s order have any merit and that Defendants\u2019 counsel should not be subject to sanctions pursuant to N.C.R. App. P. 34 for pursuing a frivolous appeal. As a result, the Commission\u2019s order should be, and hereby is, affirmed, and Boyet Builders\u2019 and Auto-Owners Insurance\u2019s motion for sanctions should be, and hereby is, denied.\nAFFIRMED; MOTION FOR SANCTIONS DENIED.\nJudges ROBERT N. HUNTER, JR., and McCULLOUGH concur.\n. The present appeal has been taken by Defendants AMS Staff Leasing, Dallas National Insurance, Co., and Crawford & Company, all of whom will be referred to collectively throughout the remainder of this opinion as \u201cDefendants.\u201d The non-appealing defendants, Wright\u2019s Roofing, Boyet Builders, and Auto-Owners Insurance, will be identified by name as necessary.\n. A Form 63 is filed pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-18(d), which provides that, if \u201cthe employer or insurer is uncertain on reasonable grounds whether the claim is compensable or whether it has liability for the claim under this Article, the employer or insurer may initiate compensation payments without prejudice and without admitting liability.\u201d However, \u201c[i]f the employer or insurer does not contest the compensability of the claim or its liability therefor within 90 days from the date it first has written or actual notice of the injury or death... it waives the right to contest the compensability of and its liability for the claim\u201d in the absence of newly-discovered evidence.", "type": "majority", "author": "ERVIN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Crumley Roberts, LLP, by Michael T. Brown, Jr., for Plaintiffappellee.", "McAngus Goudelock and Courie, by Daniel L. McCullough, for Defendant-appellees Boyet Builders and Auto-Owners Insurance.", "Teague Campbell Dennis & Gorham, L.L.P., by John A. Tomei and Tara D. Muller, for Defendant-appellants" ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "DENNIS RAY SPIVEY, Plaintiff v. WRIGHT\u2019S ROOFING, Employer/Subcontractor, NONINSURED; RANDY WRIGHT, Individually; AMS STAFF LEASING, Employer; DALLAS NATIONAL INSURANCE, Carrier for Wright\u2019s Roofing and AMS Staff Leasing; CRAWFORD & COMPANY, Administrator/Servicing Agent for Dallas National Insurance; BOYET BUILDERS, General Contractor; and AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE, Carrier [for Boyet Builders], Defendants\nNo. COA12-270\nFiled 15 January 2013\n1. Workers\u2019 Compensation \u2014 Form 60 admission of liability\u2014 unilateral mistake \u2014 no relief\nDefendants forfeited the ability to challenge their responsibility for paying plaintiff workers\u2019 compensation benefits by filing a Form 60. In doing so, defendants admitted the compensability of plaintiffs claim and their liability for making the necessary benefit payments, so that the basis for relief was a claim of unilateral mistake. An employer or carrier is not entitled to relief from a Form 60 based solely upon the fact that the party making the filing failed to adequately investigate all relevant issues before conceding compensability or liability.\n2. Workers\u2019 Compensation \u2014 uninsured employer \u2014 subcontractor \u2014 coverage previously carried\n\u2018 The Industrial Commission did not err by failing to hold Boyet Builders, a contractor, liable for plaintiff\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation benefits under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-19 on the grounds that plaintiff was employed by a subcontractor that did not obtain workers\u2019 compensation coverage. It was held elsewhere in the opinion that the carrier for plaintiff\u2019s immediate employer was liable for plaintiff\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation benefits.\n3. Appeal and Error \u2014 motion for sanctions \u2014 frivolous appeal \u2014 denied\nThe motion of three of the defendants for sanctions against other defendants under N.C. R. App. R 34(a) for filing a frivolous appeal in a workers\u2019 compensation case was denied. Although the position of the appealing defendants was not strong and the underlying theme of the appeal was more equitable than legal in nature, the Court of Appeals denied the motion in its discretion.\nAppeal by defendants from Opinion and Award entered 2 December 2011 by the North Carolina Industrial Commission. Heard in the Court of Appeals 30 August 2012.\nCrumley Roberts, LLP, by Michael T. Brown, Jr., for Plaintiffappellee.\nMcAngus Goudelock and Courie, by Daniel L. McCullough, for Defendant-appellees Boyet Builders and Auto-Owners Insurance.\nTeague Campbell Dennis & Gorham, L.L.P., by John A. Tomei and Tara D. Muller, for Defendant-appellants" }, "file_name": "0106-01", "first_page_order": 116, "last_page_order": 130 }