{ "id": 4131600, "name": "IN THE MATTER OF D.C.", "name_abbreviation": "In re D.C.", "decision_date": "2013-02-05", "docket_number": "No. COA12-893", "first_page": "327", "last_page": "333", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "225 N.C. App. 327" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "618 S.E.2d 813", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633890 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "819" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/618/0813-01" ] }, { "cite": "623 S.E.2d 587", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12634710 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/623/0587-01" ] }, { "cite": "615 S.E.2d 391", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633272 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "396" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/615/0391-01" ] }, { "cite": "663 S.E.2d 13", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12641472, 12641473, 12641474, 12641457, 12641458, 12641459, 12641460, 12641461, 12641462, 12641463, 12641464, 12641465, 12641466, 12641467, 12641468, 12641469, 12641470, 12641471 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "unpublished" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/663/0013-16", "/se2d/663/0013-17", "/se2d/663/0013-18", "/se2d/663/0013-10", "/se2d/663/0013-01", "/se2d/663/0013-02", "/se2d/663/0013-03", "/se2d/663/0013-04", "/se2d/663/0013-05", "/se2d/663/0013-06", "/se2d/663/0013-07", "/se2d/663/0013-08", "/se2d/663/0013-09", "/se2d/663/0013-11", "/se2d/663/0013-12", "/se2d/663/0013-13", "/se2d/663/0013-14", "/se2d/663/0013-15" ] }, { "cite": "577 S.E.2d 421", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "426", "parenthetical": "a finding of one statutory ground is sufficient to support the termination of parental rights" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "156 N.C. App. 533", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9191392 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "540", "parenthetical": "a finding of one statutory ground is sufficient to support the termination of parental rights" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/156/0533-01" ] }, { "cite": "453 S.E.2d 220", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "224" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "117 N.C. App. 693", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526237 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "699" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/117/0693-01" ] }, { "cite": "554 S.E.2d 341", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "354 N.C. 218", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 138560, 138547, 138483, 138421, 138301 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/354/0218-02", "/nc/354/0218-05", "/nc/354/0218-03", "/nc/354/0218-01", "/nc/354/0218-04" ] }, { "cite": "546 S.E.2d 169", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "175" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "143 N.C. App. 402", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11434950 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "410" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/143/0402-01" ] }, { "cite": "173 N.C. App. 375", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8353569 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "384" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/173/0375-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 64", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3795488, 3786707, 3786455, 3793944, 3788505, 3793787, 3789308, 3792765 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0064-03", "/nc/360/0064-01", "/nc/360/0064-04", "/nc/360/0064-07", "/nc/360/0064-06", "/nc/360/0064-08", "/nc/360/0064-02", "/nc/360/0064-05" ] }, { "cite": "171 N.C. App. 457", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8437773 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "464-65" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/171/0457-01" ] }, { "cite": "323 S.E.2d 754", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "758" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "72 N.C. App. 118", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526281 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "124" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/72/0118-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 N.C. App. 399", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "unpublished" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 586, "char_count": 13761, "ocr_confidence": 0.756, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.5330875625009783e-08, "percentile": 0.2841433998661698 }, "sha256": "df14416f0a36ca958f834dacc2cb4dc9800ad4d36dc002033c142a59eca6d542", "simhash": "1:bba8d2ce32af84f4", "word_count": 2254 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:12:03.865649+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge ERVIN concur." ], "parties": [ "IN THE MATTER OF D.C." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "STROUD, Judge.\nRespondent mother appeals from the trial court\u2019s 1 May 2012 order terminating her parental rights in her minor child. We affirm.\nOn 17 November 2004, the New Hanover County Department of Social Services (\u201cDSS\u201d) filed a juvenile petition alleging Don, then three years old, to be neglected and dependent due to severe injuries he sustained from a dog attack in the home. DSS obtained non-secure custody, and the child was placed in foster care. The minor child was adjudicated neglected on 13 January 2005, and the allegation of dependency was dismissed. On 14 July 2005, the permanent plan was changed from reunification to adoption and DSS was authorized to pursue termination of parental rights.\nAfter another permanency planning review hearing held on 29 November 2007, the trial court changed the permanent plan for Don to guardianship and granted guardianship to the child\u2019s foster parents. Respondent appealed to this Court, which affirmed the order in an opinion filed on 15 July 2008. In re D.C., 191 N.C. App. 399, 663 S.E.2d 13 (2008) (unpublished).\nOn 27 May 2011, respondent filed a pro se motion for review. Due to the passage of time, new counsel and a guardian ad litem were appointed to represent respondent and a guardian ad litem was appointed for the minor child. On 29 August 2011, respondent\u2019s attorney filed a new motion for review. Respondent\u2019s pro se motion was dismissed on 23 December 2011.\nOn 19 October 2011, Don\u2019s guardians filed a petition to terminate respondent\u2019s parental rights. The petition alleged respondent parents neglected and/or abused the minor child, willfully left the minor child in placement outside the home for more than twelve months without making reasonable progress to correct the conditions that led to the removal of the child, are incapable of providing for the proper care and supervision of the child, failed to pay support for the child, and willfully abandoned the child.\nThe termination petition and the August motion for review were consolidated for a hearing held on 9 January and 20 February 2012. The trial court entered its order on 1 May 2012 terminating respondent\u2019s parental rights to the minor child based on neglect, failure to make reasonable progress, and willful abandonment. The court also denied respondent\u2019s motion for review. Respondent appeals.\n\u201cThe standard for review in termination of parental rights cases is whether the findings of fact are supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence and whether these findings, in turn, support the conclusions of law.\u201d In re Clark, 72 N.C. App. 118, 124, 323 S.E.2d 754, 758 (1984).\nRespondent challenges the findings of fact relating to each of the three grounds contained in the order as being unsupported by the evidence and argues that the findings of fact do not support the trial court\u2019s conclusions. Further, respondent argues petitioners had no authority to file a petition to terminate her parental rights after the trial court ordered guardianship as the permanent plan. We address the latter issue first.\nRespondent notes that in the 14 December 2007 order establishing guardianship as the permanent plan for the minor child, the trial court did not close the juvenile case or relieve DSS of responsibility for reunification but instead directed DSS to participate in helping respondent reestablish a relationship with the minor child. Respondent argues that the guardians were not parties to the juvenile case, nor did they seek to intervene as parties at any point in the case. She asserts that a hearing should have been held in order to allow her to contest a change in the permanent plan from guardianship to termination of her rights. She argues that without an order from the trial court changing the permanent plan and without making DSS a party, \u201cthe guardians unilaterally commenced a private action for termination by filing their petition in October 2011.\u201d We agree that this is what the guardians did; that action, however, is specifically authorized by the Juvenile Code.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1103, which governs \u201cWho may file a petition or motion\u201d to terminate a parent\u2019s rights, permits \u201c[a]ny person who has been judicially appointed as the guardian of the person of the juvenile\u201d to file such a petition or motion. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1103(a)(2) (2011). Despite respondent\u2019s arguments, the Juvenile Code places no preliminary requirements on guardians before they may file a petition or motion to terminate a parent\u2019s rights. Therefore, the guardians\u2019 petition seeking to terminate respondent\u2019s parental rights was proper, and respondent\u2019s contention that another permanent planning review hearing should have been held prior to the filing of the termination petition has no merit.\nRespondent contends the grounds of neglect and failure to make reasonable progress are not supported by the findings of fact or the evidence.\nTo terminate a parent\u2019s rights pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1111(a)(2), it must be shown by clear and convincing evidence that the parent (1) willfully left the child in placement outside the home for more than twelve months, and (2) as of the time of the termination hearing, failed to make reasonable progress under the circumstances to correct the conditions that led to the child\u2019s removal. In re O.C., 171 N.C. App. 457, 464-65, 615 S.E.2d 391, 396, disc. review denied, 360 N.C. 64, 623 S.E.2d 587 (2005). The trial court\u2019s order must contain adequate findings of fact as to whether the parent acted willfully and as to whether the parent made reasonable progress under the circumstances. In re C.C., 173 N.C. App. 375, 384, 618 S.E.2d 813, 819 (2005). We have stated that \u201c[willfulness is established when the respondent had the ability to show reasonable progress, but was unwilling to make the effort.\u201d In re McMillon, 143 N.C. App. 402, 410, 546 S.E.2d 169, 175, (citation omitted), disc. review denied, 354 N.C. 218, 554 S.E.2d 341 (2001). \u201cA finding of willfulness is not precluded even if the respondent has made some efforts to regain custody of the child[].\u201d In re Nolen, 117 N.C. App. 693, 699, 453 S.E.2d 220, 224 (1995).\nRespondent first argues that the condition which led to Don\u2019s removal from the home, a dangerous environment due to the dog attack, no longer exists. She notes that the dog was destroyed, there was no evidence of another dog in the home, and that respondent\u2019s home was reported to be \u201cclean and tidy\u201d by DSS in 2007. At the time of the termination hearing in 2012, she had maintained custody of one of her other children for three years and she had regular extended visitation with her other two minor children. She argues that because her home was deemed appropriate for her to have custody of one of her children and she had made progress in other aspects of her life, the trial court had no basis for determining that she willfully left the minor child in foster care. We do not agree.\nPolice officers who responded to the attack on Don killed the dog that night, even before Don was adjudicated neglected. Don was removed from respondent\u2019s custody because of the injurious environment in respondent\u2019s home and the lack of proper care and supervision therein; the dog attack was just one of the manifestations of the injurious environment. Don was removed not merely because of the attack, but because respondent had the poor judgment to leave her young child with a dangerous animal. Ms. Sargent testified that respondent still does not understand the nature of Don\u2019s injuries or the trauma he experienced. This lack of understanding of the seriousness of Don\u2019s injuries and post-traumatic stress caused by the dog attack reflects the same underlying condition that led to Don\u2019s removal \u2014 respondent\u2019s failure to understand what constitutes a danger to Don\u2019s health, safety, and welfare. Evidence of respondent\u2019s lack of reasonable progress toward understanding the significance of Don\u2019s injuries, and the trauma he suffered as a result, therefore, constitutes evidence of a failure to correct the injurious environment that led to Don\u2019s removal. The reunification plan was meant in part to educate respondent about these issues and to enable her to reestablish her relationship with Don.\nThe court found that the child\u2019s therapist, Ms. Sargent, was charged with establishing a plan for respondent to work on reunification with the minor child. The plan included having an individual meeting between Ms. Sargent and respondent before any visits with the child could take place. Ms. Sargent communicated multiple times with respondent regarding the need to set up such an appointment, but respondent did not do so until 19 January 2012, after the first hearing in the termination proceedings and over four years after the last order entered in the case.\nThe court found as fact that the child had been in the care of the guardians since December 2004, and that the last visit between the child and respondent took place in 2005. The trial court also found that respondent did not believe her child was scared of her or of going to live with her and did not believe the letters she received from the child in which he stated his desire to be adopted by his foster parents were actually written by him.\nBased upon our review of the transcript, Ms. Sargent\u2019s testimony supports the findings that respondent was told what she had to do to progress toward visits with the minor child, that Ms. Sargent talked to respondent about needing to set up an appointment on multiple occasions, and that respondent failed to do so. Despite respondent\u2019s contention that a plan was never put in writing, Ms. Sargent\u2019s testimony, determined by the trial judge to be credible, clearly showed that respondent knew what she had to do and she failed to do it. Although respondent testified that she did not attempt to make an appointment because Ms. Sargent told her the child wasn\u2019t ready for visitation, respondent was supposed to meet with Ms. Sargent separately first as a preliminary step toward visitation, and she did not take that step in the four years after guardianship became the permanent plan. Moreover, the December 2007 order establishing guardianship of the child specifically stated that any party could go back to court by filing a motion. Respondent waited over three and a half years before seeking help with visitation by filing a motion for review in the trial court.\nThe findings of fact that respondent did not believe the letters sent to her by the minor child were actually written by him, or that the minor child was scared of her and of coming to live with her are supported by respondent\u2019s testimony as well as Ms. Sargent\u2019s testimony. Respondent\u2019s inability to acknowledge and comprehend the severity of the minor child\u2019s trauma indicates a lack of progress despite respondent\u2019s years of counseling with her own therapist.\nGiven these circumstances, we conclude that the trial court\u2019s findings of fact were supported by the evidence and those findings supported the court\u2019s determination under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-llll(a)(2) that respondent willfully left Don in placement outside the home for more than 12 months and failed to make reasonable progress to correct the conditions that led to Don\u2019s removal. Therefore, it was not error for the trial court to terminate respondent\u2019s parental rights on this ground.\nBecause the trial court did not err in terminating respondent\u2019s parental rights on at least one ground for termination pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1111, we need not address respondent\u2019s arguments regarding the grounds of neglect or willful abandonment. See In re Humphrey, 156 N.C. App. 533, 540, 577 S.E.2d 421, 426 (2003) (a finding of one statutory ground is sufficient to support the termination of parental rights). The order of the trial court is affirmed.\nAFFIRMED.\nChief Judge MARTIN and Judge ERVIN concur.\n. The order also terminated the rights of the juvenile\u2019s father, who has not filed an appeal.\n. The trial court specifically found Ms. Sargent\u2019s testimony credible and relied on the information she provided.\n. The trial court specifically found Ms. Sargent\u2019s testimony credible and relied on the information she provided.", "type": "majority", "author": "STROUD, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "No brief filed for petitioner-appellees.", "Parker Poe Adams & Bernstein LLP, by William L. Esser IV, for guardian ad litem.", "Jeffrey L. Miller for respondent-appellant mother." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE MATTER OF D.C.\nNo. COA12-893\nFiled 5 February 2013\n1. Termination of Parental Rights \u2014 authority to file petition\u2014 guardianship \u2014 permanent planning review\nThe trial court did not err in a termination of parental rights case by concluding petitioners had authority to file a petition to terminate respondents\u2019 parental rights after the trial court ordered guardianship as the permanent plan. The guardians\u2019 petition seeking to terminate respondent\u2019s parental rights was proper, and respondent\u2019s contention that another permanency planning review hearing should have been held prior to the filing of the termination petition had no merit.\n2. Termination of Parental Rights \u2014 grounds\u2014failure to make reasonable progress \u2014 sufficiency of findings of fact\nThe trial court did not err in a termination of parental rights case by concluding that respondent mother\u2019s failure to make reasonable progress was supported by the findings of fact. Because the trial court did not err in terminating respondent\u2019s parental rights on at least one ground for termination pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-1111, the Court of Appeals did not need to address respondent\u2019s arguments regarding the grounds of neglect or willful abandonment.\nAppeal by respondent from order entered 1 May 2012 by Judge Jeffrey E. Noecker in District Court, New Hanover County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 3 January 2013.\nNo brief filed for petitioner-appellees.\nParker Poe Adams & Bernstein LLP, by William L. Esser IV, for guardian ad litem.\nJeffrey L. Miller for respondent-appellant mother." }, "file_name": "0327-01", "first_page_order": 337, "last_page_order": 343 }