{ "id": 4131664, "name": "IN THE MATTER OF E.J.", "name_abbreviation": "In re E.J.", "decision_date": "2013-02-05", "docket_number": "No. COA12-673", "first_page": "333", "last_page": "339", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "225 N.C. App. 333" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "669 S.E.2d 850", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12642339 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "854" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/669/0850-01" ] }, { "cite": "430 S.E.2d 277", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "281", "parenthetical": "\"In exercising jurisdiction over child custody matters, North Carolina requires the trial court to make specific findings of fact supporting its actions.\"" }, { "page": "281" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "110 N.C. App. 406", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525695 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "411", "parenthetical": "\"In exercising jurisdiction over child custody matters, North Carolina requires the trial court to make specific findings of fact supporting its actions.\"" }, { "page": "411" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/110/0406-01" ] }, { "cite": "498 S.E.2d 836", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "839" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "129 N.C. App 338", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11650050 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "343" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/129/0338-01" ] }, { "cite": "194 N.C. App. 439", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4162787 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "446" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/194/0439-01" ] }, { "cite": "566 S.E.2d 858", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "860-61" }, { "page": "860" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "151 N.C. App. 690", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9082050 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "692-94" }, { "page": "693" }, { "page": "693" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/151/0690-01" ] }, { "cite": "581 S.E.2d 793", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "795" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 N.C. App. 441", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9188012 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "443" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/158/0441-01" ] }, { "cite": "716 S.E.2d 354", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "357" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 591, "char_count": 14808, "ocr_confidence": 0.765, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.06991798394977e-08, "percentile": 0.3749454118753642 }, "sha256": "e93cc01326cc876be067b3ec1e26acec44eef5687c4f224423ff2a9bdc46da1c", "simhash": "1:cce3314772693550", "word_count": 2434 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:12:03.865649+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges STROUD and ERVIN concur." ], "parties": [ "IN THE MATTER OF E.J." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MARTIN, Chief Judge.\nMother appeals from an order that adjudicated her son neglected and dependent, and placed him in the temporary legal custody of the Guilford County Department of Social Services (\u201cDSS\u201d). For the following reasons, we vacate and remand.\nOn or about 23 January 2012, fourteen-year-old E.J. and his father were returning to Tennessee after a weekend trip to Fayetteville, North Carolina, when they stopped at a gas station in Greensboro. Following an argument with his father, E.J. called police and informed them that his father was trying to fight him and that they had been living out of a car. Greensboro Police officers brought E.J. to DSS.\nThe next day, DSS filed a juvenile petition alleging E.J. was a neglected and dependent juvenile. In the petition, DSS alleged that the father and E.J. had traveled to Fayetteville, North Carolina, in the hopes of finding an apartment; that the father was diagnosed with bipolar disorder; and that E.J.\u2019s relatives in the area were unwilling to take E.J. into their homes. DSS further alleged that mother, who lived in New Hampshire, informed DSS that she was unable to care for E.J.; that she admitted to DSS that several of her children had been removed from her care and placed in the custody of social services in New York; and that she acknowledged paying $100.00 per month in child support towards E.J.\u2019s care. A summons was personally served on the father, but the summons mailed to mother was not returned and the record does not indicate that she was served through any other means. The trial court entered an initial order for non-secure custody based upon E.J. being abandoned.\nThe trial court held a hearing on 25 January 2012 and entered an order for continued non-secure custody on 1 February 2012. The court found that there was prior child protective services history in Clinton County, New York, and that DSS was to provide the name and phone number of \u201cthe Judge in Clinton County, NY\u201d so the court could speak with the New York judge. The trial court entered another order for continued non-secure custody on 10 February 2012. The trial court found that:\nThis court spoke w/ Judge Timothy Lawless, presiding judge in Clinton County, New York. Judge Lawless has not determined if Clinton County should retain custody [sic], but will make determination and notify this court prior to next hearing. Appropriate for this Ct. to exercise emergency jurisdiction for the purpose of continuing custody with GCDSS.\nThe trial court ordered E.J. to remain in the non-secure custody of DSS and set the adjudication hearing for March 2012.\nThe trial court conducted an adjudication and disposition hearing on 9 March 2012. At the start of the hearing, the trial court was advised that mother had not been served with the juvenile petition and she was not present for the hearing. The parties also advised the court that mother, through her attorney, had filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude oral statements mother made to DSS personnel. The trial court did not rule on the motion in limine as mother had not been served with the petition and dismissed mother\u2019s provisional counsel based upon mother\u2019s failure to appear. By order filed 4 April 2012, the trial court adjudicated E.J. to be a dependent and neglected juvenile. The trial court concluded that \u201c[t]his matter is properly before the Court and the Court has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of this action\u201d and ordered \u201c[t]his matter is retained for further orders of the court.\u201d Mother appeals.\nWe first address DSS and the Guardian ad Litem\u2019s (\u201cGAL\u201d) assertion that mother lacks standing to bring this appeal. Although mother was not served with the juvenile petition, she is a proper party to appeal the adjudication and disposition order. N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 7B-1001 and 7B-1002 designate when a right to appeal exists in a juvenile matter and which persons possess the right to appeal. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 7B-1001 & 7B-1002 (2011). N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-1001 provides that \u201c[a]ny initial order of disposition and the adjudication order upon which it is based\u201d may be appealed directly to this Court. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1001(a)(3). Under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-1002, which is entitled \u201cProper parties for appeal[,]\u201d an appeal may be taken by \u201c[a] parent[.]\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1002(4). Accordingly, as mother is E.J.\u2019s parent, she may pursue the present appeal from the adjudication and disposition order. We now turn to the merits of mother\u2019s arguments.\nMother contends the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the 4 April 2012 adjudication and disposition order. We agree.\nWhether the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, and is reviewed de novo on appeal. Powers v. Wagner,_ N.C. App._,_, 716 S.E.2d 354, 357 (2011). Subject matter jurisdiction is the threshold requirement for a court to hear and adjudicate a controversy brought before it. In re McKinney, 158 N.C. App. 441, 443, 581 S.E.2d 793, 795 (2003). The North Carolina Juvenile Code grants our district courts \u201cexclusive, original jurisdiction over any case involving a juvenile who is alleged to be abused, neglected, or dependent.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-200(a) (2011). However, the jurisdictional requirements of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act (\u201cUCCJEA\u201d) and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (\u201cPKPA\u201d) 'must also be satisfied for a court to have authority to adjudicate petitions filed pursuant to our juvenile code. In re Brode, 151 N.C. App. 690, 692-94, 566 S.E.2d 858, 860-61 (2002).\nJurisdiction under the UCCJEA may be either \u201cexclusive, continuing\u201d or \u201ctemporary emergency.\u201d See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 50A-201-204 (2011). \u201cThe first provision of the UCCJEA, [N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50A-201], addresses the jurisdictional requirements for initial child-custody determinations.\u201d In re J.W.S., 194 N.C. App. 439, 446, 669 S.E.2d 850, 854 (2008). According to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50A-102(8), an \u201cinitial determination\u201d is \u201cthe first child-custody determination concerning a particular child.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50A-102(8) (2011). A court that properly makes an initial determination will have \u201cexclusive, continuing jurisdiction\u201d until the happening of certain enumerated events which cause the court to lose that jurisdiction. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50A-202. These events include, inter alia, when a court \u201cdetermines that the child, the child\u2019s parents, and any person acting as a parent do not presently reside in [the state that made the initial determination].\u201d Id. Either the state that made the initial child-custody determination or another state may make the determination that none of the enumerated parties continue to reside in that state. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50A-203(2); Official Comment to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50A-203; Official Comment to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50A-202 (\u201cIf the child, the parents, and all persons acting as parents have all left the State which made the custody determination prior to the commencement of the modification proceeding, considerations of waste of resources dictate that a court in State B, as well as a court in State A, can decide that State A has lost exclusive, continuing jurisdiction.\u201d).\nA North Carolina court may not modify another court\u2019s child-custody determination unless:\na court of this State has jurisdiction to make an initial determination under G.S. 50A-201(a)(l) or G.S.. 50A-201(a)(2) and:\n(1) The court of the other state determines it no longer has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under G.S. 50A-202 or that a court of this State would be a more convenient forum under G.S. 50A-207; or\n(2) A court of this State or a court of the other state determines that the child, the child\u2019s parents, and any person acting as a parent do not presently reside in the other state.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50A-203 (emphasis added). The requirements for an \u201cinitial determination\u201d under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50A-201(a)(l) and 50A-201(a)(2) state:\n[A] court of this State has jurisdiction to make an initial child-custody determination only if:\n(1) This State is the home state of the child on the date of the commencement of the proceeding, or was the home state of the child within six months before the commencement of the proceeding, and the child is absent from this State but a parent or person acting as a parent continues to live in this State;\n(2) A court of another state does not have jurisdiction under subdivision (1), or a court of the home state of the child has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this State is the more appropriate forum under G.S. 50A-207 or G.S. 50A-208, and:\na. The child and the child\u2019s parents, or the child and at least one parent or a person acting as a parent, have a significant connection with this State other than mere physical presence; and\nb. Substantial evidence is available in this State concerning the child\u2019s care, protection, training, and personal relationships;\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50A-201(a).\nA court that cannot meet the requirements for exclusive, continued jurisdiction may, nevertheless, exercise \u201ctemporary emergency\u201d jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50A-204. Under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50A-204(a), temporary emergency jurisdiction may be invoked by a court if a \u201cchild is present in this State and the child has been abandoned or it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because the child, or a sibling or parent of the child, is subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50A-204(a). The statute further provides:\n(c) If there is a previous child-custody determination that is entitled to be enforced under this Article, . .. any order issued by a court of this State under this section must specify in the order a period that the court considers adequate to allow the person seeking an order to obtain an order from the state having jurisdiction .... The order issued in this State remains in effect until an order is obtained from the other state within the period specified or the period expires.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50A-204(c). \u201cWhen the court invokes emergency jurisdiction, any orders entered shall be temporary protective orders only.\u201d In re Brode, 151 N.C. App. at 693, 566 S.E.2d at 860 (citing In re Malone, 129 N.C. App 338, 343, 498 S.E.2d 836, 839 (1998)).\nTo exercise either emergency or exclusive jurisdiction, the trial court must make specific findings of fact to support such an action. Williams v. Williams, 110 N.C. App. 406, 411, 430 S.E.2d 277, 281 (1993) (\u201cIn exercising jurisdiction over child custody matters, North Carolina requires the trial court to make specific findings of fact supporting its actions.\u201d).\nIn this case, it appears the trial court first learned of the possibility of a valid New York child-custody order at the 25 January 2012 hearing. After making contact with Judge Lawless of Clinton County, New York, the trial court properly entered its February 2012 order that continued non-secure custody and concluded it had emergency jurisdiction as the New York court had not determined at that time whether New York would retain jurisdiction. Then, in its adjudication and disposition order, the trial court summarily concluded it had \u201cjurisdiction over the . . . subject matter of this action.\u201d However, there is no finding of fact, order, or any other indication in the record showing that the New York court had opted not to exercise its jurisdiction in this matter. And while it appears from the record that neither of the parents nor E.J. continue to live in New York, there is no specific finding of fact or conclusion of law concerning the status of the New York court\u2019s exclusive, continuing jurisdiction. Even if the trial court had supported a conclusion that New York no longer had exclusive, continuing jurisdiction because none of the parties continued to reside in New York with adequate findings of fact, the order still lacked specific findings of fact and conclusions of law that the North Carolina court met the requirements of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50A-201(a)(1) or 50A-201(a)(2) such that it could make a modification under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50A-203. Without these specific findings, the order was insufficient to invoke exclusive jurisdiction in North Carolina. See Williams, 110 N.C. App. at 411, 430 S.E.2d at 281.\nThe adjudication and disposition order is also insufficient to invoke temporary emergency jurisdiction under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50A-204. The trial court could only enter an order under its temporary emergency jurisdiction for a specific period of time. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-204(c); In re Brode, 151 N.C. App. at 693, 566 S.E.2d at 860. The trial court\u2019s order of 4 April 2012 does not state a period at the end of which the order will expire. Indeed, the trial court\u2019s order states that the matter was \u201cretained for further orders of the court\u201d and establishes a permanent plan for E.J. Therefore, the order, by its terms, is insufficient to establish the court\u2019s temporary emergency jurisdiction over this action.\nAccordingly, while the trial court had temporary jurisdiction to enter the continued non-secure custody orders, the trial court did not have jurisdiction, exclusive or temporary, to enter the juvenile adjudication order. Thus, we vacate the trial court\u2019s order entered 4 April 2012.\nVacated and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion and the dictates of the UCCJEA and PKPA.\nJudges STROUD and ERVIN concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "MARTIN, Chief Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Mercedes 0. Chut, for petitioner-appellee, Guilford County Department of Social Services.", "Margaret F. Rowlett, for, Guardian ad Litem.", "Leslie Rawls, for respondent-appellant, mother." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE MATTER OF E.J.\nNo. COA12-673\nFiled 5 February 2013\n1. Parties \u2014 proper party \u2014 juvenile neglect and dependency\u2014 parent\nAlthough respondent mother was not served with the juvenile petition in a neglect and dependency case, she was a proper party to appeal the adjudication and disposition order under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-1002.\n2. Child Abuse, Dependency, and Neglect \u2014 adjudication and disposition order \u2014 lack of subject matter jurisdiction\nThe trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction in a juvenile neglect and dependency case to enter the 4 April 2012 adjudication and disposition order. The order lacked specific findings of fact and conclusions of law that the North Carolina court met the requirements of N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 50A-201(a)(l) or 50A-201(a)(2) such that it could make a modification under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50A-203. While the trial court had temporary jurisdiction to enter the continued non-secure child custody orders, the trial court did not have jurisdiction, exclusive or temporary, to enter the juvenile adjudication and disposition order.\nAppeal by respondent-mother from order entered 4 April 2012 by Judge Betty J. Brown in Guilford County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 3 January 2013.\nMercedes 0. Chut, for petitioner-appellee, Guilford County Department of Social Services.\nMargaret F. Rowlett, for, Guardian ad Litem.\nLeslie Rawls, for respondent-appellant, mother." }, "file_name": "0333-01", "first_page_order": 343, "last_page_order": 349 }