{ "id": 4132597, "name": "IN THE MATTER OF T.R.T.", "name_abbreviation": "In re T.R.T.", "decision_date": "2013-02-19", "docket_number": "No. COA12-905", "first_page": "567", "last_page": "575", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "225 N.C. App. 567" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "621 S.E.2d 647", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12634400 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "652" }, { "page": "652", "parenthetical": "alteration in original" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/621/0647-01" ] }, { "cite": "644 S.E.2d 588", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12638413 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "592", "parenthetical": "affirming a finding of neglect based on parents' previous involvement with DSS and failure to comply with case plan" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/644/0588-01" ] }, { "cite": "638 S.E.2d 236", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637349 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "240", "parenthetical": "\"[W]e agree that some of [the challenged findings] are not supported by evidence in the record. When, however, ample other findings of fact support an adjudication of neglect, erroneous findings unnecessary to the determination do not constitute reversible error.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/638/0236-01" ] }, { "cite": "616 S.E.2d 264", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633480 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "273", "parenthetical": "quoting In re Huff, 140 N.C. App. 288, 298, 536 S.E.2d 838, 845 (2000)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/616/0264-01" ] }, { "cite": "151 S.E.2d 582", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "586" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "268 N.C. 624", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564406 ], "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "628-29" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/268/0624-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 6-21", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(2)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "728 S.E.2d 356", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "365", "parenthetical": "concluding that a generic provision in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 6-21(2" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 5043.2", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-13.2", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 4, "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(e)", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "(e)" }, { "page": "(e)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "681 S.E.2d 559", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "563" }, { "page": "563" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "199 N.C. App. 557", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4169900 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "562" }, { "page": "562" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/199/0557-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 S.E.2d 844", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "849" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "10 N.C. App. 545", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8554881 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "552" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/10/0545-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 N.C. App. 517", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8352485 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "522" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/174/0517-01" ] }, { "cite": "183 N.C. App. 207", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8202464 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "210", "parenthetical": "affirming a finding of neglect based on parents' previous involvement with DSS and failure to comply with case plan" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/183/0207-01" ] }, { "cite": "306 S.E.2d 792", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "796" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "64 N.C. App. 95", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526232 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "101" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/64/0095-01" ] }, { "cite": "436 S.E.2d 898", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "901-02", "parenthetical": "quoting In re Thompson, 64 N.C. App. 95, 101, 306 S.E.2d 792, 796 (1983)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "112 N.C. App. 747", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523795 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "752", "parenthetical": "quoting In re Thompson, 64 N.C. App. 95, 101, 306 S.E.2d 792, 796 (1983)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/112/0747-01" ] }, { "cite": "180 N.C. App. 539", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8243658 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "547", "parenthetical": "\"[W]e agree that some of [the challenged findings] are not supported by evidence in the record. When, however, ample other findings of fact support an adjudication of neglect, erroneous findings unnecessary to the determination do not constitute reversible error.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/180/0539-01" ] }, { "cite": "536 S.E.2d 838", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "845" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "140 N.C. App. 288", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12125951 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "298" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/140/0288-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 N.C. App. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8318580 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "16", "parenthetical": "quoting In re Huff, 140 N.C. App. 288, 298, 536 S.E.2d 838, 845 (2000)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/172/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "562 S.E.2d 551", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "556", "parenthetical": "a party must object to testimony on the challenged basis to properly preserve the issue for appeal" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 N.C. App. 563", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9130119 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "569", "parenthetical": "a party must object to testimony on the challenged basis to properly preserve the issue for appeal" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/149/0563-01" ] }, { "cite": "580 S.E.2d 69", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "73" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "157 N.C. App. 673", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9188432 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "679" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/157/0673-01" ] }, { "cite": "491 S.E.2d 672", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "676", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 N.C. App. 505", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11798267 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "511", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/127/0505-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 858, "char_count": 20541, "ocr_confidence": 0.762, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.556435772388583e-08, "percentile": 0.34959161711744585 }, "sha256": "1fc22eddaf0433b33e4644eb8ef01a9dee66295b41541c51b0ebf3f661d1e1e4", "simhash": "1:efe8a06e351f5f73", "word_count": 3167 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:12:03.865649+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges HUNTER (Robert C.) and DAVIS concur." ], "parties": [ "IN THE MATTER OF T.R.T." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "McCullough, Judge.\nRespondent-mother appeals from an order concluding that her son, T.R.T., was neglected and that it was in T.R.T.\u2019s best interest to remain in the custody of the New Hanover County Department of Social Services (\u201cDSS\u201d). We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.\nOn 6 February 2012, DSS filed a juvenile petition alleging that T.R.T. was neglected in that he lived in an environment injurious to his welfare and did not receive proper care, supervision, or discipline from his mother. DSS had previously been involved with the family due to respondent-mother\u2019s mental health issues; T.R.T. had previously been adjudicated neglected; and T.R.T. had been in DSS custody from July 2010 until 27 October 2011, when he was returned to respondent-mother. The petition alleged that on 9 November 2011, DSS received a report of inappropriate supervision. According to the petition, five-year-old T.R.T. had left respondent-mother\u2019s apartment and sought food and assistance from residents in the apartment complex. The petition alleged that respondent-mother was \u201cdecompensating,\u201d had terminated counseling, and was not adhering to her medication regimen. T.R.T. was taken into nonsecure custody on the following day.\nFollowing a hearing on 29 March 2012, the trial court entered an order on 25 April 2012 concluding that T.R.T. was a neglected juvenile within the definition of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-101(15) (2011). In the dis-positional portion of the order, the trial court maintained custody with DSS. Respondent-mother timely appealed from the order.\nI.\nRespondent-mother first challenges the trial court\u2019s adjudication of neglect. The trial court made the following findings of fact to support its conclusion that T.R.T. was neglected:\n1. . .. [T.R.T.] was previously in the legal custody of [DSS] from July 20, 2010 through October 10, 2011. On November 9, 2011 [DSS] received a child protective services report alleging inappropriate supervision and care of [T.R.T.].\n2. [T.R.T.] was allegedly seeking food and assistance from a neighbor because he was unable to wake his mother. The distance between [T.R.T.\u2019s] home and the neighbor\u2019s home was estimated to be two city blocks. On January 5, 2012, the Case Decision determined the family in need of services and on January 5, 2012, the case was transferred to on-going services.\n3. That between January 5, 2012 and the filing of the Juvenile Petition, [respondent-mother] refused to cooperate with [DSS]\u2019s attempts at weekly home visits, attendance in parenting classes, development of an In-Home Family Services Plan, participation in a Child and Family Team meeting, and consistent mental health treatment. She informed [DSS] via email of her refusal to cooperate, and demanded that [DSS] close her case.\n4. That Social Worker, Pam Nelson has known [respondent-mother] for the past five years and has knowledge of [respondent-mother]\u2019s symptoms of regression. Ms. Nelson noticed a decline in [respondent-mother] \u2019s personal appearance, hygiene and living environment. Ms. Nelson determined that services needed to be implemented to ensure [respondent-mother]\u2019s mental health issues were being properly addressed.\n5. That [respondent-mother]\u2019s mental health therapist, Andrea Murrow, expressed concerns that [respondent-mother]\u2019s mental health had deteriorated significantly and expressed concern for her welfare as well as the safety of her son. [DSS] believed [respondent-mother] to be noncompliant with her psychotropic medication regimen; however, [DSS] was unable to verify compliance with her medication and mental health treatment due to her refusal to sign releases for information.\n6. That [respondent-mother]\u2019s refusal to cooperate with [DSS], which directly impacted said agency\u2019s ability to determine her mental status and compliance with prescribed psychotropic medications and lack of appropriate supervision, placed the juvenile at risk of substantial harm.\n\u201cAllegations of neglect must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. In a non-jury neglect adjudication, the trial court\u2019s findings of fact supported by clear and convincing competent evidence are deemed conclusive, even where some evidence supports contrary findings.\u201d In re Helms, 127 N.C. App. 505, 511, 491 S.E.2d 672, 676 (1997) (citation omitted). If competent evidence supports the findings, they are \u201cbinding on appeal.\u201d In re McCabe, 157 N.C. App. 673, 679, 580 S.E.2d 69, 73 (2003).\nRespondent-mother argues that the findings of fact do not support the trial court\u2019s conclusion of neglect because (1) the trial court did not and could not base its adjudication on T.R.T.\u2019s alleged excursion from the home; and (2) the trial court improperly concluded that uncertainty regarding respondent-mother\u2019s mental health rendered T.R.T. neglected.\nAs to her first argument, respondent-mother contends that finding of fact number 2 is based solely on allegations that T.R.T. left respondent-mother\u2019s home unsupervised, and even if the trial court had made a finding that T.R.T. left his mother\u2019s home unsupervised, the evidence is not competent to support such a finding. Respondent-mother is correct in her assertion that finding of fact number 2 contains only an allegation that T.R.T. left his home unsupervised. However, her challenge to this finding is immaterial to the trial court\u2019s adjudication of neglect. It appears that the trial court\u2019s ultimate determination was not based on a finding that T.R.T. actually left the home unsupervised. Findings of fact numbers 1 and 2 provide historical context for the case and illustrate why DSS began a second investigation.\nMoreover, even if the trial court had made a finding that T.R.T. left the apartment unsupervised, such a finding would have been supported by the evidence. At the hearing, Social Worker Pamela Nelson testified that at one of her home visits, T.R.T. acknowledged that he left the apartment on his own and admitted that he would probably do it again. Respondent-mother argues that this testimony is impermissible hearsay; however, she did not object to this testimony at the hearing and therefore cannot raise this issue on appeal. See State v. Robertson, 149 N.C. App. 563, 569, 562 S.E.2d 551, 556 (2002) (a party must object to testimony on the challenged basis to properly preserve the issue for appeal). Therefore, we reject respondent-mother\u2019s challenge to finding of fact number 2.\nAs to her second argument, respondent-mother challenges findings of fact numbers 4 and 5, both of which pertain to her mental health. Respondent-mother contends that finding of fact number 4 is based on speculation. We disagree. First, we note that none of the language in finding 4 uses speculative terms. Rather, this finding is based solely on Ms. Nelson\u2019s direct observations of respondent-mother and her familiarity with respondent-mother\u2019s history of mental health issues. Furthermore, this finding of fact is supported by competent evidence in the record. At the hearing, Ms. Nelson testified that she had known respondent-mother for five years; that she visited respondent-mother after the report of inappropriate supervision; and that respondent-mother\u2019s physical appearance and the condition of her apartment had deteriorated. Ms. Nelson testified that based on her observations, respondent-mother was in need of services. We find the foregoing testimony sufficient to support finding of fact number 4, and we accordingly reject respondent-mother\u2019s argument.\nRespondent-mother also objects to the first sentence in finding of fact number 5. She argues that it is based on incompetent hearsay evidence. We agree with respondent-mother\u2019s argument. It appears that this finding was based on testimony from social worker Allison Nance regarding observations by respondent-mother\u2019s therapist, Andrea Murrow. Counsel for respondent-mother objected to Ms. Nance\u2019s testimony, and the trial court sustained the objection. Therefore, the trial court should have disregarded the objectionable testimony. This Court has acknowledged the \u201cwell-established supposition that the trial court in a bench trial \u2018is presumed to have disregarded any incompetent evidence.\u2019 \u201d In re J.B., 172 N.C. App. 1, 16, 616 S.E.2d 264, 273 (2005) (quoting In re Huff, 140 N.C. App. 288, 298, 536 S.E.2d 838, 845 (2000)). Here, however, the trial court cannot be presumed to have disregarded the incompetent evidence because the trial court made findings based on the objectionable testimony. Nonetheless, even without this finding of fact, we conclude that the trial court\u2019s findings of fact support an adjudication of neglect. See In re T.M., 180 N.C. App. 539, 547, 638 S.E.2d 236, 240 (2006) (\u201c[W]e agree that some of [the challenged findings] are not supported by evidence in the record. When, however, ample other findings of fact support an adjudication of neglect, erroneous findings unnecessary to the determination do not constitute reversible error.\u201d).\nLastly, respondent-mother invokes this Court\u2019s longstanding requirement \u201cthat there be some physical, mental, or emotional impairment of the juvenile or a substantial risk of such impairment as a consequence of the failure to provide \u2018proper care, supervision, or discipline.\u2019 \u201d In re Safriet, 112 N.C. App. 747, 752, 436 S.E.2d 898, 901-02 (1993) (quoting In re Thompson, 64 N.C. App. 95, 101, 306 S.E.2d 792, 796 (1983)). Respondent-mother argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the conclusion that T.R.T. suffered from an impairment.\nWhile it is true that T.R.T. did not suffer from an actual impairment, the trial court, ultimately found that respondent-mother\u2019s refusal to cooperate with DSS placed him at risk of substantial harm. We find that this ultimate finding complies with the requirement stated above, that it is supported by the evidence, and that it supports the trial court\u2019s adjudication of neglect.\nT.R.T. had been in respondent-mother\u2019s custody for only a month when DSS received the report of inappropriate supervision. During the investigation, Ms. Nelson observed that respondent-mother\u2019s personal appearance, hygiene, and the condition of her home had deteriorated. At a home visit, respondent-mother and Ms. Nelson discussed safety measures which respondent-mother could take in order to properly supervise T.R.T.; and respondent-mother admitted that she had difficulty disciplining and controlling T.R.T. After Ms. Nelson determined that respondent-mother was in need of services, respondent-mother refused to cooperate with DSS. She refused to take parenting classes, refused free daycare for T.R.T., admitted that she was no longer attending mental health therapy, and refused to allow DSS access to her records to determine whether she was compliant with her mental health medication. Moreover, respondent-mother testified at the hearing, where she admitted that the social workers\u2019 testimony was accurate. She also admitted to refusing services from DSS.\nThis evidence, in light of T.R.T.\u2019s past adjudication of neglect and the social workers\u2019 knowledge of respondent-mother\u2019s history of mental health issues, was sufficient for the trial court to determine that respondent-mother\u2019s refusal to cooperate with DSS placed T.R.T. at risk of substantial harm. See In re C.M., 183 N.C. App. 207, 210, 644 S.E.2d 588, 592 (2007) (affirming a finding of neglect based on parents\u2019 previous involvement with DSS and failure to comply with case plan). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court\u2019s conclusion that T.R.T. was a neglected juvenile.\nII.\nNext, respondent-mother challenges the portion of the trial court\u2019s disposition order pertaining to visitation. Our juvenile code provides that \u201c[a]ny dispositional order... under which the juvenile\u2019s placement is continued outside the home shall provide for appropriate visitation as may be in the best interests of the juvenile and consistent with the juvenile\u2019s health and safety.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-905(c) (2011). \u201cThe awarding of visitation of a child is an exercise of a judicial function, and a trial court may not delegate this function to the custodian of a child.\u201d In re E.C., 174 N.C. App. 517, 522, 621 S.E.2d 647, 652 (2005). This Court has previously stated that:\nIn the absence of findings that the parent has forfeited [her] right to visitation or that it is in the child\u2019s best interest to deny visitation \u201cthe court should safeguard the parent\u2019s visitation rights by a provision in the order defining and establishing the time, place[,] and conditions under which such visitation rights may be exercised.\u201d\nId. at 522, 621 S.E.2d at 652 (alteration in original) (quoting In re Stancil, 10 N.C. App. 545, 552, 179 S.E.2d 844, 849 (1971)). We have further held:\nAs a result, even if the trial court determines that visitation would be inappropriate in a particular case or that a parent has forfeited his or her right to visitation, it must still address that issue in its dispositional order and either adopt a visitation plan or specifically determine that such a plan would be inappropriate in light of the specific facts under consideration.\nIn re K.C. & C.C., 199 N.C. App. 557, 562, 681 S.E.2d 559, 563 (2009).\nIn the instant case, the trial court\u2019s order provided the following regarding visitation:\nThat the Department is authorized to set up Skype visitation for [respondent-mother] with [T.R.T.]. The Skype visitation is to occur during the supervised visitation class with Ms. Schultz at the Child Advocacy Parenting Place (CAPP). The facilitators are authorized to terminate the Skype visitation, if [respondent-mother] does not comply with any necessary re-direction. Visitation may be expanded in the discretion of the Department and the Guardian ad Litem.\nRespondent-mother argues that the trial court erred in ordering the visitation plan because the court failed to make a finding that respondent-mother forfeited her right to visitation or that visitation was not in T.R.T.\u2019s best interest. In so arguing, respondent-mother takes the position that communication via Skype is not visitation as contemplated by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-905(c), and that the trial court\u2019s order effectively denies her visitation with T.R.T. We agree.\nThe trial court did not permit face-to-face visitation, but instead allowed respondent-mother to communicate with T.R.T. via Skype. Skype is a software application that allows video communication between individuals using an internet connection, webcam, and computer or mobile device with a microphone or speakers. See What is Skype?, http://beta.skvpe.com/en/what-is-skvpe (last visited 31 Jan. 2013). We conclude that, contrary to the assertions of DSS and the guardian ad litem, communication via Skype does not constitute visitation as contemplated by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-905(c). Nothing in our juvenile code states that electronic communication may be substituted for in-person visitation. To the contrary, our General Statutes state that \u201c[electronic communication with a minor child may be used to supplement visitation with the child. Electronic communication may not be used as a replacement or substitution for custody or visitation.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-13.2(e) (2011) (emphasis added). \u201cElectronic communication\u201d is defined as \u201ccontact, other than face-to-face contact, facilitated by electronic means, such as by telephone, electronic mail, instant messaging, video teleconferencing, wired or wireless technologies by Internet, or other medium of communication.\u201d Skype is at essence a form of video conferencing and therefore is included in the definition of \u201celectronic communication\u201d found in Section 50-13.2(e).\nAlthough this section is found in Chapter 50 of our General Statutes, nothing limits subsection (e) to custody actions brought pursuant to Chapter 50. Unlike subsection (a), which applies to \u201c[a]n order for custody of a minor child entered pursuant to this section,\u201d subsection (e) applies to \u201c[a]n order for custody of a minor child.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 5043.2(a), (e) (emphasis added). We therefore hold that it is a generic provision which applies to all custody actions. See Belk v. Belk,_N.C. App._,_, 728 S.E.2d 356, 365 (2012) (concluding that a generic provision in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 6-21(2) allowing for the award of attorneys\u2019 fees in an action to fix the rights and duties of a party under a trust agreement applies to an action for the removal of a custodian and resulting accounting brought pursuant to Chapter 33A of our General Statutes); see also Food Stores v. Board of Alcoholic Control, 268 N.C. 624, 628-29, 151 S.E.2d 582, 586 (1966) (\u201cWhere there is one statute dealing with a subject in general and comprehensive terms, and another dealing with a part of the same subject in a more minute and definite way, the two should be read together and harmonized, if possible, with a view to giving effect to a consistent legislative policy[.]\u201d (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Based on the foregoing, we conclude that by ordering only Skype visitation, the trial court\u2019s order denied respondent-mother visitation with T.R.T as contemplated by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-905(c).\nDespite denying visitation, the trial court did not make any specific findings that respondent-mother forfeited her right to visitation or that visitation would be inappropriate under the circumstances. See K.C., 199 N.C. App. at 562, 681 S.E.2d at 563. The order therefore fails to comply with N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-905(c). As a result, we remand this case to the trial court for additional findings and conclusions relating to the issue of visitation.\nFurthermore, should a trial court wish to order electronic communication as a supplement to visitation between a parent and juvenile, it must comply with the pertinent statutory authority. To reiterate, such communications are governed by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-13.2(e), which provides, in pertinent part, the following:\nAn order for custody of a minor child may provide for visitation rights by electronic communication. In granting visitation by electronic communication, the court shall consider the following:\n(1) Whether electronic communication is in the best interest of the minor child.\n(2) Whether equipment to communicate by electronic means is available, accessible, and affordable to the parents of the minor child.\n(3) Any other factor the court deems appropriate in determining whether to grant visitation by electronic communication.\nThe court may set guidelines for electronic communication, including the hours in which the communication may be made, the allocation of costs between the parents in implementing electronic communication with the child, and the furnishing of access information between parents necessary to facilitate electronic communication.\nId.\nAlthough the trial court\u2019s findings set up some guidelines for Skype communication and touched on the court\u2019s rationale for such communication, the court should make sure it considers items under this section. Consequently, we conclude that the trial court erred in ordering electronic video communication between respondent-mother and T.R.T. We therefore also remand the case for additional findings in accordance with N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-13.2(e).\nAffirmed in part; reversed and remanded in part.\nJudges HUNTER (Robert C.) and DAVIS concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "McCullough, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Regina Floyd-Davis for New Hanover County Department of Social Services petitioner-appellee.", "Mark L. Hayes for respondent-mother appellant.", "Associate Counsel Deana K. Fleming for guardian ad litem." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE MATTER OF T.R.T.\nNo. COA12-905\nFiled 19 February 2013\n1. Child Abuse, Dependency, and Neglect \u2014 neglect\u2014facts supported by evidence \u2014 conclusion support by facts\nThe trial court did not err in a child neglect case by concluding that the minor child was neglected. The findings of fact were supported by competent evidence, and the findings supported the conclusion of law that the child was neglected.\n2. Child Abuse, Dependency, and Neglect \u2014 visitation\u2014via Skype\u2014 not sufficient\nThe trial court erred in a child neglect case by ordering that respondent mother\u2019s sole visitation with the minor child take place via Skype. The trial court did not find that respondent-mother forfeited her right to visitation or that visitation was not in the minor child\u2019s best interest and communication via Skype is not visitation as contemplated by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-905(c).\nAppeal by respondent-mother from order entered 25 April 2012 by Judge J.H. Coipening, II, in New Hanover County District Court. Heard\u2019 in the Court of Appeals 29 January 2013.\nRegina Floyd-Davis for New Hanover County Department of Social Services petitioner-appellee.\nMark L. Hayes for respondent-mother appellant.\nAssociate Counsel Deana K. Fleming for guardian ad litem." }, "file_name": "0567-01", "first_page_order": 577, "last_page_order": 585 }