{ "id": 4132362, "name": "IN THE MATTER OF APPEAL OF PARKDALE MILLS AND PARKDALE AMERICA, from the decisions of the Davidson County Board of Equalization and Review concerning the valuation of Certain Real Property for tax year 2007", "name_abbreviation": "In re Appeal of Parkdale Mills", "decision_date": "2013-03-05", "docket_number": "No. COA 12-1078", "first_page": "713", "last_page": "720", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "225 N.C. App. 713" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "731 S.E.2d 444", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "444-45", "parenthetical": "reversing the third final decision of the Commission and remanding with instructions that the Commission enter a decision adopting the value listed by the taxpayer, \"due to the failure of the County to meet its burden\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-283", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2011, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 S.E.2d 235", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "239" }, { "page": "349" }, { "page": "239" }, { "page": "239" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 N.C. 177", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4724189 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "182" }, { "page": "182" }, { "page": "182" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/313/0177-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 S.E.2d 811", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "816-17" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "282 N.C. 402", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565405 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "410" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/282/0402-01" ] }, { "cite": "503 S.E.2d 679", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "682", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "130 N.C. App. 529", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11468793 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "533", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/130/0529-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 S.E.2d 752", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 9, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "761" }, { "page": "761" }, { "page": "762" }, { "page": "761" }, { "page": "762" }, { "page": "762" }, { "page": "765" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "287 N.C. 547", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564265 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "562" }, { "page": "562" }, { "page": "563" }, { "page": "563" }, { "page": "562" }, { "page": "563" }, { "page": "563" }, { "page": "568" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/287/0547-01" ] }, { "cite": "253 S.E.2d 912", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "922" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "297 N.C. 48", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566826 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "65" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/297/0048-01" ] }, { "cite": "283 S.E.2d 115", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "127", "parenthetical": "quoting In re Rogers, 297 N.C. 48, 65, 253 S.E.2d 912, 922 (1979)" }, { "page": "127", "parenthetical": "quotation marks and citations omitted" }, { "page": "126" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 N.C. 68", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565314 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "87", "parenthetical": "quoting In re Rogers, 297 N.C. 48, 65, 253 S.E.2d 912, 922 (1979)" }, { "page": "86-87" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/304/0068-01" ] }, { "cite": "433 S.E.2d 471", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "474" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "111 N.C. App. 857", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524424 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "861" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/111/0857-01" ] }, { "cite": "511 S.E.2d 671", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "677", "parenthetical": "citing Dept. of Trans. v. Overton, 111 N.C. App. 857, 861, 433 S.E.2d 471, 474 (1993)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "132 N.C. App. 237", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11237465 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "244", "parenthetical": "citing Dept. of Trans. v. Overton, 111 N.C. App. 857, 861, 433 S.E.2d 471, 474 (1993)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/132/0237-01" ] }, { "cite": "70 S.E.2d 500", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1952, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "503" }, { "page": "503" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "235 N.C. 463", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8625479 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1952, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "468" }, { "page": "468" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/235/0463-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-345.2", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)" }, { "page": "(b)(5)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-345", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(d)", "parenthetical": "stating an appeal shall be to this Court" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "689 S.E.2d 487", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "489", "parenthetical": "\"IBM Credit IT'" }, { "page": "489" }, { "page": "491", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "489", "parenthetical": "noting that, once the burden has been shifted, the County must prove its valuation methods will indeed produce the property's \"true value\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "201 N.C. App. 343", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4172930 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "345", "parenthetical": "\"IBM Credit IT'" }, { "page": "345" }, { "page": "345" }, { "page": "345" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/201/0343-01" ] }, { "cite": "710 S.E.2d 449", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 18, "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "453", "parenthetical": "\"Parkdale F" }, { "page": "450" }, { "page": "453", "parenthetical": "emphasis in original" }, { "page": "451" }, { "page": "451" }, { "page": "452", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "452-53" }, { "page": "453" }, { "parenthetical": "emphasis in original" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 767, "char_count": 18161, "ocr_confidence": 0.747, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.89950402824256e-08, "percentile": 0.30813360161152253 }, "sha256": "40bd8710f25ee9a7aed5988f21abf8b9315bd4837b97f893fed7209695db583d", "simhash": "1:89309caac63f7c56", "word_count": 2887 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:12:03.865649+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges STROUD and DAVIS concur." ], "parties": [ "IN THE MATTER OF APPEAL OF PARKDALE MILLS AND PARKDALE AMERICA, from the decisions of the Davidson County Board of Equalization and Review concerning the valuation of Certain Real Property for tax year 2007" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUNTER, JR., Robert, N., Judge.\nParkdale America, LLC (\u201cParkdale\u201d) appeals from the Final Decision on Remand of the North Carolina Property Tax Commission (\u201cthe Commission\u201d) upholding Davidson County\u2019s (the \u201cCounty\u201d) 2007 ad valorem property tax valuation of two textile mills located in Lexington and Thomasville. Parkdale alleges, inter alia, that the Commission erred in re-affirming the County\u2019s valuation because the Commission did not follow this Court\u2019s instructions in In re Parkdale Am.,_ N.C. App._,_, 710 S.E.2d 449, 453 (2011) (\u201cParkdale F). We agree with Parkdale that the Commission\u2019s decision remains arbitrary and capricious and does not contain a \u201creasoned analysis.\u201d Therefore, we again remand to the Commission for further findings of fact and conclusions of law consistent with this opinion.\nI. Factual and Procedural Background\nIn our previous consideration of this case, we noted that the County assessed the 1 January 2007 tax value of Parkdale\u2019s Lexington plant at $6,776,160 and its Thomasville plant at $3,620,080. See Parkdale I,_N.C. App. at_, 710 S.E.2d at 450. Parkdale appealed both valuations to the Davidson County Board of Equalization and Review (the \u201cReview Board\u201d). The Review Board subsequently reduced the appraised value to $5,040,429 for the Lexington plant and $3,287,150 for the Thomasville plant. Id. Parkdale contended before the Review Board that the true value of the Lexington plant was $906,000 and the true value of the Thomasville plant was $625,000. Id.\nAfter the hearing, the Commission determined that \u201cthe County had met its burden with regard to the assessments of the Lexington and Thomasville manufacturing facilities\u201d and affirmed the appraised values established by the Review Board. Id. Parkdale then appealed the Commission\u2019s ruling to this Court. Id.\nIn Parkdale I, this Court held that the Commission had improperly applied the requisite burden-shifting framework. See id. at_, 710 S.E.2d at 451 (citing In re IBM Credit Corp., 201 N.C. App. 343, 345, 689 S.E.2d 487, 489 (2009) (\u201cIBM Credit IT\u2019)). This Court then vacated the Commission\u2019s decision and remanded with specific instructions that it \u201cshall make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law explaining how it weighed the evidence to reach its conclusions using the burden-shifting framework articulated above and in this Court\u2019s previous decisions.\u201d Id. at _, 710 S.E.2d at 453 (emphasis in original).\nThe Commission entered its Final Decision on Remand on 23 May 2012, and Parkdale timely appealed.\nII. Jurisdiction & Standard of Review\nWe have jurisdiction over Parkdale\u2019s appeal of right. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-29 (2011) (stating a party has an appeal of right from any final order of the Property Tax Commission); N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-345(d) (2011) (stating an appeal shall be to this Court).\nWhen reviewing decisions of the Commission, this Court\nmay affirm or reverse the decision of the Commission, declare the same null and void, or remand the case for further proceedings; or it may reverse or modify the decision if the substantial rights of the appellants have been prejudiced because the Commission\u2019s findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are:\n(1) In violation of constitutional provisions; or\n(2) In excess of statutory authority or jurisdiction of the Commission; or\n(3) Made upon unlawful proceedings; or\n(4) Affected by other errors of law; or\n(5) Unsupported by competent, material and substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted; or\n(6) Arbitrary or capricious.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-345.2(b) (2011).\nOur Supreme Court has noted, \u201c[a]n act is arbitrary when it is done without adequate determining principle.\u201d In re Hous. Auth. of City of Salisbury, Project NC-16-2, 235 N.C. 463, 468, 70 S.E.2d 500, 503 (1952). Moreover, an act is capricious \u201cwhen it is done without reason, in a whimsical manner, implying either a lack of understanding of or a disregard for the surrounding facts and settled controlling principles.\u201d Id. In short, when these terms are applied to discretionary acts, such as the determinations of the Commission, \u201cthey ordinarily denote abuse of discretion, though they do not signify nor necessarily imply bad faith.\u201d Id. \u201cDetermination of whether conduct is arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion is a conclusion of law.\u201d Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. Calco Enters., 132 N.C. App. 237, 244, 511 S.E.2d 671, 677 (1999) (citing Dept. of Trans. v. Overton, 111 N.C. App. 857, 861, 433 S.E.2d 471, 474 (1993)).\nWe review Commission decisions under the whole record test to \u201c \u2018determine whether an administrative decision has a rational basis in the evidence.\u2019 \u201d In re McElwee, 304 N.C. 68, 87, 283 S.E.2d 115, 127 (1981) (quoting In re Rogers, 297 N.C. 48, 65, 253 S.E.2d 912, 922 (1979)).\nThe \u201cwhole record\u201d test does not allow the reviewing court to replace the [Commission\u2019s] judgment as between two reasonably conflicting views, even though the court could justifiably have reached a different result had the matter been before it de novo. On the other hand, the \u201cwhole record\u201d rule requires the court, in determining the substantiality of evidence supporting the [Commission\u2019s] decision, to take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from the weight of the [Commission\u2019s] evidence. Under the whole evidence rule, the court may not consider the evidence which in and of itself justifies the [Commission\u2019s] result, without taking into account contradictory evidence or evidence from which conflicting inferences could be drawn.\nId. at 87-88, 283 S.E.2d at 127 (quotation marks and citations omitted). However, this Court cannot reweigh the evidence presented and substitute its evaluation for the Commission\u2019s. In re AMP, 287 N.C. 547, 562, 215 S.E.2d 752, 761 (1975). \u201cIf the Commission\u2019s decision, considered in the light of the foregoing rules, is supported by substantial evidence, it cannot be overturned.\u201d In re Philip Morris U.S.A., 130 N.C. App. 529, 533, 503 S.E.2d 679, 682 (1998) (emphasis added).\nIII. Analysis\nOur opinion in Parkdale I thoroughly described the burden-shifting framework the Commission is required to apply. See Parkdale I, _N.C. App. at_, 710 S.E.2d at 451. A county\u2019s ad valorem tax assessment is presumptively correct. See IBM Credit II, 201 N.C. App. at 345, 689 S.E.2d at 489 (2009) (citing In re AMP, 287 N.C. at 562, 215 S.E.2d at 761). However, the taxpayer may rebut this presumption by presenting \u201ccompetent, material[,] and substantial evidence that tends to show that (1) [e]ither the county tax supervisor used an arbitrary method of valuation; or (2) the county tax supervisor used an illegal method of valuation; and (3) the assessment substantially exceeded the true value in money of the property.\u201d Id. (quoting In re AMP, 287 N.C. at 563, 215 S.E.2d at 762) (second alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted). \u201cSimply stated, it is not enough for the taxpayer to show that the means adopted by the tax supervisor were wrong, he must also show that the result arrived at is substantially greater than the true value in money of the property assessed, i.e., that the valuation was unreasonably high.\u201d In re AMP, 287 N.C. at 563, 215 S.E.2d at 762 (citing Albemarle Elec. Membership Corp. v. Alexander, 282 N.C. 402, 410, 192 S.E.2d 811, 816-17 (1972)).\nOnce the taxpayer rebuts the initial presumption, the burden shifts back to the County which must then demonstrate that its methods produce true values. See IBM Credit II, 201 N.C. App. at 345, 689 S.E.2d at 489 (citing In re S. Ry., 313 N.C. 177, 182, 328 S.E.2d 235, 239 (1985)). The critical inquiry in such instances is whether the County\u2019s appraisal methodology \u201cis the proper means or methodology given the characteristics of the property under appraisal to produce a true value or fair market value.\u201d Id. at 349, 689 S.E.2d at 491 (internal quotation marks omitted). To determine the appropriate appraisal methodology under the given circumstances, the Commission must \u201c \u2018hear the evidence of both sides, to determine its weight and sufficiency and the credibility of witnesses, to draw inferences, and to appraise conflicting and circumstantial evidence, all in order to determine whether the Department met its burden.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting In re S. Ry., 313 N.C. at 182, 328 S.E.2d at 239).\nIn the initial appeal of the present case, Parkdale contended, as it contends now, that the County\u2019s appraisal methodology was arbitrary and capricious. See Parkdale I,_N.C. App. at_, 710 S.E.2d at 451. This Court did not see then, and does not see now, how the Commission\u2019s acceptance of the County\u2019s valuation without further appraisal of conflicting evidence (as required by IBM Credit II) is anything but arbitrary or capricious; the Commission\u2019s decision appears to be wholly discretionary and not based on the requisite determining principles. See In re Hous. Auth. of City of Salisbury, Project NC-16-2, 235 N.C. at 468, 70 S.E.2d at 503.\nThis Court remanded the Commission\u2019s initial decision in part because of the Commission\u2019s enigmatic application of the aforementioned burden-shifting framework. Curiously, the Commission concluded \u201cthat the County met its burden with regard to the assessments of the Lexington and Thomasville manufacturing facilities.\u201d Parkdale I, _N.C. App. at_, 710 S.E.2d at 452 (emphasis added). This is puzzling because ordinarily the County bears no burden, as the County\u2019s tax assessment is presumptively correct. See In re AMP, 287 N.C. at 562, 215 S.E.2d at 761. Thus, following the burden-shifting scheme, in order for the County to have any sort of burden to meet, Parkdale must have shifted the burden to the County by successfully rebutting the presumptive validity of the County\u2019s ad valorem tax assessment. See Parkdale I,_N.C. App. at__, 710 S.E.2d at 452-53.\nParkdale may have rebutted the presumptive validity of the ad valorem tax assessment (and thereby shifted the burden to the County) by showing that the County\u2019s valuation was either (1) arbitrary or (2) illegal; and that this valuation was (3) substantially higher than the true value of the property. See In re AMP, 287 N.C. at 563, 215 S.E.2d at 762. Problematically, the Commission\u2019s initial decision made no explicit mention by findings of fact or conclusions of law to show precisely how Parkdale shifted the burden to the County. See Parkdale I,_N.C. App. at_, 710 S.E.2d at 453. Even more concerning is that the Commission\u2019s initial decision did not explain the process by which the County carried its newly applied burden to demonstrate that the County\u2019s valuation (and not Parkdale\u2019s) was correct. Id.\nLacking both an explanation for the burden shifting and justification for the decision in favor of the County, this Court could not place faith in the Commission\u2019s ultimate finding nor adequately apply the standard of review. Id. As such, we vacated and remanded the case to the Commission with an expectation that they would conduct additional hearings as necessary. Id. This Court also explicitly instructed that the Commission \u201cshall make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law explaining how it weighed the evidence to reach its conclusions using the burden-shifting framework articulated above and in this Court\u2019s previous decisions.\u201d Id. (emphasis in original).\nOn remand, the Commission did not conduct additional hearings. The Commission did, however, make additional conclusions of law. In the Commission\u2019s Final Decision on Remand, the Commission clarified that the testimony of Mr. Carter, Parkdale\u2019s appraiser, \u201ctends to show that the County Board used an arbitrary method... and that the assessments of the Lexington and Thomasville plants substantially exceeded true value.\u201d This finding adequately explains why the burden was shifted to the County. See In re AMP, 287 N.C. at 563, 215 S.E.2d at 762. However, the Commission still fails in its Final Decision on Remand to adequately explain how the County met this newly applied burden.\nThe Commission\u2019s Final Decision on Remand presents three rationales by which the County has purportedly carried its burden: (1) the incomparability of the value of other plants Mr. Carter used in his appraisal, (2) the comparability of plants that the County used in its appraisal, and (3) Davidson County\u2019s Schedule of Values. Upon examination, each of these rationales fails.\nFirst, the Commission notes that Mr. Carter\u2019s appraisals relied on plants that were closed or otherwise not comparable to the Parkdale plants. However, the alleged dissimilarity of the plants considered in Mr. Carter\u2019s appraisal was only relevant when the burden belonged to Parkdale; the inadequacy of Mr. Carter\u2019s appraisal is not material once the burden shifted to the County. If Mr. Carter\u2019s appraisals were in fact unreliable, the burden should never have been shifted onto the County in the first instance.\nSecond, the Commission relies on the County\u2019s comparable sales method without fully explaining how the properties examined are particularly comparable to Parkdale\u2019s plants. Although potentially relevant, the details about these \u201cmore comparable\u201d properties, and specifics regarding the possibility of adaptive reuse of Parkdale\u2019s plants, are substantially lacking. Moreover, because the Commission undertook no additional hearings or fact-finding ventures, these comparable sales findings were necessarily part of the record when the Commission first ruled that Parkdale had carried its burden. Thus, if such findings were not substantial enough to prevent Parkdale from carrying its burden, they should not be determinative now that the burden rests on the County.\nThird, the application of Davidson County\u2019s Schedule of Values likewise fails to carry its burden here. Indeed, these were the same values the Commission rejected as \u201carbitrary\u201d and \u201csubstantially exceeding] true value\u201d when it shifted the burden from Parkdale to the County. Accordingly, because the Commission shifted the burden to the County, the County must adequately demonstrate why these once \u201carbitrary\u201d and excessive values should now be deemed appropriate. See In re S. Ry. Co., 313 N.C. at 182, 328 S.E.2d at 239; IBM Credit II, 201 N.C. App. at 345, 689 S.E.2d at 489 (noting that, once the burden has been shifted, the County must prove its valuation methods will indeed produce the property\u2019s \u201ctrue value\u201d).\nThe Commission\u2019s new findings do nothing to alleviate this Court\u2019s lack of confidence that the County has, in fact, carried its burden. In order to prevail, the County must \u201cdemonstrate to the Property Tax Commission that the values determined in the revaluation process were not substantially higher than that called for by the statutory formula, and the county must demonstrate the reasonableness of its valuation \u2018by competent, material and substantial evidence[.]\u2019 \u201d In re McElwee, 304 N.C. at 86-87, 283 S.E.2d at 126 (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-345.2(b)(5)). Although the Commission\u2019s Final Decision on Remand declares that the County has presented \u201ccompetent, material, and substantial evidence\u201d necessary to carry its burden, we hold that it has not. The Final Decision on Remand merely establishes that the Commission initially found the County\u2019s assessed value to be \u201carbitrary\u201d and substantially above the market value of the property.\nThe dictate of ad valorem taxes is that the value of the property is the price at which the property would likely change hands between a willing buyer and equally willing seller. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 105-283 (2011). By emphasizing the fact that Parkdale uses these facilities industrially to produce yam 24-hours a day, the Commission\u2019s findings implicitly allow the County to measure the value of the properties as their subjective worth to Parkdale. Such a valuation is obviously not the same as adequately determining the objective value of these properties to another willing buyer. Cf. In re AMP, 287 N.C. at 568, 215 S.E.2d at 765.\nAlthough we make no finding on appeal here regarding the true value of the property, this Court is troubled by the substantial discrepancy between Parkdale\u2019s assessed value and the County\u2019s assessed value. On remand, the Commission shall conduct additional hearings as necessary and make further findings of fact and conclusions of law in order to reconcile this discrepancy. If the County cannot carry its assigned burden, or if the Commission again fails to rectify the inadequacies of its Final Decision, this Court may exercise its prerogative to remand for yet a third time with specific instructions for the Commission to adopt Parkdale\u2019s valuation of the property as, unlike the County\u2019s valuation, it has not been held to be \u201carbitrary.\u201d See In re IBM Credit Corp.,_N.C. App._,_, 731 S.E.2d 444, 444-45 (2012) (reversing the third final decision of the Commission and remanding with instructions that the Commission enter a decision adopting the value listed by the taxpayer, \u201cdue to the failure of the County to meet its burden\u201d).\nVACATED AND REMANDED.\nJudges STROUD and DAVIS concur.\n. As a result, we do not address any of Parkdale\u2019s other arguments.", "type": "majority", "author": "HUNTER, JR., Robert, N., Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Parker Poe Adams & Bernstein LLP, by Charles C. Meeker and Jamie S. Schwedler, for respondent.", "Bell, Davis & Pitt, PA., by John A. Cocklereece, Jr., D. Anderson Carmen, and Justin M. Hardy, for taxpayer." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE MATTER OF APPEAL OF PARKDALE MILLS AND PARKDALE AMERICA, from the decisions of the Davidson County Board of Equalization and Review concerning the valuation of Certain Real Property for tax year 2007\nNo. COA 12-1078\nFiled 5 March 2013\nTaxation \u2014 ad valorem property tax \u2014 arbitrary and capricious decision\nThe North Carolina Property Tax Commission erred by upholding Davidson County\u2019s 2007 ad valorem property tax valuation of two textile mills. The Commission\u2019s decision remained arbitrary and capricious and did not contain a reasoned analysis. The case was again remanded to the Commission for further findings of fact and conclusions of law.\nAppeal by taxpayer from final decision on remand entered 23 May 2012 by the North Carolina Property Tax Commission. Heard in the Court of Appeals 10 January 2013.\nParker Poe Adams & Bernstein LLP, by Charles C. Meeker and Jamie S. Schwedler, for respondent.\nBell, Davis & Pitt, PA., by John A. Cocklereece, Jr., D. Anderson Carmen, and Justin M. Hardy, for taxpayer." }, "file_name": "0713-01", "first_page_order": 723, "last_page_order": 730 }