{ "id": 4131547, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JOHN EARL DEW, JR.", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Dew", "decision_date": "2013-03-05", "docket_number": "No. COA12-642", "first_page": "750", "last_page": "764", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "225 N.C. App. 750" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "535 U.S. 1114", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 354625, 353731, 354760, 353448, 352172, 354576, 351828, 353749, 355188, 354680, 354745, 352827, 353947, 354297 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/535/1114-11", "/us/535/1114-05", "/us/535/1114-06", "/us/535/1114-02", "/us/535/1114-09", "/us/535/1114-03", "/us/535/1114-07", "/us/535/1114-08", "/us/535/1114-10", "/us/535/1114-13", "/us/535/1114-04", "/us/535/1114-14", "/us/535/1114-12", "/us/535/1114-01" ] }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 95", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2537624, 2543137, 2540494, 2543288 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0095-01", "/nc/328/0095-02", "/nc/328/0095-03", "/nc/328/0095-04" ] }, { "cite": "355 N.C. 216", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 219943, 220131, 219981, 219911 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/355/0216-01", "/nc/355/0216-02", "/nc/355/0216-03", "/nc/355/0216-04" ] }, { "cite": "504 S.E.2d 84", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "92", "parenthetical": "holding that witness's descriptions of a child's conduct constituted an admissible \"shorthand statement of fact\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "130 N.C. App. 488", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11468692 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "501-02", "parenthetical": "holding that witness's descriptions of a child's conduct constituted an admissible \"shorthand statement of fact\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/130/0488-01" ] }, { "cite": "651 S.E.2d 279", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639564 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "285", "parenthetical": "emphasis in the original" }, { "page": "287", "parenthetical": "stating that \"[statements elicited by a defendant on cross-examination are, even if error, invited error, by which a defendant cannot be prejudiced as a matter of law\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/651/0279-01" ] }, { "cite": "513 U.S. 1096", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1330500, 1335240, 1333385, 1334762, 1331435, 1333611, 1334957, 1335022, 1333578, 1330707, 1331797, 1334134, 1333626, 1335324 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/513/1096-09", "/us/513/1096-08", "/us/513/1096-06", "/us/513/1096-11", "/us/513/1096-03", "/us/513/1096-02", "/us/513/1096-07", "/us/513/1096-10", "/us/513/1096-04", "/us/513/1096-12", "/us/513/1096-05", "/us/513/1096-13", "/us/513/1096-14", "/us/513/1096-01" ] }, { "cite": "501 S.E.2d 334", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "345" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "348 N.C. 474", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1659843 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "492" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/348/0474-01" ] }, { "cite": "684 S.E.2d 535", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "540", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Lee, 348 N.C. 474, 492, 501 S.E.2d 334, 345 (1998)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "200 N.C. App. 731", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4172160 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "738", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Lee, 348 N.C. 474, 492, 501 S.E.2d 334, 345 (1998)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/200/0731-01" ] }, { "cite": "153 L. Ed. 2d 162", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 S. Ct. 2332", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "557 S.E.2d 500", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "524-25", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "354 N.C. 131", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 138455 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "166-67", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/354/0131-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 U.S. 668", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6204802 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "687-88" }, { "page": "2064" }, { "page": "693" }, { "page": "694" }, { "page": "2068" }, { "page": "698" }, { "page": "697" }, { "page": "2069" }, { "page": "699" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "696 S.E.2d 724", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "733", "parenthetical": "quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693 (1984)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "205 N.C. App. 470", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 3733662 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "480-81", "parenthetical": "quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693 (1984)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/205/0470-01" ] }, { "cite": "712 S.E.2d 193", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "196", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Mohamed, 205 N.C. App. 470, 480-81, 696 S.E.2d 724, 733 (2010) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693 (1984)), and 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "682 S.E.2d 754", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "757-58", "parenthetical": "holding testimony that, \" '[i]n all of my training and experience, when children provide those types of specific details it enhances their credibility' \" to be inadmissible" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "200 N.C. App. 74", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4171697 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "78", "parenthetical": "holding testimony that, \" '[i]n all of my training and experience, when children provide those types of specific details it enhances their credibility' \" to be inadmissible" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/200/0074-01" ] }, { "cite": "305 S.E.2d 535", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "537", "parenthetical": "holding testimony \" '[t]hat an attack occurred on him; [] this was reality' \" to be inadmissible" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 N.C. 158", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4763016 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "162", "parenthetical": "holding testimony \" '[t]hat an attack occurred on him; [] this was reality' \" to be inadmissible" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/309/0158-01" ] }, { "cite": "341 S.E.2d 565", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "568-69" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 337", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4700970 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "340-44" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0337-01" ] }, { "cite": "350 S.E.2d 347", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "350-52" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 614", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4735495 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "619-21" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0614-01" ] }, { "cite": "370 S.E.2d 676", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "678", "parenthetical": "stating that \"this Court has held it [to be] reversible error for medical experts to testify as to the veracity of the victim,\" including situations in which \"experts have testified that the victim was believable, had no record of lying, and had never been untruthful\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 818", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2515424 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "822" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0818-01" ] }, { "cite": "357 S.E.2d 359", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "366-67", "parenthetical": "admitting testimony describing the symptoms exhibited by sexually abused children and opining that the alleged victims exhibited symptoms consistent with sexual abuse" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "320 N.C. 20", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4729914 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "31-32", "parenthetical": "admitting testimony describing the symptoms exhibited by sexually abused children and opining that the alleged victims exhibited symptoms consistent with sexual abuse" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/320/0020-01" ] }, { "cite": "402 S.E.2d 423", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "395 S.E.2d 429", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "433", "parenthetical": "holding that an individual with a master's degree in counseling who had counseled children suspected of having been sexually abused was properly qualified to present expert testimony" }, { "page": "433", "parenthetical": "1990" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "100 N.C. App. 226", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526582 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "233", "parenthetical": "holding that an individual with a master's degree in counseling who had counseled children suspected of having been sexually abused was properly qualified to present expert testimony" }, { "page": "233" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/100/0226-01" ] }, { "cite": "386 S.E.2d 748", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "750" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "96 N.C. App. 589", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523715 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "592" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/96/0589-01" ] }, { "cite": "461 S.E.2d 631", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "639-40" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "341 N.C. 513", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 793165 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "527-29" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/341/0513-01" ] }, { "cite": "597 S.E.2d 674", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "686", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Goode, 341 N.C. 513, 527-29, 461 S.E.2d 631, 639-40 (1995)" }, { "page": "687-88" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 440", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2986682 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "459", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Goode, 341 N.C. 513, 527-29, 461 S.E.2d 631, 639-40 (1995)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/358/0440-01" ] }, { "cite": "322 S.E.2d 370", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "376" }, { "page": "376" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 129", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4750010 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "139" }, { "page": "140" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0129-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 S.E.2d 387", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "391", "parenthetical": "stating that, \"[b]y failing to preserve the evidence for our review, defendant has deprived us of the necessary record from which to ascertain if the alleged error was prejudicial\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 445", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2570119 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "452", "parenthetical": "stating that, \"[b]y failing to preserve the evidence for our review, defendant has deprived us of the necessary record from which to ascertain if the alleged error was prejudicial\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0445-01" ] }, { "cite": "445 S.E.2d 581", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "584", "parenthetical": "holding that the defendant's failure to \"show what the response of the witness would have been if he had been allowed to answer\" precluded a determination of whether \"the defendant was prejudiced by the exclusion of the answers\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 415", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2550148 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "423", "parenthetical": "holding that the defendant's failure to \"show what the response of the witness would have been if he had been allowed to answer\" precluded a determination of whether \"the defendant was prejudiced by the exclusion of the answers\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0415-01" ] }, { "cite": "441 S.E.2d 306", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "310-11", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "335 N.C. 741", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2530091 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "749", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/335/0741-01" ] }, { "cite": "468 S.E.2d 525", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "531", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Barton, 335 N.C. 741, 749, 441 S.E.2d 306, 310-11 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 N.C. App. 25", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11915232 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "33", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Barton, 335 N.C. 741, 749, 441 S.E.2d 306, 310-11 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/122/0025-01" ] }, { "cite": "249 S.E.2d 387", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "390" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "296 N.C. 95", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564743 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "99-100" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/296/0095-01" ] }, { "cite": "299 S.E.2d 633", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "639" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 552", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564147 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "561" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0552-01" ] }, { "cite": "334 S.E.2d 53", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "60", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Cheek, 307 N.C. 552, 561, 299 S.E.2d 633, 639 (1983)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 N.C. 359", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4694660 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "370", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Cheek, 307 N.C. 552, 561, 299 S.E.2d 633, 639 (1983)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0359-01" ] }, { "cite": "374 S.E.2d 858", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "864" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 646", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2564239 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "655" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0646-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 L. Ed. 2d 603", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "110 S. Ct. 1465", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "494 U.S. 1022", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5540, 5547, 5516, 5166, 5366, 4823, 5560 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/494/1022-04", "/us/494/1022-06", "/us/494/1022-03", "/us/494/1022-05", "/us/494/1022-01", "/us/494/1022-02", "/us/494/1022-07" ] }, { "cite": "376 S.E.2d 430", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "438" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2485742 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/324/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "380 S.E.2d 359", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "360" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 N.C. 573", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2484315 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "575-76" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/324/0573-01" ] }, { "cite": "434 S.E.2d 840", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "850", "parenthetical": "stating that \" 'invited error' does not merit relief'" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 N.C. 467", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2528837 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "485", "parenthetical": "stating that \" 'invited error' does not merit relief'" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/334/0467-01" ] }, { "cite": "560 S.E.2d 142", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "554 S.E.2d 413", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "416" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "147 N.C. App. 69", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9377955 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "74" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/147/0069-01" ] }, { "cite": "661 S.E.2d 732", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 342", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4150926 ], "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0342-01" ] }, { "cite": "552 S.E.2d 596", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "620" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "354 N.C. 76", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 138508 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "109" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/354/0076-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 N.C. App. 308", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8156410 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "317", "parenthetical": "emphasis in the original" }, { "page": "319" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/186/0308-01" ] }, { "cite": "130 L. Ed. 2d 661", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 S. Ct. 764", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "445 S.E.2d 917", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "927", "parenthetical": "stating that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 701 allows the admission of \"what are frequently called 'shorthand statements of facts' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 N.C. 730", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2536958 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "747", "parenthetical": "stating that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 701 allows the admission of \"what are frequently called 'shorthand statements of facts' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/336/0730-01" ] }, { "cite": "350 S.E.2d 76", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "81", "parenthetical": "holding that expert testimony to the effect that the victim was \"believable\" was inadmissible" }, { "page": "81-82" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 590", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4732149 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "599", "parenthetical": "holding that expert testimony to the effect that the victim was \"believable\" was inadmissible" }, { "page": "597-600" }, { "page": "599" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0590-01" ] }, { "cite": "559 S.E.2d 788", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "789", "parenthetical": "per curiam" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "355 N.C. 266", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 219976 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "266-67", "parenthetical": "per curiam" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/355/0266-01" ] }, { "cite": "349 S.E.2d 566", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "572", "parenthetical": "stating that \"[i]t is unlikely that the jury gave great weight to the fact that a mother believed that her son was truthful\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 457", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4732391 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "466", "parenthetical": "stating that \"[i]t is unlikely that the jury gave great weight to the fact that a mother believed that her son was truthful\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0457-01" ] }, { "cite": "300 S.E.2d 375", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 655", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565416 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "660" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0655-01" ] }, { "cite": "723 S.E.2d 326", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "333", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 660, 300 S.E.2d 375, 378 (1983)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "698 S.E.2d 170", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "174" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "206 N.C. App. 391", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4177851 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "395" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/206/0391-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1402, "char_count": 35745, "ocr_confidence": 0.757, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.4576123777769797e-07, "percentile": 0.6562550557966893 }, "sha256": "5d9dd5152869d46fbf8af67b12304761bb7d79368e45e02d35c9ba812b7c73d4", "simhash": "1:c7a9646a763fdc76", "word_count": 5760 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:12:03.865649+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge DILLON concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JOHN EARL DEW, JR." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ERVIN, Judge.\nDefendant John Earl Dew, Jr., appeals from judgments entered based upon his convictions of six counts of taking indecent liberties with a child stemming from conduct he allegedly engaged in with two sisters, V.M. and B.M. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court committed plain error by allowing Angela M. to testify that she believed Becky and Violet, who are her daughters; committed plain error by allowing Detective Tracy Curry of the Cleveland County Sheriffs Department to offer expert testimony vouching for Becky and Violet\u2019s credibility; erred by excluding evidence that Defendant had cooperated with investigating officers; and erred by allowing Carol Hollandsworth to testify as an expert and to vouch for Becky and Violet\u2019s credibility. In addition, Defendant contends that, to the extent that any of his substantive challenges to the trial court\u2019s judgments were not properly preserved for appellate review, he is entitled to relief on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds. After careful review of Defendant\u2019s challenges to the trial court\u2019s judgments in light of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that Defendant is not entitled to any relief from the trial court\u2019s judgments.\nI. Factual Background\nA. Substantive Facts\n1. State\u2019s Evidence\nBecky, who was born in 1995, was sixteen years old at the time of trial. Her sister, Violet, was born in 1993 and was eighteen at the time of trial. Defendant, who was married to their mother\u2019s sister and who lived with his wife and three children in Casar, was Becky and Violet\u2019s uncle.\nDefendant began molesting Becky and Violet around 2001 and continued to do so until 2006. The sexual abuse of which Defendant was accused usually occurred at family gatherings held at Defendant\u2019s home; however, Defendant was also accused of abusing Becky and Violet at other times when he was alone with one or the other of them.\nBecky testified that Defendant had sexually molested her about fifty times, beginning when she was five or six years old and continuing until she was twelve. The abuse that Becky described consisted of Defendant rubbing her vagina with his hands and forcing her to touch his penis. Defendant usually touched Becky during nighttime games of hide-and-seek, during which she would hide in Defendant\u2019s yard away from the other children. Becky also recalled an incident that occurred during a family vacation to Hershey, Pennsylvania, when Defendant gave her a piggyback ride and tried to rub her vagina while carrying her on his back. On another occasion, Defendant sat Becky on his lap and made her watch a pornographic video, in which a child performed fellatio, and asked Becky if she wanted to do that to him. During one family gathering on the Fourth of July, Defendant sat Becky on his lap to watch fireworks. While she was on his lap, Defendant made her put her hand inside his pants and guided her hand up and down his penis. Becky thought she was the only one who was subjected to this abuse.\nViolet testified that Defendant began molesting her when she was six or seven years old. Like Becky, Violet recalled family gatherings held at Defendant\u2019s house at which she and the other girls would play hide and seek. During these games, Defendant would put his hand inside Violet\u2019s pants and move his finger back and forth on her vagina. According to Violet, Defendant touched her in this manner on ten to twenty different occasions. On one occasion, Defendant rubbed Violet\u2019s vagina so much that she developed a rash there.\nViolet recalled several other instances during which she was subjected to sexual abuse by Defendant as well. When she was six or seven years old, Defendant let her sit on his lap and drive his truck. As she drove, Defendant put his hand inside Violet\u2019s pants and rubbed his finger against her vagina until they arrived at his house. Defendant also touched Violet while giving her a piggyback ride on two occasions, one of which occurred in Hershey and the other of which occurred at Defendant\u2019s home. In addition, Violet recalled seeing a screensaver on Defendant\u2019s computer depicting the silhouette of a female performing fellatio. Once, while Violet was alone with Defendant at his house, Defendant began tickling her. After grabbing her ankle and jerking her up so that she was looking up at his stomach and pelvic area, Defendant asked Violet to put her hand inside his pants. After Violet failed to make any response to this inquiry, Defendant took her hand and put it in his pants, at which point his breathing got heavy and he said that \u201cit was okay.\u201d\nWhen she reached the fourth or fifth grade, Violet told Defendant to stop touching her, an instruction with which he complied. Several years later, Violet told a friend that Defendant had abused her when she was younger. About six months later, after watching a television program with her mother about victims of child molestation, Violet went to pick her sister up from basketball practice. After becoming very upset, Violet told her sister that Defendant had molested her as a child. In response, Becky told Violet that she had been abused by Defendant as well. Upon returning home, both girls told their mother, who reported the incidents to Detective Curry.\nCarol Hollandsworth, a family therapist, provided counseling to both Violet and Becky. After describing Violet and Becky\u2019s mental states, Ms. Hollandsworth testified that both children behaved in a manner that was consistent with symptoms exhibited by children who had been sexually abused.\n2. Defendant\u2019s Evidence\nDefendant\u2019s three children testified that the children in Defendant\u2019s extended family only played hide-and-seek a few times and that Defendant rarely played hide-and-seek with them. During family gatherings, the adults, including Defendant, usually stayed together while the children played separately. None of Defendant\u2019s children recalled seeing anything suspicious about the manner in which Defendant interacted with Becky and Violet or ever heard Violet and Becky claim to have been molested.\nDefendant acknowledged having hosted family gatherings at his home and admitted that he had played hide-and-seek with the girls on one occasion when they were younger. In addition, Defendant admitted that he had given both Violet and Becky multiple piggyback rides. Although he had pornographic materials in his home, Defendant denied having ever shown such materials to Violet and Becky and repeatedly denied having ever molested either child.\nB. Procedural History\nOn 12 January 2011, the Cleveland County grand jury returned bills of indictment charging Defendant with three counts of taking indecent liberties with a minor involving acts committed against Violet and three counts of taking indecent liberties with a child involving acts committed against Becky. The charges against Defendant came on for trial before the trial court and a jury at the 8 December 2011 criminal session of Cleveland County Superior Court. On 13 December 2011, the jury returned verdicts convicting Defendant as charged. At the ensuing sentencing hearing, the trial court entered judgments sentencing Defendant to six consecutive terms of 16 to 20 months imprisonment, the first three of which involved active terms of incarceration and the last three of which were suspended on the condition that Defendant be placed on supervised probation for 36 months subject to certain terms and conditions. Defendant noted an appeal to this Court from the trial court\u2019s judgments.\nII. Legal Analysis\nA. Ms. M.\u2019s Testimony\nIn his first challenge to the trial court\u2019s judgments, Defendant contends that the trial court erred by allowing Angela M., the mother of Becky and Violet, to testify that she believed the victims. More specifically, Defendant challenges the admission of Ms. M.\u2019s testimony that,\nThey said just \u2014 they\u2014I don\u2019t remember even which one of it was, but they said they had been messed with. And I said, what? They said, \u201cWe\u2019ve been molested.\u201d And I said, \u201cBy who?\u201d And they said, \u201cUncle John.\u201d And I just jumped up and down and screamed because I couldn\u2019t, you know, it was hard to believe. And I said, \u201cNo he did-n\u2019t, no he didn\u2019t.\u201d And I mean, not telling them that he really didn\u2019t, but just \u2014 I couldn\u2019t believe that he\u2019d done it. But I believe my girls and I looked at them and I \u2014 and I just remember hugging them and I said, oh God. You know what this means? And I said, you know, I\u2019ll do whatever I have to do to prosecute and they understood that.\nAccording to Defendant, Ms. M.\u2019s statement that \u201cI believe my girls\u201d was inadmissible.\nAs he candidly acknowledges in his brief, Defendant did not object to the admission of this testimony at trial. For that reason, we review this aspect of Defendant\u2019s challenge to the trial court\u2019s judgments for plain error. N.C. R. App. P. 10(a)(4); State v. Mendoza, 206 N.C. App. 391, 395, 698 S.E.2d 170, 174 (2010). In order to establish that plain error occurred, a convicted criminal defendant must show that a fundamental error occurred during the defendant\u2019s trial which \u201c \u2018had a probable impact on the jury\u2019s finding that the defendant was guilty.\u2019 \u201d State v. Lawrence, _ N.C. _, _, 723 S.E.2d 326, 333 (2012) (quoting State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 660, 300 S.E.2d 375, 378 (1983)). \u201c[Pjlain error review should be used sparingly, only in exceptional circumstances, to reverse criminal convictions on the basis of unpreserved error[.]\u201d Id.\nA lay witness is entitled to testify \u201cin the form of opinions or inferences . . . [which are] (a) rationally based on [his] perception . . . and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 701. When taken in context, Ms. M.\u2019s statement that she believed her daughters was made in the course of a discussion of her emotional state at the time that Violet and Becky informed her that Defendant had sexually abused them. Assuming, without in any way deciding, that the admission of this portion of Ms. M.\u2019s testimony was improper, Defendant has failed to show that, absent the error, the jury would have probably reached a different result. Simply put, in view of the relatively incidental nature of the challenged statement and the fact that most jurors are likely to assume that a mother will believe accusations of sexual abuse made by her own children, we cannot conclude that the challenged portion of Ms. M.\u2019s testimony had any significant impact on the jury\u2019s decision to convict Defendant. See State v. Ramey, 318 N.C. 457, 466, 349 S.E.2d 566, 572 (1986) (stating that \u201c[i]t is unlikely that the jury gave great weight to the fact that a mother believed that her son was truthful\u201d). As a result, after reviewing the record in its entirety, we cannot hold that the trial court committed plain error by failing to preclude Ms. M. from testifying that she believed her daughters.\nB. Detective Curry\u2019s Testimony\nSecondly, Defendant argues that Detective Curry impermissibly vouched for Becky and Violet\u2019s credibility. Once again, given that Defendant did not object to the admission of the challenged testimony at trial, we review the trial court\u2019s failure to preclude the admission of this testimony utilizing a plain error standard of review. After engaging in the required plain error review, we conclude that Defendant\u2019s argument lacks merit.\nAs an initial matter, Defendant argues that Detective Curry testified that the children \u201cactually remembered incidents, attesting as an expert that the incidents actually happened as they claimed.\u201d Defendant bases this claim upon the following testimony, which the State elicited on direct examination:\nQ. What were your impressions of [Becky], her manner and her demeanor when you met with her in November of 2010?\nA. [Becky] appeared to be \u2014 to have more of a \u2014 she was matter of fact. She remembered less. She remembered incidents. She remembered very specific incidents but he didn\u2019t \u2014 she did not remember times. And she was \u2014 and in looking and trying to get her to explain specific incidents, she would actually remember \u2014 it would appear that she would remember as we were talking if I said something that would [cue] her to her memory. Not a lead, but a [cue]. So, that she would actually think about when I. . . would say where were you, she would literally think and then say oh yeah, I remember this. That\u2019s very common as well. But time, she still didn\u2019t \u2014 like [Violet], had very limited concept of time because of the age of the incident.\nAlthough Defendant correctly asserts that a witness may not vouch for the credibility of the alleged victim in a child sexual abuse case, State v. Stancil, 355 N.C. 266, 266-67, 559 S.E.2d 788, 789 (2002) (per curiam); State v. Aguallo, 318 N.C. 590, 599, 350 S.E.2d 76, 81 (1986) (holding that expert testimony to the effect that the victim was \u201cbelievable\u201d was inadmissible), a careful examination of the challenged testimony, when read in context, clearly indicates that, instead of vouching for the veracity of Becky\u2019s allegations, Detective Curry was simply describing Becky\u2019s appearance and behavior as she observed it during their meeting.\nAccording to well-established North Carolina law, a witness is entitled to utilize \u201cshorthand statements of facts\u201d during the course of his or her testimony, State v. Eason, 336 N.C. 730, 747, 445 S.E.2d 917, 927 (1994) (stating that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 701 allows the admission of \u201cwhat are frequently called \u2018shorthand statements of facts\u2019 \u201d), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1096, 115 S. Ct. 764, 130 L. Ed. 2d 661 (1995), on the theory that \u201cinstantaneous conclusions of the mind as to the appearance, condition, or mental or physical state of persons, animals, and things, derived from observation of a variety of facts presented to the senses at one and the same time, are, legally speaking, matters of fact, and are admissible in evidence.\u201d State v. Gobal, 186 N.C. App. 308, 317, 651 S.E.2d 279, 285 (2007) (emphasis in the original) (quoting State v. Lloyd, 354 N.C. 76, 109, 552 S.E.2d 596, 620 (2001)), aff\u2019d, 362 N.C. 342, 661 S.E.2d 732 (2008). Detective Curry began her response to the prosecutor\u2019s question concerning Becky\u2019s \u201cmanner\u201d and \u201cdemeanor\u201d by detailing Becky\u2019s appearance, expressions, mannerisms, and thought processes. When considered in context, the challenged testimony consisted of nothing more than a permissible discussion of the manner in which Becky communicated with Detective Curry, including the limitations to which Becky\u2019s ability to recount past events was subject, based on Detective Curry\u2019s observations during her meeting with Becky. State v. Waddell, 130 N.C. App. 488, 501-02, 504 S.E.2d 84, 92 (1998) (holding that witness\u2019s descriptions of a child\u2019s conduct constituted an admissible \u201cshorthand statement of fact\u201d). As a result, this component of Detective Curry\u2019s testimony was not inadmissible.\nSecondly, Defendant challenges Detective Curry\u2019s assertion that Becky and Violet were \u201cextremely credible.\u201d The challenged testimony occurred on cross-examination, when Detective Curry testified that:\nQ. Okay. Did you ever tell them that I \u2014 I believe you two and I think you are extremely credible?\nA. Did I ever tell who that?\nQ. [Violet] and/or [Becky]?\nA. I\u2019m sure I did.\nAlthough the statement upon which Defendant predicates this aspect of his challenge to the trial court\u2019s judgments clearly constitutes an affirmation of Becky and Violet\u2019s credibility, \u201c[a] defendant is not prejudiced by . . . error resulting from his own conduct.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1443(c). As a result, \u201ca defendant who invites error has waived his right to all appellate review concerning the invited error, including plain error review.\u201d State v. Barber, 147 N.C. App. 69, 74, 554 S.E.2d 413, 416 (2001), disc. review denied and dismissed, 355 N.C. 216, 560 S.E.2d 142 (2002). The testimony about which Defendant now complains stemmed from language contained in a leading question posed by Defendant\u2019s trial counsel as part of an apparent effort to challenge Detective Curry\u2019s credibility. Having directly posed a question that incorporated inadmissible material, Defendant is simply not entitled to seek appellate relief on the grounds that the challenged testimony should have been excluded. See Gobal, 186 N.C. App. at 319, 651 S.E.2d at 287 (stating that \u201c[statements elicited by a defendant on cross-examination are, even if error, invited error, by which a defendant cannot be prejudiced as a matter of law\u201d). Thus, since this alleged error was clearly invited by Defendant, it provides no basis for an award of appellate relief. State v. Gay, 334 N.C. 467, 485, 434 S.E.2d 840, 850 (1993) (stating that \u201c \u2018invited error\u2019 does not merit relief\u2019) (citing State v. Rivers, 324 N.C. 573, 575-76, 380 S.E.2d 359, 360 (1989); State v. Greene, 324 N.C. 1, 12, 376 S.E.2d 430, 438 (1989), sentence vacated on other grounds, 494 U.S. 1022, 110 S. Ct. 1465, 108 L. Ed. 2d 603 (1990); State v. Silvers, 323 N.C. 646, 655, 374 S.E.2d 858, 864 (1989)). As a result, Defendant is not entitled to appellate relief based upon either of his challenges to Detective Curry\u2019s testimony.\nC. Defendant\u2019s Cooperation\nThirdly, Defendant contends that the trial court erred by refusing to allow the admission of evidence that he cooperated with Detective Curry. In support of this assertion, Defendant points to his cross-examination of Detective Curry, during which the trial court sustained the State\u2019s objection when his trial counsel asked, \u201cNow, I was \u2014 was Mr. Dew cooperative with you?\u201d Defendant is not entitled to relief from the trial court\u2019s judgments on the basis of this ruling.\n\u201cIt is well established that an exception to the exclusion of evidence cannot be sustained where the record fails to show what the witness\u2019 testimony would have been had he been permitted to testify.\u201d State v. Simpson, 314 N.C. 359, 370, 334 S.E.2d 53, 60 (1985) (citing State v. Cheek, 307 N.C. 552, 561, 299 S.E.2d 633, 639 (1983)) (other citations omitted). For that reason, \u201cin order for a party to preserve for appellate review the exclusion of evidence, the significance of the excluded evidence must be made to appear in the record and a specific offer of proof is required unless the significance of the evidence is obvious from the record.\u201d Id. (citing Currence v. Hardin, 296 N.C. 95, 99-100, 249 S.E.2d 387, 390 (1978)). \u201cIn the absence of an adequate offer of proof, [w]e can only speculate as to what the witness\u2019 answer would have been.\u2019 \u201d State v. Ginyard, 122 N.C. App. 25, 33, 468 S.E.2d 525, 531 (1996) (quoting State v. Barton, 335 N.C. 741, 749, 441 S.E.2d 306, 310-11 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted)). As a result of the fact that the record does not contain the substance of any answer that Detective Curry might have given to the question posed by Defendant\u2019s trial counsel, we have no basis for determining the extent, if any, to which the trial court\u2019s ruling might have prejudiced Defendant. State v. Lynch, 337 N.C. 415, 423, 445 S.E.2d 581, 584 (1994) (holding that the defendant\u2019s failure to \u201cshow what the response of the witness would have been if he had been allowed to answer\u201d precluded a determination of whether \u201cthe defendant was prejudiced by the exclusion of the answers\u201d); State v. Miller, 321 N.C. 445, 452, 364 S.E.2d 387, 391 (1988) (stating that, \u201c[b]y failing to preserve the evidence for our review, defendant has deprived us of the necessary record from which to ascertain if the alleged error was prejudicial\u201d). As a result, Defendant is not entitled to relief from the trial court\u2019s judgments on the basis of this contention.\nD. Expert Testimony of Ms. Hollandsworth\nFourthly, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by admitting the testimony of Ms. Hollandsworth in two different respects. First, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by allowing Ms. Hollandsworth to testify as an expert in family counseling. Secondly, Defendant argues that the trial court erroneously allowed Ms. Hollandsworth to vouch for the credibility of Violet and Becky. We do not believe that either of these contentions has merit.\n1. Ms. Hollandsworth\u2019s Expert Qualification\nIn the course of challenging the trial court\u2019s decision to allow Ms. Hollandsworth to present expert testimony, Defendant argues that Ms. Hollandsworth lacked the necessary credentials and failed to utilize an appropriate methodology. We disagree with both of Defendant\u2019s assertions.\n\u201c[E]xpert testimony is properly admissible when such testimony can assist the jury to draw certain inferences from facts because the expert is better qualified.\u201d State v. Bullard, 312 N.C. 129, 139, 322 S.E.2d 370, 376 (1984). In ruling upon a request to allow the admission of expert testimony, \u201cthe trial court must determine whether the expert\u2019s method of proof is sufficiently reliable as an area for expert testimony.\u201d Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 358 N.C. 440, 459, 597 S.E.2d 674, 686 (2004) (citing State v. Goode, 341 N.C. 513, 527-29, 461 S.E.2d 631, 639-40 (1995)). An \u201cexpert\u2019s testimony [does not have to be shown to be] conclusively reliable or indisputably valid before it can be admitted into evidence,\u201d since the credibility of and weight to be given to the expert\u2019s testimony is a question for the jury rather than the trial court. Id. at 460-61, 597 S.E.2d at 687-88. As a result of the fact that \u201cthe trial judge is afforded wide latitude of discretion when making a determination about the admissibility of expert testimony,\u201d Bullard, 312 N.C. at 140, 322 S.E.2d at 376, we review the trial court\u2019s decision to allow Ms. Hollandsworth to testify as an expert using an abuse of discretion standard of review. State v. Parks, 96 N.C. App. 589, 592, 386 S.E.2d 748, 750 (1989).\nMs. Hollandsworth clearly possessed the qualifications needed to present expert testimony. Among other things, Ms. Hollandsworth has earned a master\u2019s degree in Christian counseling and has completed additional professional training relating to the trauma experienced by children who have been subjected to sexual abuse. Ms. Hollandsworth is engaged in private practice as a therapist and is a licensed family therapist and professional counselor. According to Ms. Hollandsworth, over half of her clients have been subjected to some sort of trauma, with a significant number of these patients having suffered sexual abuse. As a result, the trial court had ample justification for allowing Ms. Hollandsworth to testify as an expert witness. State v. Love, 100 N.C. App. 226, 233, 395 S.E.2d 429, 433 (1990) (holding that an individual with a master\u2019s degree in counseling who had counseled children suspected of having been sexually abused was properly qualified to present expert testimony), disc. review denied, 328 N.C. 95, 402 S.E.2d 423 (1991).\nAlthough Defendant challenges the admission of Ms. Hollandsworth\u2019s testimony on reliability grounds, he has failed to demonstrate that the methods that she employed in the course of her work with Becky and Violet were unreliable. Instead, Defendant simply points to Ms. Hollandsworth\u2019s testimony to the effect that there is no way to tell whether any particular individual has been sexually abused based solely upon what he or she says and that different people respond to the experience of having been sexually abused in different ways. However, the appellate courts in this jurisdiction have consistently allowed the admission of expert testimony, such as that provided by Ms. Hollandsworth, which relies upon personal observations and professional experience rather than upon quantitative analysis. See, e.g., State v. Kennedy, 320 N.C. 20, 31-32, 357 S.E.2d 359, 366-67 (1987) (admitting testimony describing the symptoms exhibited by sexually abused children and opining that the alleged victims exhibited symptoms consistent with sexual abuse); Love, 100 N.C. App. at 233, 395 S.E.2d at 433 (1990) (holding that \u201c[allowing experts to testify as to the symptoms and characteristics of sexually abused children and to state their opinions that the symptoms exhibited by the victim were consistent with sexual or physical abuse is proper\u201d). As a result, having concluded that Defendant\u2019s challenges to Ms. Hollandsworth\u2019s credentials and the reliability of the methods that Ms. Hollandsworth employed lack merit, we hold that the trial court did not err by allowing Ms. Hollandsworth to testify as an expert witness.\n2. Vouching for the Children\u2019s Credibility\nSecondly, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by allowing Ms. Hollandsworth to vouch for Becky and Violet\u2019s credibility. Once again, we do not find Defendant\u2019s argument persuasive.\nOn direct examination, the prosecutor asked Ms. Hollandsworth, \u201cIs it common for children, especially younger children, who experience trauma of this nature to be unable or unwilling to tell a trusted family member even when they live in a loving home?\u201d In response, Ms. Hollandsworth stated that:\nWhat research says is 60% of cases like this do not even get reported. And in my experience with clients, this is young to be even talking about it actually. Most of my cases people were after college age into young adulthood before they even talked about it. And, again, it goes back to that sense of guilt and shame. And this is common in literature and in what I\u2019ve seen in my cases. That feeling of being bad or as if they participated. What research says is that the\u2014\nAt this point, the trial court sustained an objection lodged by Defendant\u2019s trial counsel.\nAs we have already noted, a witness is not permitted to vouch for the credibility of the alleged victim in a child sexual abuse case. State v. Aguallo, 322 N.C. 818, 822, 370 S.E.2d 676, 678 (1988) (stating that \u201cthis Court has held it [to be] reversible error for medical experts to testify as to the veracity of the victim,\u201d including situations in which \u201cexperts have testified that the victim was believable, had no record of lying, and had never been untruthful\u201d) (citing Aguallo, 318 N.C. at 597-600, 350 S.E.2d at 81-82; State v. Kim, 318 N.C. 614, 619-21, 350 S.E.2d 347, 350-52 (1986); and State v. Heath, 316 N.C. 337, 340-44, 341 S.E.2d 565, 568-69 (1986)). According to Defendant, Ms. Hollandsworth improperly vouched for the credibility of Becky and Violet by describing child sexual abuse cases with which she was familiar as \u201ccases like this.\u201d We do not, however, believe that the challenged testimony constitutes impermissible vouching for the children\u2019s credibility.\nThe cases in which this Court and the Supreme Court have reversed convictions based upon the principle upon which Defendant relies generally involve testimony that directly comments on the credibility of the alleged victim or sets out the witness\u2019 subjective beliefs concerning the veracity of the alleged victim\u2019s allegations. See, e.g., Aguallo, 318 N.C. at 599, 350 S.E.2d at 81 (holding testimony that \u201c 1 think she\u2019s believable\u2019 \u201d to be inadmissible); State v. Keen, 309 N.C. 158, 162, 305 S.E.2d 535, 537 (1983) (holding testimony \u201c \u2018[t]hat an attack occurred on him; [] this was reality\u2019 \u201d to be inadmissible); State v. Horton, 200 N.C. App. 74, 78, 682 S.E.2d 754, 757-58 (2009) (holding testimony that, \u201c \u2018[i]n all of my training and experience, when children provide those types of specific details it enhances their credibility\u2019 \u201d to be inadmissible). When read in context, Ms. Hollandsworth\u2019s testimony did not constitute a comment upon Becky and Violet\u2019s veracity. Ms. Hollandsworth never directly stated that Becky and Violet were believable. Instead, the challenged testimony describes the actions and reactions of sexual abuse victims in general and is devoid of any direct comment upon the credibility of the witnesses upon whom the State\u2019s case hinges. As a result, the trial court did not, contrary to Defendant\u2019s contention, allow Ms. Hollandsworth to vouch for the children\u2019s credibility in an impermissible manner.\nE. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel\nFinally, Defendant contends that, if this Court concludes that any of the claims discussed above have not been properly preserved for appellate review, he is entitled to relief on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds. We disagree.\nIn analyzing ineffective assistance of counsel claims, we utilize a two-part test, under which the \u201c[defendant must show (1) that \u2018counsel\u2019s performance was deficient,\u2019 meaning it \u2018fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,\u2019 and (2) that \u2018the deficient performance prejudiced the defense,\u2019 meaning that \u2018counsel\u2019s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.\u2019 \u201d... In proving whether counsel\u2019s actions resulted in prejudice to the defendant, he or she must demonstrate that \u201cthere is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel\u2019s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different[,]\u201d with a \u201creasonable probability\u201d being \u201ca probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.\u201d\nState v. Womack,_N.C. App._,_, 712 S.E.2d 193, 196 (2011) (quoting State v. Mohamed, 205 N.C. App. 470, 480-81, 696 S.E.2d 724, 733 (2010) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693 (1984)), and 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698). \u201cIf it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.\u201d Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S. Ct. at 2069, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 699. In the event that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim cannot be properly evaluated \u201cwithout such ancillary procedures as the appointment of investigators or an evidentiary hearing,\u201d that claim should be dismissed \u201cwithout prejudice to the defendant\u2019s right to reassert [that claim] during a subsequent [motion for appropriate relief] proceeding.\u201d State v. Fair, 354 N.C. 131, 166-67, 557 S.E.2d 500, 524-25 (2001) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1114, 122 S. Ct. 2332, 153 L. Ed. 2d 162 (2002).\nAfter carefully reviewing the record, we conclude that Defendant is not entitled to relief on the basis of any of the ineffective assistance of counsel claims that he has asserted in his brief. Having upheld the admission of Detective Curry\u2019s description of her meeting with Becky and the challenged portions of Ms. Hollandsworth\u2019s testimony on the merits, we conclude that Defendant has failed to establish that there were any deficiencies in the representation which he received from his trial counsel with respect to this evidence. State v. Mewborn, 200 N.C. App. 731, 738, 684 S.E.2d 535, 540 (2009) (citing State v. Lee, 348 N.C. 474, 492, 501 S.E.2d 334, 345 (1998)) (stating that \u201cthe failure to object to admissible evidence does not constitute an error which would satisfy the first prong of the Strickland test\u201d). In addition, we cannot conclude, on the basis of the present record, that there is any reasonable probability that the outcome at Defendant\u2019s trial would have been different had his trial counsel persuaded the trial court to exclude Ms. M.\u2019s expression of confidence in her daughters\u2019 truthfulness or to overrule the State\u2019s objection to the question inquiring about the extent of Defendant\u2019s cooperation with investigating officers. Finally, given that we do not know why Defendant\u2019s trial counsel elected to inquire about Detective Curry\u2019s confidence in Becky and Violet\u2019s veracity, we are unable, on the basis of the present record, to properly evaluate the validity of Defendant\u2019s challenge to the admission of the relevant portion of Detective Curry\u2019s testimony and dismiss Defendant\u2019s challenge to the representation which he received from his trial counsel with respect to the admission of that evidence without prejudice to his ability to assert that claim in a future motion for appropriate relief. As a result, Defendant is not entitled to relief from the trial court\u2019s judgments on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds.\nIII. Conclusion\nThus, for the reasons set forth above, we conclude that none of Defendant\u2019s challenges to the trial court\u2019s judgments have merit. As a result, the trial court\u2019s judgments should, and hereby do, remain undisturbed.\nNo Error.\nChief Judge MARTIN and Judge DILLON concur.\n. V.M. and B.M wUl be referred to as \u201cViolet\u201d and \u201cBecky,\u201d respectively, throughout the remainder of this opinion for ease of reading and to protect the children\u2019s privacy.", "type": "majority", "author": "ERVIN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper; by Assistant Attorney General Teresa M. Postell, for the State.", "Mark Montgomery for Defendant-Appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JOHN EARL DEW, JR.\nNo. COA12-642\nFiled 5 March 2013\n1. Evidence \u2014 victims\u2019 credibility \u2014 statement by victims\u2019 mother\u2014 reaction when told of abuse\nThere was no plain error in a prosecution for indecent liberties where the victims\u2019 mother repeated in court a statement that she believed her daughters. Taken in context, the statement was made in the course of a discussion of her emotional state when the victims told her that defendant had sexually abused them. Assuming that the admission of this portion of her testimony was improper, defendant did not show that the jury would have probably reached a different result absent the error.\n2. Evidence \u2014 victims\u2019 credibility \u2014 victims\u2019 appearance and behavior \u2014 meeting with detective\nThere was no plain error in a prosecution for indecent liberties where a detective allegedly vouched for a victim\u2019s credibility in his testimony. In context, the detective was simply describing the victim\u2019s appearance and behavior as she observed it during their meeting.\n3. Evidence \u2014 victims\u2019 credibility \u2014 detective\u2019s statement\u2014 invited error\nThere was no error in a prosecution for indecent liberties where a detective allegedly testified on cross-examination that the victims were \u201cextremely credible.\u201d Defendant was not entitled to seek appellate relief on the grounds that the challenged testimony should have been excluded after directly posing a question that incorporated inadmissible material.\n4. Evidence \u2014 exclusion of evidence \u2014 offer of proof required on appeal\nNo error was found in the exclusion of evidence by the trial court in an indecent liberties case where there was no offer of proof.\n5. Witnesses \u2014 expert\u2014family therapist \u2014 indecent liberties prosecution\nThe trial court did not err in an indecent liberties prosecution by allowing a family therapist to testify as an expert where she clearly had the necessary qualifications and defendant did not demonstrate that her methods were unreliable.\n6. Evidence \u2014 victims\u2019 credibility \u2014 therapist\u2019s opinion\nThe trial court did not err in an indecent liberties prosecution by allowing testimony from a family therapist in which, according to defendant, the therapist vouched for the victims\u2019 credibility. In context, the therapist never directly stated that the victims were believable, but described the actions and reactions of sexual abuse victims in general.\n7. Constitutional Law \u2014 effective representation of counsel\u2014 admission of evidence\nAn indecent liberties defendant was not entitled to relief on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds where he did not show deficient representation or prejudice from the admission of certain evidence. Defendant\u2019s ineffective representation claim regarding a detective\u2019s testimony on cross-examination was dismissed without prejudice to a future motion for appropriate relief because the record did not permit a proper evaluation of the evidence.\nAppeal by defendant from judgments entered 13 December 2011 by Judge Eric Levinson in Cleveland County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 7 January 2013.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper; by Assistant Attorney General Teresa M. Postell, for the State.\nMark Montgomery for Defendant-Appellant." }, "file_name": "0750-01", "first_page_order": 760, "last_page_order": 774 }