{ "id": 4131819, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TRAVIS DOUGLAS MORGAN", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Morgan", "decision_date": "2013-03-05", "docket_number": "No. COA12-889", "first_page": "784", "last_page": "791", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "225 N.C. App. 784" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "664 S.E.2d 339", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12641600 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "342" }, { "page": "477" }, { "page": "342" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/664/0339-01" ] }, { "cite": "673 S.E.2d 394", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12642934 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "395" }, { "page": "395" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/673/0394-01" ] }, { "cite": "61 S.E.2d 107", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "108" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "232 N.C. 374", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8601837 ], "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "375-76" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/232/0374-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 S.E.2d 500", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "503" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 N.C. 534", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569411 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "539" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/304/0534-01" ] }, { "cite": "577 S.E.2d 319", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "324", "parenthetical": "\"[A]n indictment is fatally defective when the indictment fails on the face of the record to charge an essential element of the offense.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "156 N.C. App. 490", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9191220 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "499", "parenthetical": "\"[A]n indictment is fatally defective when the indictment fails on the face of the record to charge an essential element of the offense.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/156/0490-01" ] }, { "cite": "323 S.E.2d 343", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "346" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 432", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4756963 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "435" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0432-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 N.C. App. 474", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4160226 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "476" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/191/0474-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-27", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15-144.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)", "parenthetical": "providing the essential elements for an indictment for forcible rape" }, { "page": "(b)", "parenthetical": "providing the essential elements for an indictment for rape of a female child under the age of 13" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "494 U.S. 433", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 4898 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/494/0433-01" ] }, { "cite": "372 S.E.2d 12", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "23", "parenthetical": "\"While intoxication is a circumstance critical to the issue of voluntariness, intoxication at the time of a confession does not necessarily render it involuntary. It is simply a factor to be considered in determining voluntariness.\" (citation omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2560587 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "22", "parenthetical": "\"While intoxication is a circumstance critical to the issue of voluntariness, intoxication at the time of a confession does not necessarily render it involuntary. It is simply a factor to be considered in determining voluntariness.\" (citation omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "212 S.E.2d 92", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "102-03", "parenthetical": "concluding the defendant's confession was involuntary where the interrogating police officers' statements created in the defendant \"fear or hope, or both\" when the officers implied that \"things would be better for defendant if he would cooperate, i.e., confess\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "286 N.C. 442", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568818 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "458", "parenthetical": "concluding the defendant's confession was involuntary where the interrogating police officers' statements created in the defendant \"fear or hope, or both\" when the officers implied that \"things would be better for defendant if he would cooperate, i.e., confess\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/286/0442-01" ] }, { "cite": "732 S.E.2d 571", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "574" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "709 S.E.2d 463", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "468" }, { "page": "468" }, { "page": "466" }, { "page": "470" }, { "page": "470", "parenthetical": "concluding \"the trial court's failure to make written findings does not require remand for a new trial, but remand for further findings of fact\" and conclusions of law to resolve material conflicts in the evidence" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "702 S.E.2d 825", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "829", "parenthetical": "citing Williams, 195 N.C. App. at 555, 673 S.E.2d at 395" }, { "page": "829" }, { "page": "831" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "208 N.C. App. 376", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4180643 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "381", "parenthetical": "citing Williams, 195 N.C. App. at 555, 673 S.E.2d at 395" }, { "page": "384" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/208/0376-01" ] }, { "cite": "195 N.C. App. 554", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4165417 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "555" }, { "page": "555" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/195/0554-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 737, "char_count": 17481, "ocr_confidence": 0.736, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.13335680960550209 }, "sha256": "57d6e7dcafb7fce3722669d2c2a3443df4d407a9e015081d5e3b34384b4f859b", "simhash": "1:a3e8f02a76af2c35", "word_count": 2865 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:12:03.865649+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges McGEE and ELMORE concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TRAVIS DOUGLAS MORGAN" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUNTER, Robert C., Judge.\nTravis Douglas Martin (\u201cdefendant\u201d) appeals from judgment entered in Moore County Superior Court upon return of a jury verdict finding him guilty of statutory rape of a 15-year-old girl and indecent liberties with a child. On appeal, defendant argues that: (1) the trial court erred by failing to enter written factual findings and conclusions of law in its denial of defendant\u2019s motion to suppress, and (2) the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter its judgment due to defects in the indictment. After careful review, we find no error in the indictment but remand to the trial court for entry of a written order on defendant\u2019s motion to suppress.\nBackground\nThe evidence at trial established the following facts. On 17 June 2010, defendant was at the home of his friends Philip Cagle (\u201cCagle\u201d), Teresa Duncan (\u201cDuncan\u201d), and Duncan\u2019s daughter, Becky, when defendant decided to stay the night. At approximately 3:00 a.m., Becky woke up, got a drink from the kitchen, and returned to her bedroom. A few minutes later, defendant joined Becky in her room and watched television with her. Defendant got on Becky\u2019s bed, positioned himself behind her, pulled down Becky\u2019s shorts, and vaginally ' penetrated her with his penis. Becky told defendant to stop, and he did. Defendant then left the bedroom. Approximately one week later, Becky told her mother about the incident, and Becky\u2019s mother told Cagle.\nOn 23 June 2010, Cagle invited defendant to his house. When defendant arrived, Cagle physically assaulted defendant while wearing brass knuckles. Injured, defendant returned to his home where he smoked some marijuana and took some sleeping pills. At approximately 11:00 p.m., someone called the Moore County Sheriff\u2019s Department about the incident, and Detective Donald Shingleton (\u201cDetective Shingleton\u201d) drove to Cagle\u2019s home. Becky told the detective that defendant had sexually assaulted her on the 17th of June, and Cagle admitted to the detective that he had beaten defendant. Detective Shingleton collected evidence including Becky\u2019s bed comforter and the clothing she was wearing on the 17th of June.\nThe detective obtained an arrest warrant for defendant, arrested defendant at his home, and took him to the sheriff\u2019s department. There, defendant waived his Miranda rights and cooperated with the questioning by Detective Shingleton. After approximately 15 minutes, defendant signed a written statement about the events on 17th and 18th of June in which he admitted that he had vaginally penetrated Becky.\nDefendant was indicted on 20 September 2010 for (1) statutory rape of a child 13, 14, or 15 years old, (2) taking indecent liberties with a minor, and (3) sexual battery. A grand jury issued a superseding indictment for the three charges on 2 May 2011; the new indictment changed the date of the offense to \u201con or about\u201d 17 or 18 June 2010 and changed the name of the grand jury witness. On 27 November 2010, defendant filed a motion to suppress the written statement he provided to Detective Shingleton. The motion was heard on 27 February 2012 in Moore County Superior Court, Judge Anderson Cromer presiding. At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Cromer orally denied the motion, and the case proceeded to a jury trial the next day. The jury returned verdicts of guilty as to the charges of statutory rape of a 15-year-old girl and indecent liberties with a child, but it acquitted defendant of sexual battery. The trial court consolidated the two convictions and sentenced defendant to 180-225 months imprisonment. Defendant appeals.\nA. Motion to Suppress\nDefendant first argues that the trial court erred by failing to set out written findings of fact and conclusions of law in denying his motion to suppress. Defendant contends that there was a material conflict in the evidence as to whether he voluntarily waived his Miranda rights and voluntarily provided his written statement regarding the events of 17 and 18 June 2010. This conflict, he argues, required the trial court to enter a written order when ruling on his motion to suppress.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-977(f) (2011) provides that when a trial court rules on a motion to suppress, \u201c[t]he judge must set forth in the record his findings of facts and conclusions of law.\u201d We have interpreted this statute \u201cas mandating a written order unless (1) the trial court provides its rationale from the bench, and (2) there are no material conflicts in the evidence at the suppression hearing.\u201d State v. Williams, 195 N.C. App. 554, 555, 673 S.E.2d 394, 395 (2009).\n[W]hen a trial court\u2019s failure to make findings of fact and conclusions of law is assigned as error, the appropriate standard of review on appeal is as follows: The trial court\u2019s ruling on the motion to suppress is fully reviewable for a determination as to whether the two criteria set forth in Williams have been met[.]\nState v. Baker, 208 N.C. App. 376, 381, 702 S.E.2d 825, 829 (2010) (citing Williams, 195 N.C. App. at 555, 673 S.E.2d at 395). \u201cIf a reviewing court concludes that both criteria are met, then the findings of fact are implied by the trial court\u2019s denial of the motion to suppress[.]\u201d Id. \u201cIf a reviewing court concludes that either of the criteria is not met, then a trial court\u2019s failure to make findings of fact, contrary to the mandate of section 15A-977(f), is fatal to the validity of its ruling and constitutes reversible error.\u201d Id. at 381-82, 702 S.E.2d at 829.\nIn State v. Neal, _ N.C. App. _, _, 709 S.E.2d 463, 468 (2011), we concluded that a material conflict in the evidence required the trial court to enter a written order resolving the conflict. The trial court announced, from the bench, its rationale for its denial of the defendant\u2019s motion. Id. at_, 709 S.E.2d at 468. The trial court\u2019s oral findings addressed the defendant\u2019s contention that the arresting officer promised to \u201cstrike\u201d a charge of trespass if he would provide a statement to the police and consent to a search of his house. Id. at_, 709 S.E.2d at 466. Despite the fact that the trial court addressed this evidence in its oral findings, we concluded that because there was a material conflict in the evidence, Williams \u201cnecessitated a written order with findings of fact resolving the conflict.\u201d Neal,_N.C. App. at _, 709 S.E.2d at 470.\nIn the recent decision of State v. Oates,_N.C._,_, 732 S.E.2d 571, 574 (2012), the Supreme Court of North Carolina addressed the timeliness of the State\u2019s appeal from the trial court\u2019s grant of a motion to suppress pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-977(f). Regarding the necessity of a written order, the Supreme Court stated:\n[A] judge ruling on a suppression motion that is not determined summarily is required to \u201cset forth in the record his findings of facts and conclusions of law.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-977(f) (2011). While a written determination is the best practice, nevertheless the statute does not require that these findings and conclusions be in writing.\nId. The holding in Oates was related to \u201cthe window for the filing of a written notice of appeal in a criminal case\u201d pursuant to Rule 4 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure and N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1448. Id. While we conclude the Court\u2019s comments on section 15A-977(f) were not necessary to the Court\u2019s holding in Oates, we do not find the Court\u2019s comments to contradict our analysis of the statute under Williams or Neal \u2014 that a written order is necessary unless the court announces its rationale from the bench and there are no material conflicts in the evidence.\nHere, the State contends that it is clear from the transcript that the trial court provided its rationale for denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress. Indeed, the trial court acknowledged that there was evidence that defendant had sustained physical injuries in an assault and ingested controlled substances prior to his interrogation, but concluded that neither of these factors rendered defendant\u2019s written statement involuntary. The trial court did not, however, address whether plaintiff\u2019s waiver of his Miranda rights and the signed statement had been obtained in exchange for a promise of leniency.\n\u201c[A] material conflict in the evidence exists when evidence presented by one party controverts evidence presented by an opposing party such that the outcome of the matter to be decided is likely to be affected.\u201d Baker, 208 N.C. App. at 384, 702 S.E.2d at 831. In ruling on defendant\u2019s motion to suppress, the voluntariness of defendant\u2019s waiver of his Miranda rights and of his written statement was central to the outcome of the motion. The Supreme Court of North Carolina has recognized that promises of leniency and a defendant\u2019s intoxication are factors to be considered in determining voluntariness of a defendant\u2019s statements. See State v. Pruitt, 286 N.C. 442, 458, 212 S.E.2d 92, 102-03 (1975) (concluding the defendant\u2019s confession was involuntary where the interrogating police officers\u2019 statements created in the defendant \u201cfear or hope, or both\u201d when the officers implied that \u201cthings would be better for defendant if he would cooperate, i.e., confess\u201d); State v. McKoy, 323 N.C. 1, 22, 372 S.E.2d 12, 23 (1988) (\u201cWhile intoxication is a circumstance critical to the issue of voluntariness, intoxication at the time of a confession does not necessarily render it involuntary. It is simply a factor to be considered in determining voluntariness.\u201d (citation omitted)), sentence vacated on other grounds, 494 U.S. 433, 108 L. Ed. 2d 369 (1990).\nDefendant testified that he did not recall signing the confession. He could only recall signing what he thought was a waiver of his Miranda rights, and that he signed the waiver because Detective Shingleton indicated he could help defendant get probation. The detective denied making any promises to defendant. Defendant also testified that he was in a \u201cgood amount of pain\u201d and was \u201chighly under the influence\u201d of the controlled substances he had ingested. Detective Shingleton testified that defendant did not appear to be under the influence of any \u201cimpairing-type substance\u201d during the interrogation.\nThis testimony presented a conflict in the evidence which was likely to affect the outcome of the motion to suppress. Thus, the conflict was a material conflict as contemplated by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-977(f). Accordingly, the trial court was required to enter a written order of its findings and conclusions of law. As it failed to do so, we must remand for entry of a written order on defendant\u2019s motion to suppress with additional findings and conclusions of law addressing the material conflicts in the evidence. See Neal,_N.C. App. at_, 709 S.E.2d at 470 (concluding \u201cthe trial court\u2019s failure to make written findings does not require remand for a new trial, but remand for further findings of fact\u201d and conclusions of law to resolve material conflicts in the evidence).\nB. Indictment for Statutory Rape\nDefendant next argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter judgment on the charge of statutory rape because the superseding indictment did not satisfy the requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15-144.1, the statute that authorizes short-form indictments for rape, or N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-27.7A(a), the statute providing the elements of statutory rape of a child 13, 14, or 15 years old. We disagree.\n\u201cA facially invalid indictment deprives the trial court of jurisdiction to enter judgment in a criminal case.\u201d State v. Haddock, 191 N.C. App. 474, 476, 664 S.E.2d 339, 342 (2008). \u201cAn indictment is not facially invalid as long as it notifies an accused of the charges against him sufficiently to allow him to prepare an adequate defense and to protect him from double jeopardy.\u201d Id. at 477, 664 S.E.2d at 342. Additionally, \u201c[notification is sufficient if the illegal act or omission alleged in the indictment is \u2018clearly set forth so that a person of common understanding may know what is intended.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting State v. Coker, 312 N.C. 432, 435, 323 S.E.2d 343, 346 (1984)).\nHere, the textual description of the statutory rape charge provided in the superseding indictment stated that defendant \u201cunlawfully, willfully and feloniously did carnally know and abuse\u201d Becky, \u201ca child of the age of 13, 14 or 15 years,\u201d and that defendant was \u201cat least six years older\u201d than Becky. The statute cited in the indictment for this charge was N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-27.7A(a), which states:\nA defendant is guilty of a Class B1 felony if the defendant engages in vaginal intercourse or a sexual act with another person who is 13, 14, or 15 years old and the defendant is at least six years older than the person, except when the defendant is lawfully married to the person.\nDefendant contends that because the indictment did not contain the words \u201cvaginal intercourse\u201d as provided in section 14-27.7A, it omitted an essential element of the crime, thus invalidating the indictment. See State v. Bartley, 156 N.C. App. 490, 499, 577 S.E.2d 319, 324 (2003) (\u201c[A]n indictment is fatally defective when the indictment fails on the face of the record to charge an essential element of the offense.\u201d). Defendant concedes, however, that at common law \u201ccarnal knowledge\u201d and \u201csexual intercourse\u201d are synonymous. See State v. Locklear, 304 N.C. 534, 539, 284 S.E.2d 500, 503 (1981). \u201cThere is \u2018carnal knowledge\u2019 or \u2018sexual intercourse\u2019 in a legal sense if there is the slightest penetration of the sexual organ of the female by the sexual organ of the male.\u201d State v. Bowman, 232 N.C. 374, 375-76, 61 S.E.2d 107, 108 (1950). As the indictment alleged that defendant did \u201ccarnally know\u201d Becky, a person of common understanding would know that the indictment alleged an act of vaginal intercourse. Therefore, we find that the indictment alleged all material elements of the crime charged.\nAs to the indictment\u2019s alleged insufficiency in regard to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15-144.1, defendant contends that the superseding indictment was fatally defective because it did not contain the statutory language \u201cby force and against her will[.]\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7.15-144.1(a). We conclude, however, that section 15-144.1 does not apply in this case as the statute\u2019s subsections do not address an indictment for the statutory rape of a child 13, 14, or 15 years old. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15-144.1(a) (providing the essential elements for an indictment for forcible rape); N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15-144.1(b) (providing the essential elements for an indictment for rape of a female child under the age of 13); N.C. Gen. Stat \u00a7 15-144.1(c) (providing the essential elements for an indictment on rape of a person who is mentally disabled, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless).\nThe indictment in this case was sufficient because it alleged all material elements of section 14-27.7A. Thus, the superseding indictment was not defective, and it provided defendant with sufficient notice of the crimes with which he was charged such that he could prepare an adequate defense.\nConclusion\nWe find no error in the indictment and conclude that the trial court had jurisdiction to enter its judgment. We remand for the trial court to enter written findings of fact and conclusions of law for its ruling on defendant\u2019s motion to suppress.\nNo Error in part; Remanded.\nJudges McGEE and ELMORE concur.\n. \u201cTeresa Duncan\u201d and \u201cBecky\u201d are pseudonyms used to protect the identity of the minor victim.\n. Because N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15-144.1 provides the essential elements for statutory rape of a female under 13, we suggest that the General Assembly consider whether it intended the statute to omit the elements for statutory rape of a female 13,14, or 15 years old.", "type": "majority", "author": "HUNTER, Robert C., Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Anita LeVeaux, for the State.", "Appellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender David W. Andrews, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TRAVIS DOUGLAS MORGAN\nNo. COA12-889\nFiled 5 March 2013\n1. Criminal Law \u2014 denial of motion to dismiss \u2014 no written findings\nThe trial court\u2019s failure to make written findings when denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss resulted in the remand of convictions for statutory rape and indecent liberties. While the trial court provided from the bench its rational for concluding that defendant\u2019s written statement was not rendered involuntary by injuries or painkillers, there was a material conflict in the evidence concerning a promise of leniency in exchange for the statement that the trial court did not address.\n2. Indictment and Information \u2014 statutory rape \u2014 carnal knowledge \u2014 common understanding\nAn indictment for statutory rape that alleged that defendant did \u201ccarnally know\u201d the victim alleged all material elements of the crime charged, even though the statute referred to \u201cvaginal intercourse.\u201d At common law \u201ccarnal knowledge\u201d and \u201csexual intercourse\u201d are synonymous and a person of common understanding would know that the indictment alleged an act of vaginal intercourse.\n3. Rape \u2014 statutory\u2014indictment\u2014language\nAn indictment for statutory rape was sufficient where it alleged all of the material elements of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-27.7A. The indictment was not insufficient because it did not contain the language \u201cby force and against her will\u201d; N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15-144.1 does not apply to the statutory rape of a child 13, 14, or 15 years old.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 1 March 2012 by Judge Anderson Cromer in Moore County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 December 2012.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Anita LeVeaux, for the State.\nAppellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender David W. Andrews, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0784-01", "first_page_order": 794, "last_page_order": 801 }