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  "name": "TINA HARDISON and DALTON HARDISON, Plaintiffs v. KIA MOTORS AMERICA, INC., Defendant",
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    "judges": [
      "Judges McGEE and CALABRIA concur."
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    "parties": [
      "TINA HARDISON and DALTON HARDISON, Plaintiffs v. KIA MOTORS AMERICA, INC., Defendant"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "MARTIN, Chief Judge.\nPlaintiffs Tina and Dalton Hardison brought this action alleging violations of the New Motor Vehicles Warranties Act, (\u201cthe North Carolina Lemon Law\u201d), N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-351, against defendant Kia Motors America, Inc. After a hearing on the parties\u2019 cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted plaintiffs\u2019 motion on the issue of liability and awarded attorney\u2019s fees, but denied their prayer for treble damages pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-351.8(2). Defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment was denied. Defendant appealed from the grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs and the denial of its motion for summary judgment; plaintiffs have cross-appealed the denial of treble damages. We affirm the trial court\u2019s order with regard to liability and trebling of damages, but reverse the award of attorney\u2019s fees.\nThe evidence at the hearing tended to show: plaintiffs purchased a Kia Borrego (\u201cthe Borrego\u201d) at Stevenson Kia in Jacksonville on 15 March 2010. The Borrego is covered by a sixty-month, 60,000-mile Express Limited Warranty, the details of which are located in the Borrego\u2019s manual. Shortly thereafter, the Borrego began exhibiting a \u201cno start\u201d condition and needed to be towed to Kia of New Bern (\u201cthe dealership\u201d), an authorized agent of defendant, for repair. Plaintiffs\u2019 Borrego was ultimately taken to the dealership for repair four times between 12 April and 19 July 2010, each time exhibiting the same \u201cno start\u201d condition. The dealership was unsuccessful in its attempts to identify the cause of the problem or to repair the Borrego.\nPlaintiffs obtained counsel, who sent a letter to defendant\u2019s National Consumer Affairs Department on 22 July 2010 alleging violations of the North Carolina Lemon Law. Defendant\u2019s Consumer Affairs Department received the letter on 27 July 2010, and responded to the letter via email on 5 August and via letter faxed to plaintiffs\u2019 counsel on 6 August 2010. The letter instructed plaintiffs to bring the Borrego to the dealership on 30 August 2010 for inspection and repair the following day by a Kia professional.\nOn 23 August 2010, prior to the 30 August 2010 scheduled drop-off, plaintiffs had to take the Borrego to the dealership when it failed to start again. Plaintiffs were allegedly unaware of the inspection and repair appointment scheduled for 31 August 2010 at that time. On August 31st, because the Borrego remained at the dealership, Mark Ramsey, a Field Technical Representative for defendant, inspected the Borrego, conducted several electrical tests, and discovered that the audio unit was malfunctioning and drawing on the battery when the car was turned off, thereby causing the \u201cno start\u201d condition. Ramsey met with plaintiff Dalton Hardison and explained the problem to him. Thereafter, the dealership ordered a replacement audio unit and Ramsey installed it on or about 1 September 2010. Plaintiffs picked up the Borrego on 3 September 2010 and have not experienced the \u201cno start\u201d condition again.\nOn appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred by granting plaintiffs\u2019 motion for summary judgment, ordering that defendant repurchase the Borrego pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-351.3(a) and awarding plaintiffs attorney\u2019s fees pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-351.8(3)(a). Plaintiffs contend the trial court erred by determining they are not entitled to the trebling of damages under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-351.8(2).\n\u201cOur standard of review of an appeal from summary judgment is de novo; such judgment is appropriate only when the record shows that \u2018there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\u2019 \u201d In re Will of Jones, 362 N.C. 569, 573, 669 S.E.2d 572, 576 (2008) (quoting Forbis v. Neal, 361 N.C. 519, 524, 649 S.E.2d 382, 385 (2007)).\nI.\nNorth Carolina\u2019s New Motor Vehicles Warranties Act, N.C.G.S \u00a7 20-351, provides remedies to consumers where a new motor vehicle does not conform to express warranties. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-351 (2011). Under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-351.3, the remedy of repurchase of the vehicle or refund of the purchase price is provided where:\n[T]he manufacturer is unable, after a reasonable number of attempts, to conform the motor vehicle to any express warranty by repairing or correcting, or arranging for the repair or correction of, any defect or condition or series of defects or conditions which substantially impair the value of the motor vehicle to the consumer....\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-351.3(a) (2011) (emphasis added). N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-351.5 creates a presumption that a \u201creasonable number of attempts have been undertaken\u201d if \u201cthe same nonconformity has been presented for repair to the manufacturer, its agent, or its authorized dealer four or more times but the same nonconformity continues to exist.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-351.5(a)(l) (2011) (emphasis added). The presumption has been referred to as an \u201cinitial eligibility hurdle[].\u201d Anders v. Hyundai Motor Am. Corp., 104 N.C. App. 61, 65, 407 S.E.2d 618, 621, disc. review denied, 330 N.C. 440, 412 S.E.2d 69 (1991). For the presumption to apply, the consumer must have notified the manufacturer directly in writing of the defect and allowed the manufacturer a reasonable period, not to exceed fifteen calendar days, in which to make the repairs. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-351.5(a). The statute also requires that the manufacturer \u201cclearly and conspicuously disclose to the consumer in the warranty or owners manual that written notification of a nonconformity is required before a consumer may be eligible for a refund or replacement of the vehicle\u201d and must \u201cinclude in the warranty or owners manual the name and address where the written notification may be sent.\u201d Id.\nDefendant argues there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether plaintiffs gave notice in accordance with the instructions in the warranty and whether they afforded defendant the requisite reasonable opportunity to repair. Plaintiffs respond that defendant\u2019s notice to consumers was defective because it was not \u201cclear and conspicuous,\u201d excusing them from the written notice requirement.\nDefendant\u2019s manual contains a section labeled \u201cWhen you need to talk to Kia and Roadside Assistance,\u201d beginning on page 43, just after the full text of the warranty. Just below the first paragraph in that section, the manual informs the consumer that \u201c[a]lso included [in the manual] are basic requirements established by your state regarding Lemon Laws for your reference.\u201d On pages 45-47, defendant outlines various steps for obtaining help when a \u201csituation arises that has not been addressed to your satisfaction.\u201d In this section, defendant\u2019s manual states, \u201c[t]he following section has been developed with information on contacting Kia and on the basic provisions of your State\u2019s \u2018Lemon Laws.\u2019 \u201d On the page labeled, \u201cNOTICE TO CONSUMERS STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA,\u201d the manual states that if \u201cKia or its dealers have not repaired the vehicle after a reasonable number of repair attempts . . . you may be entitled under the provisions of your state \u2018Lemon Law\u2019 to a replacement or repurchase of the vehicle.\u201d It directs the consumer to \u201c1) notify Kia at the address below, by certified mail, of the problem with your vehicle at least 10 days before filing suit; and 2) provide Kia an opportunity to repair it.\u201d As the manual contained a section directed solely at consumers in North Carolina, instructions to notify Kia in writing when there is an unresolved problem or nonconformity, and gave an address to which to send this notice, we conclude that defendant met its disclosure requirement under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-351.5. Cf. Anders, 104 N.C. App. at 67, 407 S.E.2d at 622 (holding that the manufacturer\u2019s disclosure was deficient when its manual made no mention of written notification requirement).\nThus, we must determine whether there are genuine issues of fact as to the sufficiency of plaintiffs\u2019 notice to defendant that the Borrego was nonconforming and whether they afforded defendant a reasonable opportunity to repair.\nDefendant first argues that plaintiffs\u2019 notice was deficient because it was sent to an address different from that listed in the warranty section of the vehicle manual. Plaintiffs\u2019 counsel sent the letter to the Kia Motors America National Consumer Affairs Department in Irvine, California, rather than the \u201cConsumer Assistance Center\u201d at a different post office box in Irvine, California. The letter was stamped by the Consumer Affairs Department as received on 27 July 2010. The letter specified that plaintiffs\u2019 vehicle had been taken to the dealership on repeated occasions for \u201cattempted repairs to non-conformities that have caused a substantial impairment to the use, value and/or safety of the vehicle\u201d and notified defendant that the plaintiffs were \u201crevoking acceptance of [the] vehicle.\u201d Plaintiffs alleged violations of the North Carolina Lemon Law and demanded that Kia accept return of the vehicle and refund the purchase price. Despite the letter being sent to a different Irvine, California address than the one listed in the manual, defendant responded to plaintiffs\u2019 notice by contacting their attorney, making settlement offers, and ultimately setting up an inspection. Therefore, we conclude that there is no genuine issue of fact as to the sufficiency of plaintiffs\u2019 notice of the nonconformity under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-351.5.\nHowever, defendant further contends there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether it was given a reasonable period in which to repair the nonconformity. Defendant contends the fifteen-day time period specified in the statute for making the repairs begins when the manufacturer or its agent obtains access to the vehicle for inspection and repair. We disagree.\nIn. Eugene Tucker Builders, Inc., 175 N.C. App. 151, 152, 622 S.E.2d 698, 699 (2005), cert. denied, 360 N.C. 479, 630 S.E.2d 926 (2006), this Court recognized that \u201c[i]n compliance with the statute, plaintiff requested that defendant cure the alleged defect within 15 days of receipt of the letter\u201d and that defendant repaired the vehicle \u201c[d]uring this cure period.\u201d This suggests that the fifteen-day period begins when the manufacturer receives written notice of the nonconformity. Moreover, to interpret the \u201ccure period\u201d as beginning when the manufacturer obtains possession of the car to inspect or repair it could lead to absurd results, i.e., the manufacturer or agent could wait weeks or even months after receiving the notice to set up an inspection or to repair the vehicle, as long as it resolves the problem within fifteen days of receipt of the car. This interpretation does not comport with the rationale behind the North Carolina Lemon Law, which is to provide \u201cprivate remedies against motor vehicle manufacturers for persons injured by new motor vehicles failing to conform to express warranties,\u201d and to set standards that induce manufacturers to be prompt and fair in their resolution of consumer complaints. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-351.\nHere, plaintiffs\u2019 letter closed by stating \u201cif you wish to resolve this matter amicably, please contact us within 14 days.... Should you fail to contact us, we will be left with no alternative but to commence legal proceedings.\u201d While defendant did contact plaintiffs\u2019- attorney within that fourteen-day window, first by email and then via faxed letter, defendant did not actually inspect or repair the vehicle until at least 31 August 2010, more than a month after receiving plaintiffs\u2019 letter. Therefore, plaintiffs afforded \u201ca reasonable period, not to exceed 15 calendar days, in which to correct the nonconformity,\u201d and defendant failed to timely repair the Borrego.\nDefendant has not pointed us to any evidence in the materials before the trial court which would give rise to a genuine issue of fact as to the applicability of the \u201cinitial eligibility hurdle\u201d created by the presumption in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-351.5 or as to the nonconformity of the Borrego. Therefore, the trial court did not err in determining that plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment requiring defendant to repurchase the vehicle under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-351.3.\nn.\nDefendant also contends the trial court erred in awarding plaintiffs attorney\u2019s fees because there is no evidence that defendant acted unreasonably in resolving the matter. We agree.\nA trial court can award attorney\u2019s fees as relief under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-351.8(3) if \u201c[t]he manufacturer unreasonably failed or refused to fully resolve the matter which constitutes the basis of such action.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-351.8(3)(a) (2011) (emphasis added). \u201cThe statute places an award of attorney\u2019s fees within the discretion of the trial court. We will not second-guess a trial court\u2019s exercise of its discretion absent evidence of abuse. An abuse of discretion occurs only when a court makes a patently arbitrary decision, manifestly unsupported by reason.\u201d Buford v. Gen. Motors Corp., 339 N.C. 396, 406, 451 S.E.2d 293, 298 (1994).\nWhile \u201c[w]e agree that there is a distinction between refusing to comply and failing to comply with the Act,\u201d the latter seemingly indicating that attorney\u2019s fees can be awarded for an unintentional failure to resolve the consumer\u2019s issue, we conclude the evidence presents no issue of fact as to the question of whether defendant unreasonably failed to resolve the matter. Taylor v. Volvo N. Am. Corp., 339 N.C. 238, 256, 451 S.E.2d 618, 627 (1994). Beyond the fact that defendant failed to act as quickly as prescribed by statute to fully resolve plaintiffs\u2019 concerns, the record is devoid of evidence that defendant did anything but \u201c[act] altogether reasonably from the time it learned of plaintiffs\u2019 complaints about their vehicle.\u201d Buford, 339 N.C. at 406-07, 451 S.E.2d at 298. Therefore, because defendant \u201caddressed their concerns in a prompt and honest manner,\u201d see id. at 405, 451 S.E.2d at 298, we find that the trial court erred in awarding plaintiffs attorney\u2019s fees and, accordingly, reverse on this issue.\nin.\nBy their cross-appeal, plaintiffs contend the trial court erred by failing to award treble damages as a matter of law because defendant unreasonably failed to repurchase or replace the Borrego. We disagree.\nUnder N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-351.8, the trial court may award monetary damages as relief \u201cto the injured consumer in an amount fixed by the verdict.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-351.8(2). Further, \u201c[s]uch damages shall be trebled upon a finding that the manufacturer unreasonably refused to comply with G.S. 20-351.2 and G.S. 20-351.3.\u201d Id. (emphasis added).\nAlthough we find that defendant violated N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-351.3 by failing to inspect and repair the Borrego within the fifteen-day cure period, we agree with the trial court that the evidence does not support a finding that defendant acted unreasonably in its handling of plaintiffs\u2019 situation, much less that they \u201cunreasonably refused\u201d to comply with N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-351.3 so as to justify the award of treble damages. This Court previously awarded treble damages under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-351.8(2) in Taylor, 339 N.C. at 256, 451 S.E.2d at 628, where the defendant \u201cdid nothing more than to attempt to make one phone call to plaintiffs attorney, which failed.\u201d Here, after receiving plaintiffs\u2019 letter on 27 July 2010, defendant successfully contacted plaintiffs\u2019 attorney via faxed letter on 6 August 2010. Defendant made several settlement offers and ultimately set up an inspection and repair, although outside of the fifteen-day cure period. When defendant\u2019s representative Mark Ramsey performed the inspection on the Borrego, he was able to identify and resolve the problem within a few days. For this reason, we find the trial court did not err in this case by denying plaintiffs\u2019 motion for summary judgment on the issue of treble damages.\nAffirmed in part, reversed in part.\nJudges McGEE and CALABRIA concur.",
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    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "TINA HARDISON and DALTON HARDISON, Plaintiffs v. KIA MOTORS AMERICA, INC., Defendant\nNo. COA12-981\nFiled 19 March 2013\n1. Motor Vehicles \u2014 Lemon Law \u2014 disclosure requirement\nAn automobile company met its disclosure requirement under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-351.5 (the Lemon Law) where the manual contained a section directed solely at consumers in North Carolina, instructions to notify the company in writing when there is an unresolved problem or nonconformity, and an address to which to send this notice.\n2. Motor Vehicles \u2014 Lemon Law \u2014 notice of nonconformity\nThere was no genuine issue of fact as to the sufficiency of plaintiffs\u2019 notice of the nonconformity to an automobile dealer under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-351.5 (the Lemon Law) and summary judgment was properly granted. Despite the letter being sent to a different Irvine, California address than the one listed in the owner\u2019s manual, defendant responded to plaintiffs\u2019 notice by contacting their attorney, making settlement offers, and ultimately setting up an inspection.\n3. Motor Vehicles \u2014 Lemon Law \u2014 reasonable period of nonconformity\nThere was no genuine issue of material fact in a Lemon Law case as to whether defendant auto company was given a reasonable period in which to repair a nonconformity in a new automobile where plaintiffs notified defendant by letter that plaintiffs should be contacted within fourteen days. Although defendant contended that the fifteen-day time period specified in the statute for making repairs begins when the manufacturer or its agent obtains access to the vehicle for inspection and repair, this interpretation did not comport with the rationale behind the North Carolina Lemon Law.\n4. Attorney Fees \u2014 Lemon Law \u2014 reasonable actions\nThe trial court erred in a Lemon Law action by awarding plaintiffs attorney fees where, beyond failing to act as quickly as prescribed by statute to fully resolve plaintiffs\u2019 concerns, the record was devoid of evidence that defendant did anything but act reasonably from the time it learned of plaintiffs\u2019 complaints about their vehicle.\n5. Damages and Remedies \u2014 Lemon Law \u2014 treble damages\nThe trial court did not err in a Lemon Law action by denying plaintiffs\u2019 motion for summary judgment on the issue of treble damages where, although defendant violated N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-351.3 by failing to inspect and repair the auto within the fifteen-day cure period, the evidence did not support a finding that defendant acted unreasonably in its handling of plaintiffs\u2019 situation, much less that they \u201cunreasonably refused\u201d to comply with the statute.\nAppeal by defendant and cross-appeal by plaintiffs from order entered 17 February 2012 by Judge Kenneth F. Crow in Craven County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 February 2013.\nLuxemburg & Levin, LLC, by Mitchel E. Luxenburg, for plaintiffs-appellees/cross-appellants.\nBrown, Crump, Vanore & Tierney, L.L.P., by Andrew A. Vanore, III, for defendant-appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0022-01",
  "first_page_order": 32,
  "last_page_order": 39
}
