{ "id": 6813899, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MICKEY VONRICE ROLLINS", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Rollins", "decision_date": "2013-03-19", "docket_number": "No. COA12-552", "first_page": "129", "last_page": "147", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "226 N.C. App. 129" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "648 S.E.2d 865", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639154 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "868-71" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/648/0865-01" ] }, { "cite": "640 S.E.2d 394", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637653 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "398-99", "parenthetical": "Testimony that fellow detective told witness that \"[defendant] and the informant were going to meet at Salsa's Restaurant and discuss at least a quarter kilo deal of cocaine\" was admissible to \"explain the officers' presence at Salsa's Restaurant. . . .\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/640/0394-01" ] }, { "cite": "628 S.E.2d 434", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635589 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "435-36" }, { "page": "435" }, { "page": "436" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/628/0434-01" ] }, { "cite": "658 S.E.2d 43", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640630 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"Rollins I\"" }, { "page": "50-51" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/658/0043-01" ] }, { "cite": "528 S.E.2d 326", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "350", "parenthetical": "\"An improper inducement generating hope must promise relief from the criminal charge to which the confession relates, not to any merely collateral advantage.\" (internal quotations and citation omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 481", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155877 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "520", "parenthetical": "\"An improper inducement generating hope must promise relief from the criminal charge to which the confession relates, not to any merely collateral advantage.\" (internal quotations and citation omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0481-01" ] }, { "cite": "496 U.S. 292", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12122654 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "296" }, { "page": "251" }, { "page": "297" }, { "page": "251" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/496/0292-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 436", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12046400 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 S.E.2d 653", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "659", "parenthetical": "Law enforcement officer's statement to the defendant that he would \"probably need to check to see if his father had any involvement\" with the defendant's crime did not render defendant's subsequent confession involuntary." } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 101", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567546 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "108", "parenthetical": "Law enforcement officer's statement to the defendant that he would \"probably need to check to see if his father had any involvement\" with the defendant's crime did not render defendant's subsequent confession involuntary." } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0101-01" ] }, { "cite": "304 S.E.2d 134", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "148", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "308 N.C. 549", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4705131 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "574", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/308/0549-01" ] }, { "cite": "409 S.E.2d 906", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "911" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "330 N.C. 133", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2511012 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "141" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/330/0133-01" ] }, { "cite": "451 S.E.2d 600", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "608", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "339 N.C. 207", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2558332 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "222", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/339/0207-01" ] }, { "cite": "683 S.E.2d 174", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "204", "parenthetical": "internal quotations and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 382", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4151061 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "431", "parenthetical": "internal quotations and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/363/0382-01" ] }, { "cite": "290 S.E.2d 574", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "586" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 N.C. 400", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570930 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "419" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/305/0400-01" ] }, { "cite": "539 S.E.2d 625", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "631" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 200", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135935 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "208" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0200-01" ] }, { "cite": "342 S.E.2d 823", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "828" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 594", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4703462 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "600" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0594-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 S.E.2d 618", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "619" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567694 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "134" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "372 S.E.2d 523", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "527" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 279", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2562603 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "285" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0279-01" ] }, { "cite": "655 S.E.2d 388", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "390" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 156", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4149491 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "160" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0156-01" ] }, { "cite": "467 S.E.2d 653", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "660" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "342 N.C. 667", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 795906 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "682" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/342/0667-01" ] }, { "cite": "543 S.E.2d 823", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "826", "parenthetical": "\"[A] trial court's findings of fact are conclusive on appeal if supported by competent evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting.\" (internal quotations and citations omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 332", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135584 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "336", "parenthetical": "\"[A] trial court's findings of fact are conclusive on appeal if supported by competent evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting.\" (internal quotations and citations omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0332-01" ] }, { "cite": "431 S.E.2d 7", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "10" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 N.C. 148", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2530737 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "154" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/334/0148-01" ] }, { "cite": "474 S.E.2d 336", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "340", "parenthetical": "internal quotations and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 N.C. 381", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 867667 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "386", "parenthetical": "internal quotations and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/344/0381-01" ] }, { "cite": "591 S.E.2d 11", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "17", "parenthetical": "internal quotations and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "162 N.C. App. 259", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8916392 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "266", "parenthetical": "internal quotations and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/162/0259-01" ] }, { "cite": "525 S.E.2d 793", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "806", "parenthetical": "internal quotations and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "136 N.C. App. 531", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11240921 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "550", "parenthetical": "internal quotations and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/136/0531-01" ] }, { "cite": "690 S.E.2d 53", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "55-56", "parenthetical": "Testimony that an informant told the witness that he recognized the defendant as a drug dealer was admissible \"to explain [the witness's] presence at Colony car wash rather than to prove that defendant was a known drug dealer.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "202 N.C. App. 733", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4174913 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "735-37", "parenthetical": "Testimony that an informant told the witness that he recognized the defendant as a drug dealer was admissible \"to explain [the witness's] presence at Colony car wash rather than to prove that defendant was a known drug dealer.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/202/0733-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 N.C. App. 376", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8209910 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378-84" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/185/0376-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 N.C. App. 491", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8374909 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "499-500", "parenthetical": "Testimony that fellow detective told witness that \"[defendant] and the informant were going to meet at Salsa's Restaurant and discuss at least a quarter kilo deal of cocaine\" was admissible to \"explain the officers' presence at Salsa's Restaurant. . . .\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/181/0491-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 N.C. App. 281", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8301232 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "283-84" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/177/0281-01" ] }, { "cite": "558 S.E.2d 463", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "473", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "473" }, { "parenthetical": "internal quotations and citations omitted" }, { "page": "471", "parenthetical": "internal quotations and citation omitted" }, { "page": "471" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "355 N.C. 73", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 220002 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "87", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "87" }, { "page": "84" }, { "page": "84" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/355/0073-01" ] }, { "cite": "723 S.E.2d 358", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "362" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "541 U.S. 36", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5873383 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/541/0036-01" ] }, { "cite": "730 S.E.2d 795", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "801", "parenthetical": "quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59-60 n.9, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, 197-98 n.9 (2004)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "681 S.E.2d 293", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "304", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "304" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 438", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4151754 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "452", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "452" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/363/0438-01" ] }, { "cite": "576 S.E.2d 714", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "720-21" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "156 N.C. App. 249", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9190335 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "257-58" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/156/0249-01" ] }, { "cite": "691 S.E.2d 40", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "44", "parenthetical": "\"A defendant enters into an Alford plea when he proclaims he is innocent, but intelligently concludes that his interests require entry of a guilty plea and the record before the judge contains strong evidence of actual guilt.\" (internal quotations and citation omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "203 N.C. App. 310", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4176124 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "314" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/203/0310-01" ] }, { "cite": "376 S.E.2d 728", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "734" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 N.C. 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2486178 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "181" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/324/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "706 S.E.2d 790", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "797" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "200 N.C. App. 105", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4172682 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"Rollins III\"" }, { "page": "112" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/200/0105-01" ] }, { "cite": "675 S.E.2d 334", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"Rollins II\"" }, { "page": "340" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 232", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4151376 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"Rollins II\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/363/0232-01" ] }, { "cite": "189 N.C. App. 248", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4156270 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"Rollins I\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/189/0248-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1440, "char_count": 41761, "ocr_confidence": 0.728, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.4250333130079806e-08, "percentile": 0.3418469571005877 }, "sha256": "bd9fe648eecf4733d875b8b848b58200d1c4c99763372e8b818eb4b202c5027f", "simhash": "1:a7cbe07e132f0f45", "word_count": 6714 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:05:47.059681+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge HUNTER, Robert C. concurs.", "Judge HUNTER, Jr., Robert N. concurs in the result." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MICKEY VONRICE ROLLINS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "CALABRIA, Judge.\nMickey Vonrice Rollins (\u201cdefendant\u201d) appeals from judgments entered upon jury verdicts finding him guilty of first degree murder, attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon, and felony breaking and entering. We find no error.\nI. Factual and Procedural Background\nOn 11 June 2002, eighty-eight-year-old Harriet Brown Roberson Highsmith (\u201cHighsmith\u201d) was discovered dead in her home in Robersonville, North Carolina. Highsmith\u2019s front door was found ajar, with her keys still in the lock. She had been stabbed twelve times in her neck, chest and stomach. The stab wounds had a blunt edge and a sharp edge, consistent with a knife. Although Highsmith\u2019s undergarments were pulled down to her thighs, there was no evidence of sexual assault.\nDefendant was identified by law enforcement as a person of interest because he was in the area of Highsmith\u2019s home at the time of the murder. On 12 June 2003, defendant was voluntarily interviewed by the Robersonville Police Department (\u201cRPD\u201d) in connection with the murder. During the interview, defendant admitted to being in Highsmith\u2019s neighborhood on the day of the murder. He stated that he had had an argument with his wife and spent the day at the home of his aunt, Mary Durham (\u201cDurham\u201d). Durham lived next door to Highsmith.\nIn March 2003, defendant confessed to his wife, Tolvi Rollins (\u201cTolvi\u201d), that he had murdered Highsmith. He warned Tolvi not to share this information with anyone else. In October 2003, Tolvi contacted RPD Chief Darrell Knox and told him that she had information about Highsmith\u2019s murder. On 14 October 2003, Tolvi met with Agent Walter Brown (\u201cAgent Brown\u201d) of the State Bureau of Investigation and provided him with details of Highsmith\u2019s murder which were consistent with the evidence found at the crime scene.\nAt the time Tolvi met with Agent Brown, defendant was incarcerated on unrelated charges. Tolvi agreed to wear a recording device and visit defendant in prison. Over the next two months, Tolvi visited defendant on five occasions. At each visit, defendant discussed details of the murder. According to the recordings and summaries provided by Tolvi, defendant entered Highsmith\u2019s home through an open door. When Highsmith saw defendant, he decided to kill her because he would be \u201clooking at 30 years\u201d if Highsmith contacted law enforcement. Defendant told Tolvi that he stabbed Highsmith \u201cabout twelve or thirteen times\u201d with two different knives. Defendant claimed he had attempted to make the murder look like a sexual assault in order to \u201cthrow the cops off.\u201d\nOn 2 February 2004, defendant was indicted for first degree murder, robbery with a dangerous weapon, felony breaking and entering, and first degree kidnapping, Agent Brown continued to investigate the murder and interviewed several inmates who were incarcerated with defendant. Based upon interviews with inmate Harris Ford (\u201cFord\u201d), law enforcement searched a field near the Andrews Terrace projects (\u201cAndrews Terrace\u201d) in Robersonville on 4 October 2006. The search uncovered a black-handled steak knife.\nPrior to trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress the statements he made to Tolvi regarding Highsmith\u2019s murder while he was incarcerated. After a hearing, the trial court entered an order denying defendant\u2019s motion on 19 August 2005.\nOn 6 October 2006, defendant entered an Alford plea to the offense of first degree murder, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. Durham testified at defendant\u2019s plea hearing in order to establish a factual basis for his plea. She testified that defendant had approached her house shortly after 4:00 p.m. on the day of the murder. Durham and defendant talked on her porch for a few minutes, and then defendant left to make a phone call. Defendant walked in the direction of Highsmith\u2019s house. A short time later, defendant returned to Durham\u2019s porch and asked for a glass of water. Defendant again left Durham\u2019s house, and \u201cfive or ten minutes\u201d later, Durham saw him standing by a fence at the back of Highsmith\u2019s property.\nDefendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress his statements to Tolvi to this Court. On 8 March 2008, the Court issued an opinion reversing the trial court\u2019s denial of defendant\u2019s motion and granting defendant a new trial. State v. Rollins, 189 N.C. App. 248, 658 S.E.2d 43 (2008)(\"Rollins I\u201d). The Rollins I Court held that defendant\u2019s statements to Tolvi were protected by the marital privilege. Id. at 260, 658 S.E.2d at 50-51.\nThe State petitioned our Supreme Court for discretionary review, which was granted on 26 August 2008. On 1 May 2009, the Court issued an opinion reversing the opinion of this Court. State v. Rollins, 363 N.C. 232, 675 S.E.2d 334 (2009)(\"Rollins II\"). The Rollins II Court held that defendant\u2019s statements to Tolvi were not protected by the marital privilege because defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the conversations he had with his wife while in prison. Id. at 241, 675 S.E.2d at 340. The Court remanded the case to this Court for consideration of defendant\u2019s remaining assignments of error which had not been previously addressed in Rollins I. Id.\nOn remand, this Court issued an opinion which again granted defendant a new trial. State v. Rollins, 200 N.C. App. 105,682 S.E.2d411 (2009) (\"Rollins III\"). The Rollins III Court held that the trial court failed to make necessary findings on the voluntariness of defendant\u2019s statements to Tolvi when it denied his motion to suppress. Id. at 112, 682 S.E.2d at 416. Defendant\u2019s case was remanded for a new suppression hearing. Id.\nAfter the new suppression hearing, the trial court entered an order which again denied defendant\u2019s motion to suppress his statements to Tolvi on 19 July 2010. Defendant\u2019s case then proceeded to trial. Beginning 25 April 2011, defendant was tried by a jury in Martin County Superior Court.\nAt trial, the court admitted, over defendant\u2019s objection, testimony by Agent Brown that he had interviewed defendant\u2019s fellow inmates during the course of his investigation. Agent Brown specifically noted that he had met several times with Ford, and that as a result of those conversations, he conducted a search in a field near Andrews Terrace and discovered a black-handled steak knife. The trial court overruled defendant\u2019s Confrontation Clause and relevance objections to Agent Brown\u2019s testimony and the knife.\nDurham was called to testify at trial. However, prior to her testimony, the parties conducted a voir dire examination during which Durham stated that she could not currently identify defendant, that she did not remember knowing Highsmith, that she did not remember the events of the day of the murder, and that she could not remember previously testifying. As a result, the trial court admitted, over defendant\u2019s objection, a transcript of Durham\u2019s testimony as a recorded recollection under North Carolina Rule of Evidence 803(5), as former testimony of an unavailable witness under Rule 804(b)(1), and under the residual hearsay exception, Rule 803(24).\nAt the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court dismissed the kidnapping charge. On 2 May 2011, the jury returned verdicts finding defendant guilty of first degree murder, based upon the theories of both felony murder and premeditation and deliberation, attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon, and felony breaking or entering. For the first degree murder conviction, the trial court sentenced defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. For the attempted robbery conviction, defendant was sentenced to a minimum of 103 months to a maximum of 133 months. Finally, for the felony breaking nr entering conviction, defendant was sentenced to a minimum of 10 months to a maximum of 12 months. These sentences were to be served consecutively in the North Carolina Department of Correction. Defendant appeals.\nII. Durham\u2019s Prior Testimony\nDefendant argues that the trial court erred when it admitted into evidence Durham\u2019s prior testimony from his Alford plea hearing in 2006. Defendant contends that Durham\u2019s testimony was inadmissible hearsay and violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause. We disagree.\nA. Hearsay\n\u201c \u2018Hearsay\u2019 is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 801(c) (2011). While hearsay is typically inadmissible as evidence under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 802 (2011), the Rules of Evidence provide a number of exceptions to this general rule. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rules 803-04 (2011). \u201cWhen preserved by an objection, a trial court\u2019s decision with regard to the admission of evidence alleged to be hearsay is reviewed de novo.\u201d State v. Johnson, _ N.C. App. _, _, 706 S.E.2d 790, 797 (2011).\nIn the instant case, the trial court concluded that Durham\u2019s former testimony was admissible under multiple exceptions to the hearsay rule, including the exception for the former testimony of an unavailable witness under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 804 (b)(1) (2011). Under this exception to the hearsay rule,\n[testimony taken at a prior proceeding is admissible when (1) the witness is unavailable; (2) the proceeding at which the former testimony was given was a former trial of the same cause, or a preliminary stage of the same cause, or the trial of another cause involving the issue and subject matter at which, the testimony is directed; and (3) the current defendant was present at the former proceeding and was represented by counsel.\nState v. Chandler, 324 N.C. 172, 181, 376 S.E.2d 728, 734 (1989).\nAt trial, the trial court conducted a voir dire examination of Durham and concluded that her prior testimony was admissible because it took place during\na hearing in the same case. ... [I]t was a hearing upon a plea pursuant to State V. Alford in which the defendant did not admit his guilt and also after the defendant\u2019s motion to suppress his statements made during visits with his wife at a department of correction facility were denied by the trial court and the defendant gave notice of appeal to that denial reserving the right to take that to the appellate courts and entered the Alford guilty plea pursuant to that procedure. The Court is going to find that the issue of the motion to suppress and the defendant\u2019s guilt or innocence was still pending and is a similar motive, and the lawyers for the defendant possessed similar motive to develop the testimony by direct cross or redirect-examination.\nDefendant contends that the trial court\u2019s conclusion was erroneous because he had no motive to cross-examine Durham during his Alford plea hearing. He argues that \u201c[i]t is a matter of common sense that a defendant does not ordinarily participate in plea negotiations, waive a jury trial, tender a guilty plea, and then take affirmative steps at the plea hearing to undermine acceptance of a plea hearing affording him substantial benefits.\u201d Defendant does not cite any cases to support his \u201ccommon sense\u201d assertion.\nAs the trial court correctly noted in its oral ruling, defendant, by entering an Alford plea in the earlier proceeding, did not admit his guilt. See State v. Chery, 203 N.C. App. 310, 314, 691 S.E.2d 40, 44 (2010)(\u201cA defendant enters into an Alford plea when he proclaims he is innocent, but intelligently concludes that his interests require entry of a guilty plea and the record before the judge contains strong evidence of actual guilt.\u201d (internal quotations and citation omitted)). Moreover, defendant specifically reserved the right to appeal his guilty plea based upon the denial of his motion to suppress. Thus, defendant was aware that further proceedings regarding his guilt for Highsmith\u2019s murder were possible, and he had a motive to cross-examine Durham for purposes of these future proceedings. See State v. Ramirez, 156 N.C. App. 249, 257-58, 576 S.E.2d 714, 720-21 (2003) (Testimony of the defendant\u2019s former girlfriend given at his bond hearing was properly admitted against him at trial because the defendant had the same motive to cross-examine the witness at the bond hearing as he would have at his future trial, \u201cto expand upon and possibly discredit [her] testimony.\u201d). Although defendant now claims that he had no motive to cross-examine the State\u2019s witnesses at the plea hearing, his claim cannot be reconciled with the fact that defendant did, in actuality, cross-examine another one of the State\u2019s witnesses who testified during the hearing. Ultimately, we agree with the trial court\u2019s conclusion that, under the specific circumstances of this case, defendant possessed a similar motive to cross-examine Durham during his Alford plea hearing as he would have had at trial. Thus, the trial court properly determined that Durham\u2019s testimony was admissible under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 804(b)(1). Since we have determined that Durham\u2019s testimony was admissible under this exception, we do not address defendant\u2019s arguments regarding the remaining hearsay exceptions which were found to be applicable by the trial court.\nB. Confrontation Clause\nDefendant also argues that the admission of Durham\u2019s former testimony violated his rights under the Sixth Amendment\u2019s Confrontation Clause. However, our Supreme Court has stated that \u201c [t]he Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment bars admission of testimonial evidence unless the declarant is unavailable to testily and the accused has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. \u201d State v. Locklear, 363 N.C. 438, 452, 681 S.E.2d 293, 304 (2009)(emphasis added). In the instant case, defendant definitively had a prior opportunity to cross-examine Durham during his 2006 Alford plea hearing, and, as previously noted, had a similar motive to cross-examine Durham as he would have had at trial. Since defendant was afforded a prior opportunity to cross-examine Durham, under Locklear, defendant\u2019s confrontation rights were not violated. Id. This argument is overruled.\nIII. Admission of Knife\nDefendant argues that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence a black-handled steak knife that was discovered in a field near Andrews Terrace in 2006. We disagree.\nA. Confrontation Clause\nDefendant first argues that the trial court erred by permitting Agent Brown to testify regarding his discovery of the knife after he had interviewed some of defendant\u2019s fellow inmates. Defendant contends that his constitutional right to confront witnesses against him was violated by Agent Brown\u2019s testimony.\nAs previously noted, the Confrontation Clause bars the admission of testimonial evidence unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Locklear, 363 N.C. at 452, 681 S.E.2d at 304. However, \u201c[t]he Sixth Amendment\u2019s Confrontation Clause \u2018does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted.\u2019 \u201d State v. Mason, _ N.C. App. _, _, 730 S.E.2d 795, 801 (2012)(quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59-60 n.9, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, 197-98 n.9 (2004)). \u201cThis Court reviews de novo whether the right to confrontation was violated.\u201d State v. Lowery, _ N.C. App. _, _, 723 S.E.2d 358, 362 (2012).\nIn the instant case, the State elicited the following testimony from Agent Brown:\nQ. Now, Agent Brown, during the course of this investigation, which was somewhat lengthy, did you have an occasion to interview other inmates in the department of correction?\nA. Yes, I did.\nQ. And during the course of your investigation did you determine whether these individuals at some point or another had been housed in the same facility as [defendant]?\nA. Yes, they were.\nQ. All right. And do you have the names of some of the individuals that you interviewed?\nA. Yes, I do, Denzel Williams, James Grimes, Dale Shepherd, Curt - Mr. Hyman. I can\u2019t pronounce his first name and Harris Ford.\nThe State then focused its inquiry entirely on Agent Brown\u2019s interactions with Ford:\nQ. Now as to the last person you named, Harris Ford, do you recall how many times you interviewed him?\nA. I spoke to him on three occasions, but I spoke to him twice.\nQ. Okay. You said you spoke to him on three occasions, but how many times did you interview him?\nA. Twice.\nQ. All right. And the third time that you spoke to him, do you recall where that was?\nA. That was at Central Prison in Raleigh, North Carolina.\nQ. And was anyone else with you on that visit?\nA. Yes. The District Attorney, Seth Edwards, and his Assistant District Attorney Tom Aaglim.\nQ. And do you recall the date of that third encounter with Mr. Ford?\nA. I believe it was October 2, 2000 and \u2014 give me one second \u2014 2006.\nQ. Okay. So that was over four years after Mrs. Highsmith\u2019s murder.\nA. That\u2019s correct.\nQ. And as a result of those interviews and conversations, what did you do next in your investigation?\nAgent Brown next testified that he \u201corganized a search of some areas that we identified by arranging other local law enforcement... to search some areas near the . .' . Andrews Terrace projects in Robersonville, North Carolina\u201d on 4 October 2006. Agent Brown then began to describe the parameters of the search near Andrews Terrace. When the State asked Agent Brown what the search had uncovered, defendant objected and the trial court sent the jury out of the courtroom so that the parties could conduct a voir dire examination.\nAgent Brown testified on voir dire that, based upon a conversation between Ford, Edwards and Anglim, outside of Agent Brown\u2019s presence, he led a search of a field near the Andrews Terrace projects. Ford\u2019s conversation with Edwards and Anglim was the sole reason that Agent Brown searched that area and discovered the knife.\nDefendant argues that the State improperly introduced Ford\u2019s statement about the location of the knife indirectly through the testimony of Agent Brown. Defendant contends that \u201cthe \u2018inescapable inference\u2019 from Agent Brown\u2019s testimony was that inmates Williams, Grimes, Shepherd, Hyman, and Ford told him about conversations they had with Mr. Rollins in the Department of Correction in which Mr. Rollins said that he hid a knife under shrubbery near the Andrews Terrace projects.\u201d\nInitially, we note that defendant\u2019s argument exaggerates the scope of the information Agent Brown testified to relying upon. While Agent Brown acknowledged during his testimony that he had spoken to several of defendant\u2019s fellow inmates, he only discussed, in detail, his meetings with Ford. It was only after answering several questions about his meetings with Ford that Agent Brown testified that he organized his search. Thus, it is clear from the context of Agent Brown\u2019s examination that Ford was the source of his information. Indeed, when arguing that Agent Brown\u2019s testimony should be excluded due to its violation of defendant\u2019s confrontation rights, defense counsel focused exclusively on Ford:\nWell, I guess, with regards to my argument, Your Honor, I would submit to the Court that it\u2019s - it\u2019s kind of clear that the testimony is, \u201cI had this conversation with Harris Ford, an inmate, and from that conversation\u201d \u2014 even though the officer is not testifying that that conversation led him to the knife, the way he testified it\u2019s clear to the jury that he had a conversation with Harris Ford. Following that conversation, \u201cI went to this vacant lot and found this knife based upon what Harris Ford said to me.\u201d\nWhat I am saying is that the confrontation clause, in my opinion and for purposes of my argument, does apply as it relates to Harris Ford giving the police information.\nSince defendant\u2019s argument at trial was only that the indirect introduction of Ford\u2019s interviews with Agent Brown, Edwards, and Anglim violated defendant\u2019s confrontation rights, we will limit our focus to the introduction of the information Ford provided to the State regarding the location of the knife recovered from Andrews Terrace.\nOur Supreme Court has held that \u201c[o]ut-of-court statements that are offered for purposes other than to prove the truth of the matter asserted are not considered hearsay. Specifically, statements are not hearsay if they axe made to explain the subsequent conduct of the person to whom the statement was directed.\u201d State v. Gainey, 355 N.C. 73, 87, 558 S.E.2d 463, 473 (2002)(citations omitted). Based upon this principle, this Court has upheld a law enforcement officer\u2019s testimony concerning witness statements that subsequently explained his actions during an investigation. See State v. Alexander, 177 N.C. App. 281, 283-84, 628 S.E.2d 434, 435-36 (2006).\nIn Alexander, a law enforcement officer was told by another detective that an informant had information regarding an armed robbery he was investigating. Id. at 283, 628 S.E.2d at 435. According to the officer\u2019s testimony, the informant gave him a name, \u201cVaughntray,\u201d which the officer connected to the defendant. Id. The officer then showed a photo array to the victim, who identified the defendant \u201calmost immediately.\u201d Id. This Court held that the officer\u2019s testimony\nregarding his interaction with the detective and [the informant] was nonhearsay and proper to explain his subsequent actions. It was not admitted to prove that the information [the informant] offered was \u201cimportant\u201d or that someone named \u201cVaughntray\u201d committed the crime. Rather, the testimony explained how Officer Dozier had received information leading him to form a reasonable suspicion that defendant was involved in the robbery, which in turn justified his inclusion of defendant\u2019s photograph in the lineup.\nId. at 284, 628 S.E.2d at 436.\nIn the instant case, Agent Brown\u2019s testimony regarding the information he learned from Ford was used to explain to the jury the reason Agent Brown took the subsequent action of searching a particular field near Andrews Terrace almost four years after Highsmith\u2019s murder. While it is true, as defendant suggests, that Agent Brown\u2019s testimony creates a strong inference that Ford learned the location of the knife from defendant, that inference would only be problematic if Ford\u2019s indirect statement had been admitted for its truth. Statements by non-testifying witnesses which may implicate the defendant in a crime are permissible when they are only used to explain the subsequent actions of the testifying witness. See, e.g., id.; State v. Leyva, 181 N.C. App. 491, 499-500, 640 S.E.2d 394, 398-99 (2007)(Testimony that fellow detective told witness that \u201c[defendant] and the informant were going to meet at Salsa\u2019s Restaurant and discuss at least a quarter kilo deal of cocaine\u201d was admissible to \u201cexplain the officers\u2019 presence at Salsa\u2019s Restaurant. . . .\u201d); State v. Wiggins, 185 N.C. App. 376, 378-84, 648 S.E.2d 865,868-71 (2007) (Testimony regarding an informant\u2019s repeated statements to the witness that the defendants would be selling drugs from a Quality Inn was admissible to \u201cexplain how the investigation of Defendants unfolded, why Defendants were under surveillance at the Quality Inn, and why [the witness] followed the vehicle to the Quality Inn.\u201d); and State v. Batchelor, 202 N.C. App. 733, 735-37, 690 S.E.2d 53, 55-56 (2010)(Testimony that an informant told the witness that he recognized the defendant as a drug dealer was admissible \u201cto explain [the witness\u2019s] presence at Colony car wash rather than to prove that defendant was a known drug dealer.\u201d). Since Agent Brown\u2019s testimony regarding his conversations with Ford was admitted for the proper purpose of explaining his decision to conduct a search near Andrews Terrace, the testimony was not hearsay. See Gainey, 355 N.C. at 87, 558 S.E.2d at 473. Accordingly, defendant\u2019s confrontation rights were not violated because \u201cadmission of nonhearsay raises no Confrontation Clause concerns.\u201d Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). This argument is overruled.\nB. Relevance\nDefendant next argues that the trial court erred by admitting the knife into evidence because it was not relevant under Rule 401. \u201cThe admissibility of evidence is governed by a threshold inquiry into its relevance. In order to be relevant, the evidence must have a logical tendency to prove any fact that is of consequence in the case being litigated.\u201d State v. Griffin, 136 N.C. App. 531, 550, 525 S.E.2d 793, 806 (2000)(internal quotations and citation omitted).\nAlthough the trial court\u2019s rulings on relevancy technically are not discretionary and therefore are not reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard applicable to Rule 403, such rulings are given great deference on appeal. Because the trial court is better situated to evaluate whether a particular piece of evidence tends to make the existence of a fact of consequence more or less probable, the appropriate standard of review for a trial court\u2019s ruling on relevancy pursuant to Rule 401 is not as deferential as the \u2018abuse of discretion\u2019 standard which applies to rulings made pursuant to Rule 403.\nDunn v. Custer, 162 N.C. App. 259, 266, 591 S.E.2d 11, 17 (2004)(internal quotations and citation omitted).\n\u201cAs a general rule weapons may be admitted in evidence where there is evidence tending to show that they were used in the commission of a crime.\u201d State v. Bruton, 344 N.C. 381, 386, 474 S.E.2d 336, 340 (1996) (internal quotations and citation omitted). At trial, the State presented evidence from Dr. M.G.F. Gilliland (\u201cDr. Gilliland\u201d), a pathologist. Dr. Gilliland testified that Highsmith died of multiple stab wounds which were likely to have been inflicted by a knife which was at least two-and-three-quarter inches long and which did not have a serrated edge.\nDefendant contends that the knife which was discovered near Andrews Terrace was improperly admitted into evidence because it could not have been the murder weapon. In support of its argument, defendant notes that (1) the knife was found more than four years after Highsmith\u2019s murder, in a public place, and it could not be determined when it was abandoned; (2) the knife contained neither fingerprints nor blood evidence; (3) no testifying witness identified the knife as the potential murder weapon; and (4) the knife which was discovered had small serrations, which did not match Dr. Gilliland\u2019s testimony about the type of knife which inflicted Highsmith\u2019s wounds.\nThe trial court conducted a voir dire hearing in order to determine if the knife was relevant. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court stated:\nAll right. The Court is going to find, pursuant to rule 401, that because of all the factors that have been argued for relevancy, chief among them being the defendant\u2019s statement that the knife was a black-handled knife to his wife that has already been admitted into evidence, that the defendant at a time very recently after the death of the victim was in close proximity to the area where the knife was found, and that the knife matches the description of what type of knife that would cause the wounds that the consulting pathologist testified were on Mrs. Highsmith\u2019s body, that pursuant to rule 401 this evidence has a tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination in this trial more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence, and that is the test, so your objection is overruled, and note the defendant\u2019s objection and exception for the Record.\n\u201cThe trial court\u2019s findings of fact following a voir dire hearing are binding on this Court when supported by competent evidence.\u201d State v. Lane, 334 N.C. 148, 154, 431 S.E.2d 7, 10 (1993).\nIn the instant case, the trial court\u2019s findings are supported by competent evidence. Defendant\u2019s wife had previously testified that defendant told her that he used a black-handled knife when he stabbed Highsmith. Agent Brown testified on voir dire that another officer had seen defendant approximately 150 yards from the field where the knife was discovered on the day of the murder.\nFinally, and most importantly, the trial court physically examined the knife on the record and determined it was consistent with Dr. Gilliland\u2019s prior testimony. The following exchange occurred between the trial court and the parties immediately prior to the court\u2019s ruling:\nTHE COURT: Mr. Brown, can I see the knife again.\nA. Yes, sir.\nTHE COURT: If you would, lay it up here in front of me on the bag. All right. You can sit down. Am I not further recalling that Dr. Gilliland indicated the wounds were of a nature that one side of the blade would have been blunt or flat and the other side of the blade would have been sharp, and it would not have been serrated?\n[The State]: I think that\u2019s what she said.\nTHE COURT: Isn\u2019t that the testimony in the case?\n[The State]: Yes, Your Honor.\nTHE COURT: It appears to me that that is exactly the kind of knife that we have in this exhibit. Have you examined the knife, [defense counsel]?\n[Defense Counsel]: Yes, and, again, just, you know, for purposes of the Record, I would submit to the Court that when Dr. Gilliland testified, objections were raised about her ability to testify to such evidence.\nTHE COURT: All right. I think clearly Dr. Gilliland has the experience and the knowledge of wounds and things, and that\u2019s why I overruled your objection -\nThus, the trial court had the knife physically in its possession when it found as fact that it matched Dr. Gilliland\u2019s description of the type of knife that would cause Highsmith\u2019s wounds. This evidence is sufficient to support the trial court\u2019s findings regarding the relevance of the knife.\nWe note that after the trial court ruled that the knife was admissible, Agent Brown testified that it had \u201csome small serrations[.]\u201d However, even if this testimony could be considered to conflict with the trial court\u2019s finding regarding the characteristics of the knife, the trial court\u2019s finding still stands because it was supported by competent evidence. See State v. Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332, 336, 543 S.E.2d 823, 826 (2001) (\u201c[A] trial court\u2019s findings of fact are conclusive on appeal if supported by competent evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting.\u201d (internal quotations and citations omitted)). Ultimately, the trial court\u2019s findings support its conclusion that the knife was relevant. While the State\u2019s evidence did not establish that the knife that was discovered was definitively the knife used by defendant to murder Highsmith, there was sufficient evidence to establish that the knife could have been used to commit the crime. The other issues raised by defendant regarding the knife \u201cmerely go to the weight or probative value of the evidence[,]\u201d rather than its relevance. State v. DeCastro, 342 N.C. 667, 682, 467 S.E.2d 653, 660 (1996). Accordingly, defendant\u2019s relevance argument is overruled.\nC. Probative Value and Prejudice\nDefendant also contends that the knife should have been excluded under Rule 403, which states that \u201c[although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 403 (2011). \u201cWe review a trial court\u2019s decision to exclude evidence under Rule 403 for abuse of discretion.\u201d State v. Whaley, 362 N.C. 156, 160, 655 S.E.2d 388, 390 (2008). \u201cAbuse of discretion results where the court\u2019s ruling is manifestly unsupported by reason or is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.\u201d State v. Hennis, 323 N.C. 279, 285, 372 S.E.2d 523, 527 (1988).\nIn the instant case, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court\u2019s decision to admit the knife into evidence. The trial court\u2019s findings, which are binding on appeal, reflect that the knife could have potentially been the murder weapon. Although this evidence was not substantial, it cannot be said that the court\u2019s determination that the knife\u2019s probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to defendant was \u201cmanifestly unsupported by reason or ... so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.\u201d Id. Consequently, this argument is overruled.\nIV. Voluntariness of Defendant\u2019s Confession\nDefendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the statements defendant made to his wife, Tolvi. Defendant contends that the statements were not voluntary and thus, inadmissible. We disagree.\nOur review of a trial court\u2019s denial of a motion to suppress is \u201cstrictly limited to determining whether the trial judge\u2019s underlying findings of fact are supported by competent evidence, in which event they are conclusively binding on appeal, and whether those factual findings in turn support the judge\u2019s ultimate conclusions of law.\u201d State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 134, 291 S.E.2d 618, 619 (1982). In addition, this Court may also consider any uncontroverted evidence which was presented at the suppression hearing which would support the trial court\u2019s conclusions of law. State v. Richardson, 316 N.C. 594, 600, 342 S.E.2d 823, 828 (1986). \u201cThe trial court\u2019s conclusions of law... are fully reviewable on appeal.\u201d State v. Hughes, 353 N.C. 200, 208, 539 S.E.2d 625, 631 (2000).\n\u201cThe ultimate test of the admissibility of a confession is whether the statement was in fact voluntarily and understandingly made.\u201d State v. Davis, 305 N.C. 400, 419, 290 S.E.2d 574, 586 (1982). \u201cTo be admissible, a defendant\u2019s statement must be the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker, and the State must show by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant\u2019s confession was voluntary.\u201d State v. Wilkerson, 363 N.C. 382, 431, 683 S.E.2d 174, 204 (2009)(internal quotations and citations omitted). \u201cThe voluntariness of a confession is determined by the totality of the circumstances. The proper determination is whether the confession at issue was the product of improperly induced hope or fear.\u201d Gainey, 355 N.C. at 84, 558 S.E.2d at 471 (internal quotations and citation omitted).\nFactors to be considered in this inquiry are whether defendant was in custody, whether he was deceived, whether his Miranda rights were honored, whether he was held incommunicado, the length of the interrogation, whether there were physical threats or shows of violence, whether promises were made to obtain the confession, the familiarity of the declarant with the criminal justice system, and the mental condition of the declarant.\nState v. Hardy, 339 N.C. 207, 222, 451 S.E.2d 600, 608 (1994)(citations omitted). However, \u201c[t]he presence or absence of one or more of these factors is not determinative.\u201d State v. Barlow, 330 N.C. 133, 141, 409 S.E.2d 906, 911 (1991).\nIn the instant case, the trial court\u2019s order included findings on each of Tolvi\u2019s five interactions with defendant while defendant was incarcerated at various correctional facilities due to an unrelated conviction. The findings reflect that Agent Brown instructed Tolvi as to the type of information she should seek from defendant. In order to obtain this information, Tolvi did not threaten defendant, but she instead made up certain pieces of evidence which she claimed law enforcement had recovered. Additionally, Tolvi told defendant that law enforcement suspected that she was involved in Highsmith\u2019s murder. In response, defendant provided incriminating statements in which he corrected Tolvi\u2019s lies regarding the evidence and admitted some of the details of Highsmith\u2019s murder.\nIn arguing that his confession to Tolvi was involuntary, defendant focuses on Tolvi\u2019s deception and her emotional appeals to defendant based on these deceptions. However, our Supreme Court has held that\n[t]he use of trickery by police officers in dealing with defendants is not illegal as a matter of law. The general rule in the United States, which this Court adopts, is that while deceptive methods or false statements by police officers are not commendable practices, standing alone they do not render a confession of guilt inadmissible. ... False statements by officers concerning evidence, as contrasted with threats or promises, have been tolerated in confession cases generally, because such statements do not affect the reliability of the confession.\nState v. Jackson, 308 N.C. 549, 574, 304 S.E.2d 134, 148 (1983) (citations omitted). Thus, standing alone, Tolvi\u2019s false statements about the evidence and her fear that she was being implicated in the murder, while certainly deceptive, are not determinative on the issue of voluntariness. Id.; see also State v. Branch, 306 N.C. 101, 108, 291 S.E.2d 653, 659 (1982)(Law enforcement officer\u2019s statement to the defendant that he would \u201cprobably need to check to see if his father had any involvement\u201d with the defendant\u2019s crime did not render defendant\u2019s subsequent confession involuntary.).\nIn addition, Tolvi\u2019s interactions with defendant did not require a warning under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). The United States Supreme Court has specifically held that \u201c [conversations between suspects and undercover agents do not implicate the concerns underlying Miranda.\u201d Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 296, 110 L. Ed. 2d 243, 251 (1990). Tolvi\u2019s deceptions do not alter this principle, because \u201cMiranda forbids coercion, not mere strategic deception by taking advantage of a suspect\u2019s misplaced trust.Ploys to mislead a suspect or lull him into a false sense of security that do not rise to the level of compulsion or coercion to speak are not within Miranda\u2019s concerns.\u201d Id. at 297, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 251.\nThe remaining evidence from the suppression hearing strongly suggests that defendant\u2019s statements were voluntary. Each of defendant\u2019s visits with Tolvi lasted only about one hour, and he was free to terminate the visits at any time. In addition, the trial court specifically found that Tolvi made no threats against defendant during any of her visits. Tolvi also made no promises which would have affected the voluntariness of defendant\u2019s confession. See State v. Wallace, 351 N.C. 481, 520, 528 S.E.2d 326, 350 (2000)(\u201cAn improper inducement generating hope must promise relief from the criminal charge to which the confession relates, not to any merely collateral advantage.\u201d (internal quotations and citation omitted)).\nAfter considering the totality of the circumstances, we hold the trial court\u2019s findings and the uncontroverted evidence presented at the suppression hearing support the trial court\u2019s conclusion that defendant\u2019s confession was voluntary. The preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that defendant\u2019s statements to Tolvi were not \u201cthe product of improperly induced hope or fear,\u201d Gainey, 355 N.C. at 84, 558 S.E.2d at 471, but instead resulted from his misplaced trust in her. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress defendant\u2019s confession to Tolvi. This argument is overruled.\nV. Conclusion\nThe trial court properly allowed Durham\u2019s prior testimony into evidence under Rule 804(b)(1), and defendant\u2019s confrontation rights were not violated by the introduction of her testimony. The trial court did not err by allowing Agent Brown to testify that he had met with Ford multiple times, and that, as a result of those meetings, he searched a field near Andrews Terrace and discovered a knife. The trial court\u2019s findings, which are unchallenged on appeal, support its conclusions that the knife was relevant under Rule 401 and not unduly prejudicial under Rule 403. Defendant\u2019s confession to his wife was voluntarily made and thus, admissible at trial. Defendant received a fair trial, free from error.\nNo error.\nJudge HUNTER, Robert C. concurs.\nJudge HUNTER, Jr., Robert N. concurs in the result.\n. Defendant does not challenge the trial court\u2019s conclusion that Durham was an unavailable witness.", "type": "majority", "author": "CALABRIA, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorneys General Steven M. Arbogast and William P. Hart, Sr., for the State.", "Appellate Defender Staples S. Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender Barbara S. Blackman, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MICKEY VONRICE ROLLINS\nNo. COA12-552\nFiled 19 March 2013\n1. Evidence \u2014 hearsay\u2014prior testimony \u2014 confrontation rights not violated\nThe trial court did not err in a first-degree murder, attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon, and felony breaking and entering case by admitting into evidence a witness\u2019s prior testimony from defendant\u2019s Alford plea hearing under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 804(b) (1), and defendant\u2019s confrontation rights were not violated.\n2. Evidence \u2014 steak knife \u2014 relevant\u2014not unduly prejudicial\nThe trial court did not err in a first-degree murder, attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon, and felony breaking and entering case by admitting into evidence a steak knife. The knife was relevant under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 401 and not unduly prejudicial under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 403.\n3. Confessions and Incriminating Statements \u2014 motion to suppress \u2014 voluntary statements to spouse while incarcerated\nThe trial court did not err in a first-degree murder, attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon, and felony breaking and entering case by denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress the statements he made to his wife while defendant was incarcerated at various correctional facilities due to an unrelated conviction. Defendant\u2019s confession to his wife was voluntarily made, and thus, admissible at trial.\nJudge HUNTER, Jr., Robert N. concurring in result only.\nAppeal by defendant from judgments entered 2 May 2011 by Judge Wayland J. Sermons, Jr. in Martin County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 24 October 2012.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorneys General Steven M. Arbogast and William P. Hart, Sr., for the State.\nAppellate Defender Staples S. Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender Barbara S. Blackman, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0129-01", "first_page_order": 139, "last_page_order": 157 }