{ "id": 6813989, "name": "PAUL E. WALTERS, Plaintiff v. ROY A. COOPER, III, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Walters v. Cooper", "decision_date": "2013-03-19", "docket_number": "No. COA12-1221", "first_page": "166", "last_page": "174", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "226 N.C. App. 166" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "649 S.E.2d 382", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639168 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "385" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/649/0382-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-4.01", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(4a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "379 S.E.2d 30", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "37" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 N.C. 373", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2483734 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "384" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/324/0373-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-415.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "making it unlawful for \"any person who has been convicted of a felony\" to possess a firearm and specifically defining \"conviction\" as \"a final judgment in any case in which felony punishment is . . . authorized, without regard ... to the sentence imposed\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-24", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "540-41" }, { "page": "(c)", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "540" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-28.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "400 S.E.2d 118", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "119" }, { "page": "119-20" }, { "page": "119" }, { "page": "121" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 N.C. App. 539", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527952 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/101/0539-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 S.E.2d 793", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "804" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "276 N.C. 641", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563176 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "658" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/276/0641-01" ] }, { "cite": "420 S.E.2d 124", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "128", "parenthetical": "quotation marks and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "332 N.C. 184", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2505670 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "191", "parenthetical": "quotation marks and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/332/0184-01" ] }, { "cite": "527 S.E.2d 75", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "77" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "137 N.C. App. 82", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11091951 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "85" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/137/0082-01" ] }, { "cite": "209 S.E.2d 754", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "756", "parenthetical": "quotation marks and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "286 N.C. 148", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563921 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "152", "parenthetical": "quotation marks and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/286/0148-01" ] }, { "cite": "100 S.E.2d 49", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1957, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "50" }, { "page": "51" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "246 N.C. 680", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8628148 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1957, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "682" }, { "page": "683" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/246/0680-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(4)", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "(5)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.7", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 519", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3739573 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "523-24" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0519-01" ] }, { "cite": "669 S.E.2d 572", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "576", "parenthetical": "quoting Forbis v. Neal, 361 N.C. 519, 523-24, 649 S.E.2d 382, 385 (2007)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 569", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4150896 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "573", "parenthetical": "quoting Forbis v. Neal, 361 N.C. 519, 523-24, 649 S.E.2d 382, 385 (2007)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0569-01" ] }, { "cite": "168 S.E.2d 345", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "350", "parenthetical": "holding that \"[w]hat constitutes cruel and unusual punishment is a question of law\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "275 N.C. 411", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558852 ], "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "421", "parenthetical": "holding that \"[w]hat constitutes cruel and unusual punishment is a question of law\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/275/0411-01" ] }, { "cite": "115 N.C. 760", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8653020 ], "year": 1894, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "764" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/115/0760-01" ] }, { "cite": "229 S.E.2d 227", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "228" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "31 N.C. App. 379", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8549682 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "382" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/31/0379-01" ] }, { "cite": "430 S.E.2d 433", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "434" }, { "page": "434" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "110 N.C. App. 658", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526272 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "659-60" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/110/0658-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.5", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "100 S.E.2d 49", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1957, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "51" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "246 N.C. 680", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8628148 ], "year": 1957, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "683" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/246/0680-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 4, "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(5)" }, { "page": "(4)", "parenthetical": "a" }, { "page": "(4)(a)" }, { "page": "(4)(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.7", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 776, "char_count": 17797, "ocr_confidence": 0.727, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.643594115661138e-08, "percentile": 0.291506184337388 }, "sha256": "1a99ce24089ee28e3694f7def84aef3e17c3ddcd896fc3a0c21f801b8ac3d333", "simhash": "1:b96c846c532b5ee0", "word_count": 2877 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:05:47.059681+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge GEER concurs.", "Judge STEELMAN dissents in a separate opinion." ], "parties": [ "PAUL E. WALTERS, Plaintiff v. ROY A. COOPER, III, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge.\nPaul E. Walters (\u201cPlaintiff\u2019) appeals from an order denying his Motion for Summary Judgment and granting summary judgment for Defendant. On appeal, Plaintiff argues the trial court erred in concluding that Plaintiff has a \u201creportable conviction\u201d which subjects him to the Sex Offender and Public Protection Registration Program. For the following reasons, we reverse.\nI. Factual & Procedural History\nOn 16 August 2006 Plaintiff, then 19 years old, pled guilty to the criminal charge of sexual battery in Nash County Superior Court. On the same date, Prayer for Judgment was continued by the trial court upon payment of costs and attorney fees, and so long as Plaintiff did not have any contact with the victim or her immediate family. Plaintiff was not required by the trial court to comply with the registration requirements of the Sex Offender and Public Protection Registration Program.\nFrom the date of the Prayer for Judgment Continued until November 2011, Plaintiff resided in Franklin County and was not registered as a sex offender. In November 2011, the Franklin County Sheriff\u2019s Office notified Plaintiff that because of his conviction for sexual battery, he was required to register as a sex offender, or else be criminally charged for his failure to do so. On 30 November 2011 Plaintiff registered as a sex offender with the Franklin County Sheriff\u2019s Office. Plaintiff filed this action on 4 April 2012, seeking (1) a Declaratory Judgment that he is not subject to registration and (2) an order directing the Office of the North Carolina Attorney General to remove his name and other information from the sex offender registry. \\\nExcept for the conviction in question, Plaintiff has no criminal convictions which would require him to maintain registration as a sex offender. At the hearing on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, the parties agreed to these facts and stipulated that there was no issue of material fact before the Court. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendant on 23 July 2012. Plaintiff filed a timely written notice of appeal. Plaintiff has remained registered during the pendency of this appeal.\nII. Jurisdiction & Standard of Review\nAs Plaintiff appeals from the final judgment of a superior court, an appeal lies of right to this Court pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-27(b) (2011).\n\u201cOur standard of review of an appeal from summary judgment is de novo; such judgment is appropriate only when the record shows that \u2018there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\u2019 \u201d In re Will of Jones, 362 N.C. 569, 573, 669 S.E.2d 572, 576 (2008) (quoting Forbis v. Neal, 361 N.C. 519, 523-24, 649 S.E.2d 382, 385 (2007)).\nIII. Analysis\nPlaintiff\u2019s sole argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in concluding that the Prayer for Judgment Continued (\u201cPJC\u201d) entered on his sexual battery conviction makes that conviction a \u201cfinal conviction,\u201d and thus a \u201creportable conviction,\u201d such that Plaintiff must comply with the provisions of the Sex Offender and Public Protection Registration Program.\nNorth Carolina\u2019s Sex Offender and Public Protection Registration Program requires any individual \u201cwho has a reportable conviction . . . to maintain registration with the sheriff of the county where the person resides\u201d for a period of at least 30 years. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.7(a) (2011). A \u201creportable conviction\u201d is defined as \u201c[a] final conviction for an offense against a minor, a sexually violent offense, or an attempt to commit any of those offenses.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(4) (2011) (emphasis added). Sexual battery falls within the definition of \u201csexually violent offense.\u201d See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(5) (2011).\nThe term \u201cfinal conviction,\u201d however, is not defined in the registration statute. Thus, the question presented by this appeal is whether a PJC entered upon a conviction makes that conviction a \u201cfinal conviction,\u201d and therefore a \u201creportable conviction\u201d for the purposes of the registration statute. After review of analogous case law and consideration of the legislature\u2019s intent, we hold that a true PJC does not operate as a \u201cfinal conviction\u201d under the registration statute.\nAfter a defendant has been found guilty or entered a guilty plea, a trial court may (1) pronounce judgment and place it into immediate execution; (2) pronounce judgment and suspend or stay its execution; or (3) enter a PJC. State v. Griffin, 246 N.C. 680, 682, 100 S.E.2d 49, 50 (1957). A prayer for judgment continued upon payment of costs, without more, does not typically constitute an entry of judgment. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-101(4a) (2011). However, our Supreme Court has acknowledged that a continuation of entry of judgment may lose its character as \u201ctrue\u201d PJC and is converted into a \u201cjudgment\u201d when it includes conditions \u201camounting to punishment.\u201d Griffin, 246 N.C. at 683, 100 S.E.2d at 51.\nAt the outset, we note that none of the conditions imposed upon Plaintiff in this case appear to be punitive in nature, and Defendant does not contend otherwise on appeal. In fact, Defendant acknowledges that \u201cno punitive sentence was pronounced against [Plaintiff].\u201d \u201cIssues not presented and discussed in a party\u2019s brief are deemed abandoned.\u201d N.C. R. App. P. 28(a). Accordingly, we conclude Plaintiff in fact received a \u201ctrue PJC\u201d for the purposes of our analysis.\n\u201cWhere the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for judicial construction and the courts must give it its plain and definite meaning, and are without power to interpolate, or superimpose, provisions and limitations not contained therein.\u201d State v. Camp, 286 N.C. 148, 152, 209 S.E.2d 754, 756 (1974) (quotation marks and citation omitted). In this case, however, the term \u201cfinal conviction\u201d has no ordinary meaning, and is not otherwise defined by the statute. In situations such as this, \u201c[w]here the plain meaning is unclear, legislative intent controls.\u201d Sharpe v. Worland, 137 N.C. App. 82, 85, 527 S.E.2d 75, 77 (2000). In ascertaining the legislature\u2019s intent, our Courts should consider the statute in its entirety, \u201cweighing the language of the statute, its spirit, and that which the statute seeks to accomplish.\u201d Harris v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 332 N.C. 184, 191, 420 S.E.2d 124, 128 (1992) (quotation marks and citation omitted). We also assume that the legislature acted with full knowledge of prior and existing law in drafting any particular statute. State v. Benton, 276 N.C. 641, 658, 174 S.E.2d 793, 804 (1970).\nOur Court has considered the precise issue presented by this appeal before, in the context of our motor vehicle statutes. See Florence v. Hiatt, 101 N.C. App. 539, 400 S.E.2d 118 (1991). In Florence, a criminal defendant was convicted of operating a motor vehicle without a license. He received a PJC from the trial court, which included certain non-punitive conditions. Id. at 539-40, 400 S.E.2d at 119. Subsequently, the Department of Motor Vehicles revoked the defendant\u2019s license pursuant to the then-applicable version of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-28.1, which permitted the DMV to revoke a driver\u2019s license upon conviction of a moving violation during a period of suspension. Id. At that time, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-24 defined \u201cconviction\u201d as a \u201cfinal conviction of a criminal offense.\u201d Id. at 540-41,400 S.E.2d at 119-20; N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-24(c) (1987) (emphasis added).\nThe defendant in Florence obtained a permanent injunction against the DMV enjoining it from suspending his license. The DMV appealed. Id. at 540, 400 S.E.2d at 119. \u201cThe issue on appeal [was] whether the conditional language in [the trial court\u2019s] order rendered] the putative \u2018prayer for judgment continued\u2019 a final conviction.\u201d Id. This Court ultimately held that a true PJC does not operate as a \u201cfinal conviction\u201d for the purposes for Chapter 20. Id. at 542, 400 S.E.2d at 121.\nThe registration statute in the instant case was first enacted in 1995. We must therefore presume that the legislature was aware of our prior case law, albeit in another context, interpreting the term \u201cfinal conviction\u201d as excluding convictions which are followed by true PJCs. In drafting the registration statute, the legislature could have indicated that any conviction triggers the provisions of the statute, as it has in other contexts. See, e.g., N.C. R. Evid. 609 (allowing in some circumstances impeachment of a witness via evidence that the witness \u201chas been convicted of afelony\u201d); N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-415.1 (2011) (making it unlawful for \u201cany person who has been convicted of a felony\u201d to possess a firearm and specifically defining \u201cconviction\u201d as \u201ca final judgment in any case in which felony punishment is . . . authorized, without regard ... to the sentence imposed\u201d).\nInstead, the legislature chose the registration statute at issue in this case to apply to only those individuals who have obtained a \u201cfinal conviction,\u201d and did not provide any additional definition for that term. We must assume that the legislature enacted Section 14-208.6 with an awareness of Florence, and yet chose not to articulate whether PJCs are \u201cfinal convictions\u201d for the purposes of the registration statute. This suggests that the legislature saw no need to do so, even in light of case law holding PJCs are not \u201cfinal convictions\u201d in the context of another statutory scheme employing similar language.\nOur Supreme Court has not ruled on this particular issue, and we are bound by previous holdings of this Court. See In re Civil Penalty, 324 N.C. 373, 384, 379 S.E.2d 30, 37 (1989). Therefore, in reliance on Florence, we hold that a true PJC does not operate as a \u201cfinal conviction\u201d for the purposes of the Sex Offender and Public Protection Registration Program. Accordingly, Plaintiff\u2019s motion for summary judgment should have been granted, and the trial court erred in granting judgment for Defendant.\nDefendant acknowledges that \u201cit is reasonable to conclude . . . that the use of the word \u2018final\u2019 would import some meaning for the proposes of [S]ection 14-208.6(4).\u201d However, Defendant suggests that purpose of the word \u201cfinal\u201d in the statute is to indicate that the \u201cconviction\u201d must be final within the trial division before it becomes a \u201cfinal conviction.\u201d For example, Defendant contends a conviction would not be \u201cfinal\u201d if it were obtained in district court and an appeal de novo was pending in the superior court. We find this argument unpersuasive. Plaintiff\u2019s particular offense notwithstanding, the vast majority of offenses which subject an individual to registration are felonies, and thus are generally tried in superior court from the outset. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 7A-271, 7A-272 (2011) (specifying the original jurisdiction of superior and district courts). It would seem unlikely that the legislature inserted the word \u201cfinal\u201d to guard against a contingency which could only occur in a small minority of cases implicating the statute.\nIV. Conclusion\nFor the foregoing reasons, the order of the trial court is reversed and remanded for entry of an order directing the Office of the Attorney General to remove Plaintiff\u2019s name and other information from the sex offender registry.\nREVERSED AND REMANDED.\nJudge GEER concurs.\nJudge STEELMAN dissents in a separate opinion.\n. The definition of \u201cconviction\u201d in Chapter 20 is now found in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-4.01(4a) (2011).", "type": "majority", "author": "HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge." }, { "text": "STEELMAN, Judge,\ndissenting.\nThe majority\u2019s analysis is based upon case law construing provisions of Chapter 20 of the General Statutes, which deals with motor vehicles. This is a case involving sex offender registration under Article 27A of Chapter 14 of the General Statutes. The purpose of this statute was set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.5:\nThe General Assembly recognizes that sex offenders often pose a high risk of engaging in sex offenses even after being released from incarceration or commitment and that protection of the public from sex offenders is of paramount governmental interest.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.5 (2011).\nThe majority acknowledges that the crime to which defendant pled guilty was a \u201csexually violent offense\u201d under the provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(5). Because a final conviction for a sexually violent offense is a \u201creportable conviction\u201d under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(4) (a), defendant was required to register as a sex offender. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.7(a) (2011).\nThe only issue presented in this case is whether the judgment entered in the underlying criminal case was a \u201cfinal conviction\u201d as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(4)(a). I would look for resolution of this question to the provisions of Chapter 15A of the General Statutes, dealing with criminal procedure, rather than to the motor vehicle laws.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-101(4a) defines the term \u201centry of judgment\u201d as follows: \u201cJudgment is entered when sentence is pronounced. Prayer for judgment continued upon payment of costs, without more, does not constitute the entry of judgment.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-101(4a) (2011).\nAs acknowledged by the majority, the prayer for judgment entered in the underlying criminal case was not a \u201c[p]rayer for judgment continued upon payment of costs, without more[.]\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-101(4a). The trial court placed several explicit conditions upon the entry of the prayer for judgment continued.\nIn State v. Brown, 110 N.C. App. 658, 430 S.E.2d 433 (1993), this Court set forth the circumstances where the entry of a prayer for judgment continued constituted \u201centry of judgment.\u201d\n\u201cWhen the prayer for judgment is continued there is no judgment-only a motion or prayer by the prosecuting officer for judgment.\u201d Griffin, 246 N.C. at 683, 100 S.E.2d at 51. When, however, the trial judge imposes conditions \u201camounting to punishment\u201d on the continuation of the entry of judgment, the judgment loses its character as a PJC and becomes a final judgment. Id. Conditions \u201camounting to punishment\u201d include fines and imprisonment. Id. Conditions not \u201camounting to punishment\u201d include \u201crequirements to obey the law,\u201d State v. Cheek, 31 N.C. App. 379, 382, 229 S.E.2d 227, 228 (1976), and a requirement to pay the costs of court. State v. Crook, 115 N.C. 760, 764 (1894); N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-101(4a) (1988) (\u201c[p]rayer for judgment continued upon payment of costs, without more, does not constitute the entry of judgment\u201d).\nState v. Brown, 110 N.C. App. at 659-60, 430 S.E.2d at 434.\nIn Brown, we held that aprayer for judgment continued upon defendant continuing with psychiatric treatment \u201cwent beyond defendant\u2019s obligation to obey the law, and was thus punishment.\u201d Id. at 660,430 S.E.2d at 434. We further noted that violation of this condition \u201csubjected the defendant to criminal contempt of court[.]\u201d Id.\nIn the instant case, the entry of the prayer for judgment continued was expressly conditioned upon defendant not having any contact or communication with the victim; defendant not being on the victim\u2019s property; and defendant not having any contact with any member of the victim\u2019s immediate family. This condition amounts to more than a mere requirement that defendant \u201cobey the law.\u201d It places fundamental restrictions upon his rights of association and restrains him from going upon the victim\u2019s property. These conditions constitute \u201cpunishment\u201d for which defendant could be subject to contempt. Under the rationale of Brown and N.C. Gen. Stat. 15A-101(4a), the judgment entered upon the defendant\u2019s guilty plea to the charge of sexual battery was a \u201cfinal conviction\u201d as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(4)(a).\nThe majority relies upon the following sentence from the State\u2019s brief to support its assertion that the State acknowledged that the conditions imposed were not punishment:\nPlaintiff, whose guilt for the registerable offense of sexual battery has been definitively established in a court of law, should not be permitted to evade the civil regulatory scheme of the Registration Programs, the purpose of which is to protect the general public, merely because no punitive sentence was pronounced against him.\nFirst, the State\u2019s argument refers to \u201cno punitive sentence.\u201d In fact, the judgment did not impose a sentence upon defendant. This passage does not refer to whether the conditions imposed upon the prayer for judgment constituted punishment. Second, whether a condition of a prayer for judgment continued constituted \u201cpunishment\u201d is a question of law for the courts to determine. It is not a question of fact as to which the parties, on appeal, can stipulate. See State v. Rogers, 275 N.C. 411, 421, 168 S.E.2d 345, 350 (1969) (holding that \u201c[w]hat constitutes cruel and unusual punishment is a question of law\u201d).\nI would affirm the order of the learned trial judge.", "type": "dissent", "author": "STEELMAN, Judge," } ], "attorneys": [ "Etheridge & Hamlett, LLP, by J. Richard Hamlett, II, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General William P. Hart, Jr., for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "PAUL E. WALTERS, Plaintiff v. ROY A. COOPER, III, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, Defendant\nNo. COA12-1221\nFiled 19 March 2013\nSexual Offenders \u2014 sex offender registration \u2014 prayer for judgment continued\nA true prayer for judgment continued does not operate as a \u201cfinal conviction\u201d for the purposes of the Sex Offender and Public Protection Registration Program. Accordingly, plaintiffs motion for summary judgment in an action seeking a declaratory judgment that he did not have to register as a sex offender should have been granted, and the trial court erred in granting judgment for defendant.\nJudge STEELMAN dissenting\nAppeal by plaintiff from order entered 23 July 2012 by Judge Quentin T. Sumner in Nash County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 13 February 2013.\nEtheridge & Hamlett, LLP, by J. Richard Hamlett, II, for plaintiff-appellant.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General William P. Hart, Jr., for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0166-01", "first_page_order": 176, "last_page_order": 184 }