{ "id": 6814902, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TYRON JAUREL ARRINGTON, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Arrington", "decision_date": "2013-04-02", "docket_number": "No. COA12-1333", "first_page": "311", "last_page": "317", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "226 N.C. App. 311" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "669 S.E.2d 749", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12642320 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "752" }, { "page": "752" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/669/0749-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-202.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "676 S.E.2d 308", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 138", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "194 N.C. App. 524", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4163160 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "529" }, { "page": "529" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/194/0524-01" ] }, { "cite": "732 S.E.2d 491", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "494", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he existence of a prior conviction may be established by, inter alia, '[stipulation of the parties.' N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1340.14(f)(1).\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "342 S.E.2d 855", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 523", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4697700 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0523-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 S.E.2d 617", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "619" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "254 N.C. 231", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8625597 ], "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "234" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/254/0231-01" ] }, { "cite": "710 S.E.2d 292", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "295" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "700 S.E.2d 226", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "364 N.C. 418", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4152970 ], "year": 2010, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/364/0418-01" ] }, { "cite": "689 S.E.2d 562", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "567-68" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "201 N.C. App. 620", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4173923 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "630" }, { "page": "630" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/201/0620-01" ] }, { "cite": "702 S.E.2d 794", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "364 N.C. 439", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 2010, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "691 S.E.2d 104", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "106" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "203 N.C. App. 326", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4176186 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "328-29" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/203/0326-01" ] }, { "cite": "703 S.E.2d 738", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "364 N.C. 599", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 2010, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "689 S.E.2d 510", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "517" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "201 N.C. App. 354", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4173701 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "364" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/201/0354-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-41", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 9, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(4)" }, { "parenthetical": "a" }, { "page": "(lm)" }, { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "(la)" }, { "page": "(lm)" }, { "page": "(2b)" }, { "page": "(4)" }, { "page": "(li)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "679 S.E.2d 430", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "432", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "198 N.C. App. 363", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4169223 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "366", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/198/0363-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2011, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 670, "char_count": 16082, "ocr_confidence": 0.73, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.552284461341054e-08, "percentile": 0.44828733258193815 }, "sha256": "ab1957f337ce6b94d7344c27f5a1ffef2404d097a589ae564b175c056a4987e7", "simhash": "1:09ee0b6178af655e", "word_count": 2630 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:05:47.059681+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges ELMORE and STEELMAN concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TYRON JAUREL ARRINGTON, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "STROUD, Judge.\nTyron Arrington (\u201cdefendant\u201d) appeals from an order entered on or about 22 March 2012 requiring him to enroll in satellite-based monitoring (SBM) for the remainder of his natural life. Defendant was convicted on 29 May 2009 of four counts of abduction of a child. On 28 January 2012, the Department of Correction (DOC) notified defendant that it would seek an SBM hearing after it determined that he was a recidivist based upon a 2005 conviction for indecent liberties with a child. The trial court found him to be a recidivist and ordered him to enroll in SBM for the remainder of his life. Defendant argues that the trial court\u2019s findings of fact were unsupported by the evidence. Specifically, he contends that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that he had been convicted of a reportable offense, and insufficient evidence that he was a recidivist under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40 (2011) because the State failed to present evidence of his prior \u201creportable\u201d conviction.\n\u201cThe standard of review for the trial court\u2019s findings of fact is well-established: The trial court\u2019s findings of fact are conclusive on appeal if supported by competent evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting.\u201d State v. Kilby, 198 N.C. App. 363, 366, 679 S.E.2d 430, 432 (2009) (citation and quotation marks omitted).\nThe trial court held an extremely brief hearing, totaling about five transcript pages. The following exchange was the entirety of the discussion on defendant\u2019s convictions:\n[Prosecutor]: Mr. Arrington was convicted of four counts of abduction of children an offense that\u2019s arrestable [sic], May 29th of 2009. The State will contend that he is a recidivist and that he had a prior convention [sic] with a child January 5th, 2005.\nTHE COURT: Yes, sir.\n[Defense Attorney]: Judge, we do not deny his convictions that Mr. Arrington has. If the Court will indulge me for a moment. Judge, I had continued this matter from Monday with the attitude that the statutes would apply in this situation.\nTHE COURT: Yes, sir.\n[Defense Attorney]: Myself and [the prosecutor] have talked and I have talked with my client. The first offense was January 5th, 2005, of course, before the statute was enacted in August of 2006. It became effective in January of 2007. Judge, I explained to my client what the statutory requirements were based on this GPS Satellite Base Monitoring Statute. I just want to bring something to the Court\u2019s attention, Judge. The Court will correct me if I am wrong he is quote the statute by DOC as being a recidivist unquote.\nTHE COURT: Yes, sir.\n[DEFENSE ATTORNEY: Because of these 2009 conviction from a \u201906 offense and a 2005 conviction from a 2004 offense....\nThe remainder of the hearing focused on trial counsel\u2019s ex post facto arguments, which are not raised on appeal.\nDefendant first argues that the trial court\u2019s finding that he was convicted of a reportable offense was unsupported by the evidence. Defendant contends that because his 2009 conviction for abduction of children falls under the \u201coffense against a minor\u201d portion of the reportable conviction definition, the trial court was required to find that he was not the parent of the minor abducted and that such a finding was not supported by the evidence.\nThe SBM hearing provisions in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40B apply \u201c[w]hen an offender is convicted of a reportable conviction as defined by G.S. 14-208.6(4)\u201d and there has not been a prior SBM determination made by a court. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40B(a) (2011). N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(4) defines a reportable conviction in relevant part as \u201c[a] final conviction for an offense against a minor, a sexually violent offense, or an attempt to commit any of those offenses unless the conviction is for aiding and abetting.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6 (4)(a) (2011).\nDefendant was convicted of four counts of abduction of children in 2009. The State contends that these convictions were reportable convictions that made defendant eligible for SBM. Abduction of children, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-41 (2005), is specifically included in the definition of an \u201coffense against a minor.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(lm) (2011). That statute defines an \u201coffense against a minor\u201d as \u201cany of the following offenses if the offense is committed against a minor, and the person committing the offense is not the minor\u2019s parent:... G.S. 14-41 (abduction of children).\u201d Id. (emphasis added).\nA defendant commits the offense of abduction of children when he \u201cwithout legal justification or defense, abducts or induces any minor child who is at least four years younger than the person to leave any person, agency, or institution lawfully entitled to the child\u2019s custody, placement, or care.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-41. Thus, the statutory definition of \u201coffense against a minor\u201d for purposes of SBM requires proof of a fact in addition to the bare fact of conviction-that the defendant is not the minor\u2019s parent.\nIn the context of deciding whether a conviction was an \u201caggravated offense\u201d for SBM purposes, we have held that \u201cthe trial court is only to consider the elements of the offense of which a defendant was convicted and is not to consider the underlying factual scenario giving rise' to the conviction.\u201d State v. Davison, 201 N.C. App. 354, 364, 689 S.E.2d 510, 517 (2009), disc. rev. denied, 364 N.C. 599, 703 S.E.2d 738 (2010). Davison and the cases following it specifically addressed whether a particular conviction could constitute an aggravated offense. See, e.g., State v. Phillips, 203 N.C. App. 326, 328-29, 691 S.E.2d 104, 106, disc. rev. denied, 364 N.C. 439, 702 S.E.2d 794 (2010), State v. Singleton, 201 N.C. App. 620, 630, 689 S.E.2d 562, 567-68, disc. rev. dismissed as improvidently allowed, 364 N.C. 418, 700 S.E.2d 226 (2010). They did not address what the trial court may consider in determining whether a conviction qualifies as a reportable \u201coffense against a minor.\u201d\nThe plain language in the definition of \u201caggravated offense\u201d requires that courts consider the elements of the conviction as it covers\nany criminal offense that includes either of the following: (i) engaging in a sexual act involving vaginal, anal, or oral penetration with a victim of any age through the use of force or the threat of serious violence; or (ii) engaging in a sexual act involving vaginal, anal, or oral penetration with a victim who is less than 12 years old.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(la) (2011). The definition of \u201coffenses against a minor,\u201d by contrast, lists certain, particular offenses, and then adds the requirements that the victim be a minor and that the defendant not be a parent of the victim. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(lm).\nFurther, in concluding that trial courts are restricted to considering the elements of the offense in determining whether a given conviction was an \u201caggravated offense\u201d we noted a concern that defendants would be forced to re-litigate the underlying facts of their case even if they pleaded guilty to a lesser offense. See Singleton, 201 N.C. App. at 630, 689 S.E.2d at 568. This concern is absent in the context of defining \u201coffenses against a minor.\u201d Trial courts in this context do not need to inquire into whether defendant\u2019s conduct could have constituted a greater offense, despite a plea to the lesser. They only need decide whether the victim was a minor and whether defendant was a parent of the minor child, facts that will normally be readily ascertainable.\nBecause the statute explicitly requires that the State show that defendant was not the parent of the minor victim in addition to the fact that defendant was convicted of one of the listed offenses, the statute effectively \u201cmandates that the trial court must look beyond the offense of conviction.\u201d State v. Green, _ N.C. App. _, _, 710 S.E.2d 292, 295 (2011). Therefore, we hold that in deciding whether a conviction counts as a reportable conviction under the \u201coffense against a minor\u201d provision, the trial court is not restricted to simply considering the elements of the offense for which the defendant was convicted to the extent that the trial court may make a determination as to whether or not the defendant was a parent of the abducted child.\nHere, although the State did not present any independent evidence at the SBM hearing that defendant was not the parent of the child he abducted, the trial court had previously made this determination at the sentencing hearing. Specifically, the SBM trial court had before it the judgments and sentencing forms from defendant\u2019s 2009 convictions. At the 2009 sentencing hearing, the trial court found that defendant\u2019s 2009 convictions were reportable offenses. As part of the suspended sentence it imposed on defendant, the trial court also imposed special conditions only applicable to reportable offenses under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1343(b2) (2009) and ordered that DOC evaluate defendant for SBM. In doing so, it specifically found that \u201cdefendant has been convicted of an offense which is a reportable conviction as defined in G.S. 14-208.6(4)[.]\u201d Additionally, on its judgment form for sex offender suspended sentences, AOC form CR-615, the trial court specifically found that defendant had been convicted of \u201can offense against a minor under G.S. 14-208.6(li), or an attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy to commit such offense, and defendant is not the parent of the victim.\u201d\nDefendant does not challenge any of these prior findings, nor did he appeal from the judgments. All of these findings were before the trial court at the SBM hearing. We hold that these prior findings support the trial court\u2019s finding at the SBM hearing that defendant\u2019s conviction for abduction of children was a reportable conviction as an offense against a minor.\nAs to defendant\u2019s recidivism argument, he fails to note that the prior record level worksheet for his 2009 conviction and the Department of Correction notice were submitted to the trial court. Both the prior record worksheet and the notice listed defendant\u2019s 2005 offense as indecent liberties with a child. There was no evidence of other convictions that year. The State noted the convictions upon which it was relying, and defendant\u2019s counsel stated, \u201cJudge, we do not deny his convictions .. .The prior record worksheet and the stipulation by counsel to defendant\u2019s prior convictions support a finding that defendant had been convicted of indecent liberties with a child in 2005, even though it appears that the State did not introduce the judgment or record of conviction from that case, or a copy of defendant\u2019s criminal history. See State v. Powell, 254 N.C. 231, 234, 118 S.E.2d 617, 619 (1961) (\u201cNo proof of stipulated or admitted facts, or of matters necessarily implied thereby, is necessary, the stipulations being substituted for proof and dispensing with evidence. While a stipulation need not follow any particular form, its terms must be definite and certain in order to afford a proper basis for judicial decision, and it is essential that they be assented to by the parties or those representing them. Silence, under some circumstances, may be deemed assent. These principles apply in both civil and criminal cases.\u201d (citations, quotation marks, and ellipses omitted)), superseded on other grounds by statute, as recognized in State v. Denning, 316 N.C. 523, 342 S.E.2d 855 (1986).\nA stipulation to prior convictions has been held as sufficient for purposes of determining prior record level in felony sentencing, which is a criminal proceeding; we believe that if this proof is sufficient for sentencing purposes, it is also sufficient for purposes of SBM, which is a civil regulatory proceeding. State v. Powell, _ N.C. App. _, _, 732 S.E.2d 491, 494 (2012) (\u201c[T]he existence of a prior conviction may be established by, inter alia, \u2018[stipulation of the parties.\u2019 N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1340.14(f)(1).\u201d).\nWe have previously held that a prior conviction for indecent liberties, even one from prior to the enactment of the reporting statute, supports a finding that the defendant is a recidivist for purposes of the SBM statute. See, e.g., State v. Wooten, 194 N.C. App. 524, 529, 669 S.E.2d 749, 752 (2008), disc. rev. denied, 363 N.C. 138, 676 S.E.2d 308 (2009). A recidivist is \u201ca person who has a prior conviction for an offense that is described in G.S. 14-208.6(4).\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(2b) (2011). N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(4) describes a variety of offense classes, including \u201csexually violent offensefs].\u201d \u201cA sexually violent offense includes the offense of taking indecent liberties with a child as described in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-202.1.\u201d Wooten, 194 N.C. App. at 529, 669 S.E.2d at 752. Therefore, a prior conviction for indecent liberties with a child supports a finding of recidivism under the SBM statute and defendant\u2019s arguments to the contrary are unavailing.\nBecause the evidence at the SBM hearing, including defendant\u2019s admissions and the judgments from his 2009 convictions, supports the trial court\u2019s findings, both as to the reportability of defendant\u2019s 2009 offense and as to recidivism, we affirm the SBM order.\nAFFIRMED.\nJudges ELMORE and STEELMAN concur.\n. Under the 2007 version of the statute, the definition of offense against a minor was found in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(li), rather than (lm).\n. Although it is not specifically required by the SBM statute, the State could easily use one of the forms of evidence of the criminal record as noted by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1340.14 (f), which governs felony record level determinations. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1340.14 (f) (2011) (\u201cThe original or a copy of the court records or a copy of the records maintained by the Division of Criminal Information, the Division of Motor Vehicles, or of the Administrative Office of the Courts, bearing the same name as that by which the offender is charged, is prima facie evidence that the offender named is the same person as the offender before the court, and that the facts set out in the record are true. For purposes of this subsection, \u2018a copy\u2019 includes a paper writing containing a reproduction of a record maintained electronically on a computer or other data processing equipment, and a document produced by a facsimile machine. The prosecutor shall make all feasible efforts to obtain and present to the court the offender\u2019s full record. Evidence presented by either party at trial may be utilized to prove prior convictions.\u201d).", "type": "majority", "author": "STROUD, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Special Deputy Attorney General Joseph Finarelli, for the State.", "Gerding Blass, PLLG, by Danielle Blass, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TYRON JAUREL ARRINGTON, Defendant\nNo. COA12-1333\nFiled 2 April 2013\n1. Satellite \u2014 Based Monitoring \u2014 reportable defense \u2014 child abduction \u2014 not parent of minor \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nThe evidence supported the 2012 finding of a trial court imposing satellite-based monitoring (SBM) for a 2009 child abduction conviction that defendant had been convicted of a reportable offense. Defendant contended that the conviction for abduction required the 2012 court to find that he was not the parent of the minor, but the 2009 trial judge had made that determination at the sentencing hearing and the 2012 SBM trial court had before it the judgments and sentencing forms from defendant\u2019s 2009 convictions.\n2. Satellite \u2014 Based Monitoring \u2014 recidivist\u2014sufficiency of evidence \u2014 stipulation sufficient\nThere was sufficient evidence that a defendant convicted of abduction of a child and required to submit to lifetime satellite-based monitoring (SBM) was a recidivist in defendant\u2019s prior record worksheet and counsel\u2019s stipulation to a conviction for indecent liberties. A stipulation to prior convictions has been held sufficient for determining prior record level in felony sentencing and is also sufficient for purposes of SBM, which is a civil regulatory proceeding.\nAppeal by defendant from Order entered on or about 22 March 2012 by Judge Quentin T. Sumner in Superior Court, Nash County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 14 March 2013.\nAttorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Special Deputy Attorney General Joseph Finarelli, for the State.\nGerding Blass, PLLG, by Danielle Blass, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0311-01", "first_page_order": 321, "last_page_order": 327 }