{ "id": 6815344, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. BOBBY LEE SESSOMS, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Sessoms", "decision_date": "2013-04-02", "docket_number": "No. COA12-1232", "first_page": "381", "last_page": "385", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "226 N.C. App. 381" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "193 S.E.2d 288", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "289", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "17 N.C. App. 115", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8553672 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "116", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/17/0115-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 S.E.2d 72", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "82 N.C. App. 586", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8359441 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/82/0586-01" ] }, { "cite": "583 S.E.2d 354", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "360", "parenthetical": "\"Defendant also cites State v. Holloway, 82 N.C. App. 586, 347 S.E.2d 72 (1986" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "159 N.C. App. 534", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8957209 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "542", "parenthetical": "\"Defendant also cites State v. Holloway, 82 N.C. App. 586, 347 S.E.2d 72 (1986" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/159/0534-01" ] }, { "cite": "445 S.E.2d 18", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "22", "parenthetical": "\"We cannot hold that the reference to the prosecuting -witness as the victim was an error so basic and lacking in its elements that justice could not have been done.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 N.C. 559", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2536933 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "566", "parenthetical": "\"We cannot hold that the reference to the prosecuting -witness as the victim was an error so basic and lacking in its elements that justice could not have been done.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/336/0559-01" ] }, { "cite": "723 S.E.2d 326", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "334", "parenthetical": "citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted" }, { "page": "334" }, { "page": "334" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 500, "char_count": 10211, "ocr_confidence": 0.717, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.60167783687625e-08, "percentile": 0.28872281743066874 }, "sha256": "abf10eddd38420d473ba546e11f2663541d270030153287cd28fa39cb4256153", "simhash": "1:d767ce2e97ce25f0", "word_count": 1713 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:05:47.059681+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges STEPHENS and DILLON concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. BOBBY LEE SESSOMS, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "STROUD, Judge.\nDefendant appeals from a judgment entered upon his conviction of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury. For the following reasons, we find no error.\nI. Background\nThe State\u2019s evidence tended to show that on 8 August 2009, John Marcus Griffin, Jr. returned to his home to find defendant in his driveway in a van. Mr. Griffin asked defendant to leave, but defendant refused. Defendant got out of the van and cut Mr. Griffin in the shoulder with a machete. A jury found defendant guilty of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury. Defendant was sentenced to 42 to 60 months imprisonment. Defendant appeals.\nII. Plain Error\nDefendant contends that the trial court committed plain error as to three issues.\nFor error to constitute plain error, a defendant must demonstrate that a fundamental error occurred at trial. To show that an error was fundamental, a defendant must establish prejudice that, after examination of the entire record, the error had a probable impact on the jury\u2019s finding that the defendant was guilty. Moreover, because plain error is to be applied cautiously and only in the exceptional case, the error will often be one that seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.\nState v. Lawrence, _ N.C. _, _, 723 S.E.2d 326, 334 (2012) (citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).\nA. Improper Opinion Expressed by the Trial Court\nDefendant first contends that \u201cthe trial court committed plain error and expressed an improper opinion by repeatedly referring to Jon \u2018Doc\u2019 Griffin as \u2018the victim,\u2019 when the question of whether... [defendant] acted in self [-]defense was at issue.\u201d (Original in all caps.) Our Supreme Court has previously determined that referring to the prosecuting witness as \u201cthe victim\u201d is not plain error. See State v. McCarroll, 336 N.C. 559, 566, 445 S.E.2d 18, 22 (1994) (\u201cWe cannot hold that the reference to the prosecuting -witness as the victim was an error so basic and lacking in its elements that justice could not have been done.\u201d). In this case, defendant raised the issue of self-defense and thereby challenged whether Mr. Griffin was actually a victim, but we still do not believe the use of the term \u201cvictim\u201d rose to the level of plain error in light of the evidence which showed defendant came to Mr. Griffin\u2019s house, got out of his van, and cut Mr. Griffin with a machete while Mr. Griffin had no weapon of his own. See Lawrence at _, 723 S.E.2d at 334. This argument is overruled.\nB. Improper Opinion Expressed by a Police Officer\nDefendant next contends that \u201cthe trial court committed plain error by allowing a police officer to give impermissible opinion testimony by stating that a specific prosecution witness\u2019 testimony was unbiased and \u2018would be most valuable\u2019 here today.\u2019\u201d (Original in all caps.) Although defendant\u2019s argument is unclear, he seems to suggest that the police officer was testifying as an expert witness. Here, the police officer testifying was not an expert witness, but even assuming arguendo that the trial court erred in allowing \u201ca police officer to give impermissible opinion testimony\u201d as to the credibility of another witness, such error does not rise to the level of plain error in light of the State\u2019s other evidence demonstrating that defendant came to Mr. Griffin\u2019s home, got out of his van, and cut Mr. Griffin with a machete. See Lawrence at _, 723 S.E.2d at 334; see also State v. Lawson, 159 N.C. App. 534, 542, 583 S.E.2d 354, 360 (2003) (\u201cDefendant also cites State v. Holloway, 82 N.C. App. 586, 347 S.E.2d 72 (1986), which is also distinguishable from the case before us. In Holloway, expert witnesses testified that a State\u2019s witness was telling the truth. This Court held that such testimony constituted plain error as it invaded the province of the jury to determine the credibility of witnesses. In the present case, Officer Wilson\u2019s testimony was not that of an expert as to credibility, further, he was not invading the province of the jury as he was not commenting on the credibility of a witness. As noted above, Officer Wilson was testifying to the circumstances of the traffic stop and the reason for defendant\u2019s detention. The above testimony by Officer Wilson does not rise to the level of plain error. This argument is overruled.\u201d (emphasis added) (citations omitted)). This argument is overruled.\nC. Jury Instruction on Defense of Others\nDefendant also argues that \u201cthe trial court committed plain error by failing to instruct the jury on defense of others [,]\u201d an instruction defendant did not request. (Original in all caps.)\nPersons in a family relation, and persons in the relation of master and servant, have the reciprocal right to come to the aid and defense of the person in that relation when faced with an assault. The law does not allow this interference as an indulgence of revenge, but merely to prevent injury. The assistant\u2019s act may not be in excess of that which the law would allow the assisted party, for they are in a mutual relation one to another.\nIn any event there must be some evidence pertaining to the doctrine before the Court is required to charge about it. Where there is no evidence from which the jury could find that the defendant reasonably believed a third person was in immediate peril of death or serious bodily harm at the hands of another, it would be improper for the Court to instruct on defendant\u2019s defense of a third person as justification for the assault.\nState v. Moses, 17 N.C. App. 115, 116, 193 S.E.2d 288, 289 (1972) (citations omitted).\nHere, the sole evidence defendant directs this Court\u2019s attention to as evidence to support an instruction for defense of others is defendant\u2019s testimony that \u201c \u2018I took the machete and done like that to defend myself and my vehicle and my wife,\u201d\u2019 after explaining that Mr. Griffin \u201cattacked him and tried to open the door to his minivan while he was sitting inside next to\u201d his wife. We are not aware of any evidence that demonstrated that Mr. Griffin had a weapon, defendant believed Mr. Griffin had a weapon, or Mr. Griffin threatened or in any way acted as though he was going to touch defendant\u2019s wife. Accordingly, defendant\u2019s lone statement that he was defending \u201cmyself and my vehicle and my wife\u201d is not \u201cevidence from which the jury could find that the defendant reasonably believed a third person was in immediate peril of death or serious bodily harm at the hands of another,\u201d and the trial court did not commit error in failing to instruct the jury on defense of others. Id. (emphasis added). This argument is overruled.\nIII. Character Evidence\nCiting North Carolina General Statute \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404(b), defendant also contends that \u201cthe trial court erred by allowing Jason Griffin to testify to improper bad character evidence by stating that. . . [defendant] was \u2018a man with a machete riding around.\u2019\u201d (Original in all caps.) North Carolina General Statute \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404(b) provides that \u201c[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404(b) (2009). Here the following exchange took place during defendant\u2019s trial between the State and Jason Griffin, Mr. Griffin\u2019s brother, who had witnessed the incident:\nQ. And you had called for help?\nA. Yes, sir.\nQ. And was that because your brother had been hurt and needed some attention?\nA. Yes. And also I didn\u2019t want anybody else to get hurt by a man with a machete riding around.\nMr. Jason Griffin\u2019s statement was not \u201ccharacter evidence\u201d pursuant to North Carolina General Statute \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404(b), but rather his description of what he saw and his reason for calling for help; wielding a machete is not a character trait. See id. North Carolina General Statute \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404(b) is inapplicable, and this argument is without merit.\nIV. Conclusion\nFor the foregoing reasons, we find no error.\nNO ERROR.\nJudges STEPHENS and DILLON concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "STROUD, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney General Jane L. Oliver, for the State.", "Appellate Defender Staples S. Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender John F. Carella, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. BOBBY LEE SESSOMS, Defendant\nNo. COA12-1232\nFiled 2 April 2013\n1. Criminal Law \u2014 assault\u2014court\u2019s reference to \u201cvictim\u201d\nThere was no plain error in an assault prosecution where the trial court referred to the person who was assaulted (Mr. Griffin) as the victim. Although defendant raised the issue of self-defense, the evidence showed that defendant came to Mr. Griffin\u2019s house, got out of his van, and cut Mr. Griffin with a machete while Mr. Griffin had no weapon of his own.\n2. Evidence \u2014 police officer\u2019s testimony \u2014 credibility of victim\nThere was no plain error in an assault prosecution where a police officer testified that the testimony of a specific prosecution witness was unbiased and would be valuable. Even assuming arguendo that the trial court erred, such error did not rise to the level of plain error in light of the State\u2019s other evidence.\n3. Criminal Law \u2014 defense of others \u2014 instruction not given\nThere was no plain error in an assault prosecution where the trial court did not instruct the jury on defense of others. Defendant\u2019s lone statement that he was defending himself, his vehicle, and his wife was not evidence from which the jury could find that the defendant reasonably believed a third person was in immediate peril of death or serious bodily harm at the hands of another.\n4. Evidence \u2014 description of defendant \u2014 not evidence of bad character\nThe trial court did not allow improper character evidence in an assault prosecution where the victim\u2019s brother described defendant as a man riding around with a machete. The statement was not \u201ccharacter evidence\u201d pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404(b), but rather a description of what the witness saw and his reason for calling for help. Wielding a machete is not a character trait.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered on or about 21 September 2011 by Judge Claire V. Hill in Superior Court, Bladen County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 28 February 2013.\nAttorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney General Jane L. Oliver, for the State.\nAppellate Defender Staples S. Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender John F. Carella, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0381-01", "first_page_order": 391, "last_page_order": 395 }