{ "id": 4220538, "name": "IN THE MATTER OF A.K.D. and O.R.D.", "name_abbreviation": "In re A.K.D.", "decision_date": "2013-05-07", "docket_number": "No. COA12-1355", "first_page": "58", "last_page": "63", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "227 N.C. App. 58" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. 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App.", "case_ids": [ 9442570 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "610", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" }, { "page": "610" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/142/0607-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 560, "char_count": 11161, "ocr_confidence": 0.731, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.74394270658507e-08, "percentile": 0.455237737798613 }, "sha256": "74a7893a107c6634dbadf4f4845613759a982f5540c53e2a7898ab96da745954", "simhash": "1:abf3d83638ee86f2", "word_count": 1751 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:48:13.495142+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges STROUD and DILLON concur." ], "parties": [ "IN THE MATTER OF A.K.D. and O.R.D." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge.\nThe juveniles\u2019 father (\u201cRespondent\u201d) appeals from orders terminating his parental rights to his minor children A.K.D. and O.R.D. (\u201cthe juveniles\u201d). Because the trial court erred by relying on an improper stipulation to the sole ground for termination of parental rights, we reverse and remand for new hearing.\nI. Facts & Procedural History\nOn 28 October 2011, the juveniles\u2019 mother (\u201cPetitioner\u201d) petitioned to terminate Respondent\u2019s parental rights to the juveniles. Petitioner alleged Respondent: (i) failed to pay court-ordered child support; (ii) neglected the juveniles; and (iii) abandoned the juveniles. On 28 November 2011, Respondent filed a pro se response denying the allegations.\nThe trial court held hearings on 18 April, 18 June and 3 July 2012. On 13 August 2012, the trial court entered orders terminating Respondent\u2019s parental rights to the juveniles. In its orders, the trial court made the following factual finding:\nThe parties stipulated that the Court could find by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that [Respondent] willfully abandoned the juvenile [s] for at least six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition and that grounds exist to terminate [Respondent\u2019s] parental rights under NCGS \u00a7 7B-1111(7).\nBased on this stipulation, the trial court concluded as a matter of law that grounds existed to terminate Respondent\u2019s parental rights. The trial court then concluded it was in the juveniles\u2019 best interests to terminate Respondent\u2019s parental rights. On 29 August 2012, Respondent filed timely notice of appeal.\nII. Jurisdiction & Standard of Review\nThis Court has jurisdiction to hear the instant case pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1001(a)(6) (2011) (stating that \u201cappeal of a final order of the court in a juvenile matter shall be made directly to the Court of Appeals\u201d when the order \u201cterminates parental rights\u201d).\nThere is a two-step process in a termination of parental rights proceeding. In the adjudicatory stage, the trial court must establish that at least one ground for the termination of parental rights listed in [N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1111] exists. . . . Once one or more of the grounds for termination are established, the trial court must proceed to the dispositional stage where the best interests of the child are considered. There, the court shall issue an order terminating the parental rights unless it further determines that the best interests of the child require otherwise.\nIn re Blackburn, 142 N.C. App. 607, 610, 543 S.E.2d 906, 908 (2001) (internal citations omitted).\nFor the trial court\u2019s adjudicatory determination, \u201c[t]he standard for appellate review is whether the trial court\u2019s findings of fact are supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence and whether those findings of fact support its conclusions of law.\u201d In re C.C., 173 N.C. App. 375, 380, 618 S.E.2d 813, 817 (2005). Clear, cogent and convincing evidence requires more proof than the \u201cpreponderance of the evidence\u201d standard but less than the \u201cbeyond a reasonable doubt\u201d standard. Bost v. Van Nortwick, 117 N.C. App. 1, 13-14, 449 S.E.2d 911, 918 (1994).\nWe review adjudicatory conclusions of law de novo. In re D.H., 177 N.C. App. 700, 703, 629 S.E.2d 920, 922 (2006). \u201cUnder a de novo review, the court considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment for that of the lower tribunal.\u201d State v. Williams, 362 N.C. 628, 632-33, 669 S.E.2d 290, 294 (2008) (quotation marks and citation omitted).\nWe review the trial court\u2019s dispositional \u201cbest interests of the child\u201d determination for abuse of discretion. See In re S.F., 198 N.C. App. 611, 614, 682 S.E.2d 712, 715-16 (2009); In re A.R.H.B., 186 N.C. App. 211, 218, 651 S.E.2d 247, 253 (2007). \u201cAbuse of discretion results where the court\u2019s ruling is manifestly unsupported by reason or is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.\u201d State v. Hennis, 323 N.C. 279, 285, 372 S.E.2d 523, 527 (1988).\nIII. Analysis\nOn appeal, Respondent argues the trial court erred by relying on the parties\u2019 stipulation that grounds existed to terminate Respondent\u2019s parental rights under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-llll(a)(7). We agree.\nIn North Carolina, \u201cstipulations are judicial admissions and are therefore binding in every sense, preventing the party who agreed to the stipulation from introducing evidence to dispute it and relieving the other party of the necessity of producing evidence to establish an admitted fact.\u201d Thomas v. Poole, 54 N.C. App. 239, 241, 282 S.E.2d 515, 517 (1981).\n\u201cWhen construing a stipulation a court must attempt to effectuate the intention of the party making the stipulation as to what facts were to be stipulated without making a construction giving the stipulation the effect of admitting a fact the party intended to contest.\u201d In re I.S., 170 N.C. App. 78, 87, 611 S.E.2d 467, 473 (2005). However, \u201c[stipulations as to questions of law are generally held invalid and ineffective, and not binding upon the courts, either trial or appellate.\u201d State v. Prush, 185 N.C. App. 472, 480, 648 S.E.2d 556, 561 (2007) (quotation marks and citation omitted).\nUnder N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1111(a)(7), grounds for terminating parental rights exist where the parent has \u201cwillfully abandoned the juvenile for at least six consecutive months immediately preceding the filing of the petition or motion.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-llll(a)(7) (2011). \u201cAbandonment implies conduct on the part of the parent which manifests a willful determination to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child.\u201d In re Adoption of Searle, 82 N.C. App. 273, 275, 346 S.E.2d 511, 514 (1986). \u201cIn this context, the word \u2018willful\u2019 encompasses more than an intention to do a thing; there must also be purpose and deliberation. Whether a biological parent has a willful intent to abandon his child is a question of fact to be determined from the evidence.\" In re T.C.B., 166 N.C. App. 482, 485, 602 S.E.2d 17, 19 (2004) (emphasis added)(quotation marks and internal citations omitted).\nIn the present case, Respondent argues the trial court erred by relying on the parties\u2019 stipulation that grounds for terminating his parental rights exist. We agree.\nAt the 18 April 2012 adjudication hearing, the following discussion occurred between Respondent\u2019s counsel, Petitioner\u2019s counsel, and the trial court:\n[Respondent\u2019s counsel]: [W]hat I have discussed with my client is, for the adjudicatory phase only, to stipulate the grounds exist for the adjudication only, not for the dispositional portion of the hearing, and he\u2019s agreed to do that----\nTHE COURT: . . . What do we need to do as far as this adjudication-stipulation on the adjudication? What exactly are we stipulating to?\n[Petitioner\u2019s counsel]: I believe it\u2019s that grounds have been met, specifically that abandonment.\n[Respondent\u2019s counsel]: The only ground that is time here-that is timely alleged is the abandonment.\n[Petitioner\u2019s counsel]: Which is 7B-1111 subsection 7.\nTHE COURT: All right. Do you agree with that, [Petitioner\u2019s counsel], both the ground that\u2019s alleged, and that\u2019s the ground under which the stipulation is?\n[Petitioner\u2019s counsel]: Yes.\n[Respondent\u2019s counsel]: I do.\nTHE COURT: So do we need to stipulate as to any specific findings or just that-that there are findings-there are facts that support that stipulation?\n[Respondent\u2019s counsel]: Yes, by the presumptive-I\u2019m trying to figure\u2014\n[Petitioner\u2019s counsel]: By clear, cogent, and convincing evidence [Inaudible] there are facts-the parties have stipulated that the facts at issue here will show that [Respondent] willfully abandoned the juvenile for at least six months immediately preceding the filing of this petition, and we just need specifically that ground.\nTHE COURT: All right.\n[Petitioner\u2019s counsel]: And then we would have to make\u2014\nTHE COURT: I don\u2019t want to have to come back later and get in an argument about what facts support that finding.\n[Respondent\u2019s counsel]: No. On disposition-I mean, on disposition, it\u2019s-there is no dispute of fact that he has not seen the children for over a six month period of time. At the dispositional phase, we\u2019ll be presenting evidence as to why that occurred, but there\u2019s no dispute that he has not\u2014\nTHE COURT: But it did occur.\n[Respondent\u2019s counsel]: Yes, sir.\nTHE COURT: All right. And that doesn\u2019t preclude him in any way at the disposition hearing to explain why that occurred.\n[Respondent\u2019s counsel]: Yes, sir.\nIn this discussion, Respondent\u2019s attorney twice stipulated that the ground of willful abandonment existed. However, this stipulation is an invalid stipulation to a conclusion of law.\nIn the relevant exchange, the trial court recognized it needed factual stipulations to support its conclusi\u00f3n that willful abandonment existed. Although Petitioner\u2019s counsel stipulated these facts existed, Respondent\u2019s counsel only stipulated there was \u201cno dispute of fact that he has not seen the children for over a six month period of time.\u201d Respondent\u2019s stipulation only eliminated Petitioner\u2019s need to prove Respondent abandoned the juveniles for at least six consecutive months immediately preceding the termination petitions. See Thomas, 54 N.C. App. at 241; 282 S.E.2d at 517. Respondent never stipulated his abandonment was willful. Since Petitioner presented no evidence during the hearing\u2019s adjudicatory phase, no facts support the trial court\u2019s conclusion that the abandonment was willful. Accordingly, the trial court\u2019s adjudication under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-llll(a)(7) is not supported by its findings of fact.\nIV. Conclusion\nBecause the parties\u2019 stipulation failed to establish the sole ground found for termination, we reverse the trial court\u2019s orders terminating Respondent\u2019s parental rights and remand for a new hearing. Since we remand for new hearing, we do not address Respondent\u2019s challenge to the trial court\u2019s conclusion that terminating his parental rights in is the juveniles\u2019 best interests.\nREVERSED and REMANDED.\nJudges STROUD and DILLON concur.\n. The \u201cclear, cogent and convincing\u201d standard is synonymous with the \u201cclear and convincing\u201d standard used in some cases. Blackburn, 142 N.C. App. at 610, 543 S.E.2d at 908.\n. Additionally, Respondent\u2019s counsel repeatedly stated she intended to explain \u201cwhy\u201d Respondent abandoned the juveniles during the disposition phase of the trial. We believe this statement further indicates Respondent denied the abandonment was willful.", "type": "majority", "author": "HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Laura F. Meads for petitioner-appellee mother.", "Mary McCullers Reece for respondent-appellant father." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE MATTER OF A.K.D. and O.R.D.\nNo. COA12-1355\nFiled 7 May 2013\nTermination of Parental Rights \u2014 grounds for termination\u2014 improper reliance on stipulation\nThe trial court erred in a termination of parental rights case by terminating respondent\u2019s rights to his two children. The trial court improperly relied on the parties\u2019 stipulation that grounds existed to terminate respondent\u2019s parental rights under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-llll(a)(7).\nAppeal by respondent-father from orders entered 13 August 2012 by Judge Robert Trivette in Dare County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 17 April 2013.\nLaura F. Meads for petitioner-appellee mother.\nMary McCullers Reece for respondent-appellant father." }, "file_name": "0058-01", "first_page_order": 68, "last_page_order": 73 }