{ "id": 4220614, "name": "LEE FRANKLIN BOOTH, Plaintiff v. STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Booth v. State", "decision_date": "2013-06-04", "docket_number": "No. COA13-2", "first_page": "484", "last_page": "489", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "227 N.C. App. 484" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 13-1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "noting conditional and unconditional pardons" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "737 S.E.2d 121", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "123-24", "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "123-24" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-415.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 8, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(d)" }, { "page": "(d)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 552, "char_count": 12773, "ocr_confidence": 0.701, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.12982294956584e-08, "percentile": 0.3241262328421464 }, "sha256": "ca321d811d66bad4d330e20313747078881710d585d18f3f799b8006539396b7", "simhash": "1:8981cd27d64d44bf", "word_count": 2022 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:48:13.495142+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges ELMORE and STEELMAN concur." ], "parties": [ "LEE FRANKLIN BOOTH, Plaintiff v. STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "STROUD, Judge.\nThe State of North Carolina appeals an order exempting plaintiff from the Felony Firearms Act due to plaintiff\u2019s pardon. For the following reasons, we affirm.\nI. Background\nPlaintiff filed a complaint against the State of North Carolina requesting a declaratory judgment that the North Carolina Felony Firearms Act is \u201cunconstitutional on its face and as applied to plaintiff under the provisions of the Constitutions of the United States and the State of North Carolina\u201d and \u201ccompensatory damages for violation of his constitutional rights and for harm, loss and damage suffered\u201d and that plaintiff is \u201cexempt from operation of the Felony Firearms Act, due to the fact that he holds a Pardon of Forgiveness[.]\u201d Plaintiff\u2019s complaint alleged that in 1981 plaintiff \u201cpled guilty to one felony count of non-aggravated kidnaping[.]\u201d Plaintiff was sentenced, served his time in prison, and was released on parole; plaintiff\u2019s parole was completed and terminated on 30 December 1985. On 5 January 2001, Governor James B. Hunt Jr. granted plaintiff a \u201cPardon of Forgiveness[.]\u201d Plaintiff\u2019s pardon reads,\nNOW, THEREFORE, I, James B. Hunt Jr., Governor of the State of North Carolina, in consideration of the above factors, and by virtue of the power and authority vested in me by the Constitution of the State, do by these presents PARDON the said Lee Franklin Booth, it being a Pardon of Forgiveness, subject to the following conditions: that Lee Franklin Booth be of general good behavior and not commit any felony or misdemeanor other than a minor traffic offense and further upon the condition that this Pardon shall not apply to any other offense whereof the said party may be guilty.\nPlaintiff also made detailed factual allegations regarding his behavior as an upstanding citizen since he completed his prison sentence and his employment and business ventures as \u201ca professional engineer and an entrepreneur.\u201d In addition, plaintiff alleged that he has worked in businesses which provided \u201cthe overhaul and repair of high technology systems and components in the aerospace, space, maritime and weapons industriesf,]\u201d serving \u201ccommercial and military clients both domestic and foreign.\u201d \u201cIn 2007 plaintiff organized, and initially served as president of, a new business, Victory Arms, Inc., with apian to design, develop and produce firearmsf,]\u201d but when he applied for a federal license to undertake this business, he learned \u201cthat the 2004 amendment to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-415.1 was being interpreted by the federal licensing authorities to prohibit issuing a license to the plaintiff or any company which employed plaintiff],]\u201d thus forcing plaintiff to resign from and have no interest in Victory Arms, Inc.\nOn 13 March 2012, the State answered plaintiffs complaint, admitting the material factual allegations regarding plaintiff\u2019s prior conviction and his pardon but denying many of plaintiff\u2019s other allegations for lack of \u201csufficient information and knowledge\u201d including plaintiffs factual allegations regarding his conduct and loss of business opportunities based upon his inability to obtain a federal license or to own a firearm. The State also denied that plaintiff was entitled to his requested relief including a declaration that the Felony Firearms Act is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to plaintiff and allowing him to recover damages and that plaintiff is exempt from the Felony Firearms Act due to his Pardon of Forgiveness.\nOn 10 May 2012, plaintiff filed a \u201cMOTION FOR PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS\u201d requesting that the trial court rule upon \u201conly the issue of law on the question of whether the pardon of Plaintiff by Governor Hunt makes the application of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-415.1 to Plaintiff unconstitutional.\u201d On 27 September 2012, the trial court entered an order determining \u201cthat the Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings for declaratory relief on constitutional grounds as applied to the Plaintiff is DENIED\u201d but \u201cthat the Plaintiff\u2019s Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings exempting him from the operation of the Felony Firearms Act due to the fact that he holds a Pardon of Forgiveness is ALLOWED.\u201d The trial court also noted that the Felony Firearms Act \u201csimply does not apply to the plaintiff\u2019 as he has received a pardon and thus \u201cit is not necessary that the Court determine whether the Act is, as to this plaintiff, unconstitutional under an \u2018as applied\u2019 challenge.\u201d Although the order was addressing plaintiff\u2019s motion for partial judgment, the order actually disposed of the issues raised by plaintiff\u2019s complaint and is thus a final order. The State appeals from the trial court\u2019s determination that plaintiff\u2019s pardon exempts him from the Felony Firearms Act; plaintiff cross-appeals from the trial court\u2019s denial of his constitutional claim.\nII. State\u2019s Appeal\nWe will first address the State\u2019s appeal, which presents a question of the interpretation of the North Carolina Felony Firearms Act. The State argues that \u201cthe North Carolina Felony Firearms Act prohibition under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-415.1(a) applies to plaintiff by virtue of his 1981 felony kidnapping conviction in this State, notwithstanding the fact that plaintiff\u2019s conviction was thereafter conditionally pardoned by the governor of North Carolina.\u201d\nQuestions of statutory interpretation are questions of law, which are reviewed de novo by an appellate court.\nLegislative intent controls the meaning of a statute. To determine legislative intent, a court must analyze the statute as a whole, considering the chosen words themselves, the spirit of the act, and the objectives the statute seeks to accomplish. First among these considerations, however, is the plain meaning of the words chosen by the legislature; if they are clear and unambiguous within the context of the statute, they are to be given their plain and ordinary meanings. The Court\u2019s analysis therefore properly begins with the words themselves.\nJenner v. Ecoplus, Inc., _ N.C. App. _, _, 737 S.E.2d 121, 123-24 (2012) (citations and quotation marks omitted).\nNorth Carolina General Statute \u00a7 14-415.1 provides in pertinent part,\n(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has been convicted of a felony to purchase, own, possess, or have in his custody, care, or control any firearm or any weapon of mass death and destruction as defined in G.S. 14-288.8(c)____\n(d) This section does not apply to a person who, pursuant to the law of the jurisdiction in which the conviction occurred, has been pardoned or has had his or her firearms rights restored if such restoration of rights could also be granted under North Carolina law.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-415.1(a), (d) (2011).\nThe State\u2019s argument reviews hundreds of years of the development of the executive pardon, going back to English common law and providing a lengthy \u201c[o]verview\u201d of the history of pardons, examining the different types of pardons including conditional pardons, unconditional pardons, and pardons of innocence and the different ramifications of the different types of pardons. This discussion is informative and interesting but fails to address the plain language of the statute at issue. See generally Jenner, __ N.C. App. at _, 737 S.E.2d at 123-24. The State claims that the words of North Carolina General Statute \u00a7 14-415.1(d) are ambiguous so that we must seek the legislative intent behind it. As to North Carolina General Statue \u00a7 14-415.1(d) the State contends,\nThe phrase \u201chas been pardoned\u201d as used in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-415.1(d) does not have a clear and unambiguous meaning. The phrase follows immediately after the introductory phrase \u201cpursuant to the law of the jurisdiction in which the conviction occurred.\u201d This language limits the succeeding clauses, but the precise implication cannot be readily ascertained from the text of this provision alone.\nThe State then presents a lengthy discourse on federal law and the laws of other jurisdictions and concludes with a series of hypothetical applications of the statute at issue. But none of this changes the plain language of North Carolina General Statue \u00a7 14-415.1(d), and we can ascertain the meaning of the statute from the text alone.\nThe plain and unambiguous language of subsection (d) of North Carolina General Statute \u00a7 14-415.1 says that North Carolina General Statute \u00a7 14-415.1 does not apply to individuals who have been pardoned \u201cpursuant to the law of the jurisdiction in which the conviction occurred[.]\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-415.1(d). It is true that there are different types of pardons, but the word \u201cpardon\u201d in North Carolina General Statute \u00a7 14-415.1(d) is not modified by any adjective or other descriptive phrase and thus includes all types of pardons, whether they are denominated as unconditional, conditional or of innocence. See id. We note that in various other statutes our legislature does specify that particular types of pardons have different consequences, but here the legislature chose not to modify the word \u201cpardon\u201d but instead spoke to pardons in general. See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 13-1 (noting conditional and unconditional pardons); 14-208.6(C) (recognizing the \u201cunconditional pardon of innocence\u201d). The only qualification pursuant to North Carolina General Statute \u00a7 14-415.1(d) is that the pardon must be issued pursuant to \u201cthe law of the jurisdiction in which the conviction occurred[.]\u201d Here, both plaintiff\u2019s conviction and his pardon occurred in North Carolina. As the plain language of North Carolina General Statute \u00a7 14-415.1(d) states, \u201c[t]his section does not apply to a person who, pursuant to the law of the jurisdiction in which the conviction occurred, has been pardoned[,]\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-415.1, and as plaintiff has been pardoned in North Carolina, which is the jurisdiction where his kidnapping conviction occurred, the trial court properly determined that North Carolina General Statute \u00a7 14-415.1 does not apply to plaintiff. This argument is overruled.\nIII. Plaintiff\u2019s Appeal\nPlaintiff also appeals, contending that the trial court should have also allowed his motion to be granted as to North Carolina General Statute \u00a7 14-415.1(d) being unconstitutional as applied to plaintiff. North Carolina General Statute \u00a7 14-415.1(d) provides that \u201c[t]his section does not apply to a person who, pursuant to the law of the jurisdiction in which the conviction occurred, has been pardoned or has had his or her firearms rights restored if such restoration of rights could also be granted under North Carolina law.\u201d (emphasis added.) We have already determined that the trial court properly ruled that North Carolina General Statute \u00a7 14-415.1 does not apply to plaintiff. Accordingly, North Carolina General Statute \u00a7 14-415.1 cannot be unconstitutional as applied to plaintiff, because it does not apply to him at all. The trial court correctly noted that pursuant to subsection (d) of North Carolina General Statute \u00a7 14-415.1 the statute does not apply to plaintiff and declined to address an as applied constitutional challenge.\nIV. Conclusion\nSince plaintiff has been pardoned, the trial court properly determined that North Carolina General Statute \u00a7 14-415.1(a) does not apply to him.\nAFFIRMED.\nJudges ELMORE and STEELMAN concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "STROUD, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Dan L. Hardway Law Office, by Dan L. Hardway, for plaintiff-appellee/cross-appellant.", "Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney General William R Hart, Jr., for the State." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "LEE FRANKLIN BOOTH, Plaintiff v. STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, Defendant\nNo. COA13-2\nFiled 4 June 2013\n1. Firearms and Other Weapons \u2014 North Carolina Felony Firearms Act \u2014 statutory construction \u2014 prohibition against possession of firearms \u2014 not applicable to pardoned individuals\nThe trial court did not err in a declaratory judgment action by determining that the North Carolina Felony Firearms Act prohibition under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-415.1(a) did not apply to plaintiff. The plain and unambiguous language of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-415.1(d) says that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-415.1 does not apply to individuals who have been pardoned pursuant to the law of the jurisdiction in which the conviction occurred. Although plaintiff had been convicted of felony kidnapping, he was thereafter conditionally pardoned by the governor of North Carolina.\n2. Firearms and Other Weapons \u2014 North Carolina Felony Firearms Act \u2014 constitutional challenge \u2014 not applicable\nThe trial court did not err by failing to determine that the North Carolina Felony Firearms Act under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-415.1 was unconstitutional as applied to plaintiff because it did not apply to him at all.\nAppeal by defendant and plaintiff from order entered 27 September 2012 by Judge Robert F. Johnson in Superior Court, Wake County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 April 2013.\nDan L. Hardway Law Office, by Dan L. Hardway, for plaintiff-appellee/cross-appellant.\nAttorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney General William R Hart, Jr., for the State." }, "file_name": "0484-01", "first_page_order": 494, "last_page_order": 499 }