{ "id": 4221086, "name": "GEORGE KING, d/b/a GEORGE'S TOWING AND RECOVERY, Plaintiff v. TOWN OF CHAPEL HILL, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "King v. Town of Chapel Hill", "decision_date": "2013-06-04", "docket_number": "No. COA12-1262", "first_page": "545", "last_page": "562", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "227 N.C. App. 545" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "615 S.E.2d 660", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633322 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/615/0660-01" ] }, { "cite": "659 S.E.2d 762", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640826 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "764-65", "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/659/0762-01" ] }, { "cite": "573 S.E.2d 166", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "171" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "154 N.C. App. 119", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9249064 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "125" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/154/0119-01" ] }, { "cite": "39 S.E.2d 817", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1946, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "818", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "226 N.C. 637", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8623689 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1946, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "639" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/226/0637-01" ] }, { "cite": "242 S.E.2d 862", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "870" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 N.C. 598", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574144 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "611" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/294/0598-01" ] }, { "cite": "581 S.E.2d 415", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 9, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "430" }, { "page": "420" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 170", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491505 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0170-01" ] }, { "cite": "160 S.E.2d 18", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "23", "parenthetical": "\"We hold that the occupation of a massagist and the business of massage parlors and similar establishments are proper subjects for regulation under the police power of the City of Charlotte.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "273 N.C. 293", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575113 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "298", "parenthetical": "\"We hold that the occupation of a massagist and the business of massage parlors and similar establishments are proper subjects for regulation under the police power of the City of Charlotte.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/273/0293-01" ] }, { "cite": "206 S.E.2d 203", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "206", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "285 N.C. 530", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565346 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "534-35", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/285/0530-01" ] }, { "cite": "434 S.E.2d 604", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "613" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 N.C. 496", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2529794 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "509" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/334/0496-01" ] }, { "cite": "517 S.E.2d 874", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "879", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "883-84", "parenthetical": "Frye, J., dissenting" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "350 N.C. 805", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 132228 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/350/0805-01" ] }, { "cite": "451 S.E.2d 284", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "289", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "426" }, { "page": "293" }, { "page": "418-23" }, { "page": "288-91", "parenthetical": "noting that the relevant language \"has a definite meaning not subject to alteration by local governments\"" }, { "page": "288", "parenthetical": "\"[Section 4], while reflecting our legislature's desire that cities should have the authority to exercise the powers conferred upon them, nevertheless clearly reiterates the principle that municipalities have only that power which the legislature has given them.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "339 N.C. 413", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2558127 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "419-20", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "417" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/339/0413-01" ] }, { "cite": "442 S.E.2d 45", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "50", "parenthetical": "emphasis in original" }, { "page": "50", "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "49" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 N.C. 37", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2538018 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "43-44", "parenthetical": "emphasis in original" }, { "page": "42" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/336/0037-01" ] }, { "cite": "35 Wake Forest L. Rev. 671", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Wake Forest L. Rev.", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "680-82", "parenthetical": "providing a detailed history of the law regarding local government authority in North Carolina" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "70 N.C. 14", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8683798 ], "year": 1874, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "18", "parenthetical": "emphasis in original" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/70/0014-01" ] }, { "cite": "731 S.E.2d 800", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 14, "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "808" }, { "page": "809" }, { "page": "809", "parenthetical": "noting that, unlike Dillon's Rule, \"section 160A established a legislative mandate that [the appellate courts must] construe in a broad fashion the provisions and grants of power conferred upon municipalities\"" }, { "page": "810" }, { "page": "808" }, { "page": "810" }, { "page": "811" }, { "page": "815" }, { "page": "810", "parenthetical": "concluding that a county-specific provision that is similar to the \"broad construction\" provision embodied in section 4 only applies when the enabling statute is ambiguous" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "403 S.E.2d 291", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "294" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 651", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2538925 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "656" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0651-01" ] }, { "cite": "507 S.E.2d 894", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "895" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 520", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571692 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "522" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0520-01" ] }, { "cite": "543 S.E.2d 492", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 474", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155717, 1155826, 1155731, 1155895, 1155679 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0474-05", "/nc/351/0474-04", "/nc/351/0474-01", "/nc/351/0474-03", "/nc/351/0474-02" ] }, { "cite": "525 S.E.2d 786", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "789" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "136 N.C. App. 567", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11240989 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "570" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/136/0567-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 S.E.2d 879", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "881" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "277 N.C. 439", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565807 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "443" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/277/0439-01" ] }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 629", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3794693, 3804106, 3799854, 3797940, 3803604, 3802940, 3797532 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0629-03", "/nc/359/0629-01", "/nc/359/0629-06", "/nc/359/0629-07", "/nc/359/0629-04", "/nc/359/0629-02", "/nc/359/0629-05" ] }, { "cite": "606 S.E.2d 721", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 8, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "724" }, { "page": "726" }, { "page": "726-28" }, { "page": "728", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he language of the statute is ambiguous as to whether the fiber optic network run by [the city] falls within [the statute's] contours.\"" }, { "parenthetical": "noting, however, that the system - if it had existed in 1971 - would likely have been authorized through those \"additional and supplementary powers that are reasonably necessary or expedient\" under section 4" }, { "page": "726" }, { "page": "726", "parenthetical": "citations, certain quotation marks, brackets, and emphasis omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "168 N.C. App. 75", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8468200 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "80" }, { "page": "82-83" }, { "page": "83-87" }, { "page": "86" }, { "page": "82" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/168/0075-01" ] }, { "cite": "189 N.C. App. 755", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4156804 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "757", "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/189/0755-01" ] }, { "cite": "245 S.E.2d 105", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "106", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "37 N.C. App. 36", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8550226 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "39", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/37/0036-01" ] }, { "cite": "669 S.E.2d 290", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "294", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 628", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4150837 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "632-33", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0628-01" ] }, { "cite": "597 S.E.2d 717", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "721", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 512", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2987016 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "517", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/358/0512-01" ] }, { "cite": "712 S.E.2d 874", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "878", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "365 N.C. 162", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4153463 ], "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "168", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/365/0162-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-219.2", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1498, "char_count": 41782, "ocr_confidence": 0.716, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.13969482390672197 }, "sha256": "321dceb80cdedbb6afcd9e354609594f37a6f13d9ea8f6e9900e87fad1c7d5df", "simhash": "1:af60944e476f665a", "word_count": 6706 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:48:13.495142+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge HUNTER, JR., ROBERT N., concur." ], "parties": [ "GEORGE KING, d/b/a GEORGE\u2019S TOWING AND RECOVERY, Plaintiff v. TOWN OF CHAPEL HILL, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "STEPHENS, Judge.\nFactual Background and Procedural History\nThis case arises from the enactment of two ordinances by the Town of Chapel Hill (\u201cDefendant\u201d or \u201cthe Town\u201d). The ordinances involve the regulation of towing practices and mobile phone usage. Plaintiff George King operates a towing business in the Town under the name \u201cGeorge\u2019s Towing and Recovery\u201d and filed a complaint against the Town on 2 May 2012, requesting (1) a judgment declaring the ordinances invalid and (2) preliminary and permanent injunctions barring their enforcement.\nThe trial court issued a temporary restraining order that same day and, six days later, ordered a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the ordinances. On 4 June 2012, Defendant filed its amended answer. On 15 June and 18 June 2012, respectively, Defendant and Plaintiff moved for judgment on the pleadings, alleging that there were no material issues of fact and judgment was proper as a matter of law. The case was heard on 2 August 2012. On 9 August 2012, the trial court issued its order and judgment granting Plaintiff\u2019s request to permanently enjoin enforcement of the ordinances. In its order, the trial court made the following pertinent findings of fact and conclusions of law:\nFINDINGS OF FACT\n2. Defendant. . . enacted a towing ordinance, . . . which came into effect May 1, 2012, hereinafter \u201cthe Towing Ordinance.\u201d\n4. Defendant. . . also enacted an ordinance prohibiting the use of mobile phones while driving a motor vehicle,... which was to become effective June 1, 2012, hereinafter \u201cthe Mobile Phone Ordinance.\u201d\n9. [The Towing Ordinance] sets a fee schedule, regulates the method of payment, and includes extensive sign and notice requirements for private lots, as well as specifications for a tow storage lot which the Chapel Hill Police Department will inspect once per year .... All towing operators are required to comply with this ordinance at the risk of civil and criminal penalties.\n11. To comply with [the Towing Ordinance], Plaintiff is required to use a telephone to report to the police department when he removes an illegally parked vehicle before the vehicle is removed from the private property.\n12. It is the nature of Plaintiff\u2019s business to operate from trucks that are constantly driving to carry out their duties to their clients, to check the businesses\u2019 parking lots, check video equipment, and to tow and travel to release vehicles.\n13. The use of a mobile, phone by Plaintiff\u2019s drivers is necessary to make the required phone calls to the police department while in their vehicles.\n14. [B]ecause of Plaintiff\u2019s mobile business, he must be able to use his mobile phone to respond to inquiries regarding vehicles that have been towed and need to be released.\n15. [The Mobile Phone Ordinance] prohibits use of a mobile phone, either handheld or hands-free, while driving a vehicle.\n16. Plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm if Defendant is allowed to enforce [the Towing Ordinance] and [the Mobile Phone Ordinance] due to the threat of prosecution for violation of any notice requirements or use of a mobile phone while driving, which is a necessary part of his business.\nCONCLUSIONS OF LAW\n3. Article II[,] \u00a7[]24 (1)Q) of the North Carolina Constitution states: \u201cThe General Assembly shall not enact any local, private, or special act or resolution: [r]egulating labor, trade, mining[,] or manufacturingf.]\u201d\n4. The relevant enabling statute for the Towing Ordinance is N.C.[ Gen. Stat.] \u00a7 20-219.2. Defendant has conceded that [section 219] is a local law.\n5. \u201cTrade,\u201d as used in Article II[,] \u00a7[]24[,] . . . has been defined ... as \u201ca business venture for profit and includes any employment or business embarked in for gain orprofit[]\u201d....\n6. [Section 219] and the [Towing Ordinance]... regulate trade within the meaning of [Article II, \u00a7 24(1)Q)].\n7. Because [section 219] is a local law regulating trade, it violates [Article II, \u00a7 24(I)(j)].\n9. In the absence of [section 219], the Town[] has not been granted the authority to regulate towing from the General Assembly.\n10. Plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm if Defendant is allowed to enforce [the Towing Ordinance] and [the Mobile Phone Ordinance] due to the threat of prosecution for violation of any notice requirements or use of a mobile phone while driving, which is a necessary part of his business.\n12. The North Carolina General Assembly has enacted general laws regulating the use of mobile phones by all North Carolina drivers by proscribing the use of cell phones for texting and other media..., by prohibiting all use of cell phones by drivers under 18 years of age..., and by prohibiting all use of cell phones by anyone operating a school bus....\n13. In regulating mobile phone usage . . . , the General Assembly has enacted a comprehensive scheme of mobile phone regulation.\n14. As a result..., the authority of [the Town] to enact the Mobile Phone Ordinance is preempted, and therefore the ordinance is void, and without force and effect.\n16. As a result of the foregoing, Plaintiff is entitled to a declaratory judgment entering the conclusions set forth herein and a permanent injunction preventing enforcement of [the Towing Ordinance] and [the Mobile Phone Ordinance].\nAccordingly, the trial court determined that (1) N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-219.2 is -unconstitutional, (2) the Towing Ordinance is unconstitutional as an application of section 219, and (3) the Mobile Phone Ordinance is unconstitutional as preempted by State law enacted by the General Assembly. The court permanently restrained enforcement of both ordinances, and this appeal followed.\nStandard of Review\nConclusions of law and issues of statutory construction are reviewed de novo on appeal. State v. Biber, 365 N.C. 162, 168, 712 S.E.2d 874, 878 (2011) (citation omitted); Carolina Power & Light Co. v. City of Asheville, 358 N.C. 512, 517, 597 S.E.2d 717, 721 (2004) (citation omitted). \u201cUnder a de novo review, the court considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment for that of the lower tribunal.\u201d State v. Williams, 362 N.C. 628, 632-33, 669 S.E.2d 290, 294 (2008) (citation and quotation marks omitted).\n\u201cWhen a party moves for judgment on the pleadings, he admits the truth of all well-pleaded facts in the pleading of the opposing party and the untruth of his own allegations insofar as they are controverted by the pleadings of the opposing party.\u201d Pipkin v. Lassiter, 37 N.C. App. 36, 39, 245 S.E.2d 105, 106 (1978) (citation omitted).\n[We review] a trial court\u2019s grant of a motion for judgment on the pleadings de novo. Judgment on the pleadings, pursuant to Rule 12(c), is appropriate when all the material allegations of fact are admitted in the pleadings and only questions of law remain.\nCarpenter v. Carpenter, 189 N.C. App. 755, 757, 659 S.E.2d 762, 764-65 (2008) (citations and quotation marks omitted).\nDiscussion\nOn appeal, the Town argues (1) that the Towing Ordinance is a lawful exercise of its general police power or, in the alternative, that section 219 is a constitutional grant of authority sufficient to support the Towing Ordinance; and (2) that the trial court erred by addressing the Mobile Phone Ordinance in its order because Plaintiff is not subject to an imminent threat of irreparable harm or, if Plaintiff is subject to an imminent threat of irreparable harm, that the Mobile Phone Ordinance is authorized by the Town\u2019s general police power. We find the Town\u2019s primary arguments persuasive and decline to address either section 219 or the enforceability of the Mobile Phone Ordinance.\nI. Die Towing Ordinance\nIn support of its contention that the Towing Ordinance is enforceable via the Town\u2019s general police power, Defendant cites to sections 160A-174(a) and 160A-194 of the North Carolina General Statutes as enabling legislation. We agree that the Towing Ordinance is a valid exercise of the Town\u2019s police power under section 174(a) and refrain from addressing its validity under section 194.\nA. Municipal Authority to Enact Legislation\nThe North Carolina Constitution declares that \u201cthe legislative power of the State shall be vested in the General Assembly,\u201d N.C. Const, art. II, \u00a7 1, which \u201cmay give such powers and duties to counties, cities and towns, and other governmental subdivisions as it may deem advisable.\u201d N.C. Const, art. VII, \u00a7 1. Accordingly, \u201c[i]t is a well-established principle that municipalities, as creatures of statute, can exercise only that power which the legislature has conferred upon them.\u201d Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc. v. City of Laurinburg, 168 N.C. App. 75, 80, 606 S.E.2d 721, 724 (citations and quotation marks omitted), disc, review denied, 359 N.C. 629, 615 S.E.2d 660 (2005) [hereinafter BellSouth]. Therefore, \u201c[a] city or town in this State has no inherent police power. It may exercise only such powers as are expressly conferred upon it by the General Assembly or as are necessarily implied from those expressly so conferred.\u201d Town of Conover v. Jolly, 277 N.C. 439, 443, 177 S.E.2d 879, 881 (1970).\nIn order to determine whether the legislature intended section 174(a) to authorize cities and towns to implement towing regulations like the one here, we rely on established canons of statutory construction. \u201cThe polar star of statutory construction is that the intent of the legislature controls. That intent must be found from the language of the act, its legislative history],] and the circumstances surrounding its adoption],] which throw light upon the evil sought to be remedied [by the statute].\u201d Multimedia Publ\u2019g of N.C., Inc. v. Henderson Cnty., 136 N.C. App. 567, 570, 525 S.E.2d 786, 789 (citation and quotation marks omitted), disc, review denied, 351 N.C. 474, 543 S.E.2d 492 (2000). \u201cTo determine legislative intent, a court must analyze the statute as a whole, considering the chosen words themselves, the spirit of the act, and the objectives the statute seeks to accomplish.\u201d Brown v. Flowe, 349 N.C. 520, 522, 507 S.E.2d 894, 895 (1998). \u201cA construction which operates to defeat or impair the object of the statute must be avoided [where possible]. An analysis... must be done in a manner which harmonizes with the underlying reason and purpose of the statute.\u201d Elec. Supply Co. of Durham v. Swain Elec. Co., 328 N.C. 651, 656, 403 S.E.2d 291, 294 (1991).\n\u201cEarly in our history, [the Supreme Court] broadly construed the State\u2019s grant of legislative authority to municipalities.\u201d Lanvale Props., LLC v. Cnty. of Cabarrus, __ N.C. _, _, 731 S.E.2d 800, 808 (2012) [hereinafter Lanvale]. This changed in the 1870s, when the \u201c[Supreme] Court adopted a more restrictive approach known as \u2018Dillon\u2019s Rule.\u2019 \u201d Id. at_, 731 S.E.2d at 809. Dillon\u2019s Rule is named for Judge John Dillon of Iowa, who proclaimed in a 19th-century treatise on municipal law that:\nIt is a general and undisputed proposition of law[] that a municipal corporation possesses and can exercise the following powers and no others: First, those granted in express words-, second, those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted; third, those essential to the declared objects and purposes of the corporation.\nSmith v. City of Newbern, 70 N.C. 14, 18 (1874) (emphasis in original); see also David W. Owens, Local Government Authority to Implement Smart Growth Programs, 35 Wake Forest L. Rev. 671,680-82 (2000) (providing a detailed history of the law regarding local government authority in North Carolina); see generally 1 John F. Dillon, The Law of Municipal Corporations ch. V, \u00a7 55, at 173 (2d ed. 1873), available at http://books. google.com/books ?id=QeQ9AAAAIAAJ&pg=PA173#v=onepage&q&f= false (\u201c[The municipal corporation may only possess those powers that are] not simply convenient, but indispensable. Any fair, reasonable doubt concerning the existence of power is resolved by the courts against the corporation, and the power is denied.\u201d).\nIn 1971, however, the General Assembly implicitly overruled Dillon\u2019s Rule by enacting chapter 160A. Bellsouth, 168 N.C. App. at 82-83, 606 S.E.2d at 726 (\u201cThe narrow Dillon\u2019s Rule of statutory construction used when interpreting municipal powers has been replaced by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-4\u2019s mandate that the language of Chapter 160A be construed .in favor of extending powers to a municipality....\u201d); see also Lanvale, _N.C. at_, 731 S.E.2d at 809 (noting that, unlike Dillon\u2019s Rule, \u201csection 160A established a legislative mandate that [the appellate courts must] construe in a broad fashion the provisions and grants of power conferred upon municipalities\u201d) (citation and quotation marks omitted).\nIn chapter 160A, the legislature made the following pronouncement regarding how courts should construe its various grants of legislative authority to municipalities:\nARTICLE 1.\n[JSTATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.\n\u00a7 160A-4. Broad construction.\nIt is the policy of the General Assembly that the cities of this State should have adequate authority to execute the powers, duties, privileges, and immunities conferred upon them by law. To this end, the provisions of this Chapter and of city charters shall be broadly construed and grants of power shall be construed to include any additional and supplementary powers that are reasonably necessary or expedient to carry them into execution and effect: Provided[] that the exercise of such additional or supplementary powers shall not be contrary to State or federal law or to the public policy of this State.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-4 (2011) (emphasis added) [hereinafter section 4],\nB. Judicial Interpretation of Authority Granted to Municipalities After 1971\nOur Supreme Court has since determined that section 4 \u201cmakes it clear that the provisions of [C]hapter 160A and of city charters shall be broadly construed and... grants of power shall be construed to include any additional and supplementary powers that are reasonably necessary or expedient to carry [those provisions] into execution and effect.\u201d Homebuilders Ass\u2019n of Charlotte, Inc. v. City of Charlotte, 336 N.C. 37, 43-44, 442 S.E.2d 45, 50 (1994) (emphasis in original) [hereinafter Homebuilders]. Accordingly, \u201c[w]e treat this language as a legislative mandate that we are to construe in a broad fashion the provisions and grants of power contained in Chapter 160A.\u201d Id. at 44, 442 S.E.2d at 50 (citations and quotation marks omitted).\nDespite the language in Homebuilders, our Supreme Court has failed to broadly construe grants of power to cities and towns with uniformity. Specifically, when the language of a municipal statute is unambiguous, the Court has directed that such language \u201cmust be enforced as written.\u201d Bowers v. City of High Point, 339 N.C. 413, 419-20, 451 S.E.2d 284, 289 (1994) (citation omitted). In Bowers, our Supreme Court allowed the City of High Point to void a contract between itself and certain early-retired police officers as ultra vires on grounds that the city did not have the statutory authority to contract with them and pay a separation allowance. Id. at 426, 451 S.E.2d at 293. In coming to that determination, the Bowers Court \u2014 after citing to both Dillon\u2019s Rule and section 4 of Chapter 160A \u2014 used a plain meaning analysis of the relevant statutory language. Id. at 418-23, 451 S.E.2d at 288-91 (noting that the relevant language \u201chas a definite meaning not subject to alteration by local governments\u201d).\nIn Smith Chapel Baptist Church v. City of Durham, 350 N.C. 805, 517 S.E.2d 874 (1999) [hereinafter Smith Chapel], decided approximately five years after Bowers, the Supreme Court again used a plain meaning construction to interpret certain municipal statutes. Id. Employing that construction, the Court determined that the City of Durham had the authority to implement a stormwater management program only to the extent that it involved \u201cthose systems of physical infrastructure, structural or natural, for servicing stormwater.\u201d Id. at 812, 517 S.E.2d at 879 (emphasis added). Given that limitation, the Court struck down the city\u2019s stormwater program as exceeding \u201cthe express limitation of the plain and unambiguous reading of the statutef.]\u201d Id. Justice Frye authored a dissenting opinion in that case. Joined by two other justices, Justice Frye argued for application of the broad mandate prescribed in section 4 on grounds that the word \u201csystem\u201d in \u201cstormwater drainage system\u201d is impliedly ambiguous, and section 4 should have been used to allow the city to execute its stormwater program. Id. at 819-21, 517 S.E.2d at 883-84 (Frye, J., dissenting) (citing Homebuilders, 336 N.C. at 42, 442 S.E.2d at 49) (\u201cAny ambiguity in the meaning of the term \u2018stormwater and drainage system\u2019 must be resolved in favor of enabling municipalities to execute the duties imposed upon them by [law].\u201d).\nSix years later, in 2005, we declined to use the plain meaning construction described in Bowers and Smith Chapel when interpreting certain sections of Chapter 160A. Instead, we relied on Homebuilders to hold that the City of Laurinburg had been granted sufficient authority under Chapter 160A to operate a fiber optics network. Bellsouth, 168 N.C. App. at 83-87, 606 S.E.2d at 726-28. We found in BellSouth that the alleged legislative grant of authority \u2014 which defined certain authorized public enteiprises as, inter alia, \u201c[c]able television systems\u201d \u2014 was ambiguous. Id. (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-311(7)). Specifically, we noted that the term \u201ccable television systems\u201d is defined by statute as \u201cany system or facility that... by wires or cables alone, receives, . . . transmits, or distributes any . . . electronic signal, audio or video or both, to [subscribers].\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-319(b); see also Bellsouth, 168 N.C. App. at 86, 606 S.E.2d at 728 (\u201c[T]he language of the statute is ambiguous as to whether the fiber optic network run by [the city] falls within [the statute\u2019s] contours.\u201d). Accordingly, we applied the broad construction required by section 4 to our interpretation of the relevant statutory sections and ruled that the city was acting within its municipal authority even though \u201c[the] fiber optics network was most likely not something the legislature envisioned in 1971 when [it] enacted the statute allowing a municipality to operate a [cable television system] as a public enterprise.\u201d Id. (noting, however, that the system \u2014 if it had existed in 1971 \u2014 would likely have been authorized through those \u201cadditional and supplementary powers that are reasonably necessary or expedient\u201d under section 4).\nMost recently, in Lanvale, our Supreme Court determined that the language of certain zoning statutes was unambiguous and, thus, that the county-equivalent of section 4 did not apply to their interpretation. Lanvale,_N.C. at_, 731 S.E.2d at 810. The relevant statutes in that case (1) provided that county zoning ordinances may \u201cregulate and restrict\u201d certain specific qualities of buildings and real property \u201cor [regulate and restrict] other purposes\u201d and (2) listed those specific \u201cpublic purposes\u201d that could be regulated, providing that the ensuing regulations should \u201cbe designed to promote the public health, safety, and general welfare.\u201d Id. at_, 731 S.E.2d at 808; see also N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 153A-340(a), -341 (2011). Using a plain meaning analysis, the Court held that the statutes at issue did not give the county implied authority to enact a public facilities ordinance, citing the maxim that \u201ca county\u2019s zoning authority cannot be exercised in a manner contrary to the express provisions of the zoning enabling authority.\u201d Lanvale, _ N.C. at _, 731 S.E.2d at 810 (citing Cnty. of Lancaster, S.C. v. Mecklenburg Cnty., N.C., 334 N.C. 496, 509, 434 S.E.2d 604, 613 (1993)) (quotation marks omitted).\nJustice Hudson authored a dissenting opinion in that case, joined by Justice Timmons-Goodson, in which she argued for the implementation of a broad interpretation under the county-equivalent of section 4. Id. at 818-28 (Hudson, J., dissenting). In response, the Court asserted that the language of the statutes already provides \u201cclear guidance.\u201d Id. at_, 731 S.E.2d at 810 (\u201c[The dissent\u2019s] argument overlooks the fact that the plain language of [the statutes] provides clear guidance to counties regarding the extent of their zoning powers. Accordingly, [the statutes] simply cannot be employed to give authority to county ordinances that do not fit within the parameters set forth in the enabling statutes.\u201d) (emphasis added). Importantly, in responding to Justice Hudson\u2019s dissent, the Court implicitly affirmed two different approaches that may be employed when evaluating the validity of a statutory grant of authority to municipal corporations. Citing Homebuilders and Smith Chapel as examples of those different approaches, the Court stated that Smith Chapel was binding on it because the statutory language in Smith Chapel was also \u201cclear and unambiguous.\u201d Id. at_, 731 S.E.2d at 811. Therefore, the Court concluded, \u201cabsent specific authority from the General Assembly, [public facilities ordinances like the one in this case] are invalid as a matter of law.\u201d Id. at_, 731 S.E.2d at 815.\nIt is important to understand the two different approaches referenced in Lanvale. These approaches were clearly laid out in BellSouth, where we interpreted Homebuilders, Bowers, and Smith Chapel to be \u201cconsistent statements of the law and in accord with [section 4]\u201d because they applied the broad construction mandate only where the statutory language at issue was ambiguous. BellSouth, 168 N.C. App. at 82, 606 S.E.2d at 726. Reconciling the disparate holdings in those cases, we explained that section 4 should be applied only \u201cwhere there is an ambiguity in the authorizing language, or [where] the powers clearly authorized [by the legislature] reasonably necessitate \u2018additional and supplementary powers\u2019 \u2018to carry them into execution and effect.\u2019 However, where the plain meaning of the statute is without ambiguity, it must be enforced as written.\u201d Id. at 82-83, 606 S.E.2d at 726 (citations, certain quotation marks, brackets, and emphasis omitted); see also Lanvale, _ N.C. at _, 731 S.E.2d at 810 (concluding that a county-specific provision that is similar to the \u201cbroad construction\u201d provision embodied in section 4 only applies when the enabling statute is ambiguous); see generally Bowers, 339 N.C. at 417, 451 S.E.2d at 288 (\u201c[Section 4], while reflecting our legislature\u2019s desire that cities should have the authority to exercise the powers conferred upon them, nevertheless clearly reiterates the principle that municipalities have only that power which the legislature has given them.\u201d).\nG. Interpretive Construction of Section 174(a) of Chapter 160A\nGiven the instruction we provided in BellSouth, we must examine section 174(a) in this case by asking: (1) whether the language of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-174(a) is ambiguous and, thus, should be analyzed under the broad construction of section 4, or (2) whether it is unambiguous and, thus, should be analyzed under our stricter plain-meaning inquiry. We hold that the language of section 174(a) is ambiguous, and, therefore, we apply the General Assembly\u2019s mandated broad construction when interpreting section 174(a).\nThe Town argues that it was delegated the power to regulate towing by the General Assembly as an element of the general police power granted to municipalities under section 174(a) of Chapter 160A of the North Carolina General Statutes. That section provides as follows:\nARTICLE 8.\nDELEGATION AND EXERCISE OF THE GENERAL POLICE POWER.\n\u00a7 160A-174. General ordinance-making power.\n(a) A city may by ordinance define, prohibit, regulate, or abate acts, omissions, or conditions detrimental to the health, safety, or welfare of its citizens and the peace and dignity of the city, and may define and abate nuisances.\nRelevant to this case, section 177 of Chapter 160A elaborates that \u201c[t]he enumeration in this Article or other portions of this Chapter of specific powers to regulate, restrict or prohibit acts, omissions, and conditions shall not be deemed to be exclusive or a limiting factor upon the general authority to adopt ordinances conferred on cities by G.S. [\u00a7] 160A-174.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-177 (emphasis added). In addition, our Supreme Court has observed that, \u201cwhen the legislative body undertakes to regulate a business, trade, or profession [under section 174(a) ], courts assume it acted within its powers until the contrary clearly appears.\u201d Smith v. Keator, 285 N.C. 530, 534-35, 206 S.E.2d 203, 206 (1974) (citations omitted); see, e.g., Cheek v. City of Charlotte, 273 N.C. 293, 298, 160 S.E.2d 18, 23 (1968) (\u201cWe hold that the occupation of a massagist and the business of massage parlors and similar establishments are proper subjects for regulation under the police power of the City of Charlotte.\u201d).\nUnlike the zoning ordinances in Lam\u00edale, section 174(a) fails to list specific circumstances where the general ordinance-making power may be employed. Rather, it enables municipalities to regulate the broad categories of \u201chealth,\u201d \u201csafety,\u201d and \u201cwelfare\u201d to the end of ensuring \u201cpeace and dignity\u201d and \u201cdefin[ing] and abat[ing] nuisances.\u201d Given the far-reaching meanings contained within these terms, section 174(a) is more akin to the statutes in BellSouth and, as such, ambiguous. Given that conclusion, the broad construction required by the General Assembly in section 4 of Chapter 160A is applicable here.\nD. The Town\u2019s Authority to Implement the Towing Ordinance Under Section 174(a) of Chapter 160A\nPlaintiff asserts that section 174(a) does not operate as a valid enabling statute for the Towing Ordinance, despite its broad construction, for the following reasons: (1) the \u201cNorth Carolina Supreme Court summarily rejected this argument made under county equivalents of [section 160A-174]\u201d in Williams v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of N.C., 357 N.C. 170, 581 S.E.2d 415 (2003); (2) the Towing Ordinance does not \u201cfall within the limited statutory prescriptions\u201d of section 174(a) because \u201c[towing on private lots] is not detrimental to the health or safety of the public . . .. [and] is not a nuisance that needs to be abated\u201d; (3) the fee provisions of the Towing Ordinance are \u201cin no way related to the health, safety, or welfare of its citizens and the peace and dignity of the [Town]\u201d; (4) the Towing Ordinance violates the right to contract under the North Carolina and United States Constitutions \u201cdue to its fee setting provision\u201d; and (5) the Towing Ordinance creates a private cause of action under Williams and \u201ccannot be upheld by [section 174].\u201d We are unpersuaded.\nPlaintiff\u2019s reliance on Williams in his first and fifth arguments is erroneous. In that case, our Supreme Court determined, inter alia, that a county ordinance, which \u201ccreat[ed] a civil relationship and a concomitant private cause of action by one citizen against another,\u201d was not authorized by section 174 and the county equivalent of section 174 because the ordinance \u201csubstantially exceeded] the leeway permitted to individual counties by [those] statutes.\u201d Id. at 191-92, 581 S.E.2d at 430. Specifically, \u201c[t]he [o]rdinance [was] enforceable by a private cause of action that permitted] those affected [by employment discrimination] to recover injunctive relief, back pay, and compensatory and punitive damages up to $300,000\u201d from their employers. Id. at 175, 581 S.E.2d at 420.\nUnlike the ordinance in Williams, the Towing Ordinance does not create a private cause of action against those individuals who would violate it. While the Towing Ordinance provides that an offender will be subject \u201cto a civil penalty\u201d if he or she violates the ordinance, there is no language granting a private individual the right to bring suit against the towing party. Indeed, the ordinance clearly states that a conviction for its violation shall result in \u201ca misdemeanor,\u201d which is a criminal sanction. Accordingly, Plaintiff\u2019s first and fifth arguments are without merit.\nWe are also unpersuaded by Plaintiff\u2019s second argument, that the Towing Ordinance does not fall within the broad construction of section 174(a). At oral argument, the Town commented that the Towing Ordinance requires certain signs to be placed \u201cin an interval of one at every fifth parking space\u201d for the purpose of informing citizens that they may be towed even when they lawfully park at a business and then walk to another business in a different parking lot. See also Chapel Hill, N.C., Code ch. 11, art. XIX, \u00a7 11-301(a) (2012) (requiring signs every fifth space to include the following phrase when the property owner has adopted a walk-off towing policy: \u201cIf you walk[]off this property, you are subject to being towed. This includes patrons who are frequenting business on this property.\u201d). The Towing Ordinance also includes a credit card requirement for payment of towing fees, which Defendant states is meant to protect young people who get towed early in the morning and do not have the cash necessary to release their cars at that time of the day. See id. at \u00a7 ll-304(d).\n\u2022 While Plaintiff is correct that \u201c[t] owing on private lots is done and allowed by state law for the purpose of protecting private property,\u201d this does not obviate the need to regulate that process when it has become \u201cdetrimental to the health, safety, or welfare\u201d of the citizens of the Town. In the \u201cFindings and Intent\u201d section of the Towing Ordinance, the Town states that its goal is to \u201cprotect[] the health, safety, and welfare of the general public and preserv[e] the public order,\u201d which it found had been threatened by certain \u201cpractices related to the non-consensual towing of motor vehicles from private property[.]\u201d Id. at \u00a7 11-300. The Town also states in its brief that the Towing Ordinance is meant to \u201censure that persons are on notice\u201d regarding the towing rules that will be employed in various parking lots throughout Chapel Hill. Further, the Towing Ordinance requires \u201cdetailed receipts and a towing information sheet\u201d to provide the public with information on why their vehicles were towed, which \u201ccan serve to prevent conflicts between unknowledgeable citizens and tow operators.\u201d See id. For these reasons, we hold that the Towing Ordinance falls within the purview of section 174(a).\nThird, Plaintiff argues that the fee regulations contained in the Towing Ordinance are invalid because (1) the General Assembly did not explicitly delegate the power to decide \u201cwhat a reasonable fee is with regard to towing,\u201d as it did with taxicabs, and (2) the fee regulations are \u201cin no way related to the health, safety, or welfare of [the] citizens and the peace and dignity of the [Town].\u201d We are unpersuaded.\nThe fee regulations state that a towing firm may not charge the owner of a towed vehicle more than the Town\u2019s established fee schedule and must refrain from charging storage fees during \u201cthe first twenty-four hour time period from the time the vehicle is initially removed from the private property.\u201d Id. at \u00a7 ll-304(a). The provision also requires towing firms to provide receipt for payment and \u201c[a] clear and accurate reason for the towing and the date and time of the towing.\u201d Id. at ll-304(b) (4). Payment must be accepted if it is made by cash, one of at least two major national credit cards supported by the tower, or a debit card. Id. at ll-304(d). Given these provisions, we conclude that, despite Plaintiff\u2019s protestations, the fee regulations \u201cregulate ... acts, omissions, or conditions, detrimental to the health, safety, or welfare of [the] citizens [of the Town] and the peace and dignity of the [Town].\u201d Accordingly, the fee regulations are implicitly authorized by the General Assembly under the broad ambit of section 174(a). See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-174(a).\nFourth, Plaintiff asserts that the Towing Ordinance\u2019s fee provisions violate his right to contract under the North Carolina and United States constitutions. In support of that point, Plaintiff describes the right to contract, generally, as a protected property right and cites to an opinion of our Supreme Court, which declares that a statute infringing upon an individual\u2019s freedom of contract is invalid \u201cunless the law\u2019s benefit to the public outweighs the infringement.\u201d State ex rel. Utils. Comm\u2019n v. Edmisten, 294 N.C. 598, 611, 242 S.E.2d 862, 870 (1978). Plaintiff then argues that any benefit the Towing Ordinance provides is outweighed by his right to contract, contending that the Towing Ordinance attempts to protect \u201ctrespassers who were on notice of their unlawful parking and who stole the particular property owner\u2019s rights to that parking space.\u201d To the extent that the Towing Ordinance violates Plaintiff\u2019s right to contract, we disagree.\nAs we have already discussed, supra, the Towing Ordinance was enacted to protect the citizens of the Town of Chapel Hill and provides a number of beneficial services to those citizens. In addition, we note that Plaintiff has offered no evidence that the purported \u201ctrespassers\u201d are actually on notice of any unlawful parking. Accordingly, we find this argument unpersuasive. As Plaintiff provides no other evidence to support his fourth position, it is overruled.\nThus, after a thorough review of the Towing Ordinance and chapter 160A, we broadly construe section 174(a) of Chapter 160A \u2014\u2022 as the General Assembly mandated in section 4 of that same chapter \u2014 and hold that the Towing Ordinance covers a proper subject for regulation under the Town\u2019s police power. Accordingly, the trial court\u2019s order as to the Towing Ordinance is reversed. For the foregoing reasons, we need not address the constitutionality of section 219 or whether the Towing Ordinance is authorized under section 194.\nII. The Mobile Phone Ordinance\nThe Town also contends that the trial court erred in permanently enjoining enforcement of the Mobile Phone Ordinance because Plaintiff is not subject to a manifest threat of irreparable harm. We agree.\nIn pertinent part, the Mobile Phone Ordinance states:\n[N]o person 18 years of age or older shall use a mobile telephone or any additional technology associated with a mobile telephone while operating a motor vehicle .... This prohibition shall not apply to the use of a mobile telephone or additional technology in a stationary vehicle.\nChapel Hill, N.C., Code ch. 21, art. VII, \u00a7 21-64(b). The Mobile Phone Ordinance can only be enforced when \u201cthe officer issuing [a] citation has cause to stop or arrest the driver of such motor vehicle for the violation of some other provision of State law or local ordinance relating to the operation, ownership, or maintenance of a motor vehicle or any criminal statute[.]\u201d Id. at \u00a7 21-64(e).\nIn issuing the preliminary injunction, which bars enforcement of the Mobile Phone Ordinance, the trial court concluded that Plaintiff would suffer \u201cirreparable harm... due to the threat of prosecution for violation of... [the] use of a mobile phone while driving [provision], which is a necessary part of his business.\u201d This conclusion is rooted in language from the Towing Ordinance, which requires: (1) that the towing company answer or call back within fifteen minutes of receiving any phone call made to the telephone number that it has posted on certain required notification signs located in the parking lots; and (2) that the tow truck operator who removes the vehicle reports by telephone to the Chapel Hill Police Department (a) the license tag number, (b) a description of the vehicle, (c) the original location of the vehicle, and (d) its intended storage location. Chapel Hill, N.C., Code ch. 11, art. XIX, \u00a7\u00a7 ll-301(a) (3), 11-305.\nArguing that the trial court erred by addressing the Mobile Phone Ordinance at all, the Town primarily cites two cases: Lanier v. Town of Warsaw, 226 N.C. 637, 39 S.E.2d 817 (1946) and Structural Components Int., Inc. v. City of Charlotte, 154 N.C. App. 119, 573 S.E.2d 166 (2002). In Lanier, our Supreme Court explained the law regarding the issuance of permanent injunctions against municipal ordinances as follows:\nIt is a g\u00e9neral principle of law that injunction does not he to restrain the enforcement of an alleged municipal ordinance, and ordinarily the validity of such ordinance may not be tested by injunction.\nHowever, this principle is subject to the exception that equity will enjoin a threatened enforcement of an alleged unconstitutional ordinance when it is manifest that otherwise property rights or the rights of persons would suffer irreparable injury.\nLanier, 226 N.C. at 639, 39 S.E.2d at 818 (citations omitted). In Structural Components, we further noted that \u201c[challenges to the constitutionality of the laws one is charged with violating are best brought within the context of one\u2019s own case.\u201d Structural Components, 154 N.C. App. at 125, 573 S.E.2d at 171.\nRelying on those cases, the Town argues that the trial court\u2019s order was in error because:\nNo actual contested case was before the [trial court because Plaintiff had not been charged with violating the Mobile Phone Ordinance]. . . . There is no threatened enforcement of the [Mobile Phone Ordinance] evidenced in the pleadings. [And t]here is no claim in this case to establish any irreparable injury arising out of the implementation of the [Mobile Phone Ordinance].\nThe Town also points out that \u201c[Plaintiff] could not be cited under the [Mobile Phone Ordinance] unless he already has been stopped by the police for some other valid reason.\u201d Even then, a violation would only \u201cconstitute an infraction and subject the offender to a $25.00 penalty. No points or costs could be assessed.\u201d See also Chapel Hill, N.C., Code ch. 21, art. VII, \u00a7 21-64(d). Accordingly, the Town concludes \u201cthe constitutionality of this ordinance should be left to be tested... when a citation is issued.\u201d\nIn response, Plaintiff argues: (1) that the Mobile Phone Ordinance threatens tow operators\u2019 ability to conduct their business, which cannot be done \u201cwithout the ability to use their cell phones, free from threat of prosecution\u201d; and (2) enforcement of the ordinance would result in \u201cirreparable harm by the inability of [Plaintiff\u2019s] drivers to use their cell phones.\u201d We disagree.\nWe find the Town\u2019s argument under Lanier and Structural Components to be persuasive in this case and hold that the trial court erred in concluding that Plaintiff was subject to a manifest threat of irreparable harm through enforcement of the Mobile Phone Ordinance. If Plaintiff wishes to challenge the validity of the Mobile Phone Ordinance, he must do so in the context of his own case. See id.\nREVERSED.\nChief Judge MARTIN and Judge HUNTER, JR., ROBERT N., concur.\n. An early iteration of Chapter 160A sought to abrogate Dillon\u2019s Rule explicitly, providing in its statement of policy that \u201cthe rule of construction commonly called \u2018Dillon\u2019s Rule,\u2019 by which cities are held to possess only those powers expressly conferred by law or necessarily to be implied from some specific grant of power, shall not be followed[.]\u201d H.B. 153, \u00a7 160A-4 (as referred to the House Committee on Local Government, 5 February 1971).\n. We note that, in his explanation of the general law regarding the construction of those statutes delegating the State\u2019s police power to municipalities, Plaintiff relies on decisions of our Supreme Court issued before 1971, i.e., previous to the enactment of Chapter 160A and its mandated \u201cbroad construction\u201d under section 4. Plaintiff\u2019s reliance on those legal principles, written under the auspices of Dillon\u2019s Rule, is misplaced.\n. As noted above, the credit card provision serves to protect young people in the Town who are towed late at night or early in the morning and lack the ability to pay with cash at that time of day.\n. Plaintiff presents no argument that a contract exists or that the Towing Ordinance violates his particular right to make one. Rather, he cites broad legal principles related to the right to contract and then moves immediately to his \u201cbenefit versus infringement\u201d argument.", "type": "majority", "author": "STEPHENS, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Stark Law Group, PLLC, by Thomas H. Stark, for Plaintiff.", "Ralph D. Karpinos and Matthew J. Sullivan for Defendant.", "North Carolina League of Municipalities, by Kimberly S. Hibbard and Gregory F. Schwitzgebel III, as amicus curiae." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "GEORGE KING, d/b/a GEORGE\u2019S TOWING AND RECOVERY, Plaintiff v. TOWN OF CHAPEL HILL, Defendant\nNo. COA12-1262\nFiled 4 June 2013\n1. Cities and Towns \u2014 towing ordinance \u2014 enabling authority\nA local towing ordinance was a valid exercise of a town\u2019s police power under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 160A-174(a), which is ambiguous and therefore interpreted broadly. A town has no inherent police power and may exercise only such powers that are conferred by the General Assembly. Where the authorizing language is ambiguous, a broad construction is used, but the plain meaning is used where there is no ambiguity. A thorough review of the towing ordinance in this case and N.C.G.S. \u00a7 160A-174(a) led to the holding that the ordinance covered a proper subject for regulation under the town\u2019s police power, and the trial court\u2019s order permanently enjoining the towing ordinance was reversed.\n2. Constitutional Law \u2014 challenge to ordinance \u2014 no citation issued\nIn an action to eryoin a towing ordinance and a mobile phone ordinance (because tow truck drivers used mobile phones in their business), the trial court erred by permanently enjoining enforcement of the mobile phone ordinance where plaintiff was not subject to a manifest threat of irreparable harm. The constitutionality of the ordinance should be left to be tested when a citation is issued; plaintiff must test the ordinance in the context of his own case.\nAppeal by Defendant from Order and Judgment entered 9 August 2012 by Judge Orlando F. Hudson, Jr., in Orange County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 March 2013.\nStark Law Group, PLLC, by Thomas H. Stark, for Plaintiff.\nRalph D. Karpinos and Matthew J. Sullivan for Defendant.\nNorth Carolina League of Municipalities, by Kimberly S. Hibbard and Gregory F. Schwitzgebel III, as amicus curiae." }, "file_name": "0545-01", "first_page_order": 555, "last_page_order": 572 }