{
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  "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ANTOINE DAVIS",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. Davis",
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          "parenthetical": "\"[W]hen a defendant intends to appeal from a suppression motion denial pursuant to G.S. 15A-979(b), he must give notice of his intention to the prosecutor and the court before plea negotiations are finalized or he will waive the appeal of right provisions of the statute.\""
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  "provenance": {
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges CALABRIA and GEER concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ANTOINE DAVIS"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "BRYANT, Judge.\nDefendant appeals from a judgment entered upon his guilty plea following denial of his motion to suppress. Defendant challenges this Court\u2019s jurisdiction to review his appeal from the trial court order denying his motion to suppress a prior conviction made prior to defendant\u2019s plea of guilty to the charges of felonious breaking or entering and attaining habitual felon status. After review, we find no error in the trial court\u2019s acceptance of defendant\u2019s guilty plea and its ensuing judgment.\nOn or about 11 July 2011, in Wake County Superior Court, defendant was indicted on the charges of felonious breaking or entering and attaining' habitual felon status. Defendant\u2019s habitual felon indictment listed three prior felonies: second degree burglary, entered 18 April 1994 in Connecticut Superior Court; breaking or entering, entered 14 February 2006 in Wake County Superior Court; and attempted first degree burglary, entered 14 December 2007 also in Wake County Superior Court.\nOn 31 October 2011, defendant filed a motion to suppress the use of the 1994 Connecticut felony conviction for second degree burglary to establish defendant\u2019s habitual felon status. Defendant\u2019s personal affidavit was attached to the motion. That same day, the trial court entered an order denying defendant\u2019s motion.\nDefendant stibsequently entered into a plea agreement wherein defendant agreed to plead guilty to the charges of felonious breaking or entering and attaining habitual felon status. Defendant also reserved the right to appeal from the trial court order denying his motion to suppress. The trial court accepted defendant\u2019s guilty plea and entered judgment against him in accordance with the plea agreement. Following entry of judgment, defendant noted his appeal in open court \u201cbased on the denial of the motion to suppress.\u201d\nOn appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred by accepting his guilty plea to the charges of felonious breaking and entering and attaining habitual felon status. Defendant contends that the plea agreement which included the reservation of defendant\u2019s right to appeal from the trial court\u2019s order denying his motion to suppress, was not the product of an informed choice. Defendant argues that he entered into the plea agreement having reserved the right to appeal from the trial court order denying his motion to suppress the admission of a prior felony conviction. Defendant argues that because this Court lacks the jurisdiction to review the trial court order denying his motion to suppress either by statutory right or writ of certiorari, he cannot receive the benefit of his bargain, and the judgment entered pursuant to the plea agreement must be vacated. We disagree.\n\u201cA defendant\u2019s right to appeal a conviction is purely statutory.\u201d State v. Santos, 210 N.C. App. 448, 450, 708 S.E.2d 208, 210 (2011) (citation and quotations omitted). Pursuant to North Carolina General Statutes, sections 15A-1444 and 15A-979, a defendant may appeal a trial court\u2019s denial of a motion to suppress when the defendant has entered a plea of guilty. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1444(e) (2011) (\u201c[ejxcept as provided [in pertinent part] in . . . G.S. 15A-979 [(Motion to suppress evidence in superior and district court; orders of suppression; effects of orders and of failure to make motion)], . . . the defendant is not entitled to appellate review as a matter of right when he has entered a plea of guilty or no contest to a criminal charge in the superior court....\u201d). Pursuant to General Statutes, section 15A-979, \u201c[a]n order finally denying a motion to suppress evidence may be reviewed upon an appeal from a judgment of conviction, including a judgment entered upon a plea of guilty.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-979(b) (2011); see also, State v. Reynolds, 298 N.C. 380, 397, 259 S.E.2d 843, 853 (1979) (\u201c[W]hen a defendant intends to appeal from a suppression motion denial pursuant to G.S. 15A-979(b), he must give notice of his intention to the prosecutor and the court before plea negotiations are finalized or he will waive the appeal of right provisions of the statute.\u201d).\nCiting N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1444, defendant notes that appellate review as a matter of right is precluded when a defendant has entered a plea of guilty in the superior court \u201c[e]xcept as provided [in pertinent part] in .. . G.S. 15A-979[.]\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1444(e). Defendant also acknowledges that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-979 provides a right to appeal a trial court\u2019s denial of a motion to suppress evidence upon appeal from a judgment of conviction entered upon a guilty plea. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-979(b). However, defendant contends that because his motion to suppress was made pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-980 (\u201cRight to suppress use of certain prior convictions obtained in violation of right to counsel\u201d), this Court lacks jurisdiction to review the trial court\u2019s denial of defendant\u2019s motion to suppress the use of his prior conviction as section 15A-980 does not specifically provide a right to appeal from a trial court\u2019s denial of a motion to suppress.\nDefendant cites the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, \u201cthe expression of one thing is the exclusion of another[,]\u201d as the basis for his argument that there is no right to appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress made pursuant to G.S. \u00a7 15A-980. See Baker v. Martin, 330 N.C. 331, 337, 410 S.E.2d 887, 890-91 (1991) (discussing the doctrine of \u201cexpressio unius est exclusio alterius\u201d as it applies to interpreting our State Constitution). Defendant also distinguishes G.S. \u00a7 15A-980 from G.S. \u00a7 15A-979. Defendant points out that pursuant to G.S. 15A-980, a defendant has the right to suppress a prior conviction obtained in violation of his right to counsel\nif its use by the State is to impeach the defendant or if its use will:\n(1) Increase the degree of crime of which the defendant would be guilty; or\n(2) Result in a sentence of imprisonment that otherwise would not be imposed; or\n(3) Result in a lengthened sentence of imprisonment.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-980(a). However, defendant contends that because this statute does not allow a trial court to suppress the prior conviction for all purposes, he \u201ccould not have sought appellate review of the trial court\u2019s denial of his motion to suppress the State\u2019s use of his 1994 Connecticut conviction as a matter of right.\u201d\nWe note that defendant does not make a substantive argument on appeal that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the prior conviction, and therefore, we do not directly address it. Instead, defendant challenges the trial court\u2019 acceptance of his guilty plea, stating it \u201cwas not the product of an informed choice.\u201d He argues that due to the interplay of the statutes discussed, this Court cannot have jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the denial of his motion to suppress made pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-980, and therefore, his plea bargain must be vacated. We are not persuaded by defendant\u2019s argument that this Court lacks jurisdiction to review the trial court\u2019s 31 October 2011 order denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress made prior to his plea of guilty: defendant reserved the right to appeal the trial court\u2019s 31 October 2011 order denying his motion to suppress prior to the finalization of plea negotiations; and gave notice of appeal following entry of judgment of conviction. General Statutes, section 15A-979 provides an appeal of right from such an order. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-979(b) (\u201cAn order finally denying a motion to suppress evidence may be reviewed upon an appeal from a judgment of conviction, including a judgment entered upon a plea of guilty.\u201d); see also, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-979 commentary (\u201cThis provision is intended to prevent a defendant whose only real defense is the motion to suppress from going through a trial simply to preserve his right of appeal.\u201d).\nIn his motion to suppress, defendant cites General Statutes, section 15A-980 as the basis upon which his motion should be granted; however, section 15A-980 does not contradict section 15A-979 which allows a defendant to reserve his right to appeal from a trial court order denying his motion to suppress. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-979(b); see also, State v. Fulp, 355 N.C. 171, 558 S.E.2d 156 (2002) (where our Supreme Court conducted a full review of the trial court\u2019s denial of the defendant\u2019s motion to suppress the use of his prior conviction made pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-980 after the defendant pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement and reserved his right to appeal the trial court\u2019s ruling). Therefore, defendant\u2019s right to appeal from the trial court\u2019s 31 October 2011 order denying his motion to suppress the use of a prior conviction to establish his habitual felon status was not precluded as a matter of law. Accordingly, defendant\u2019s argument is overruled.\nNo error.\nJudges CALABRIA and GEER concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "BRYANT, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Lisa G. Corbett, for the State.",
      "Guy J. Lorangerfor defendant-appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ANTOINE DAVIS\nNo. COA12-841\nFiled 4 June 2013\nCriminal Law \u2014 guilty plea \u2014 plea agreement \u2014 informed choice\u2014 felonious breaking and entering \u2014 habitual felon\nThe trial court did not err by accepting defendant\u2019s guilty plea to the charges of felonious breaking and entering and attaining habitual felon status even though defendant contended the plea agreement was not the product of an informed choice. Defendant\u2019s right to appeal from the trial court\u2019s order denying his motion to suppress the use of a prior conviction to establish his habitual felon status was not precluded as a matter of law.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 13 October 2011 by Judge Henry W. Hight Jr. in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 12 December 2012.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Lisa G. Corbett, for the State.\nGuy J. Lorangerfor defendant-appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0572-01",
  "first_page_order": 582,
  "last_page_order": 586
}