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    "judges": [
      "Judges CALABRIA and DAVIS concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "REBECCA STEPHENS KELLY, Plaintiff v. REGINALD BROWN KELLY, Defendant"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "STROUD, Judge.\nReginald Brown Kelly (\u201cdefendant\u201d) appeals from an order denying his motion to modify alimony. Defendant argues on appeal that several of the trial court\u2019s findings are not supported by the evidence and that the findings are insufficient to support the trial court\u2019s conclusion that there has been no substantial change of circumstances since the initial alimony order was entered. We affirm.\nI. Background\nOn 9 December 2004, the trial court entered a consent order (\u201cAlimony order\u201d) awarding defendant\u2019s ex-wife, Ms. Kelly (\u201cplaintiff\u2019), $12,000 per month in alimony. On 30 September 2011, defendant moved to modify his alimony obligation on the grounds that his ability to pay and his ex-wife\u2019s financial needs had substantially changed since entry of the alimony order. The trial court found no substantial change in circumstances and denied his motion. Defendant timely filed written notice of appeal.\nII. Standard of Review\nDecisions regarding the amount of alimony are left to the sound discretion of the trial judge and will not be disturbed on appeal unless there has been a manifest abuse of that discretion. When the trial court sits without a jury, the standard of review on appeal is whether there was competent evidence to support the trial court\u2019s findings of fact and whether its conclusions of law were proper in light of such facts.\nWilliamson v. Williamson,_N.C. App._,_, 719 S.E.2d 625, 626 (2011) (citations and quotation marks omitted). An abuse of discretion has occurred if the decision is \u201cmanifestly unsupported by reason or one so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.\u201d Briley v. Farabow, 348 N.C. 537, 547, 501 S.E.2d 649, 656 (1998) (citations omitted).\nIII. Sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings\nDefendant challenges findings of fact 10, 11, and 18 as unsupported by the evidence. We disagree.\nThe findings challenged by defendant are:\n10. That Defendant\u2019s employment is the same [as] at the time of the Alimony Order, namely that he is still working full time with Kelly and West, PA and although the gross revenues [have] changed over time, thos\u00e9 fluctuations in revenue occurred historically and were known to Defendant at the time he entered into the Alimony Order.\n11 [a]. That any decrease in Defendant\u2019s income has only been in the past two years and it has not kept him from his ability to maintain a reasonable standard of living.\n11[b]. That Defendant has increased his living expenses and debts since the Alimony Order but the Court finds those to be voluntary decisions by Defendant to live beyond his income, specifically, Defendant purchased a new home since the separation, refinanced the mortgages on his residence, added a huge garage to his residence in 2007, and used an equity line to finance dock repair at his beach house.\n18. That Defendant\u2019s income has not decreased substantially since the Alimony Order.\nEach of these findings is supported by the evidence.\nFindings No. 10 and 18 are probably the most important findings, as many of defendant\u2019s arguments are based upon the claim that his income has substantially decreased; his other arguments as to the general state of the economy, changes in the economics and competitiveness of law practices, and his worsened health are all simply reasons for the decline in income. If his income has not actually decreased substantially, these potential causes for a decrease in income become irrelevant. The 2004 alimony order recognizes that defendant\u2019s income has normally fluctuated. Thus, as to these pivotal findings, we note that\na court should proceed with caution in determining whether to modify a decree for alimony on the ground of a change in the financial circumstances of the parties.\nWhere the change in the circumstances is one that the trial court expected and probably made allowances for when entering the original decree, the change is not a ground for a modification of the decree. In accord with the view it is said that minor fluctuations in income are a common occurrence and the likelihood that they would occur must have been considered by the court when it entered a decree for alimony. \u2022\nThe fact that the husband\u2019s salary or income has been reduced substantially does not automatically entitle him to a reduction in alimony or maintenance. If the husband is able to make the payments as originally ordered notwithstanding the reduction in his income, and the other facts of the case make it proper to continue the payments, the court may refuse to modify the decree.\nBritt v. Britt, 49 N.C. App. 463, 472, 271 S.E.2d 921, 927 (1980) (citations and quotation marks omitted).\nThe 2004 alimony order, based on the parties\u2019 mediated settlement agreement, contained detailed findings regarding defendant\u2019s employment as an attorney at the law firm he co-owned as well as his adjusted gross income for the years of 1998 to 2003 both from his law firm as well as from Lillington Rentals:\n1998 - $304,375\n1999 - $561,383\n2000 - $247,290\n2001 - $551,240\n2002 - $382,270\n2003 - $231,816\nAt the modification hearing; the evidence showed that defendant is still employed at the same firm, which still has the same number of attorneys, a \u201csimilar number\u201d of non-lawyer emplyees, and the same areas of practice, with the addition of worker\u2019s compensation. He also still receives income from Lillington Rentals, a separate business entity owned by defendant and his law partner which owns the furniture and office equipment in the law office and receives rental income from the law firm. According to defendant\u2019s income tax returns, his net income (his adjusted gross income plus the yearly $144,000 in tax-deductible alimony) for the years of 2004 to 2011 was as follows:\n2004 - $1,697,417\n2005 - $659,867\n2006 - $577,650\n2007 - $797,889\n2008 - $311,788\n2009 - $456,393\n2010 - $216,205\n2011 - $224,769\n\u25a0 The pattern of earnings for these years is quite similar to years prior to the alimony order, and the income is reduced only in the two most recent years. Overall, defendant\u2019s average annual income over the six years prior to the alimony order was $379,729, while defendant\u2019s average annual income based upon the years since entry of the order was $617,747. Even excluding the income for 2004, which was unusually high due to one case, defendant\u2019s average annual income since 2005 was $463,509, or $83,780 more than his average income during the time period prior to alimony order based upon the amounts as stated in the order.\nAs noted by Britt, income variations as shown bydefendant are \u201ca common occurrence\u201d and the fact that they would occur was more than a \u201clikelihood,\u201d as the alimony order shows that the income variations were \u201cconsidered by the court when it entered a decree for alimony.\u201d Britt, 49 N.C. App. at 472, 271 S.E.2d at 927. The trial court\u2019s determination that defendant\u2019s income has not substantially decreased is supported by the evidence, despite the fact that his income for the two most recent years is lower, and is not an abuse of discretion.\nFindings 11a and lib are also supported by the evidence. The evidence showed that defendant has not only continued meeting his financial obligations but also is making substantial discretionary purchases and investments. Despite any changes in income, defendant has continued making monthly alimony payments in the full amount and generally on time. In the years since 2004, defendant and his current wife have gone on several vacations to Aruba, Hilton Head, and Charleston. In 2007, defendant spent $150,000 to build a three-car garage and purchased a boat for $34,000. He spent roughly $50,000 to repair the dock at his beach home in 2011 and was able to make the maximum contribution to his 40 IK over several years. He was also able to pay off his unsecured debt that existed at the time of the prior consent order with proceeds from a \u201cland deal.\u201d Thus, even if defendant\u2019s expenses have increased, as the trial court found, the evidence also shows that these increases were voluntary. Each of the challenged findings is supported by the evidence.\nIV. Failure to make more detailed findings of fact\nAlthough defendant frames his next arguments as a challenge to the trial court\u2019s conclusion of law that defendant failed to demonstrate a substantial change of circumstances since the 2004 alimony order, his arguments actually continue his contentions regarding the adequacy of the trial court\u2019s findings of fact. First, defendant argues that the trial court erred because it \u201cfail[edj to consider [or find sufficient facts regarding] the substantial decreases in [his] income,... the changed nature of his law practice, [and] the decreased income of this practice resulting from the recession . . . .\u201d (original in all caps). As to these facts, defendant does not claim that there was not sufficient evidence to support the trial court\u2019s findings, but that the trial court \u201cfailed to consider\u201d certain evidence which he contends must be addressed in the findings of fact.\nTo a large extent, defendant argues that the trial court\u2019s findings were not based upon his evidence or his interpretation of the evidence, and in this regard, his arguments fail, as this Court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the trial court in weighing the evidence. \u201cWhen the trial judge is authorized to find the facts, his findings, if supported by competent evidence, will not be disturbed on appeal despite the existence of evidence which would sustain contrary findings.\u201d Beall v. Beall, 290 N.C. 669, 673, 228 S.E.2d 407, 409 (1976) (citations omitted).\nYet defendant also correctly notes that the trial court\u2019s findings must address all of the factors relevant to determination of the amount of alimony.\nAs a general rule, the changed circumstances necessary for modification of an alimony order must relate to the financial needs of the dependent spouse or the supporting spouse\u2019s ability to pay.... To determine whether a change of circumstances under G.S. 50-16.9 has occurred, it is necessary to refer to the circumstances or factors used in the original determination of the amount of alimony awarded under G.S. 50-16.5. That statute requires consideration of the estates, earnings, earning capacity, condition, accustomed standard of living of the parties and other facts of the particular case in setting the amount of alimony.\nRowe v. Rowe, 305 N.C. 177, 187, 287 S.E.2d 840, 846 (1982).\nIn this instance, as defendant is seeking to modify the 2004 alimony order, the order must address any factors relevant to changes in circumstances since 2004 which are raised by the evidence. \u201cThe same factors used in making the initial alimony award should be used by the trial court when hearing a motion for modification. The overriding principle in cases determining the correctness of alimony is fairness to all parties.\u201d Pierce v. Pierce, 188 N.C. App. 488, 489-90, 655 S.E.2d 863, 864 (2008) (citations, quotations marks, and brackets omitted).\nAlthough N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-16.3A(b) sets forth 16 factors to be considered in the establishment of alimony, there is no need for the trial court to address each of these upon a motion for modification; the trial court needs to address only those that are relevant to the motion to modify. Defendant\u2019s motion to modify alleges three reasons for modification: (1) a reduction in income based upon the \u201crecession\u201d in the United States economy and increased competition from other law firms; (2) defendant\u2019s increase in age from 53 to 61, as a \u201ccontributing factor\u201d in diminishing his earning capacity; and (3) the fact that plaintiff\u2019s need for alimony should be reduced unless she has been \u201cfinancially imprudent and reckless\u201d in her use of assets received based upon the parties\u2019 2004 equitable distribution judgment, which was entered on the same date as the alimony order. Thus, the relevant statutory factors raised by defendant\u2019s motion to modify in this case are:\n(2) The relative earnings and earning capacities of the spouses;\n(3) The ages and the physical, mental, and emotional conditions of the spouses;\n(4) The amount and sources of earned and unearned income of both spouses, including, but not limited to, earnings, dividends, and benefits such as medical, retirement, insurance, social security, or others;\n(10) The relative assets and liabilities of the spouses and the relative debt service requirements of the spouses, including legal obligations of support;\n(15) Any other factor relating to the economic circumstances of the parties that the court finds to be just and proper.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-16.3A (b) (2011).\nIn addressing these factors, the trial court need not recite all of the evidentiary facts but must find\nthose material and ultimate facts from which it can be determined whether the findings are supported by the evidence and whether they support the conclusions of law reached.\nThere are two kinds of facts: Ultimate facts, and evidentiary facts. Ultimate facts are the final facts required to establish the plaintiff\u2019s cause of action or the defendant\u2019s defense; and evidentiary facts are those subsidiary facts required to prove the ultimate facts.\nUltimate facts are those found in that vaguely defined area lying between evidential facts on the one side and conclusions of law on the other. In consequence, the line of demarcation between ultimate facts and legal conclusions is not easily drawn. An ultimate fact is the final resulting effect which is reached by processes of logical reasoning from the evidentiary facts. Whether a statement is an ultimate fact or a conclusion of law depends upon whether it is reached by natural reasoning or by an application of fixed rules of law.\nIn summary, while Rule 52(a) does not require a recitation of the evidentiary and subsidiary facts required to prove the ultimate facts, it does require specific findings of the ultimate facts established by the evidence, admissions and stipulations which are determinative of the questions involved in the action and essential to support the conclusions of law reached.\nThe purpose of the requirement that the court make findings of those specific facts which support its ultimate disposition of the case is to allow a reviewing court to determine from the record whether the judgment-and the legal conclusions which underlie it-represent a correct application of the law. The requirement for appropriately detailed findings is thus not a mere formality or a rule of empty ritual; it is designed instead to dispose of the issues raised by the pleadings and to allow the appellate courts to perform their proper function in the judicial system.\nQuick v. Quick, 305 N.C. 446, 451-52, 290 S.E.2d 653, 657-58 (1982) (citations, quotation marks, and ellipses omitted).\nDefendant faults the trial court\u2019s order for its brevity, stating:\nIn the present case, the Court has entered a bare bones three (3) page order, with insufficient evidence to support the findings of fact and conclusions of law, to support its denial of Mr. Kelly\u2019s Motion to Modify Alimony. The Court, after hearing three days of testimony involving valuable assets, the finances of a law firm, staggering debt and reviewing extensive financial records made a mere eighteen findings of fact, only twelve of which related to the evidence offered at trial.\nBut brevity is not necessarily a bad thing; Cicero said that \u201c[B]revity is the best recommendation of speech, not only in that of a senator, but too in that of an orator,\u201d or, we might add, in many instances, a judge. Marcus Tulius Cicero, On the Laws: Book III, in The Treatises of M.T. Cicero 479 (C.D. Yonge trans., 1878). The trial court found the ultimate facts which were raised by the defendant\u2019s motion to modify, and where the evidence supports these findings, that is sufficient. \u201cThe court is not required to find all facts supported by the evidence, but only sufficient material facts to support the judgment.\u201d Medlin v. Medlin, 64 N.C. App. 600, 603, 307 S.E.2d 591, 593 (1983) (citations omitted).\nDefendant presented evidence that his firm experienced some changes since the original order for alimony, but detailed findings about those changes would be needed only to the extent that the changes have substantially reduced defendant\u2019s income and therefore his ability to pay\nDefendant argues that his practice, particularly in the areas of personal injury and real estate, has suffered due to changes in the United States\u2019 economy in general and to the increases in competition. Although we could probably take judicial notice that the United States economy in general has suffered in many ways since 2004, the actual numbers presented to the trial court in the income tax returns of the defendant and his law firm support the trial court\u2019s finding that defendant\u2019s income has fluctuated but not decreased substantially. Defendant may disagree with the trial court\u2019s finding that any decreases in the two most recent years in his income have not been \u201csubstantial\u201d and that his business has not changed in a material way, but the trial court clearly considered the evidence, weighed its credibility, and made appropriate findings based on the evidence. This Court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the trial court in this situation.\nDefendant next argues that \u201cthe trial court erred in its failure to identify\u201d the nature and scope of the \u201cother financial benefits\u201d he receives from his law firm. Again, defendant does not claim that there was no evidence of \u201cother financial benefits\u201d \u2014 he simply argues that the trial court must list them. Specifically, the trial court made the following ultimate finding of fact:\n14.That Defendant has financial benefits through his law firm partnership that might not be considered taxable income but affect his ability to maintain his standard of living.\nThe evidence as to the \u201cother financial benefits\u201d is quite simple. Defendant\u2019s own testimony was that his law firm purchased his 2009 Lexus and 2009 Suburban vehicles, pays for his car insurance, his cell phone, his car maintenance, and most of his gasoline expense, among other things. This evidence alone supports finding of fact 14 and there was no need for the trial court to list these benefits in detail.\nDefendant also argues that the trial court erred because it \u201cfail[ed] to consider [or find sufficient facts regarding]... the depletion of his separate estate____\u201d (original in all caps). However, the trial court explicitly addressed this alleged depletion and found it to be \u201cvoluntary\u201d:\n13. Since the entry of the Alimony order Defendant has been able to add contributions to a 401(k) plan in his name in the amount of approximately $104,000.00, with $24,000 in the last year alone.\n15. Defendant was able to make $21,000 in improvements to his beach house in the past year, in addition [to] buying an aluminum boat and trailer with a cost of over $12,000.\n16. Defendant was able to make a loan to his son in 2011 of close to $31,000.\nAlthough defendant argues that his assets were more depleted than the trial court found and that many of his expenses were not voluntarily incurred, the trial court properly weighed the evidence and made its findings. The fact that the trial court did not agree with defendant\u2019s contentions is not a basis for reversal. Therefore, defendant\u2019s argument that the trial court failed to consider the depletion of his estate is without merit.\nDefendant further argues that the trial court erred \u201cin its failure to detail what [his] assets and debts are.\u201d (original in all-caps). The trial court found that defendant\u2019s assets and debts \u201care similar to the assets and debts that existed at the time of the alimony order.\u201d Of course, to understand what the trial court found the defendant\u2019s assets and debts to be \u201csimilar to,\u201d we must know what the assets and debts in 2004 were. In this case, unlike many in which the prior order is a consent order, the alimony order and record do contain detailed information as to the parties\u2019 assets and debts in 2004, and defendant does not contend that the trial court must first make detailed findings as to the state of affairs in 2004 before determining if there has been a substantial change.\nDefendant also does not claim that the finding that his assets and debts \u201care similar\u201d to those in 2004 is not supported by the evidence, which does include vast amounts of detailed information as to his assets and debts in both 2004 and at the time of the hearing; he simply faults the trial court for not specifically listing his assets and debts in the order. We have reviewed the evidence as to defendant\u2019s assets and debts, and it supports the trial court\u2019s finding that his assets and debts are \u201csimilar\u201d to those in 2004, and we shall not list them in detail in this opinion either. The law does not require a \u201crecitation of the evidentiary and subsidiary facts\u201d underlying atrial court\u2019s findings. Moore, 160 N.C. App. at 571, 587 S.E.2d at 75.\nGiven the detailed previous order, a more detailed account of defendant\u2019s debts and assets was not \u201cdeterminative\u201d or \u201cessential\u201d to the trial court\u2019s conclusion that no substantial change had occurred. See Williamson v. Williamson, 140 N.C. App. 362, 363-64, 536 S.E.2d 337, 338 (2000). The findings as discussed above adequately addressed the issues presented and permit meaningful appellate review.\nDefendant next contends that the trial court \u201cfailfed] to consider\u201d or find sufficient facts regarding his \u201cincreased age and declining health.\u201d (original in all caps). The 2004 alimony order included a finding that defendant had \u201chigh blood pressure, and inherited kidney problems.\u201d Defendant contends that he now also suffers from \u201cdepression, sleep withdrawal, [and] type II diabetes.\u201d He also correctly points out that he is eight years older than he was when the original alimony award was entered.\nThe trial court found that Defendant is working full time. Defendant did not present evidence as to how his health problems affected his ability to work or his ability to pay the required alimony. Indeed, although defendant mentioned his health problems at the hearing, he did not relate his health to a reduction in his income. He acknowledged that he was already under treatment for high blood pressure and his kidney disease in 2004, and described his kidney medication as \u201cAllopurinol for kidney stones. It\u2019s not a big deal.\u201d He acknowledged that he had had \u201cdepression issues for 20 years, 30 years, for a long time\u201d but that he had not taken medication until more recently. But as noted above, the relevance of defendant\u2019s medical condition was his claim that it was contributing to his reduction in income; the trial court found that his income was not substantially reduced. It is true that worsening health may result in a decline in income, but it is not automatic. The defendant\u2019s income numbers, as noted above, support the trial court\u2019s findings that his income has not substantially decreased, and thus the trial court did not err in not making detailed findings as to defendant\u2019s health.\nWith regard to plaintiff\u2019s financial need, defendant argues that the trial court erred because it \u201cfail[ed] to consider [or find sufficient facts regarding] . . . plaintiff\u2019s squandering of $1,000,000\u201d and that it \u201cfail[ed] to distinguish between reasonable necessary expenses ... and frivolous debt incurred by plaintiff . . . .\u201d (original in all caps). Defendant\u2019s argument focuses on his claim that plaintiff has an \u201cexhorbitant, irrational and wasteful lifestyle\u201d and is not so much that plaintiff\u2019s expenses have actually decreased since 2004, but that they should have decreased, if she had managed her financial affairs since 2004 in a way that he would consider appropriate and responsible. After examining the evidence, the trial court found that plaintiff\u2019s'needs have \u201cnot decreased substantially,\u201d and also found that her \u201cexpenses have... increased.\u201d (emphasis added).\nThese findings are supported by the evidence and they show that the trial court properly considered plaintiff\u2019s expenses and financial needs and rejected defendant\u2019s contention that they had decreased substantially. Actually, plaintiff\u2019s financial affidavit in 2004 indicated \u201ctotal monthly expenditures\u201d of $24,415.62, while her 2012 affidavit indicated \u201ctotal monthly living expenses\u201d of $25,648.43, so the evidence did show that plaintiff\u2019s expenses had increased, but not very much.\nAs defendant\u2019s ability to pay had not changed and the trial court was not considering an increase in defendant\u2019s alimony obligation based upon its finding that plaintiff\u2019s expenses have actually increased, there was no need for the trial court to make more detailed findings as to why plaintiff\u2019s expenses had failed to decrease. Defendant has not cited, nor have we found, any law that would affirmatively require plaintiff to reduce her living expenses over time, even if in 2004 she might have had the potential to do so by foregoing certain luxuries and making profitable investments. The evidence showed that her expenses had not decreased and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by making this finding.\nDefendant also argues that the trial court erred \u201cin its failure to detail what [plaintiff\u2019s] assets and debts are.\u201d (original in all caps). For the same reasons that a recitation of defendant\u2019s assets and debts was not necessary, a recitation of plaintiff\u2019s assets and debts also was not necessary. See Moore, 160 N.C. App. at 571, 587 S.E.2d at 75.\nThe trial court\u2019s findings address the relevant ultimate facts raised by defendant\u2019s motion to modify. The findings show that the trial court considered all relevant factors as to the alleged changes in circumstances since the 2004 alimony order. Therefore, defendant\u2019s arguments to the contrary are unavailing.\nV. Conclusion of Law\nDefendant argues throughout his brief that the trial court erred in concluding that there has been no substantial change of circumstances to warrant a modification of alimony.\n[I]t is apparent that not any change of circumstances will be sufficient to order modification of an alimony award; rather, the phrase is used as a term of art to mean a substantial change in conditions, upon which the moving party bears the burden of proving that the present award is either inadequate or unduly burdensome.\nBritt, 49 N.C. App. at 470, 271 S.E.2d at 926 (citations omitted).\nA change in circumstances sufficient to modify alimony \u201cmust bear upon the financial needs of the dependent spouse or the ability of the supporting spouse to pay, rather than post-marital conduct of either party.\u201d Id. at 470-71, 271 S.E.2d at 926 (citations and quotation marks omitted). In considering whether alimony should be modified, \u201c[t]he present overall circumstances of the parties must be compared with the circumstances existing at the time of the original award in order to determine if there has been a substantial change.\u201d Id. at 474, 271 S.E.2d at 928 (citations and quotation marks omitted).\nHere, defendant failed to carry his burden of showing that relevant circumstances have substantially changed since the initial alimony award. \u201cThe[] facts [as found by the trial court] reveal that [defendant] has both money and property, and, taken as a whole, do not support [a] conclusion that the alimony payments should be reduced.\u201d Id. at 471, 271 S.E.2d at 927. Additionally, the trial court found that plaintiff\u2019s needs have not substantially decreased. The evidence supports these findings and these findings support the trial court\u2019s conclusion that there has been no substantial change of circumstances. Further, the findings show that the trial court properly compared the present overall circumstances of the parties with the circumstances at the time of the initial alimony award. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion is declining to modify the alimony award and affirm the order denying defendant\u2019s motion to modify.\nVI. Conclusion\nThe trial court\u2019s findings are supported by the evidence. Those findings support the trial court\u2019s conclusion that defendant has failed to show that circumstances have substantially changed since the 2004 alimony order. Therefore, we affirm the trial court\u2019s order denying defendant\u2019s motion to modify alimony.\nAFFIRMED.\nJudges CALABRIA and DAVIS concur.\n. Defendant also purports to challenge finding of fact 8, concerning the lack of a decrease in plaintiffs expenses, though he admits that finding is supported by the evidence. His argument instead focuses on whether the trial court properly considered the required factors, an argument addressed below.\n. The trial court labeled two findings as 11, so we will refer to these findings as \u201c11a\u201d and \u201c11b.\u201d\n. There is a discrepancy between the parties\u2019 2008 tax returns as to the alimony paid. Plaintiff claimed that she received $144,000 in alimony, the normal amount, but defendant claimed to have paid $156,000. The trial court made no findings regarding how much defendant had paid in 2008. Thus we have based the 2008 income upon only the $144,000 per year required by the consent alimony order, but it would make no difference to our ruling if defendant actually did pay $156,000, and defendant has not raised any issue of overpayment on appeal.\n. We do not mean to imply that defendant\u2019s motion actually cited any particular statutory provisions, but the factual allegations of the motion seem to fit under these provisions.\n. We note that plaintiff is also 8 years older, and that the trial court found that she was 71 at the time of the modification order.\n. The 2004 alimony order incorporated plaintiffs affidavit by reference, although neither party admitted \u201cthe reasonableness of the other party\u2019s expenses.\u201d",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "STROUD, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "The Rosen Law Firm by Lisa M. Angel, for plaintiff-appellee.",
      "Doster, Post, Silverman & Foushee, P.A., by Jonathan Silverman, for defendant-appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "REBECCA STEPHENS KELLY, Plaintiff v. REGINALD BROWN KELLY, Defendant\nNo. COA12-1582\nFiled 6 August 2013\nDivorce \u2014 alimony\u2014modification\u2014no substantial change of circumstances\nThe trial court did not err by denying defendant\u2019s motion to modify alimony. The trial court\u2019s findings of fact were supported by the evidence and the findings supported the conclusion that there had been no substantial change of circumstances since the initial alimony order was entered.\nAppeal by defendant from Order entered on or about 31 July 2012 by Judge William G. Stewart in District Court, Johnston County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 6 June 2013.\nThe Rosen Law Firm by Lisa M. Angel, for plaintiff-appellee.\nDoster, Post, Silverman & Foushee, P.A., by Jonathan Silverman, for defendant-appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0600-01",
  "first_page_order": 610,
  "last_page_order": 623
}
