{
  "id": 4220636,
  "name": "OUTDOOR LIGHTING PERSPECTIVES FRANCHISING, INC., Plaintiff v. PATRICK HARDERS, OUTDOOR LIGHTING PERSPECTIVES OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, INC., AND ENLIGHTENED LIGHTING, LLC, Defendants",
  "name_abbreviation": "Outdoor Lighting Perspectives Franchising, Inc. v. Harders",
  "decision_date": "2013-08-06",
  "docket_number": "No. COA12-1204",
  "first_page": "613",
  "last_page": "630",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "228 N.C. App. 613"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
    "id": 14983,
    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "610 S.E.2d 360",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 2005,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "361"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "359 N.C. 400",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        3799435
      ],
      "year": 2005,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "402"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/359/0400-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "674 S.E.2d 444",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 2009,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "446",
          "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "196 N.C. App. 126",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        4166662
      ],
      "year": 2009,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "129",
          "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/196/0126-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "524 S.E.2d 558",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 2000,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "563"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "351 N.C. 293",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        1155833
      ],
      "year": 2000,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "299"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/351/0293-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "588 S.E.2d 871",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 2003,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "875",
          "parenthetical": "quoting Gaston Cnty. Dyeing Machine Co. v. Northfield Ins. Co., 351 N.C. 293, 299, 524 S.E.2d 558, 563 (2000)"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "357 N.C. 623",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        491780
      ],
      "year": 2003,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "629",
          "parenthetical": "quoting Gaston Cnty. Dyeing Machine Co. v. Northfield Ins. Co., 351 N.C. 293, 299, 524 S.E.2d 558, 563 (2000)"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/357/0623-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "333 S.E.2d 299",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1985,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "304"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "314 N.C. 219",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        4685783
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1985,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "226"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/314/0219-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "257 S.E.2d 109",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1979,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "115"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "42 N.C. App. 515",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        8555021
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1979,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "523"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/42/0515-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "368 S.E.2d 885",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1988,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "886"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "90 N.C. App. 458",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        8525077
      ],
      "year": 1988,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "460"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/90/0458-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "25 S.E. 813",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.",
      "year": 1896,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "813"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "119 N.C. 1",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8654242
      ],
      "year": 1896,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "8"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/119/0001-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "454 S.E.2d 251",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1995,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "339 N.C. 612",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        2558242,
        2557640,
        2558539,
        2558899,
        2557052
      ],
      "year": 1995,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/339/0612-01",
        "/nc/339/0612-04",
        "/nc/339/0612-03",
        "/nc/339/0612-02",
        "/nc/339/0612-05"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "450 S.E.2d 912",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "weight": 6,
      "year": 1994,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "920"
        },
        {
          "page": "916"
        },
        {
          "page": "916"
        },
        {
          "page": "917"
        },
        {
          "page": "914-15, 918"
        },
        {
          "page": "919-20"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "117 N.C. App. 307",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        8525264
      ],
      "weight": 5,
      "year": 1994,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "317"
        },
        {
          "page": "311"
        },
        {
          "page": "311"
        },
        {
          "page": "312"
        },
        {
          "page": "308, 314"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/117/0307-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "313 S.E.2d 614",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1984,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "615",
          "parenthetical": "analyzing issues arising from a restrictive covenant entered into by an independent contractor"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "67 N.C. App. 540",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        8526832
      ],
      "year": 1984,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "541",
          "parenthetical": "analyzing issues arising from a restrictive covenant entered into by an independent contractor"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/67/0540-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "158 S.E.2d 840",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1968,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "843"
        },
        {
          "page": "843"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "272 N.C. 659",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8574231
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1968,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "662-63"
        },
        {
          "page": "663"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/272/0659-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "228 S.E.2d 451",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1976,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "290 N.C. 659",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8563019,
        8563052,
        8562990,
        8562965,
        8562938
      ],
      "year": 1976,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/290/0659-04",
        "/nc/290/0659-05",
        "/nc/290/0659-03",
        "/nc/290/0659-02",
        "/nc/290/0659-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "173 S.E.2d 316",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1970,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "319"
        },
        {
          "page": "320",
          "parenthetical": "holding that, \"to a company actually engaged in nation-wide activities, nation-wide protection would appear to be reasonable and proper\""
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "276 N.C. 475",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8561780
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1970,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "478-79"
        },
        {
          "page": "481"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/276/0475-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "225 S.E.2d 602",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "weight": 2,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "605"
        },
        {
          "page": "605"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "29 N.C. App. 679",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        8556992
      ],
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "684"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/29/0679-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "397 S.E.2d 239",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1990,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "parenthetical": "citing A.E.P. Indus., 308 N.C. at 402-03, 302 S.E.2d at 760"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "327 N.C. 488",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        2492968,
        2496467,
        2498198,
        2496765,
        2494143
      ],
      "year": 1990,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "parenthetical": "citing A.E.P. Indus., 308 N.C. at 402-03, 302 S.E.2d at 760"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/327/0488-05",
        "/nc/327/0488-03",
        "/nc/327/0488-01",
        "/nc/327/0488-02",
        "/nc/327/0488-04"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "392 S.E.2d 446",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1990,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "448",
          "parenthetical": "citing A.E.P. Indus., 308 N.C. at 402-03, 302 S.E.2d at 760"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "99 N.C. App. 120",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        8521271
      ],
      "year": 1990,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "122-23",
          "parenthetical": "citing A.E.P. Indus., 308 N.C. at 402-03, 302 S.E.2d at 760"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/99/0120-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "9 S.E.2d 476",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "weight": 4,
      "year": 1940,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "478"
        },
        {
          "page": "477",
          "parenthetical": "analyzing issues arising from the dissolution of a professional partnership"
        },
        {
          "page": "477"
        },
        {
          "page": "478"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "217 N.C. 670",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8615598
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1940,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "673-74"
        },
        {
          "page": "671"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/217/0670-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "359 S.E.2d 466",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1987,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "320 N.C. 629",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        4723358
      ],
      "year": 1987,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/320/0629-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "343 S.E.2d 562",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1986,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "567"
        },
        {
          "page": "563",
          "parenthetical": "analyzing issues arising from a venture capitalist's purchase of a franchise"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "81 N.C. App. 185",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        8522102
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1986,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "193"
        },
        {
          "page": "186"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/81/0185-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "239 S.E.2d 566",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1977,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "574"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "293 N.C. 688",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8566967
      ],
      "year": 1977,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "701"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/293/0688-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "302 S.E.2d 754",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1983,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "759-60",
          "parenthetical": "quoting Investors, Inc. v. Berry, 293 N.C. 688, 701, 239 S.E.2d 566, 574 (1977)"
        },
        {
          "page": "760"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "308 N.C. 393",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        4706622
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1983,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "401",
          "parenthetical": "quoting Investors, Inc. v. Berry, 293 N.C. 688, 701, 239 S.E.2d 566, 574 (1977)"
        },
        {
          "page": "402-03"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/308/0393-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "590 S.E.2d 267",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 2003,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "357 N.C. 658",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        491585,
        491845,
        491527,
        491825,
        491633,
        491739
      ],
      "year": 2003,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/357/0658-01",
        "/nc/357/0658-05",
        "/nc/357/0658-06",
        "/nc/357/0658-03",
        "/nc/357/0658-04",
        "/nc/357/0658-02"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "584 S.E.2d 328",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 2003,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "333"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "160 N.C. App. 1",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        8953616
      ],
      "year": 2003,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "8"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/160/0001-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "261 S.E.2d 908",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1980,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "913"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "299 N.C. 351",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8575088
      ],
      "year": 1980,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "358"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/299/0351-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "387 S.E.2d 168",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1990,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "173",
          "parenthetical": "quoting State ex rel. Edmisten v. Fayetteville Street Christian School, 299 N.C. 351, 358, 261 S.E.2d 908, 913 (1980)"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "326 N.C. 15",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        5307541
      ],
      "year": 1990,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "23",
          "parenthetical": "quoting State ex rel. Edmisten v. Fayetteville Street Christian School, 299 N.C. 351, 358, 261 S.E.2d 908, 913 (1980)"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/326/0015-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 1589,
    "char_count": 45279,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.719,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08,
      "percentile": 0.13967474551605133
    },
    "sha256": "12a5dcb4f733d4a88d4c2801badc77bc308278a16b277e2de2e05119e86e9eb3",
    "simhash": "1:87e35dae142e0475",
    "word_count": 7006
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:18:27.138557+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges BRYANT and ELMORE concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "OUTDOOR LIGHTING PERSPECTIVES FRANCHISING, INC., Plaintiff v. PATRICK HARDERS, OUTDOOR LIGHTING PERSPECTIVES OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, INC., AND ENLIGHTENED LIGHTING, LLC, Defendants"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "ERVIN, Judge.\nPlaintiff Outdoor Lighting Perspectives Franchising, Inc., appeals from an order entered by the trial court denying its request for the issuance of a preliminary injunction against Defendants Patrick Harders, Outdoor Lighting Perspectives of Northern Virginia, Inc. (OLP-NVA), and Enlightened Lighting, LLC, prohibiting Mr. Harders and Enlightened Lighting from having any involvement in an outdoor lighting business. On appeal, Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by failing to enforce the non-competition agreement between itself, on the one hand, and Mr. Harders and OLP-NVA, on the other, in its entirety on the grounds that none of the covenant\u2019s provisions were overly broad or otherwise unenforceable. After careful consideration of Plaintiff\u2019s challenges to the trial court\u2019s order in light of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that the trial court\u2019s order should be affirmed.\nI. Factual Background\nA. Substantive Facts\n1. Plaintiffs Evidence\nPlaintiff is a corporation which enters into franchise agreements authorizing franchisees to engage in the design, construction, and installation of residential and commercial outdoor lighting products. Mr. Harders began operating an OLP franchise, OLP-NVA, between July and October of 2001. Pursuant to the underlying franchise agreement, Mr. Harders had the right to operate an OLP franchise in an exclusive territory consisting of Arlington, Fairfax, Prince William, and Loudoun Counties in Virginia using the trademarked name of \u201cOutdoor Lighting Perspectives\u00ae\u201d for a five-year term. According to the franchise agreement, Mr. Harders and OLP-NVA were required to safeguard confidential OLP information and trade secrets during the term of the agreement. The franchise agreement also required Mr. Harders and OLP-NVA to return all franchise materials to OLP upon the termination of the contract or the expiration of the franchise term and prohibited Mr. Harders and OLP-NVA from operating another outdoor lighting business within a specified area for a period of two years beginning on the date upon which the franchise agreement terminated or expired.\nLathe course of his work as an OLP franchisee, Mr. Harders received training and support services from OLP in the form of attendance at workshops, seminars, and conventions. In addition, Mr. Harders was provided with a manual that contained proprietary information deemed necessary to permit the proper operation of an OLP franchise. A number of the manuals given to Mr. Harders and OLP-NVA contained information concerning standardized \u201cmarketing, sales, operations, products and services.\u201d Although techniques concerning the installation of outdoor lighting are \u201crelatively universal,\u201d the information that Plaintiff provided to Mr. Harders and OLP-NVA addressed all facets of the outdoor lighting business, including \u201corganization, marketing and promotion, sales techniques, design techniques, pricing and estimating, maintenance, customer service, accounting, billing and collections.\u201d Finally, Plaintiff referred approximately nineteen projects to Mr. Harders and OLP-NVA during the term of the franchise agreement, which projects generated around $60,000 in income. After Mr. Harders and OLP-NVA operated this OLP franchise consistently with the terms of the franchise agreement throughout the initial five-year term, the parties renewed their agreement for a subsequent five-year term on 23 October 2006.\nIn 2008, Plaintiff was purchased by Outdoor Living Brands (OLB), an entity which owned two subsidiaries: Mosquito Squad\u00ae and Archadeck\u00ae. OLB had not been previously involved in the outdoor lighting business. During the acquisition process, OLB surveyed OLP franchise owners for the purpose of inquiring into their level of satisfaction with the franchise system. Mr. Harders offered exclusively positive comments in the course of responding to this survey.\nIn October 2011, Plaintiff contacted Mr. Harders for the purpose of informing him of the steps that needed to be taken in order to renew the franchise agreement. At that time, Mr. Harders informed Plaintiff that he had received a phone call from a customer informing him that the customer had been contacted by an individual representing himself to be the new owner of OLP-NVA who claimed to have been going through Mr. Harders\u2019 database for the purpose of introducing himself to all of Mr. Harders\u2019 existing customers. After receiving that information, Plaintiff assured Mr. Harders that the franchise had not been awarded to anyone else and determined that no one had had access to Mr. Harders\u2019 database without first having received permission to do so from him. Even so, Mr. Harders and OLP-NVA allowed their franchise agreement with Plaintiff to expire on 23 October 2011, specifically informing Plaintiff two days later that they no longer had any interest in remaining affiliated with OLP.\nIn January of 2012, Corey Schroeder, Plaintiff\u2019s Vice President and Chief Financial Officer, read an article in Loudoun Magazine which indicated that Mr. Harders was operating an outdoor lighting business under the name of \u201cEnlightened Landscape Lighting.\u201d A number of projects which Mr. Harders had completed while operating as an OLP franchise were displayed on the new business\u2019 website. As a result, counsel for Plaintiff sent a letter to Defendants\u2019 attorney dated 18 January 2012 stating that Plaintiff was aware that Mr. Harders was operating an outdoor lighting business within his former territory and giving Mr. Harders ten days to voluntarily comply with the post-expiration restrictions contained in the franchise agreement. In addition, Plaintiff requested that Mr. Harders cease attempting to supply other OLP franchisees with fixtures from China because of quality issues associated with the use of such fixtures and because Mr. Harders was not an approved supplier of such products. Plaintiff did not, however, attempt to totally exclude Mr. Harders from participating in the interior lighting business. Mr. Harders, however, refused to cease operating his outdoor lighting business and to deliver allegedly proprietary information in his possession, including his customer list, to Plaintiff.\n2. Defendants\u2019 Evidence\nMr. Harders, who had purchased an OLP franchise in 2001, served as president of OLP-NVA. As part of the process of operating an OLP franchise, Mr. Harders entered into a franchise agreement that was drafted by OLP on or about 23 October 2006. During the time in which he operated as an OLP franchisee, both OLP and OLP-NVA were in the business of providing low-voltage outdoor landscape lighting. However, neither entity was involved in providing \u201cmercury vapor (moonlighting), high voltage outdoor landscape installations, and exterior attached home lighting using 120 volt fixtures and wiring (security lighting, entrance-way lighting, outdoor lampposts).\u201d\nDuring the time in which Mr. Harders operated as an OLP franchisee, entities holding OLP franchises encountered numerous problems with OLP suppliers. Since OLB purchased Plaintiff in 2008, numerous franchises have closed and the OLP business model has been devalued. Among other things, Plaintiff failed to provide its franchisees with adequate support, feedback, and product innovation. Although the information provided to Mr. Harders and OLP-NVA by OLP was alleged to be proprietary, much of it was publicly available and common knowledge in the industry. Similarly, the training that Mr. Harders had received from Plaintiff was readily available without charge in many national home improvement stores.\nIn spite of the apparent decline in the value of an OLP franchise, Mr. Harders engaged in discussions aimed at the renewal of his franchise agreement in the summer of 2011. Although Mr. Harders had scheduled a meeting with OLP representatives to discuss the possible renewal of his franchise on 26 October 2011, an unidentified individual called at least one of Mr. Harders\u2019 customers on or about 20 October 2011 and asked about the status of the customer\u2019s outdoor lighting. During the ensuing conversation, the caller told the customer that Mr. Harders was no longer associated with OLP, that Mr. Harders no longer owned OLP-NVA, and that OLP-NVA was now under new ownership. Mr. Harders deemed these actions to constitute a premature termination of his franchise agreement.\nAt some unspecified point, Mr. Harders began operating Enlightened Lighting, in which he used training obtained from sources other than OLP to perform advanced installations that the training which he had received from OLP did not qualify him to perform. The physical address and telephone number for Enlightened Lighting differed from that of OLP-NVA, and Mr. Harders refrained from \u201cactively soliciting] \u201d former customers. Although the website that Mr. Harders created for Enlightened Lighting contained photographs of completed jobs, all of the projects depicted in these photographs had been finished after the expiration of the franchise agreement between Plaintiff and Mr. Harders. In addition, despite the fact that he admitted having retained certain manuals, records, and other information from OLP, Mr. Harders claimed to have kept nothing other than the documents needed to defend himself and his businesses in this action.\nAfter Enlightened Lighting began operating, Plaintiff informed Mr. Harders that it would seek to enforce the post-expiration provisions of the franchise agreement. Among other things, OLP specifically told Mr. Harders that serving as a wholesale supplier of outdoor lights would constitute a violation of the agreement. In March 2011, OLB informed Mr. Harders that, in the event that he opened a business installing interior, as compared to exterior, lights, OLP would invoke the provisions of the franchise agreement in an effort to prevent him from operating such a business.\nB. Procedural History\nOn 5 March 2012, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants seeking damages stemming from Defendants\u2019 failure to pay royalties and other fees, misappropriation of good will, and engaging in a civil conspiracy; injunctive relief stemming from Defendants\u2019 alleged noncompliance with the post-expiration restrictions contained in the franchise agreement; and rectification of Mr. Harders\u2019 failure to return certain manuals, customer lists and other items following the termination of the franchise agreement. On 6 March 2012, Plaintiff filed a motion seeking the issuance of a preliminary injunction requiring Plaintiff to return specific proprietary information, to cease misappropriating Plaintiff\u2019s good will, and, for a period of two years, to refrain from \u201cengaging either directly or indirectly in any activity involving the marketing, selling, repairing, remodeling, enhancing, constructing, installing, or maintaining residential or commercial outdoor lighting products and services within the Defendants\u2019 former territory consisting of the counties of Arlington, Fairfax, Prince William, and Loudoun in the Commonwealth of Virginia or within the territory of any other OLP franchisee.\u201d In the course of subsequent proceedings, Mr. Schroeder executed an affidavit notifying Defendants that Plaintiff was exercising its contractual right to reduce the geographical scope of the post-expiration restrictions contained in the franchise agreement by eliminating the 100-mile zone around the territory in which Mr. Harders and OLP-NVA had operated as an OLP franchisee from the area in which Defendants should be prohibited from participating in the outdoor lighting business.\nAlthough Plaintiff\u2019s motion for the issuance of a preliminary injunction was originally scheduled to be heard on 3 April 2012, Defendants filed a motion seeking to have this case designated as a mandatory complex business case pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-45.4 on 27 March 2012. On 28 March 2012, Defendants\u2019 motion was granted. Subsequently, this case was assigned to the trial court.\nOn 12 April 2012, the trial court held a hearing for the purpose of considering the issues raised by Plaintiff\u2019s motion for the issuance of a preliminary injunction. On 13 April 2012, Defendants filed an answer in which they denied the material allegations of Plaintiffs complaint and requested that the post-expiration restrictions in the franchise agreement be deemed invalid. On 14 May 2012, the trial court entered an order which prohibited Defendants from using, and requiring the return of, certain allegedly proprietary information, including customer-related information, manuals, and similar protected items. However, the trial court denied Plaintiffs request for the issuance of a preliminaiy injunction prohibiting the operation of Enlightened Lighting or any other outdoor lighting business. Plaintiff noted an appeal to this Court from the trial court\u2019s order.\nII. Legal Analysis\nA. Standard of Review\n\u201cA preliminary injunction is interlocutory in nature. As a result, issuance of a preliminary injunction cannot be appealed prior to final judgment absent a showing that the appellant has been deprived of a substantial right which will be lost should the order \u2018escape appellate review before final judgment.\u2019 \u201d Clark v. Craven Reg\u2019l Med. Auth., 326 N.C. 15, 23, 387 S.E.2d 168, 173 (1990) (quoting State ex rel. Edmisten v. Fayetteville Street Christian School, 299 N.C. 351, 358, 261 S.E.2d 908, 913 (1980)) (citations omitted). \u201cIn reviewing the denial of a [request for the issuance of a] preliminary injunction, an appellate court is not bound by the trial court\u2019s findings of fact, but may weigh the evidence anew and enter its own findings of fact and conclusions of law; our review is de novo.\u201d Kennedy v. Kennedy, 160 N.C. App. 1, 8, 584 S.E.2d 328, 333, appeal dismissed, 357 N.C. 658, 590 S.E.2d 267 (2003). A reviewing court should uphold the issuance of a preliminary injunction \u201c(1) if a plaintiff is able to show likelihood of success on the merits of his case and (2) if a plaintiff is likely to sustain irreparable loss unless the injunction is issued, or if, in the opinion of the Court, issuance is necessary for the protection of a plaintiff\u2019s rights during the course of litigation.\u201d A.E.P. Industries, Inc. v. McClure, 308 N.C. 393, 401, 302 S.E.2d 754, 759-60 (1983) (quoting Investors, Inc. v. Berry, 293 N.C. 688, 701, 239 S.E.2d 566, 574 (1977)).\nB. Likelihood of Success\nAs a result of the fact that Defendants have not contended that Plaintiff would not be irreparably injured in the event that the issuance of the requested preliminary injunction were to be denied and the fact that Plaintiff would, in our opinion, be likely to establish the required irreparable injury if no such injunction were issued, we turn directly to the issue of the likelihood that Plaintiff will succeed on the merits of its underlying claim. However, before explicitly discussing the enforceability of the relevant contractual provision, we must first address the level of scrutiny to which these contractual provisions should be subjected during the course of our analysis, a topic which the parties debated at length in their well-written and informative briefs.\n1. Level of Scrutiny\nIn its brief, Plaintiff emphasizes the fact that the trial court referenced a number of cases arising from litigation over the validity of restrictions contained in an employment contract instead of relying exclusively on cases arising from the sale of a business. In seeking the reversal of the trial court\u2019s order, Plaintiff urges us to adopt the standard generally utilized in cases arising from the sale of a business in evaluating the correctness of the trial court\u2019s order and contends that, in the event that we were to utilize the approach which it deems appropriate, the relevant contractual provisions would be deemed clearly enforceable. We do not find Plaintiff\u2019s argument persuasive.\nAccording to well-established North Carolina law, non-competition agreements contained in an employment contract are \u201cmore closely scrutinized than\u201d those contained in a contract for the sale of a business. Keith v. Day, 81 N.C. App. 185, 193, 343 S.E.2d 562, 567 (1986), disc. review improvidently granted, 320 N.C. 629, 359 S.E.2d 466 (1987). As the Supreme Court stated over half a century ago:\nA workman \u201cwho has nothing but his labor to sell and is in urgent need of selling that\u201d may readily accede to an unreasonable restriction at the time of his employment without taking proper thought of the morrow, but a professional man who is the product of modem university or college education is supposed to have in his training an asset which should enable him adequately to guard his own interest, especially when dealing with an associate on equal terms.\nBeam v. Rutledge, 217 N.C. 670, 673-74, 9 S.E.2d 476, 478 (1940). As a result, on the one hand, a non-competition agreement contained in an employment contract is enforceable if it is \u201c(1) in writing; (2) reasonable as to time and territory; (3) made a part of the employment contract; (4) based on valuable consideration; and (5) designed to protect a legitimate business interest of the employer.\u201d Young v. Mastrom, Inc., 99 N.C. App. 120, 122-23, 392 S.E.2d 446, 448, disc. review denied, 327 N.C. 488, 397 S.E.2d 239 (1990) (citing A.E.P. Indus., 308 N.C. at 402-03, 302 S.E.2d at 760). \u201cThe territory embraced by the restrictive covenant shall be no greater than is reasonably necessary to secure the protection of the business or good will of the employer.\u201d Clyde Rudd & Assocs., Inc. v. Taylor, 29 N.C. App. 679, 684, 225 S.E.2d 602, 605 (citing Harwell Enterprises, Inc. v. Heim, 276 N.C. 475, 478-79, 173 S.E.2d 316, 319 (1970)), disc. review denied, 290 N.C. 659, 228 S.E.2d 451 (1976). On the other hand:\nwhen one sells a trade or business and, as an incident of the sale, covenants not to engage in the same business in competition with the purchaser, the covenant is valid and enforceable (1) if it is reasonably necessary to protect the legitimate interest of the purchaser; (2) if it is reasonable with respect to both time and territory; and (3) if it does not interfere with the interest of the public.\nJewel Box Stores Corp. v. Morrow, 272 N.C. 659, 662-63, 158 S.E.2d 840, 843 (1968).\nA number of prior decisions in this jurisdiction dealing with the enforceability of agreements in which one person agrees to refrain from competing with another have involved situations which do not fit neatly into either the employer-employee category or the business sale category. In such situations, the North Carolina appellate courts have engaged in a detailed analysis of the reasonableness of the restrictions to which the plaintiff seeks to have the defendant subjected rather than attempting to determine on which side of the line separating the employer-employee context from the sale of a business context the case in question falls. As a result, although Plaintiff has invited us to adopt a bright-line rule subjecting post-expiration non-competition agreements contained in a franchise agreement to the same level of scrutiny as is typically applied in cases arising from the sale of a business, we are not willing to accept Plaintiffs invitation. Instead, we believe that the present case involves a hybrid situation which does not fit neatly within either of the categories posited in Plaintiff\u2019s brief. E.g. Beam, 217 N.C. at, 671, 9 S.E.2d at 477 (analyzing issues arising from the dissolution of a professional partnership); Keith, 81 N.C. App. at 186, 343 S.E.2d at 563 (analyzing issues arising from a venture capitalist\u2019s purchase of a franchise); Starkings Court Reporting Servs., Inc. v. Collins, 67 N.C. App. 540, 541, 313 S.E.2d 614, 615 (1984) (analyzing issues arising from a restrictive covenant entered into by an independent contractor). In arriving at this conclusion, we note that the franchisor-franchisee situation differs from both the employer-employee arid the sale of business contexts. On the one hand, a franchisee who ends his relationship with the franchisor is, more likely than not, an individual possessing a skill set that makes him capable of earning a livelihood in a variety of different businesses. For that reason, such a person is not as likely to be as dependent upon his ability to perform a specific type of work in a specific area as is the case with the typical employee. On the other hand, unlike the situation which typically arises from the sale of an established business, in which the seller has spent years building up good will in a particular area, a franchisor is likely to receive the benefit of at least some of the good will which was built up by the franchisee and has the ability to sell at least some portion of that accumulated good will to a new franchisee. These practical differences between the typical employer-employee arrangement and the typical buyer-seller arrangement preclude us from concluding that the rules that typically govern either arrangement should be applied with unbending rigidity in this situation.\nAs a result, in fight of this determination, we conclude that elements of the tests utilized in both the employee-employer and the business sale context are relevant in analyzing the likelihood that Plaintiff will prevail in the present litigation. Among the factors that have been deemed relevant in evaluating the validity of non-competition agreements entered into in the employment context are:\n(1) the area, or scope, of the restriction, (2) the area assigned to employee, (3) the area in which the employee actually worked or was subject to work, (4) the area in which the employer operated, (5) the nature of the business involved, and (6) the nature of the employee\u2019s duty and his knowledge of the employer\u2019s business operation.\nClyde Rudd & Assocs., Inc., 29 N.C. at 684, 225 S.E.2d at 605. After considering these factors, this Court invalidated a contractual provision that, \u201crather than attempting to prevent [the] plaintiff from competing for actuarial business, . . . appealed] to prevent plaintiff from working as a custodian for any \u2018entity\u2019 which provide[d] \u2018actuarial services.\u2019 \u201d Hartman v. W.H. Odell & Assocs., Inc., 117 N.C. App. 307, 317, 450 S.E.2d 912, 920 (1994), disc. review denied, 339 N.C. 612, 454 S.E.2d 251 (1995). Although the specific job description of the person sought to be restrained has been deemed less relevant when courts analyze a restriction placed on a business owner, we believe that the extent to which a particular contractual provision unreasonably impairs a former franchisee\u2019s ability to work in a related field or particular industry is relevant to the reasonableness of a non-competition restriction arising from the termination of a franchise agreement.\nSimilarly, certain factors typically deemed relevant during the analysis of issues arising in the business sale context, while having little relevance in the employment context, have obvious bearing upon the proper resolution of disputes between franchisors and franchisees. For example, in the business sale context, North Carolina courts have frequently focused on issues relating to a business\u2019 good will. See, e.g., Jewel Box Stores Corp., 272 N.C. at 663, 158 S.E.2d at 843 (recognizing that a business owner \u201cacquires a property right in the good will of his patrons and that this property is not marketable \u2018unless the owner is at liberty to sell his right of competition to the full extent of the field from which he derives his profit and for a reasonable length of time\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Kramer v. Old, 119 N.C. 1, 8, 25 S.E. 813, 813 (1896)). Unlikeaformer employee, a former franchisee is, in fact, likely to share the good will associated with the formerly franchised business as a result of the fact that the good will in question will have been generated by a combination of the efforts of the franchisor and the franchisee. As a result of the varying relevance of the factors typically deemed of utmost importance in the employer-employee and business sale contexts in the franchisor-franchisee context, we conclude that the ultimate issue which we must decide in resolving such disputes among franchisors and franchisees is the extent to which the non-competition provision contained in the franchise agreement is no more restrictive than is necessary to protect the legitimate interests of the franchisor, with the relevant factors to be considered in the making of this determination to include the reasonableness of the duration of the restriction, the reasonableness of the geographic scope of the restriction, and the extent to which the restriction is otherwise necessary to protect the legitimate interests of the franchisor. We will proceed to analyze the reasonableness of the restrictions at issue in this case in light of these criteria, utilizing those decisions addressing the specific issues under consideration in each portion of our analysis that we deem relevant without regard to the factual context from which those decisions arose.\n2. Reasonableness of Restrictions\na. Geographic Scope\nIn its brief, Plaintiff argues that the geographic scope of the restriction at issue in this case is reasonable. We do not, however, find this argument persuasive.\n\u201cThe party who seeks the enforcement of the covenant not to compete has the burden of proving that the covenant is reasonable.\u201d Hartman, 117 N.C. App. at 311, 450 S.E.2d at 916. \u201cThe reasonableness of a noncompetition covenant is a matter of law for the court to decide.\u201d Beasley v. Banks, 90 N.C. App. 458, 460, 368 S.E.2d 885, 886 (1988). \u201cTo carry its burden[,] [the party seeking enforcement] must prove that the covenant not to compete is reasonable as to both time and territory.\u201d Hartman, 117 N.C. App. at 311, 450 S.E.2d at 916. The reasonableness of a geographic restriction contained in a non-competition agreement does not depend exclusively on the size of the area in question, e.g. Harwell Enterprises, Inc., 276 N.C. at 481, 173 S.E.2d at 320 (holding that, \u201cto a company actually engaged in nation-wide activities, nation-wide protection would appear to be reasonable and proper\u201d); Manpower of Guilford Cnty., Inc. v. Hedgecock, 42 N.C. App. 515, 523, 257 S.E.2d 109, 115 (1979) (stating that, while an employer had no legitimate interest in preventing an employee \u201cfrom competing with other Manpower franchisees in other cities or states . . . the [national] franchisor!] may have a legitimate right to prohibit its franchisees from competing with it or its affiliates throughout the country\u201d); instead, the reasonableness of a geographic restriction depends upon where the business\u2019 \u201ccustomers are located and [whether] the geographic scope of the covenant is necessary to maintain those customer relationships.\u201d Hartman, 117 N.C. App. at 312, 450 S.E.2d at 917.\nThe contractual language at issue here incorporates two separate geographical restraints, with the first prohibiting Mr. Harders from operating an outdoor lighting business within a 100-mile buffer surrounding the area in which OLP-NVA previously operated and the second prohibiting Mr. Harders from operating a particular type of business within the territory assigned to any of Plaintiff\u2019s franchisees or affiliates. More specifically, as originally written, section 14.2(b) of the franchise agreement provided that:\nUpon termination or expiration of the Initial Term or any Interim Period, or the transfer, sale or assignment of this Agreement by the Franchisee, neither the Franchisee, the operating manager or the Franchisee\u2019s owners will have any direct or indirect interest (i.e. through a relative) as a disclosed or beneficial owner, investor, partner, director, officer, employee, consultant, representative or agent, for two (2) years, in any Competitive Business within 100 miles of the Territory or any other franchisee\u2019s Franchisor\u2019s or Affiliates [sic] territory.\nIn apparent recognition of the problematic nature of the 100 mile buffer provision, Plaintiff filed an affidavit executed by Mr. Schroeder on 6 March 2012 indicating that it would not seek to enforce that portion of the non-competition agreement. The revised language created by Plaintiff\u2019s affidavit prohibited Mr. Harders from operating \u201cany Competitive Business within the Territory or any other franchisee\u2019s Franchisor\u2019s or Affiliatesf] territory.\u201d\nAs this Court has previously stated, \u201c[a] restriction as to territory is reasonable only to the extent it protects the legitimate interests of the employer in maintaining his customers.\u201d Manpower of Guilford Cnty., Inc., 42 N.C. App. at 527 S.E.2d at 115. Although Plaintiff argued before the trial court that the non-competition provision which it sought to enforce in this case \u201cincludes all of the prescribed territory and the territory of other OLP franchises . . . [and] is necessary to protect the goodwill associated with OLP\u2019s trademarks and to prevent Defendants from trading on the goodwill generated in the OLP\u00ae Marks in this area over the last ten years,\u201d the actual language of the provision in question sweeps more broadly than Plaintiff\u2019s argument suggests. The relevant contractual language, even as modified in Mr. Schroeder\u2019s affidavit, prohibits Defendants from engaging in the outdoor lighting business within the territory assigned to any of Plaintiff\u2019s affiliates. According to the franchise agreement, the term \u201cAffiliate\u201d \u201cmeans any person or entity that controls, is controlled by, or is in common control with, the Franchisor.\u201d As we have already noted, Plaintiff has two affiliates that are engaged in lines of business totally unrelated to outdoor lighting. Although Plaintiff argues that we should not consider the existence of these non-lighting affiliates in our analysis on the grounds that the relevant contractual language should not be read to preclude Defendants from competing with affiliates that did not exist at the time of the 2006 agreement, such as Mosquito Squad\u00ae and Archadeck\u00ae, the relevant contractual language does not provide any basis for inferring the existence of such a temporal limitation. Instead, the applicable contractual provision appears to be equally applicable to all of Plaintiff\u2019s affiliates and franchises. As a result, given that the non-competition provision contained in the franchise agreement prohibits Defendant from operating an outdoor lighting business in areas in which neither Plaintiff nor its franchisees or affiliates are engaged in similar activities, we conclude that such a restriction is excessively broad given that Plaintiff has no legitimate reason for precluding Defendants from competing with franchisees or affiliates of Plaintiff which are not engaged in the outdoor lighting business.\nb. Legitimate Business Interests\nSecondly, Plaintiff contends that the non-competition provision contained in the franchise agreement did not preclude Defendants from engaging in an overly broad range of activities. According to Plaintiff, the trial court reached a contrary conclusion because it scrutinized the non-competition provision contained in the franchise agreement using the test appropriately utilized in the employer-employee context rather than that appropriately utilized in the business sale context and would have deemed the provision enforceable had it used the proper analytical framework in the course of making its decision. More specifically, Plaintiff argues that the trial court refused to enforce the non-competition provision at issue here because it \u201cfelt constrained to apply an extreme level of hypothetical analysis\u201d even though courts should refrain from \u201cdissect[ing] the language of [a] noncompete agreement to determine whether it could conceive of an interpretation that was over-broad\u201d in non-employment contexts and should, instead, \u201cascertain the intentions of the parties and make a determination [as to] whether the defendant\u2019s conduct violates the terms of the applicable noncompete provision.\u201d We do not find this argument persuasive.\nAs a preliminary matter, Plaintiff argues that courts should focus on the intent underlying the non-competition agreement in question and refrain from giving any consideration to the plain language in which those agreements are couched in the event that a consideration of the agreement\u2019s literal language would extend the reach of the non-competition provision beyond permissible bounds. In seeking to persuade us of the merits of this position, Plaintiff relies on two Supreme Court decisions, neither of which support the position which it espouses. Plaintiff\u2019s reliance upon Bicycle Transit Auth., Inc. v. Bell, 314 N.C. 219, 333 S.E.2d 299 (1985), is misplaced given that those \u201cdefendants [did] not argue that the covenant as written [was] so broad in scope as to either interfere with the interests of the public or that it [was] not reasonably necessary to protect the legitimate interest of the purchaser\u201d and argued instead that \u201cunder any reasonable interpretation of the covenant, [Defendant's acts did not rise to the level of a breach.\u201d 314 N.C. at 226, 333 S.E.2d at 304. Similarly, we are not persuaded by Plaintiff\u2019s reliance on the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Beam, which arose from a situation in which the defendant worked for the plaintiff, an ear, eye, nose, and throat specialist, and had entered into a non-competition agreement which prevented the defendant from practicing medicine within 100 miles of the town in which they practiced after dissolution of the partnership. Beam, 217 N.C. at 671, 9 S.E.2d at 477. According to Plaintiff, because \u201c [n] owhere in the opinion is there any suggestion that the phrase \u2018the practice of the profession of medicine\u2019 was overbroad,\u201d we should infer that the Court approved the provision prohibiting the defendant from practicing medicine despite the specialized nature of the plaintiff\u2019s practice. Although the Supreme Court did uphold the enforceability of the non-competition agreement at issue in Beam, it did not specifically approve the language in question. Id. at 673-74, 9 S.E.2d at 478. Instead, the arguments advanced in Beam revolved around public policy considerations instead of a detailed analysis of the specific language contained in the non-competition agreement. As a result, we do not believe that it would be appropriate for us to read either of the decisions upon which Plaintiff relies as an invitation to ignore the language of the non-competition agreement contained in the franchise agreement and will, for that reason, focus our attention on the language which the non-competition provision of the franchise agreement utilizes to define the scope of the activities from which Defendants are prohibited from engaging.\nAccording to the Supreme Court:\n[T]he goal of [contract] construction is to arrive at the intent of the parties when the [contract] was issued. Where a [contract] defines a term, that definition is to be used. If no definition is given, non-technical words are to be given their meaning in ordinary speech, unless the context clearly indicates another meaning was intended. The various terms of the [contract] are to be harmoniously construed, and if possible, every word and every provision is to be given effect.\nSingleton v. Haywood Elec. Membership Corp., 357 N.C. 623, 629, 588 S.E.2d 871, 875 (2003) (quoting Gaston Cnty. Dyeing Machine Co. v. Northfield Ins. Co., 351 N.C. 293, 299, 524 S.E.2d 558, 563 (2000)) (alterations in original). \u201cIf the plain language of a contract is clear, the intention of the parties is inferred from the words of the contract,\u201d so that, \u201c [i]f the language is clear and only one reasonable interpretation exists, the courts must enforce the contract as written.\u201d Hodgin v. Brighton, 196 N.C. App. 126, 129, 674 S.E.2d 444, 446 (2009) (citations and quotation marks omitted).\nSection 14.2(b) of the franchise agreement specifically prohibits Defendants from having an involvement \u201cfor two (2) years, in any Competitive Business.\u201d The agreement defines \u201cCompetitive Business\u201d as \u201cany business operating in competition with an outdoor lighting business or any business similar to the Business [] as carried on from time to time during the Initial Term of this Agreement\u201d and defines \u201cBusiness\u201d as \u201cthe business operations conducted or to be conducted by the Franchisee consisting of outdoor lighting design and automated lighting control equipment and installation services, using the Franchisor\u2019s System and in association therewith the Marks.\u201d As a result of the fact that the contractual language in question is couched in disjunctive terms, the non-competition agreement prohibits Defendants from both involvement in any business \u201coperating in competition with an outdoor lighting business\u201d and \u201cany business similar to the Business\u201d regardless of the extent to which either type of entity actually competes with Plaintiff. After carefully studying the record, we are unable to see how prohibiting Defendants from having any involvement in any business \u201coperating in competition with an outdoor lighting business\u201d or any business \u201csimilar\u201d to the one Mr. Harders operated as an OLP franchisee is necessary to protect any of Plaintiff\u2019s legitimate business interests. On the contrary, we believe that the restriction in question goes well beyond the prohibition of activities that would put Defendants in competition with Plaintiff. For example, Mr. Harders would be prohibited from owning a franchise that sold and maintained indoor lighting or from obtaining employment at a major home improvement store that sold outdoor lighting supplies, equipment, or services as a small part of its business even if he had no direct involvement in that retailer\u2019s outdoor lighting operations. We do not believe that our concerns about the scope of the restrictions upon Defendants\u2019 future activities result from an exercise in an \u201cextreme level of hypothetical analysis;\u201d instead, our concerns are derived directly from the literal language of the contract provision which Plaintiff is seeking to enforce. As a result, we conclude that the non-competition agreement at issue here would prevent Defendants from engaging in activities that have no tendency to adversely affect Plaintiff\u2019s legitimate business interests.\nIn Hartman, this Court considered a non-competition agreement that prevented an employee from owning any \u201centity providing actuarial services or any other services of the same nature as the service currently offered by the Corporation to the insurance industry and others or otherwise compete against the Corporation in the actuarial or consulting business\u201d in \u201cevery city (whether or not [the] defendant did business there) in eight states for five or more years.\u201d 117 N.C. App. at 308, 314, 450 S.E.2d at 914-15, 918. In the course of holding that the agreement in question was unenforceable, we noted that the provision in question \u201cpurported] to preclude the plaintiff from working with any actuarial business in North Carolina... even if the business by which he was engaged did not service any customers located in the eight states\u201d and \u201cprohibit[ed] plaintiff from working for any business that provides actuarial services, without reference to whether or not that business competes with defendant.\u201d Id. at 316-17, 450 S.E.2d at 919-20. In like manner, we are unable to uphold the enforceability of the non-competition agreement given that, according to the plain language in which it is couched, it prohibits Defendants from engaging in lawful activities which do not impinge upon Plaintiff\u2019s legitimate business interests in any meaningful way. As a result, given that the geographic scope of the non-competition agreement at issue in this case is impermissibly broad and that the agreement prohibits Defendants from engaging in activities which do not involve an impermissible degree of competition with Plaintiff\u2019s legitimate business interests, we conclude that the trial court correctly determined that the Plaintiff had no likelihood of success on this particular claim on the merits and that Plaintiff\u2019s preliminary injunction motion should be denied.\nIII. Conclusion\nThus, for the reasons set forth above, we hold that the trial court correctly determined that Plaintiff was unlikely to prevail in its attempt to obtain enforcement of the non-competition agreement contained in the franchise agreement. As a result, the trial court\u2019s order should be, and hereby is, affirmed.\nAFFIRMED.\nJudges BRYANT and ELMORE concur.\n. According to Plaintiff, a number of other OLP franchisees were likely to surrender their franchises and begin operating outdoor lighting businesses in competition with Plaintiff in the event that the provisions of the franchise agreement were not enforced against Defendants. At least two potential purchasers of OLP franchises refused to acquire a franchise in the territory which had been assigned to Mr. Harder unless he was enjoined from continuing to operate his business due to the goodwill that he had created with customers while serving the territory as an OLP franchisee.\n. As an aside, we note that the trial court stated that the agreement at issue in this case should be invalidated under any of the standards presented for its consideration.\n. In view of the fact that section 14.5 of the franchise agreement gave Plaintiff \u201cthe right to reduce the scope of [section 14.2] without the Franchisee\u2019s consent, at any time or times, effective immediately upon notice to the Franchisee,\u201d it appears, given the language of the agreement, that Plaintiff had the right to modify the non-competition provision in this manner and exercised this authority in an appropriate manner. However, we need not determine the effectiveness of this exercise in private \u201cblue penciling\u201d given that the geographic scope of the remaining geographic restriction upon Defendants\u2019 activities remains unreasonably broad even if the buffer zone provision is excluded from our consideration.\n. Assuming that Plaintiff has, however, read Beam correctly, the facts at issue in that case are significantly different from the facts which we have before us here. We are loath to treat a case involving a dispute between physicians as analogous to a dispute between entities competing in the outdoor lighting business given the fact that physicians have the authority to practice medicine, rather than simply engage in a particular specialty, and given that the relationship between a physician and his or her patients is very different than the relationship between an outdoor lighting business and its customers. As a result, we cannot read Beam as enunciating a general rule requiring courts to focus on what the parties claim to have intended rather than the language in which their agreement is couched.\n. According to Mr. Harders\u2019 affidavit, Plaintiff informed him that he could not work for a wholesale supplier of outdoor lighting or open an indoor lighting business without violating the non-competition provisions of the franchise agreement.\n. Although Plaintiff urges us to \u201cblue pencil\u201d the non-competition agreement to the extent necessary to render it enforceable, it has not, with the exception of the 100-mile buffer provision discussed above, pointed to any specific provision which we should excise using any available \u201cblue penciling\u201d authority. In view of the fact that \u201c[i]t is not the role of the appellate courts ... to create an appeal for an appellant,\u201d Viar v. N.C. Dept. of Trans., 359 N.C. 400, 402, 610 S.E.2d 360, 361 (2005), we decline to take Plaintiff up on its nonspecific suggestion that we \u201cblue pencil\u201d any provision that we believe stands in the way of the enforcement of the non-competition provision contained in the franchise agreement.\n. Although Plaintiff has also argued that the duration of the restriction in question was reasonable, we need not address this issue given that the non-competition agreement in question is unenforceable regardless of the reasonableness of the duration provision included in that agreement.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "ERVIN, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Gray, Plant, Mooty, Mooty & Bennett, P.A., by Michael R. Gray; Parker Poe Adams & Bernstein, LLP, by William L. Esser, IV, and Katie M. lams, for Plaintiff",
      "Hagan Davis Mangum Barrett & Langley, PLLC, by Jason B. Buckland and D. Beth Langley, for Defendants."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "OUTDOOR LIGHTING PERSPECTIVES FRANCHISING, INC., Plaintiff v. PATRICK HARDERS, OUTDOOR LIGHTING PERSPECTIVES OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, INC., AND ENLIGHTENED LIGHTING, LLC, Defendants\nNo. COA12-1204\nFiled 6 August 2013\nFranchise \u2014 non-compete agreement \u2014 preliminary injunction\nThe trial court did not err by denying plaintiff\u2019s request for a preliminary injunction against defendants from having any involvement in an outdoor lighting business. Considering elements of the tests utilized in both the employee-employer and business sale context to determine the likelihood that plaintiff would prevail in the present litigation, the trial court correctly determined that plaintiff was unlikely to prevail in its attempt to obtain enforcement of the non-competition agreement contained in the franchise agreement.\nAppeal by plaintiff from order entered 14 May 2012 by Judge James L. Gale in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 27 February 2013.\nGray, Plant, Mooty, Mooty & Bennett, P.A., by Michael R. Gray; Parker Poe Adams & Bernstein, LLP, by William L. Esser, IV, and Katie M. lams, for Plaintiff\nHagan Davis Mangum Barrett & Langley, PLLC, by Jason B. Buckland and D. Beth Langley, for Defendants."
  },
  "file_name": "0613-01",
  "first_page_order": 623,
  "last_page_order": 640
}
