{
  "id": 4221395,
  "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. GREGORY R. CHAPMAN",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. Chapman",
  "decision_date": "2013-08-06",
  "docket_number": "No. COA11-229-2",
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    "judges": [
      "Judges McGEE and HUNTER, JR., Robert N., concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. GREGORY R. CHAPMAN"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "ELMORE, Judge.\nThis case is before us on remand from the North Carolina Supreme Court pursuant to the granting of the State\u2019s petition for writ of certiorari for consideration of the merits. The State appeals from an order dismissing two counts of capital first-degree murder against Gregory R. Chapman (defendant). In an opinion dated 7 February 2012, we dismissed the State\u2019s appeal on procedural grounds. Upon review once more, we vacate the order dismissing the indictments for first-degree murder.\nThe facts as established in our 7 February opinion are as follows: On 26 May 2008, defendant shot Lisa Wallace once in her left upper abdomen. Wallace was nineteen weeks and four or five days pregnant with twins. The bullet did not enter Wallace\u2019s uterus. Wallace was taken to Pitt County Memorial Hospital, where she had emergency surgery; following the surgery, Wallace underwent a spontaneous abortion of both twins. Wallace survived. Following the spontaneous abortion, both twins had heartbeats, and they were each assigned an Apgar score of one; neither twin scored on the other four factors that comprise an Apgar score - respiration, color, movement, and irritability. The first twin was delivered at 4:42 p.m., weighed 336 grams, and was pronounced dead at 5:10 p.m. when his heartbeat stopped. The second twin was delivered at 4:49 p.m., weighed 323 grams, and was pronounced dead at 5:20 p.m. when her heartbeat stopped.\nCertificates of five birth were issued for each twin. Death certificates were also issued, and both the death certificates and the medical examiner\u2019s report fisted the immediate cause of death for each twin as \u201cpreviable prematurity.\u201d The medical experts who testified at the habeas corpus hearing all agreed that a previable newborn cannot maintain life outside of the mother\u2019s womb, regardless of medical intervention. No medical expert opined that the twins were viable at their gestational age or weight.\nDefendant was charged capitally with two counts of first-degree murder for the death of the twins, who were named as the victims on the indictment. He was also charged with possession of a firearm by a felon, assault with a deadly weapon with the intent to kill inflicting serious injury, and discharging a weapon into occupied property. Under the pretrial release order for the two first-degree murder charges, defendant\u2019s release on bond was not authorized. However, under the pretrial release orders for the other three charges, bond was set at $2.5 million.\nOn 23 November 2009, defendant applied for apre-trial writ of habeas corpus, seeking \u201cto remove the restraint of his liberty with respect to his being held unlawfully without bond since July 2,2008 on two charges of first degree murder.\u201d Defendant essentially argued that \u201cthe only criminal offense for which a defendant may be held without bond is capital murder, and because [he] ha[d] not been properly and lawfully charged with the murder of any living person, his restraint without bond [was] illegal and unlawful.\u201d\nJudge Gary E. Trawick issued a writ of habeas corpus on 1 December 2009 and ordered an evidentiary hearing to resolve the issues raised by defendant in his application.\nOn 8 November 2010, Judge Russell L. Lanier, Jr., held the evidentiary hearing pursuant to the writ of habeas corpus. During the hearing, the trial court heard testimony from a number of experts, including the obstetrician who was present and attending when the twins were delivered, the surgical pathologist who conducted the post-mortem examination of the twins, a professor of pathology who was the medical examiner in this case, the labor and delivery nurse who prepared the twins\u2019 delivery report, an expert in obstetrics and gynecology who reviewed the medical records and reports for the defense, and an expert in preventative medicine and obstetrics and gynecology.\nJudge Lanier found all of the witnesses to be highly credible and noted that there was no material conflict in their testimony. At the end of the hearing, Judge Lanier concluded that the twins were never alive, under the law, and thus they could not have been murdered. Following that ruling, Judge Lanier granted defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the murder charges under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-954.\nOn 28 December 2010, the trial court entered the relief order whereby it concluded that the named victims in the murder indictments \u201cdid not meet any of the three requirements under the common law bom-alive rule. They were not viable. They were not bom alive as defined under the common-law rale. They did not die as a result of injuries inflicted upon them in \u00fatero prior to birth.\u201d Because the named victims in the murder indictments were not alive, they could not lawfully be the victims of any homicide offense. \u201cAs a result, the murder indictments in this case do not properly charge any offense, and they confer no jurisdiction on any court to establish conditions of pretrial release.\u201d Thus, the trial court concluded, defendant\u2019s \u201ccurrent detention without bond based on pretrial release orders denying the availability of bond on the basis that [defendant] is charged with capital offenses is unlawful under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 17-1 and [defendant] is entitled to immediate relief from this unlawful restraint.\u201d Finally, the trial court concluded that the appropriate remedy was \u201cto have the no-bond pretrial release orders in the murder cases vacated, and for [defendant] to be remanded to the custody of the Sheriff of Duplin [C]ounty under the authority of the pretrial release orders in his non-capital cases, which are unaffected by this order and remain valid.\u201d\nIn its 28 December 2010 order, the trial court incorporated the relief order and concluded that its ruling in the habeas proceeding \u201cconstitutes an adjudication in the defendant\u2019s favor of factual and legal issues that are essential to a successful prosecution in this case.\u201d \u2022\nThe State argues that the trial court erred in dismissing both first-degree minder indictments upon concluding: (1) that viability is a component of the common law bom-alive rule, and (2) that it is impossible for a previable fetus to be bom alive. For the reasons set forth below, we are unable to address the merits of the State\u2019s argument.\nHabeas corpus is a procedure that allows a person to challenge an imprisonment or a restraint on his or her liberty \u201cfor any criminal or supposed criminal matter, or on any pretense whatsoever.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 17-3 (2011); N.C. Const. art. I, \u00a7 21. \u201cIn habeas corpus proceedings, the court has jurisdiction to discharge petitioner only when the record discloses that the court which imprisoned him did not have jurisdiction of the offense or of the person of defendant, or that the judgment was not authorized by law.\u201d In re Burton, 257 N.C. 534, 541, 126 S.E.2d 581, 586 (1962). Thus, \u201cthe sole question for determination at habeas corpus hearing for alleged unlawful imprisonment is whether petitioner is then being unlawfully restrained of his liberty.\u201d Id. at 540, 126 S.E.2d at 586.\nThe trial court has jurisdiction to discharge a petitioner only when the record discloses that the court which imprisoned him did not have jurisdiction of the offense or of the person of defendant. Id. at 541, 126 S.E.2d at 586. Here, Judge Lanier found that the trial court (and all courts) lacked jurisdiction over defendant because the murder indictments failed to charge a proper crime. In making such determination, Judge Lanier found that the twins \u201cwere previable and incapable of survival separate and apart from their mother, the fact that they exhibited post-dehveiy heartbeats does not establish that they were bom alive for the purposes of qualifying as proper subjects of a homicide prosecution.\u201d Accordingly, Judge Lanier concluded that the twins failed to meet any of the three requirements under the common law bom-alive rule: \u201cThey were not viable. They were not bom alive as defined under the common-law rule. They did not die as a result of injuries inflicted upon them in \u00fatero prior to birth.\u201d\nWe have previously concluded that \u201cit is for the jury to decide whether the facts, taken singly or in combination, satisfy them beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is actually guilty.\u201d State v. Clark, 159 N.C. App. 520, 524, 583 S.E.2d 680, 683 (2003) (citation omitted). Thus, a jury should have been charged with deciding whether the twins met the requirements under the bom-alive rule. However, in the case sub judice, a jury trial was not conducted; thus, no jury was afforded an opportunity to weigh the evidence. Instead, the record indicated that Judge Lanier weighed the sufficiency of the evidence and erroneously dismissed the charges under the guise of a lack of jurisdiction.\nHowever, pursuant to the grand jury\u2019s indictment, the trial court was afforded proper jurisdiction over both defendant and the capital offenses charged. Thus, the trial court had proper jurisdiction to imprison defendant while awaiting trial. The trial court exceeded its authority in dismissing the charges against defendant; such dismissal essentially served as a ruling on the merits. Ultimately, only a jury shall be charged with weighing the sufficiency of the evidence; the trial court cannot usurp this duty in a habeas proceeding. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court\u2019s 28 December 2010 order and the relief order incorporated therein are void.\nVacated and remanded.\nJudges McGEE and HUNTER, JR., Robert N., concur.\n. Art. I, \u00a7 21 concerns the writ of habeas corpus, but it does not contain this quoted language.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "ELMORE, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Daniel R O\u2019Brien, for the State.",
      "Appellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender Daniel Shatz, for defendant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. GREGORY R. CHAPMAN\nNo. COA11-229-2\nFiled 6 August 2013\nHomicide \u2014 first-degree murder \u2014 born-alive rule \u2014 viability of twins \u2014 jury issue\nThe trial court\u2019s order dismissing indictments for two counts of first-degree murder was vacated. A jury, not the trial court, should have been charged with deciding whether the twins, who were in a pregnant woman\u2019s stomach when she was shot, met the requirements under the bom-alive rule.\nAppeal by the State from dismissal order entered 23 December 2010 by Judge Russell J. Lanier, Jr., in Duplin County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 13 September 2011.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Daniel R O\u2019Brien, for the State.\nAppellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender Daniel Shatz, for defendant."
  },
  "file_name": "0449-01",
  "first_page_order": 459,
  "last_page_order": 463
}
